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Before embarking with the core of the doctoral thesis, this preface is used to 
briefly elaborate on (1) the problem definition and the research questions, (2) the 
publication based character of the doctoral thesis and (3) the approach used to 
formulate and answer to the research questions. 
 
Problem definition and research questions 
Starting from the observation that criminal law is different in each of the 
member states as a result of which (1) what constitutes an offence in one 
member state does not necessarily constitute an offence in another member state, 
(2) even where criminalisation matches there might still be significant 
differences in the sanction types and levels foreseen and (3) more generally, the 
position of the offences in the entirety of the justice system may vary, the 
following research questions arise: “To what extent are the offence diversities an 
obstacle for EU policy making?” and “To what extent is it feasible to overcome 
the obstacles in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way?”. 
Comprehensive meaning all-encompassing as opposed to in an ad hoc piecemeal 
way; Consistent meaning that policies are logically interlinked, compatible and 
in support of each other as opposed to isolated and running the risk of being 
incompatible and undermining each other; Well-balanced meaning acceptable 
for all parties involved, striving to avoid member state declarations not to agree 
with certain provisions in the instruments. 
To answer those questions, it is first and foremost required to identify the 
policy areas for which offences are important and thus for which offence 
diversities could be an obstacle. Analysis revealed that there is a wide variety of 
policy areas that are to a greater or lesser extent offence-dependent. 
First, to evaluate the functioning of a criminal justice system and prepare 
new criminal policy initiatives, crime statistics are a vital source of information. 
In light thereof, member states do not only look into their own crime statistics, 
but are growing to be more and more keen on cross-national comparison of 
crime statistics. Furthermore, the EU in its capacity of a criminal policy maker is 
also highly interested in cross-nationally compiled crime statistics. It is widely 
accepted that criminalisation diversity is an obstacle for the comparability of 
crime statistics. Statistics of different member states are not comparable and 
cannot be collated if the underlying criminalisation is not identical. In this crime 
statistics context the central research questions are reformulated to read: “To 
what extent are comparable crime statistics a necessity for EU policy making?” 






overcoming the obstacles in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced 
way?”. 
Second, some forms of cooperation in criminal matters are made dependent 
on the so-called double criminality requirement, meaning that member states 
have limited their willingness to cooperate to situations where the behaviour 
underlying the cooperation request is equally criminalised in their jurisdiction. 
The criminal justice system is only activated if an offence is involved. Here too, 
criminalisation diversity can be an obstacle. In this context the central research 
questions are reformulated to read: “To what extent is international 
cooperation in criminal matters dependent on the double criminality 
requirement?” and “To what extent is it feasible to overcome the obstacles 
caused by criminalisation diversity in a comprehensive, consistent and well-
balanced way?” 
Third, with respect to cross-border gathering and admissibility of evidence in 
the EU, the link with the offence diversities extends beyond the criminalisation 
diversity that gave rise to the introduction of a double criminality requirement. 
Diversity in the position of the offence in the justice system surfaces in this 
context. Reference can be made to the offence-limits in the use of investigative 
measures, in that the national law of the executing member state could have 
limited the use of investigative measures to a specific set of offences. This 
offence diversity will be an obstacle when evidence is (required to be) gathered 
using the said investigative measure with respect to another offence. In this 
context the central research questions are reformulated to read: “To what extent 
are offence diversities an obstacle to cross-border gathering and admissibility of 
evidence?” and “To what extent is it feasible to overcome evidence gathering 
difficulties in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way?”  
Fourth, offence labels also feature in the mandates of the EU level actors. 
Reference can be made to the list of offences for which Europol is made 
competent. The open-ended character of the mandates of the EU level actors has 
been subject to intense debate. Not only does the vague delineation of the 
mandates hinder their current tasks (e.g. it is a significant obstacle to ensuring 
data flow to the EU level actors), it is also an obstacle in the debates on the 
possibility to attribute stronger powers to the EU level actors. In this context the 
central research questions are reformulated to read: “To what extent are offence 
diversities an obstacle for the delineation of the mandates of the EU level 
actors?” and “To what extent is it feasible to clarify the mandates of the EU 






Fifth, offence labels are also relevant when seeking cross-border execution of 
sentences. Prior to the start of the execution, the executing member state may 
test whether the foreign sentence is equivalent to the sentence that would have 
been imposed in a national procedure. The provisions ensuring sentence 
equivalence in the context of cross-border execution of a sentence are offence 
dependent in that information on the underlying offence is necessary to identify 
the national equivalent of a sentence imposed abroad. In this context the central 
research questions are reformulated to read: “To what extent are offence 
diversities an obstacle for the identification of the national equivalent for a 
sentence imposed abroad?” and “To what extent is it feasible to support the 
identification of the equivalent sentence in a comprehensive, consistent and 
well-balanced way?” 
Sixth and final, there is a wide variety of prior conviction provisions, i.e. the 
legal provisions that govern the taking account of a prior conviction in the 
course of a new procedure. That new procedure can either or not be a criminal 
procedure. Reference can be made to conviction related exclusion grounds that 
are found in employment law or public procurement law to support that these 
provisions beyond the criminal procedure. Candidates that have been convicted 
for any of the listed offences are not eligible anymore. In that context the central 
research questions are reformulated to read: “To what extent are offence 
diversities an obstacle for the taking account of prior convictions in the course 
of a new procedure?” and “To what extent is it feasible to scope the taking 
account of prior convictions in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced 
way?” 
 
Publication based doctoral thesis 
These research questions were answered in a publication based doctoral 
thesis comprising two journal articles and three book chapters, annexed as part 2 
of this doctoral thesis. 
The following publications are compiled:  
− De Bondt, W. (in review). Evidence based EU criminal policy making: in 
search of valid data. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. 
− De Bondt, W. (2012). Double criminality in international cooperation in 
criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. Ryckman (Eds.), 
Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters. Moving beyond 








− De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2012). EULOCS in support of international 
cooperation in criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. 
Ryckman (Eds.), Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters. 
Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
− De Bondt, W. (in review). Cross-border recidivism in the EU: Fact or Fiction? 
Evaluating the supporting policy triangle. Punishment and Society. 
− De Bondt, W. (2012). Rethinking public procurement exclusions in the EU. In 
G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, C. Ryckman, & N. Persak (Eds.), The 
disqualification triad. Approximating legislation. Executing requests. 
Ensuring equivalence. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
 
The book chapters are published in the context of EU funded research 
projects. They have been reviewed by the national experts and the European 
Commission and have been subjected to an additional traditional academic peer 
review. The articles have been submitted to leading international peer reviewed 
journals and have both been accepted for review. 
 
Approach 
Offence diversities & crime statistics 
First, participating in the EU study on crime statistics in the member states, 
the doctoral research started within that sphere. Three phases can be 
distinguished.  
Firstly, taking account of the fact that offence diversities are an obstacle to 
obtain comparable crime statistics, a thorough legal analysis was conducted to 
map the existing knowledge on common criminalisation for that knowledge 
would reflect to what extent comparable crime statistics are feasible from a 
theoretical point of view. In doing so, an Esperanto for EU crime statistics1 was 
designed, which was presented in an EU level offence classification system, 
called EULOCS.2  
                                                             
1 Preliminary remarks on the need for and feasibility of an Esperanto were published as De 
Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2009). Esperanto for EU Crime Statistics. Towards Common EU 
offences in an EU level offence classification system. In M. Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal 
Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 2, pp. 87-124). Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland: Maklu.  
2 The outcome of this phase was published as Vermeulen, G., & De Bondt, W. (2009). EULOCS. 
The EU level offence classification system: a bench-mark for enhanced internal coherence of the 






Secondly, through questionnaires sent to the police authorities in each of the 
member states in the course of the EU study, the practical feasibility of using the 
knowledge on common criminalisation as a basis to gather comparable crime 
statistics was assessed. The police authorities were asked to elaborate on the 
level of detail in their data systems and to indicate to what extent it would be 
feasible to single out the data that matched the known common denominator to 
ensure EU wide comparability of crime statistics.3  
Thirdly and finally, an additional retrospective discourse analysis was 
conducted on 569 legal and policy documents to identify the EU’s priority 
offences for which comparable crime statistics are indispensable as a basis for 
sound policy making. In doing so an answer is formulated to the question “To 
what extent are comparable crime statistics a necessity for EU policy making?”. 
Subsequently a comparative analysis was conducted between the identified 
priority offences and empirical data on the level of detail in the national data 
systems to assess to what extent the required comparable crime statistics are 
available. Finally, to answer to the question “To what extent is it feasible to 
ensure the comparability of crime statistics overcoming the obstacles in a 
comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way?” a number of 
recommendations for immediate EU actions were formulated.  
The result of the analysis is included in the following publication: 
− De Bondt, W. (in review). Evidence based EU criminal policy making: in 
search of valid data. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. 
 
Offence diversities & double criminality 
Second, the effect of offence diversities on the double criminality limits to 
cooperation was analysed. Two phases can be distinguished.  
Firstly, participating in the EU study on evidence, the analysis of the double 
criminality requirement was conducted for that one specific sphere, i.e. the 
cross-border gathering and admissibility of evidence, be under a mutual legal 
assistance or a mutual recognition regime. Based on a legal analysis of the 
existing legal framework, a questionnaire was drawn up and sent to the member 
                                                             
3 The final report of that study was published as Mennens, A., De Wever, W., Dalamanga, A., 
Kalamara, A., Kaslauskaite, G., Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W. (2009). Developing an EU level 
offence classification system: EU study to implement the Action Plan to measure crime and 
criminal justice (Vol. 34, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu; The added value 
of a EULOCS-based approach was additionally underlined in De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. 
(2010). Revolutions in EU Crime Statistics: EULOCS - the EU level offence classification system. 







states, asking practitioners and policy makers to reflect on the future of the 
double criminality requirement, focussing on the future of the 32 MR offence list 
for which double criminality had been abandoned. The feasibility to drastically 
change the approach and abandon the double criminality test (as opposed to the 
double criminality requirement) using the approximation acquis as a baseline was 
accepted.4 That acceptability is crucial when striving to ensure well-balanced 
policy making.  
Secondly, participating in the EU study on the future of the entire landscape 
of international cooperation in criminal matters, the analysis of the double 
criminality requirement was extended to encompass all cooperation spheres. 
Based on a more extended legal analysis of the legal framework governing 
international cooperation in criminal matters, a questionnaire was drawn up and 
sent to the member states, asking practitioners and policy makers again to reflect 
on the future of the double criminality requirement and the feasibility of using 
the approximation acquis to its full supporting potential. In addition thereto, the 
topic was discussed during a number of the focus group meetings held in the 
member states.  
In doing so an answer was formulated to the questions “To what extent is 
international cooperation in criminal matters dependent on the double 
criminality requirement?” and “To what extent is it feasible to overcome the 
obstacles in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way?” 
The result of the analysis is included in the following publication: 
− De Bondt, W. (2012). Double criminality in international cooperation in 
criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. Ryckman (Eds.), 
Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters. Moving beyond 
actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality (pp. 86-159). Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
 
Offence diversities & evidence gathering, sentence equivalence and 
mandate delineation  
Third, the effect of offence diversities for international cooperation extends 
beyond the double criminality requirement. The diversity with respect to the 
sanction types and levels that can be imposed and the diversity with respect to 
                                                             
4 The final report of that study – the scope of which exceeded the issues related to the double 
criminality requirement – was published as Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W., & Van Damme, Y. 
(2010). EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters. Towards mutual 







the position of the offences in the justice system also create obstacles for 
cooperation. The spheres of cross-border gathering and subsequent admissibility 
of evidence, the identification of the national equivalence of a foreign sanction 
and delineation of the mandated offences are all examples thereof. The obstacles 
have been dealt with in three different EU studies.  
Firstly, in the context of the abovementioned EU study on the laws of 
evidence in the EU, it was also highlighted that the use of investigative measures 
is not always unlimited and the situation may occur in which the national law of 
the executing member state does not allow the use of the requested investigative 
measure with respect to the specific offence involved. Through a questionnaire 
sent to the member states, it was assessed to what extent that type of offence-
related exclusion grounds could benefit from the knowledge on common 
criminalisation as a baseline,5 i.e. to what extent it is an acceptable future policy 
option to deny member states the use of the refusal ground in relation to some 
offences. That kind of information is crucial when striving to ensure well-
balanced policy making.   
Secondly, in the context of an EU study on detention, it was argued that 
criminalisation diversity is also an obstacle for the correct application of 
adaptation provisions, i.e. the provisions stipulating that executing member 
states are allowed to adapt either its nature or duration if the sentence as 
imposed by the issuing member state is inconsistent with their national law.6  
Thirdly, the EU level actors assume an important position in international 
cooperation in criminal matters. The difficulties caused by the criminalisation 
diversity are related to the delineation of their mandates. In the context of the 
abovementioned EU study on the future of international cooperation in criminal 
matters, the opportunity was seized to identify not only the obstacles with 
respect to the delineation of the mandated offences and assess the political 
acceptability of a number of recommendations, it was also used to go through 
the entirety of international cooperation and identify all obstacles caused by the 
offence diversities and assess the feasibility of overcoming them.  
In doing so, an answer was formulated to the questions “To what extent are 
offence diversities an obstacle to cross-border gathering and admissibility of 
                                                             
5 The final report of that study was published as Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W., & Van Damme, 
Y. (2010). EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters. Towards mutual 
recognition of investigative measures and free movement of evidence? (Vol. 37, IRCP-series). 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
6 The final report of that study was published as Vermeulen, G., van Kalmthout, A., Paterson, 
N., Knapen, M., Verbeke, P., & De Bondt, W. (2011). Cross-border execution of judgements 
involving deprivation of liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical problems through 






evidence?” and “To what extent is it feasible to overcome evidence gathering 
difficulties in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way?”; “To what 
extent are offence diversities an obstacle for the identification of the national 
equivalent for a sentence imposed abroad?” and “To what extent is it feasible to 
support the identification of the equivalent sentence in a comprehensive, 
consistent and well-balanced way?”; “To what extent are offence diversities an 
obstacle for the delineation of the mandates of the EU level actors?” and “To 
what extent is it feasible to clarify the mandates of the EU level actors in a 
comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way?” 
The result of the analysis is included in the following publication7: 
− De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2012). EULOCS in support of international 
cooperation in criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. 
Ryckman (Eds.), Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters. 
Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
 
Offence diversities & prior convictions 
Third, offence diversities can also be an obstacle when confronted with prior 
convictions. What immediately comes to mind are the prior conviction 
provisions found in criminal law. The obstacles that are identified there link in 
with the obstacles identified in relation to what was elaborated on under the 
previous section. However, prior convictions also feature beyond criminal 
procedures. Reference can be made to prior conviction provisions in 
employment law or public procurement law. To highlight not only the variety of 
prior conviction provisions both within and beyond criminal law, but also to 
highlight the fact that the obstacles and the feasibility of dealing with them 
differences, two case studies were dealt with under a separate heading “offence 
diversities & prior convictions”. 
Firstly, criminalisation diversity when taking account of prior convictions in 
the course of a new criminal procedure was dealt with. Though prior convictions 
can be relevant in all stages of the criminal procedure, the choice was made to 
elaborate on the sentencing provisions and look into the feasibility of cross-
                                                             
7 Additionally, besides the above mentionned books, these questions also feature in two older 
publications: De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2009). Justitiële samenwerking en harmonisatie. 
Over het hoe en het waarom van een optimalisering in het gebruik van  verwezenlijkingen op 
vlak van harmonisatie bij de uitbouw van justitiële samenwerking. Panopticon, 6, 47; De Bondt, 
W., & Vermeulen, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence concepts to 
facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. In M. Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal 






border recidivism in the EU. Using the empirical data gathered in the 
abovementioned EU study on the future of international cooperation in criminal 
matters as a baseline, additional comparative legal research into the national 
recidivism provisions of each of the 27 member states was conducted. In doing 
so an answer was formulated to the questions: “To what extent are offence 
diversities an obstacle for the taking account of prior convictions in the course of 
a new criminal procedure?” and “To what extent is it feasible to scope the taking 
account of prior convictions in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced 
way?” 
Secondly, criminalisation diversity when taking account of prior convictions 
in the course of a public procurement procedure was dealt with. The obstacles 
and feasibility of overcoming them are different because the rules governing 
public procurement are linked to the functioning of the internal market. As a 
result, the legal analysis did not only comprise the national public procurement 
legislation of each of the 27 member states complemented with specific EU 
legislation, it also included the effect of the equal treatment requirement, as a 
basic principle ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market. The case 
study was refined and finalised in the context of a recent EU study on 
disqualifications. In doing so an answer was formulated to the questions: “To 
what extent are offence diversities an obstacle for the taking account of prior 
convictions in the course of a public procurement procedure?” and “To what 
extent is it feasible to scope the taking account of prior convictions in a 
comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way?” 
The result of the analysis is included in the following publications: 
− De Bondt, W. (in review). Cross-border recidivism in the EU: Fact or Fiction? 
Evaluating the supporting policy triangle. Punishment and Society. 
− De Bondt, W. (2012). Rethinking public procurement exclusions in the EU. In 
G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, C. Ryckman, & N. Persak (Eds.), The 
disqualification triad. Approximating legislation. Executing requests. 




                                                             
8 A Dutch counterpart is currently under review: De Bondt, W. (in review). Eerst de violen 






An EU offence policy: needed and feasible 
During the doctoral research it became clear (1) that offence diversities 
constitute a significant obstacle for some mechanisms whereas in other 
mechanisms member states consider it to be irrelevant, (2) that the current 
approach of dealing with the obstacles is not comprehensive, consistent nor 
well-balanced and (3) that it is nevertheless feasible to overcome the obstacles 
provided that the common criminalisation acquis is used as a basis. Overall, the 
doctoral thesis demonstrates the need for and feasibility of an EU offence policy 
that not only ensures that the common criminalisation acquis is continuously 
updated and easily available to all, but even more so subsequently uses the 
common criminalisation acquis to overcome the obstacles caused by the offence 
diversities in a comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced way. Therefore, the 
first part of the doctoral thesis aims at providing a concise but all-encompassing 
overview of the need for and feasibility of an EU offence policy, demonstrating 
the functioning thereof in relation to the different offence-dependent 
mechanisms that have been subject to analysis. Thereafter, the second part 











Part 1 – Need for  
and feasibility of  




Need for & feasibility of an EU offence policy  
 
1 The common criminalisation acquis 
The doctoral research underpinned that member states are struggling with 
the offence diversities in the EU. Not only the diversity in the criminalisation of 
offences, be also the diversity in the sanctioning of offences and diversity in the 
position of offences in the entirety of the judicial system. Because the doctoral 
research has demonstrated that knowledge on the criminalisation acquis can be 
the saviour, it is only logical for that common criminalisation acquis to be the 
backbone of EU policy making.  
This first part of the needs and feasibility argumentation will point to the 
pitfalls when trying to identify the common criminalisation acquis and 
underline that it is not sufficient to look into approximation in the treaty-sense of 
the word, not even to approximation in the most extended interpretation of that 
word, but that there are also commonalities that have developed historically. 
1.1 Diversity in the criminal codes 
Criminal law is different in each of the member states. Because each member 
state has its own criminal code, what constitutes an offence in one member state 
does not necessarily constitute an offence in another member state. 
Traditionally, reference is made to ethical discussions to substantiate that.9 The 
recurring discussions on decriminalisation of abortion and euthanasia can serve 
as an example. The choices underlying (de)criminalisation processes are said to 
touch upon the very heart of national integrity, identity and sovereignty.10 It is 
considered very important that member states remain masters in their own 
house and retain the competence to decide what should and should not be 
included in their criminal code. Diversity needs to be accepted.11 
                                                             
9 See e.g. Cadoppi, A. (1996). Towards a European Criminal Code. European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1, 2. 
10 See e.g. Sieber, U. (1993). Union Européene et droit pénal européen. Proposition pour l'avenir 
du droit pénal européen. Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé, 2, 262; 
Albrecht, P.-A., & Braum, S. (1999). Deficiencies in the Development of European Criminal Law. 
European Law Journal, 5(3), 292; Vogel, J. (2002). Why is harmonisation of penal law necessary? 
A comment. In A. Klip, & H. Van der Wilt (Eds.), Harmonisation and harmonising measures in 
criminal law (pp. 55-65). Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science, 55:  
11 In policy documents it is repeated time after time, that within the EU, the diversity amongst 
the legal systems must be accepted. See e.g. recently in the Stockholm programme. European 
Council (2010). The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting Citizens. OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010. 





This does however not mean that there are no commonalities amongst those 
criminal codes. To the contrary, there are a number of offences or at least parts of 
offence that are commonly criminalised in the criminal codes of all EU member 
states. Those commonalities can be explained either from a historical perspective 
and have developed in each of the member states independently from one 
another based on a shared sense of justice (e.g. theft)12, or from an integration 
perspective13, originating from a joint commitment taken in an international or 
supranational context to legislate in a way that ensures that jointly identified 
behaviour is considered to be an offence in each jurisdiction (e.g. euro 
counterfeiting).14 This latter technique is called approximation: through those 
commitments to ensure that the jointly identified behaviour is considered to be 
an offence, the criminal codes are approximated, i.e. brought closer together.  
1.2 Approximation in the treaty-sense of the word 
The original legal basis to approximate the criminal codes of the member 
states can be found in old Artt. 29, 31 and 34 TEU that allowed member states to 
adopt instruments with respect to the constituent elements of offences.15  
 
Art. 29 TEU – Without prejudice to the powers of the European 
Community, the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high 
level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by 
developing common action among the member states in the fields of police 
                                                             
12 Other mala per se crimes are reflected on in Ambos, K. (2005). Is the development of a common 
substantive criminal law for Europe possible? Some preliminary reflections. Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, 12(2), 173. 
13 Criminal law is said to be used as a means to promote European integration. See e.g. Klip, A. 
(2006). European integration and harmonisation and criminal law. In D. M. Curtin, J. M. Smits, 
A. Klip, & J. A. McCahery (Eds.), European Integration and Law. Antwerp - Oxford: Intersentia. 
14 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties 
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 
140 of 14.06.2000 as amended by the Council Framework Decision of 6 December 2001 amending 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other 
sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 329 of 
14.12.2001. See more generally Grandi, C. (2004). The Protection of the Euro against 
Counterfeiting. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 12(2), 89; 
Mejborn, B. (2000). The protection of the Euro against counterfeiting. In G. De Kerchove, & A. 
Weyembergh (Eds.), Towards a European Judicial Criminal Area (pp. 273-276). Brussels: 
Editions de l’ Universitié de Bruxelles. 
15 The articles also contain a legal basis for the adoption of minimum standards with respect to 
the sanctions involved. However, as the needs assessment focusses specifically on the 
development of an EU offence policy, the development of an EU sanction policy is not 
elaborated on.  





and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and 
combating racism and xenophobia. 
That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, 
organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and 
offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms 
trafficking, corruption and fraud, through [...] approximation, where 
necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the member states, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e). 
 
Art. 31(e) TEU – Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters shall include progressively adopting measures establishing 
minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts [...] 
in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. 
 
Art. 34.2(b) TEU – [...] To that end, acting unanimously on the initiative 
of any member state or of the Commission, the Council may adopt 
framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the member states. Framework decisions shall be binding 
upon the member states as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to 
the national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not 
entail direct effect. 
 
Using these provisions as a legal basis, framework decisions have been 
adopted with respect to euro counterfeiting, fraud and counterfeiting of non-
cash means of payment, money laundering, terrorism, trafficking in human 
beings, illegal (im)migration, environmental offences, corruption, sexual 
exploitation of a child and child pornography, drug trafficking, offences against 
information systems, participation in a criminal organisation and racism and 
xenophobia.16  
                                                             
16 See more in detail: “Approximation: what’s in a name?” in De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. 
(2012). EULOCS in support of international cooperation in criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, 
W. De Bondt, & C. Ryckman (Eds.), Rethinking international cooperation in criminal 
matters.Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn-
Portland: Maklu. 





An example of such an approximation provision is inserted below: 
 
Each member state shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
following intentional conduct when committed without right is 
punishable: the production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, 
offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms 
whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, 
importation or exportation of drugs.17 
 
Those approximation provisions have been widely commented on in 
literature. Approximation is often criticized for being used beyond the limits set 
out in the treaty provisions. Comparing the diversity in the offence labels 
covered in those instruments with the offence labels included in the above cited 
articles, it becomes clear that member states were rather flexible when 
interpreting that legal basis.18 A strict reading of Art. 31 (e) TEU limits the scope 
of the competence to the approximation of organised crime, terrorism and drug 
trafficking. Read together with Art. 29 TEU trafficking in persons, offences 
against children, illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud can be added to 
the list. At least19 that list of offences does not include money laundering, illegal 
                                                             
17 This example is copied from Art. 2.1 Framework decision of 25 October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of 
illicit drug trafficking OJ L 335 of 11.11.2004. 
18 This position is elaborated on in De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2009). Esperanto for EU 
Crime Statistics. Towards Common EU offences in an EU level offence classification system. In 
M. Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 2, pp. 87-124). 
Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland: Maklu; See also: Vermeulen, G. (2002). Where do we currently 
stand with harmonisation. In A. Klip, & H. Van der Wilt (Eds.), Harmonisation and 
harmonising measures in criminal law (pp. 65-77). Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of 
Arts and Sciences. 
19 It can be argued that participation in a criminal organisaion is not included either because 
organised crime does not necessarily refer to an individual offence, but can be intended to refer 
to the modus operandi as is done in Art. 29 TEU. The various interpretations of organised crime 
have been subject to intense debate. See e.g. Mitsilegas, V. (2001). Defining Organised Crime in 
the European Union: The limits of European Criminal Law in an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. European Law Review, 26(6), 565; Finckenauer, J. (2005). Problems of Definition: What 
is Organized Crime? Trends in Organized Crime, 8(3), 63; Von Lampe, K. (2008). Organized 
Crime in Europe: Conceptions and Realities. Policing, 2(1), 7; Symeanidou-Kastanidou, E. 
(2008). Towards a New Definition of Organised Crime in the European Union. European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 83. Eurocounterfeiting is also not 
mentioned as an offence label that can be subject to approximation, but is can be argued that it 
falls within the scope of the broad notion of fraud. As a counterargument it should be added 
that with respect to the approximation of offences realted to non-cash means of payment, an 
explicit destinction is made between counterfeiting and fraud. From that perspective 
eurocounterfeiting and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment can be added to the list of 





migration, protection of the environment, offences against information systems 
or racism and xenophobia,20 that have also been subject to approximation. That 
critique has been (partially)21 dealt with when redrafting the approximation 
articles for inclusion in the proposed Constitutional Treaty and later copied into 
the Lisbon Treaty. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the legal basis 
can be found in Artt. 82 and 83 TFEU. 
 
Art. 82 TFEU – 1. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union 
shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and 
judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the member states in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 
and in Article 83.[...] 
 2. To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments 
and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and 
the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules shall 
take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems 
of the member states. 
They shall concern: (a) mutual admissibility of evidence between member 
states; (b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; (c) the rights of 
victims of crime; (d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure 
which the Council has identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption 
of such a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament.  
Adoption of the minimum rules referred to in this paragraph shall not 
prevent member states from maintaining or introducing a higher level of 
protection for individuals. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
offence labels that have been subject to approximation in spite of not being explicitly included 
in Art. 29 TEU. 
20 With respect to racism and xenophobia it can be argued that this offence label is included in 
the articles governing approximation, for it is mentioned in the first paragraph of Art. 29 TEU 
which refers to common action among the member states in the fields of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. 
However, that offence label is not explicitly repeated when elaborating on approximation as a 
means to achieve that objective. 
21 At least illegal immigration and racism and xenophobia are still not included in the list 
though they have been subject to approximation in the past. 





Art. 83 TFEU – 1. The European Parliament and the Council may, by 
means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a 
cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such 
offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis. 
These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, 
counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. 
On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision 
identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this 
paragraph. It shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament. 
2. If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the member 
states proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union 
policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, 
directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. Such directives 
shall be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as 
was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in question, 
without prejudice to Article 76. [...] 
 
There are three main novelties in the new legal basis that influence the scope 
of approximation and thus the common criminalisation acquis for the future.  
First, the new legal basis introduces a wider list of offence labels that can be 
subject to approximation, though the innovative character thereof should be 
nuanced in light of the framework decisions that had been adopted under the 
previous legal framework.22 Considering that all of the listed offence labels have 
already been subject to approximation23 it may seem as though the 
approximation targets have been reached and the technique will now only be 
used to revise the current instruments in light of new evolutions in crime as has 
                                                             
22 This position is also included in: De Bondt, W., & De Moor, A. (2009). De Europese 
Metamorfose? De implicaties van het Verdrag van Lissabon voor het Europees Strafrecht. 
Panopticon, 1, 31. 
23 It should be noted that the trafficking of arms has not been subject to approximation in the 
strict sense of the word because no approximating framework decision has been adopted for 
this offence label. However, as will be argued in the following paragrapses, there is more to 
approximation than framework decisions alone. This offence label has been subject to 
approximation via the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the 2000 UN Palermo 
Convention (infra Approximation beyond the treaty). 





recently been done with respect to trafficking in human beings24 and sexual 
exploitation of children25. However, it is important to note that the Council can 
further develop the list, based on developments in crime.  
Second, the adoption of common minimum standards for offences is also 
allowed with respect to any offence should this prove essential to ensure the 
effective implementation of a Union policy area that has been subject to 
harmonisation.26  
Third, the possibility to approximate legislation is now explicitly extended to 
also include the approximation of aspects of procedural law. Though it may look 
as though the second paragraph of Art. 82 TFEU is not relevant for this 
discussion as it refers to approximation of aspects of procedural law as opposed to 
aspects of substantive criminal law involving the constituent elements of offences, 
the inclusion of the second paragraph can be important to the extent member 
states want to limit the introduction of those minimum standards to a set of 
offences identified as being particularly serious and thus in need for a higher 
level of cooperation and acceptance of EU intrusion also into the national 
procedural law. 
1.3 Approximation beyond the treaty 
However, a common criminalisation acquis comprising solely the result of 
approximation as it is included in those framework decisions and post-Lisbon 
directives will be judged for not being able to see further than the end of its 
treaty nose. It is important not to lose sight of the other possibilities to 
approximate. It has been argued several times that the acquis of what is common 
in terms of criminalisation extends well beyond the approximation acquis in the 
strict treaty-sense of the word. It has been explained that even a quick analysis of 
the approximation instruments in the treaty-sense of the word, reveals that the 
approximation acquis extends beyond those instruments.27 The 2002 framework 
                                                             
24 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101 of 15.4.2011. 
25 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335 of 17.12.2011. 
26 See more elaborately: European Commission (2011), Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law, COM(2011) 573 final of 20.9.11. 
27 This position was already elaborated on in De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2009). Esperanto 
for EU Crime Statistics. Towards Common EU offences in an EU level offence classification 
system. In M. Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 2, pp. 





decision on the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence28 comes 
to testify to that conclusion.  
Whereas the approximation of the penalties is included in that framework 
decision, the approximation of the constituent elements of the offence involved 
is included in a separate (formerly first pillar) directive29, even though the treaty 
had appointed the framework decision as the legal basis for the approximation 
of the constituent elements of offences.30 Furthermore, analysis revealed that 
within a European Union context, approximation has also been pursued via other 
instruments.31 The Union has adopted e.g. conventions that contained 
approximation provisions.32 Finally, it is important to underline that this 
approach still fails to take into account those approximation provisions adopted 
at other cooperation levels, amongst which the Council of Europe and the 
United Nations are the most significant. The importance of non-EU-instruments 
for the European Union is emphasized through the incorporation of some of 
them in the so-called JHA-acquis, which lists the legal instruments, irrespective 
of the cooperation level at which they were negotiated, to which all EU 
(candidate) member states must conform. This final extension of the 
approximation acquis is overlooked in most literature,33 even though the 
European commission clearly argued that these instruments have acquired a 
position in the EU’s JHA-acquis based on their position in EU legal and policy 
                                                                                                                                               
87-124). Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland: Maklu. See also: “Approximation: what’s in a name?” 
in De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2012). EULOCS in support of international cooperation in 
criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. Ryckman (Eds.), Rethinking international 
cooperation in criminal matters.Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. 
Antwerpen-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
28 Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the legal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 128 of 
5.12.2002. 
29 Council Directive of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit 
and residence 
30 The Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider 
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96 of 12.4.2003 can also be mentionned 
“as an exception” here. 
31 This point has also been made by: Weyembergh, A. (2004). L'harmonisation des législations: 
condition de l'espace pénal européen et rélévateur de ses tensions (Collection "études 
européennes"). Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles. 
32 The most obvious example is the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the 
European Communities’ Financial Interests, OJ C 316 of 27.11.1995. 
33 See more elaborately: De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2009). Esperanto for EU Crime 
Statistics. Towards Common EU offences in an EU level offence classification system. In M. 
Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 2, pp. 87-124). 
Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland: Maklu and De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2010). 
Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence concepts to facilitate police and judicial 
cooperation in the EU. In M. Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & 
Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 15-40). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 





documents. Reference can be made to the UN Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs which has acquired its position through the incorporation thereof in the 
EU Action Plan on Drugs (2000-2004).34 As a result, consistent EU policy making 
requires that those approximation provisions too are taken into account. 
There is much more to approximation than framework decisions and post-
Lisbon directives. The diversity in approximation tools has as an advantage that 
approximation possibilities are very flexible; but it has as a disadvantage that the 
scattered and piecemeal approach is baleful for the clarity of the acquis and 
entails inherent consistency risks.35 
1.4 An even wider common criminalisation acquis 
Though approximation gives a fairly good overview of the common 
criminalisation amongst the criminal codes of the 27 member states, it still only 
reflects the commonalities from an integration perspective. It reflects those 
commonalities that are established based on the consideration that the diversity 
in the member states’ criminalisation provisions created unwanted loopholes to 
the benefit of criminals. Approximation seeks to do away with those loopholes 
and bring the national criminal codes closer together. 
However, there is much more common in terms of criminalisation than what 
is included in those approximation instruments. Everything that is already 
common due to the historical development of criminal law in the individual 
member states will not need to be subjected to approximation anymore and will 
thus not be found in the approximation instruments. Therefore, the 
approximation acquis is only a part of the wider common criminalisation acquis.  
To the extent it can be useful or maybe even necessary to extend the 
knowledge on common criminalisation to overcome the obstacles, it should be 
considered to also identify what is already common as opposed to only creating 
new common offences. 
                                                             
34 This argumentation is used in European Commission (2009). Acquis of the European Union: 
Title IV of the TEC, Part II of the TEC, Title VI of the TEU. available on the website of the 
European Commission, p 30. 
35 Consistency not only with respect to the approximation of offences itself, but even more so 
with respect to the complementing provisions with respect to e.g. the organisation of 
jurisdiction, the inclusion of liablity of legal persons that are also included in the approximation 
instruments. The specific concerns with respect to the liability of legal persons have been dealt 
with in “Implications for the EU’s approximation policy” in Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W., & 
Ryckman, C. (2012). Liability of legal persons for offences in the EU. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-
Portland: Maklu.  





1.5 Range of offence-related diversities 
Approximation (or common criminalisation more in general) does not do 
away with the diversity between the national criminal codes. Common 
criminalisation only leads to the establishment of a “socle commun” of 
constituent elements of offences.36 Member states retain the competence to 
develop a more strict national regime and include also other behaviour 
underneath the same heading. Furthermore, the offence-related diversities 
between the criminal codes extend beyond the mere criminalisation of offences. 
Even where the offences are equally criminalised still significant differences can 
exist with respect to the sanctions that can be imposed (both in terms of nature 
and duration of the sanctions)37 or the position the offence assumes in the 
(criminal)38 justice system as a whole. A range of procedural provisions is 
offence-dependent in that e.g. some investigative measures can only be used 
with respect to some offences. Approximation does not change the fact that 
diversity should be accepted 
Within the EU, there is no intention to work towards a unified EU criminal 
code.39 Such a project could only be justified if there was a clear need for it or 
unanimous desire of the member states. Currently that is far from the case. For 
the years to come, there are 27 individual criminal codes with a number of 
offence-related commonalities and differences; offence-related meaning either 
with respect to the criminalisation, with respect to the sanction or with respect to 
the position of the offence in the (criminal) justice system as a whole. 
                                                             
36 This expression was used by the Work Group X "Freedom, Security and Justice" (2002). Final 
report of Working Group X "Freedom, Security and Justice". CONV 426/02 of 2.12.2002, 10. 
37 Claisse, S., & Jamart, J.-S. (2003). L'Harmonisations des sanctions. In D. Flore, S. Bosly, H. 
Brulin, S. Claisse, S. de Biolley, M.-H. Descamps, et al. (Eds.), Actualités de droit pénal européen 
(pp. 59-81). Brugge: La Charte; Lambert-Abdelgawad, E. (2002). L'Harmonisation des sanctions 
pénales en Europe: Étude comparée de faisabilité appliquée aux sanctions applicable, au 
prononcé des sanctions. Archives de politique criminelle, 1(24), 177. 
38 Criminal  is placed between brackets because references to offences also appear in branches of 
law other than criminal law. 
39 See e.g. Spinellis, D. (2002). Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law: 
Objections to harmonisation and future perspectices. In A. Klip, & H. Van der Wilt (Eds.), 
Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law (pp. 87-95). Amsterdam: Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 88. Ambos, K. (2005). Is the development of a 
common substantive criminal law for Europe possible? Some preliminary reflections. 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12(2), 173. See however for ideas on 
partical unification: Delmas-Marty, M. (1997). Corpus Juris introducing penal provisions for the 
purpose of the financial interests of the European Union. Paris: Economica. Donà, G. (1998). 
Towards a European Judicial Area? A Corpus Juris Introducing Penal Provisions for the 
Purpose of the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Union. European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 6(3), 282; 





2 The saviour when diversity is an obstacle 
The doctoral research underpinned that consistent EU policy making uses 
the knowledge on the common criminalisation acquis to its full potential and 
support member states were possible. It has demonstrated that the common 
criminalisation acquis can be the saviour when diversity is an obstacle. It is 
unfortunate that this function of the common criminalisation acquis is not 
recognised and currently limited to enhancing mutual trust and facilitating 
judicial cooperation, without detailing how that facilitating role should be 
understood let alone evaluating how it is put in practice. Especially when there 
is an endless list of questions on how to overcome the obstacles caused by 
offence diversities, there is a clear need for a comprehensive, consistent and 
well-balanced policy. This second part of the needs and feasibility 
argumentation briefly elaborates on the vague function of common 
criminalisation and the endless list of questions member states are confronted 
with. 
2.1 Vague function of common criminalisation  
Taking note of the offence diversities in the member states’ legal systems, the 
question arises to what extent those diversities are an obstacle for EU policy 
making and what the function of the common criminalisation acquis therein 
is/can/should be. 
Because in the political and legal discourse common criminalisation is 
currently limited to approximation, the function thereof is currently elaborated on 
only in relation to approximation. Without a doubt, the main critique with 
respect to the current approximation efforts is the lack of a clear vision or policy 
plan on that function.40 Firstly, the legal plan as represented by the text of the 
treaty provisions does not extend beyond stipulating that judicial cooperation shall 
include approximation based on the nature or impact of such offences or from a special 
                                                             
40 This critique can be found in Albrecht, P.-A., & Braum, S. (1999). Deficiencies in the 
Development of European Criminal Law. European Law Journal, 5(3), 292; Weyembergh, A. 
(2005). The functions of approximation of penal legislation within the European Union. 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12(2), 149; Herlin-Karnell, E. (2007). 
Recent Developments in the Area of European Criminal Law. Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, 14(1), 15; Mitsilegas, V. (2009). The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law. 
Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice? European Law Review, 34(4), 523; Baker, E., & 
Harding, C. (2009). From Past imperfect to Future Perfect? A Longitudinal Study of the Third 
Pillar. European Law Review, 34(1), 25; Borgers, M. J. (2010). Functions and Aims of 
Harmonisation After the Lisbon Treaty. A European Perspective. In C. Fijnaut, & J. Ouwerkerk 
(Eds.), The Future of Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union (pp. 347-355). 
Leiden: Koninklijke Brill.  





need to combat them on a common basis. In doing so, approximation is introduced 
in the context of judicial cooperation and has as its function the establishment of 
a common fight against such offences. Between the lines it can be read that 
approximation should be used to ensure that particularly serious offences are 
criminalised throughout the EU avoiding loopholes in the national 
criminalisation provisions. Secondly, complementing policy documents are not 
very specific either. In the Tampere Conclusions it is merely posited that better 
compatibility and more convergence between the legal systems of member states 
“must be achieved”, without even clarifying the specific reason thereof.41 It can 
only be assumed that there too, avoiding loopholes is the main objective. In the 
Hague programme, the topic receives more attention through the introduction of 
a separate heading dedicated to the approximation of law. The function of 
approximation is said to be the “facilitation of mutual recognition and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension”,42 without 
further detailing how that should be achieved or in what way approximation is 
facilitating.  It is not clarified what should be understood by the facilitating role, 
whether or not it extends beyond facilitation via the increase of mutual trust as a 
result of approximation of law. In the Stockholm programme the same things are 
repeated again. “The European Council considers that a certain level of approximation 
of laws is necessary to foster a common understanding of issues among judges and 
prosecutors”.43 
Because legal and policy documents are not very helpful in detailing the 
function of the common criminalisation acquis, a literature review was 
conducted. In literature there have been attempts to map the (possible) functions 
of approximation making a distinction between an autonomous and an auxiliary 
(supporting) function.44  
 
 
                                                             
41 Point 5, Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999). Conclusions of the Presidency. SN 
200/1/99 REV 1. 
42 European Council (2004). The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice 
in the European Union. OJ C 53 of 3.3.2005. 
43 European Council (2010). The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving 
and Protecting Citizens. OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010. 
44 See e.g. Borgers, M. J. (2010). Functions and Aims of Harmonisation After the Lisbon Treaty. 
A European Perspective. In C. Fijnaut, & J. Ouwerkerk (Eds.), The Future of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union (pp. 347-355). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill; Weyembergh, A. 
(2005). The functions of approximation of penal legislation within the European Union. 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12(2), 149. 





Firstly, the autonomous function of approximation refers to the self standing 
efforts to tackle new forms of crime45 such as euro-counterfeiting and to 
gradually introduce equality for EU citizens when it comes to the qualification of 
their acts.46 This autonomous function links in with the way the current legal 
basis for approximation is formulated. A purely autonomous function of 
approximation is received with scepticism. Even though ensuring the common 
criminalisation of particularly new forms of crime is important to avoid 
loopholes in the national criminal justice systems, there are far more important 
reasons to approximate (see infra with respect to the auxiliary functions) and the 
equality sought is dependent on much more than just the constituent elements of 
the offences.  Furthermore, approximation and therefore knowledge on what is 
common in terms of criminalisation is always supporting for cooperation. An 
EU offence policy should focus on the auxiliary function of approximation.  
Secondly, the auxiliary function links in with what is found in policy 
documents and refers to the supporting role approximation can have for the 
smooth functioning of EU level actors47 and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters48.  
The link between approximation of offences and the EU level actors is 
clarified by referring to the definition of their mandates. It is argued that 
approximation helps to ensure that the competences of Europol and Eurojust can 
be clearly defined49, but does not introduce a formal requirement to use the 
approximation acquis to that end. The function does not extend beyond the mere 
                                                             
45 See e.g. Borgers, M. J. (2010). Functions and Aims of Harmonisation After the Lisbon Treaty. 
A European Perspective. In C. Fijnaut, & J. Ouwerkerk (Eds.), The Future of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union (pp. 347-355). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 349; Bosly, S., & 
Van Ravenstein, M. (2003). L'Harmonisation des incriminations. In D. Flore, S. Bosly, H. Brulin, 
S. Claisse, S. de Biolley, M.-H. Descamps, et al. (Eds.), Actualités de droit pénal européen (pp. 
19-58). Brugge: La charte, 20 
46 This function is also characterised as the macro-level function of approximation. See Klip, A. 
(2006). European integration and harmonisation and criminal law. In D. M. Curtin, J. M. Smits, 
A. Klip, & J. A. McCahery (Eds.), European Integration and Law. Antwerp - Oxford: Intersentia, 
139. 
47 This function is also characterised as the micro-level function of approximation. See Klip, A. 
(2006). European integration and harmonisation and criminal law. In D. M. Curtin, J. M. Smits, 
A. Klip, & J. A. McCahery (Eds.), European Integration and Law. Antwerp - Oxford: Intersentia, 
140. 
48 This function is also characterised as the meso-level function of approximation. See Klip, A. 
(2006). European integration and harmonisation and criminal law. In D. M. Curtin, J. M. Smits, 
A. Klip, & J. A. McCahery (Eds.), European Integration and Law. Antwerp - Oxford: Intersentia, 
140. 
49 See e.g. Borgers, M. J. (2010). Functions and Aims of Harmonisation After the Lisbon Treaty. 
A European Perspective. In C. Fijnaut, & J. Ouwerkerk (Eds.), The Future of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union (pp. 347-355). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 349. 





establishment of that potential link. Furthermore, it would make more sense to 
first establish the need to have common offences as a basis for the definition of 
the mandates of the EU level actors and where such a need exists, critically 
evaluate the actual use of the approximation acquis to that end. Where necessary 
recommendations need to be formulated.50 
The link between approximation of offences and judicial cooperation is 
clarified by referring to the increase of the mutual trust that is necessary for the 
smooth functioning of judicial cooperation. Especially the introduction of 
mutual recognition has increased the perceived need for approximation.51 
Approximation does not necessarily lead to more trust though. It establishes 
what is common in terms of criminalisation between the member states but 
leaves the door open for remaining criminalisation diversity which is ultimately 
the reason why there is no absolute trust between the member states and why 
obstacles exist. Approximation will not do away with the differences between 
the member states and therefore approximation will not create absolute trust 
with respect to criminalisation. The opposite may be true. The behaviour subject 
to approximation reflects the political agreement reached between the member 
states. Criminalisation of what is not included may be politically sensitive.52 
Moreover, trust caused by the extended common criminalisation acquis and the 
reduction of the criminalisation diversity may be helpful in situations where 
criminalisation diversity is no legal obstacle to cooperation and cooperation with 
respect to cases for which the underlying behaviour is not equally criminalised 
in all cooperating states is ultimately a political decision taken by each of the 
member states individually, that trust is useless in situations where there is a 
legal obstacle that formally limits cooperation to situations that relate to the 
common criminalisation of offences beyond the choice of the individual member 
state. The idea that cooperation is facilitated if the differences are not too great53 
is a too narrow appreciation of the offence-related obstacles found in the legal 
                                                             
50 This will be elaborated on below and has been dealt with extensively in: “EULOCS and EU 
level actors” De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2012). EULOCS in support of international 
cooperation in criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. Ryckman (Eds.), 
Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters.Moving beyond actors, bringing logic 
back, footed in reality. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
51 Vogel, J. (2002). Why is harmonisation of penal law necessary? A comment. In A. Klip, & H. 
Van der Wilt (Eds.), Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law (pp. 55-65). 
Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science; Mitsilegas, V. (2009). The Third 
Wave of Third Pillar Law. Which Direction for EU Criminal Justice? European Law Review, 
34(4), 523. 
52 Reference can be made to the exclusion of drug trafficking for own personal use from the EU 
minimum definition. 
53 See e.g. Borgers, M. J. (2010). Functions and Aims of Harmonisation After the Lisbon Treaty. 
A European Perspective. In C. Fijnaut, & J. Ouwerkerk (Eds.), The Future of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in the European Union (pp. 347-355). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 349. 





framework that governs cooperation. Cooperation in criminal matters is in need 
of a thorough analysis of the extent to which member states are free to decide to 
either or not cooperate with respect to cases for which the underlying behaviour 
is not equally criminalised. With respect to the situations that are limited along a 
double criminality requirement, the common criminalisation acquis should be 
used to its full potential to avoid a deadlock in international cooperation in 
criminal matters. 
2.2 Endless list of questions 
There is an endless list of questions on the effect of the diversity in the 
member states’ legal systems. In a globalizing world and developing European 
Union which promotes free movement,54 criminal justice systems frequently 
meet. Criminal justice systems meet when confronted with a foreign career 
criminal. Questions arise with respect to the possibilities to seek cross-border 
cooperation to gather evidence, i.e. whether or not another member state has to 
execute a request for an investigative measure if the underlying behaviour is not 
criminalised in that member state, or the investigative measure is not possible in 
relation to that offence in a mere domestic situation in the executing member 
state. Questions arise with respect to the functioning of the EU level actors, i.e. 
whether the scope of their mandate needs to be limited to and cannot exceed the 
common criminalisation acquis. Questions arise with respect to the value of his 
foreign prior convictions when deciding on the nature and duration of the sanction 
in the sentencing stage, i.e. whether or not a foreign conviction can/should have 
an aggravating effect if the underlying behaviour is not equally criminalised in 
the prosecuting member state. Questions arise with respect to the possibilities to 
seek cross-border execution of the newly imposed sanction, i.e. whether or not the 
member state of the person’s nationality can be asked/required to execute the 
conviction if the underlying behaviour is not equally criminalised in that 
member state or that particular type of sentence could not have been imposed 
(for that duration) for that offence in a mere domestic situation; Criminal justice 
systems meet when a convicted persons applies for a job in another member 
state. Questions arise with respect to the impact of the convictions on the future 
career of the person involved, i.e. whether or not a member state can/should limit 
the access to certain so-called vulnerable professions55 if a person is convicted for 
                                                             
54 Art 3.1 TEC clarified that the backbone of the European development was formed by the 
elimination of internal borders and the establishment of an internal market governed by free 
movement principles. See more generally on this topic: Barnard, C. (2007). Chapter 11 - 
Introduction to the Free Movement of Persons. In C. Barnard (Ed.), The Substantive Law of the 
EU (pp. 249-307). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
55 A selection of particularly vulnerable professions is elaborated on in Vermeulen, G., Vander 
Beken, T., De Busser, E., & Dormaels, A. (2002). Blueprint for an EU Criminal Records Database. 





behaviour that is not equally criminalised in the employing member state or the 
conviction involved an access-limitation that could not have been imposed (for 
that duration) for that offence in a mere domestic situation; and whether the 
appreciation of prior convictions changes/should change in light of the influence 
of the functioning of the internal market e.g. when looking into the value of 
prior convictions to assess the eligibility of candidates to participate in a public 
procurement procedure dominated by the equal treatment principle.  
These are all legitimate questions that are to a greater or lesser extent linked 
to the offence involved; either the behaviour involved and whether or not that 
behaviour is considered to be a criminal offence, or the sanction involved or the 
position of the offence in the (criminal) justice system. An approximation policy 
that merely seeks to increase mutual trust between the member states will not 
suffice to provide a clear and consistent answer to those questions and will not 
help member states when cooperation is not allowed beyond common 
criminalisation. 
Furthermore, criminal justice systems also meet on a more managerial level. 
Diversity in criminalisation also raises questions from an indirect more 
managerial point of view. Member states have grown to be keen on comparing 
the efficiency of their criminal justice systems and crime rates with those of other 
member states. However, the comparability of criminal justice data is 
compromised by the criminalisation diversity: a difference in the behaviour 
underlying the statistical data will compromise the comparability thereof.56 
Moreover, where it can be accepted for member states to limit the cross-national 
comparisons to data for which comparability can be guaranteed, such a 
limitation is not acceptable when the EU is evaluating its criminal policy. The EU 
as a full partner in criminal policy making can be held accountable for failing to 
organise the availability of the data it needs. The diversity in criminalisation is 
affecting the statistical data flow to the EU. Member states cannot guarantee that 
the data they are providing is comparable and constitutes a reliable base for EU 
level analysis. This compromises the evidence base the EU needs to uphold the 
credibility of EU level criminal policy making. Today, some of the above 
mentioned questions have been answered57, others are left unanswered58; some 
                                                                                                                                               
Legal, politico-institutional and practical feasibility. (Vol. 13, IRCP-series). Antwerp - 
Apeldoorn: Maklu. 
56 A similar argumentation has been made in relation to the estimation of the costs of crime and 
the difficulties with respect to cross-national comparisons due to diversity in the underlying 
national offences. See Ortiz de Urbina, I., & Ogus, A. (2009). Offence Definitions for Cost of 
Crime Estimation Purposes. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 15, 343. 
57 The degree to which cross-border execution of sentences can be made dependent on a double 
criminality requirement and thus refused if the underlying behaviour does not constitute an 
offence in the executing member state is regulated in the corresponding EU instruments. 





of them have been shifted to the choice and responsibility of the individual 
member states59, others have been dealt with at EU level.60 The lack of an 
integrated comprehensive approach has resulted in a system that is 
inconsistent61, at times not executable62 and far from well-balanced. 
2.3 An EU offence policy 
The sheer diversity of principles and mechanisms of which the functioning is 
to a greater or lesser extent linked to offence labels, potentially dependent on the 
commonality thereof, calls for a helicopter view and the development of an 
overarching EU offence policy using the common criminalisation acquis as the 
centre piece. This doctoral research has underpinned that there is a need for an 
EU offence policy that effectively tackles obstacles caused by offence-related 
diversities. Such policy should not aim to unify, but should focus on 
approximating and further developing the common criminalisation acquis 
where necessary and above all accept diversities, appreciate commonalities and 
align policies accordingly. There is a need for a holistic approach that includes 
all principles and mechanisms that are offence-related.  
                                                                                                                                               
58 The degree to which exclusion from participation in a public procurement procedure can be 
made dependent on a double criminality requirement is currently not regulated at EU level. 
59 The extent to which taking account of prior convictions in the course of a new criminal 
procedure is limited along a double criminality requirement is the decision of each individual 
member state. 
60 The degree to which cross-border execution of sentences can be made dependent on a double 
criminality requirement and thus refused if the underlying behaviour does not constitute an 
offence in the executing member state is regulated in an EU instrument. 
61 The same offence label does not always refer to the same underlying behaviour. Different 
instruments are (intended to be) based on different offence definitions. Reference can be made 
to the offence labels as they appear in the Europol list and in in Art. 40(7) and Art. 41(4)(a) of 
the Schengen Implementation Convention. For the definition of the offences on the Europol list, 
it is explicitly stated that they shall be assessed by the competent national authorities in 
accordance with the national law of the member states to which they belong. There are strong 
indications that an entirely different interpretation is envisioned in SIC. When updating the Art. 
40(7) SIC list to include participation to a criminal organisation and terrorism, references to the 
1998 joint action (OJ L 351 of 29.12.1998) and the 2002 framework decision (OJ L 164 of 
22.6.2002) were included. In doing so the SIC list tends towards the use of common offence 
concepts as included in the EU JHA acquis. As a result, mirroring offence concepts have a 
different meaning across instruments. 
62 The level of detail in the current criminal records exchange mechanism is not sufficient to 
apply to offence-based provisions in some cooperation instruments or provisions in legislation 
governing the effect of prior convictions.  





This need for a comprehensive approach that includes all principles and 
mechanisms that are offence-related means that it is not sufficient to build an EU 
offence policy around the traditional judicial cooperation in criminal matters63, 
extended with police cooperation64 and the functioning of actors such as Europol 
and Eurojust. A consistent and comprehensive EU offence policy requires that 
this is extended to all domains that have a link with offences in their scope or 
application conditions, i.e. from crime statistics to taking account of prior 
convictions, even beyond criminal procedures, such as the taking account of 
prior convictions to apply the rules with respect to offence-related exclusion 
grounds found in public procurement instruments. The entirety of the EU body 
of legal instruments needs to be scanned for references to offences or to ways of 
dealing with the offence diversities. 
As a result, this doctoral thesis holds a strong argumentation to develop an 
EU offence policy that is both needed and feasible. In literature it has been 
argued that it is difficult to determine the direction in which the member states, 
the European Commission and the Council wish to go.65 This doctoral thesis 
contains a number of detailed suggestions and a warm appeal to intervene 
immediately where necessary.  
                                                             
63 Most authors limit the discussion on the complexity created by criminalisation diversity to 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. See e.g. Weyembergh, A. (2005). The functions of 
approximation of penal legislation within the European Union. Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, 12(2), 149. This is largely due to the fact that approximation is inserted 
into the treaty under the heading of judicial cooperation. 
64 Other authors have argued that police cooperation should be included in the scope. See e.g. 
Vervaele, J. A. E. (2004). Europeanisering van het strafrecht of de strafrechtelijke dimensie van 
de Europese integratie. Panopticon, 3, who’s argumentation is supported in De Bondt, W., & 
Vermeulen, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence concepts to 
facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. In M. Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal 
Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 15-40). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
Along the same line of argumentation we have argued, in the context of a recent study, that the 
distinction between police and judicial cooperation is artificial and outdated. Vermeulen, G., De 
Bondt, W., & Ryckman, C. (2012). Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters. 
Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. 
65 See e.g. Klip, A. (2006). European integration and harmonisation and criminal law. In D. M. 
Curtin, J. M. Smits, A. Klip, & J. A. McCahery (Eds.), European Integration and Law. Antwerp - 
Oxford: Intersentia, 138. 





3 To ensure comparability of crime statistics 
The first obstacle identified relates to the comparability of crime statistics. 
Therefore, the first function for the common criminalisation acquis that will be 
elaborated on is ensuring the comparability of crime statistics.  
The need for cross-national comparable crime statistics has been widely 
recognised both from a national as well as from an EU criminal policy 
perspective. Crime statistics are a vital part of criminal policy making. To be able 
to ensure cross-national comparability, data needs to be limited to relate only to 
what is commonly criminalised. The feasibility of that approach is currently 
compromised by the limits in the level of detail in the national data systems and 
the freedom to choose an implementation strategy to comply with 
approximation obligations. Those two concerns reflect the need for the policy to 
be adjusted. The doctoral research underpinned the feasibility of ensuring 
comparable crime statistics, provided that the level of detail in the national data 
systems is increased and the freedom to choose an implementation strategy is 
reconsidered. 
3.1 Recognising the need for comparable crime 
statistics 
The needs assessment to tackle the obstacles caused by offence diversities has 
started in 2008, in the context of an EU study on the feasibility of attaining 
comparable crime statistics between the member states of the EU.66 That is the 
reason why comparability of crime statistics is dealt with as the first function for 
the common criminalisation acquis.  
The compilation of EU level crime statistics has been an official EU objective 
for more than 15 years. Even though a lot has happened in that time span, 
limited progress has been made. The importance of comparable crime statistics 
is consistently reiterated in policy documents, e.g. in the 1997 Action Plan to 
combat organised crime,67 in the 1998 Vienna Action Plan,68 in the 2000 
                                                             
66 The report of the study was published as: Mennens, A., De Wever, W., Dalamanga, A., 
Kalamara, A., Kaslauskaite, G., Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W. (2009). Developing an EU level 
offence classification system: EU study to implement the Action Plan to measure crime and 
criminal justice (Vol. 34, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
67 European Council (1997). "Action plan to combat organised crime." OJ C 251 of 15.8.1997 
68 Council and Commission (1998) “Action Plan of 3 December 1998 on how best to implement 
the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the creation of an area of freedom, security and 
justice”, OJ C 19 of 23.01.1999. 





Millennium Strategy,69 in the 2003 Dublin Declaration,70 in the 2005 The Hague 
Programme,71 in the 2006 Commission Communication on the EU Action Plan to 
measure crime and criminal justice72 and in the 2010 Stockholm programme. 
“Adequate, reliable and comparable statistics are a necessary prerequisite, inter alia, for 
evidence-based decisions on the need for action, on the implementation of decisions and 
on the effectiveness of action.”73 
3.2 First things first: developing EULOCS 
Though the comparability of crime statistics is dependent on more aspects 
than the underlying offence,74 comparative criminologists maintain that the 
diversity in criminalisation remains the most important reason why cross-
national comparability of crime statistics is almost impossible.75 It soon becomes 
clear that the current approximation policy and the functions attributed to 
approximation cannot lead to comparable crime statistics. “An increased mutual 
trust” between the member states with respect to the criminalisation of offences 
is not what is needed here. Comparable crime statistics require that a clear cut 
distinction can be made between what is common (and thus comparable) and 
what is different (and thus not comparable). 
                                                             
69 European Council (2000). "The prevention and control of organised crime: a European Union 
strategy for the beginning of the new millennium." OJ C 124 of 3.5.2000 
70 Council or the European Union (2003). "Declaration of the Dublin Conference on Organised 
Crime." Doc 16302/03, CRIMORG 96, 19.12.2003 
71 European Council (2004). "The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union." OJ C 53/11 of 3.3.2005. 
72 European Commission (2006). "Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: Developing a comprehensive and 
coherent EU strategy to measure crime and criminal justice: An EU action Plan 2006-2010." 
COM(2006) 437 final of 07.08.2006 
73 European Council (2010). The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving 
and Protecting Citizens. OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010. 
74 See more in detail: Robert, P. (2009). Comparing Crime Data in Europe. Official crime 
statistics and survey based data (Criminologische studies). Brussels: VUBPress; Aebi, M. (2008). 
Measuring the Influence of Statistical Counting Rules on Cross-National Differences in 
Recorded Crime. In K. Aromaa, & M. Heiskanen (Eds.), Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in 
Europe and North America 1995-2004 (pp. 196-215). Helsinki: HEUNI; Barclay, G. (2000). The 
comparability of data on convictions and sanctions: are international comparisons possible? 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 8, 13. 
75 Harrendorf, S. (2012). Offence Definitions in the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics and Their Influence on Data Quality and Comparability. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, 18, 23. 





Based on that concern, the 2008 EU study started off with the clarification of 
commonalities in criminalisation.76 Knowledge on what is common in terms of 
criminalisation in the member states will lead to knowledge on the limits of 
comparable crime statistics. That is the logical first step when attempting to 
attain comparable crime statistics. To that end, the common criminalisation 
acquis – composed of any type of instrument relevant to EU policy making in 
which member states have committed themselves to ensuring the criminalisation 
of the included offences – was mapped and classified in an EU level offence 
classification system, named EULOCS.77 To clearly differentiate between what is 
common and what is different, the architecture of EULOCS distinguishes 
between jointly identified parts of offences and other parts of offences.78 Through 
clickable links the definitions of the jointly identified offences appear, 
complemented with a reference to the legal instrument that holds the legal basis 
for the joint identification. In doing so, the common criminalisation acquis was 
clearly visualised and ready to be used as a basis for the delineation of the limits 
of comparable crime statistics. It is important to underline that EULOCS does 
not reflect the largest common denominator of available crime statistics, but the 
largest common denominator of criminalisation delineating the limits of 
comparable crime statistics.79  
                                                             
76 Within a team of 5 researchers, I was responsible for the work package that aimed at 
clarifying the known commonalities in criminalisation. 
77 Initial reflections on the building blocks of a statistical Esperanto based on a thorough legal 
analysis were published as De Bondt, W. & Vermeulen, G. (2009). Esperanto for EU Crime 
Statistics. Towards Common EU offences in an EU level offence classification system. In M. 
Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 2, pp. 87-124). 
Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland: Maklu. A preliminary version of EULOCS was discussed with 
peers at various international conferences (e.g. 2008 ESC in Edinburgh, 2009 Stockholm 
Symposium, 2009 EUROSTAT expert meeting) and with member state representatives during 
focus group meetings in the member states. The final product was originally published as 
Vermeulen, G. & De Bondt, W. (2009). EULOCS. The EU level offence classification system : a 
bench-mark for enhanced internal coherence of the EU's criminal policy (Vol. 35, IRCP-series). 
Antwerp – Apeldoorn – Portland: Maklu. 
78 See more in detail on the pittfalls and the importance thereof for crime statistics: De Bondt, 
W., & Vermeulen, G. (2010). Revolutions in EU Crime Statistics: EULOCS - the EU level offence 
classification system. In L. Pauwels, & G. Vermeulen (Eds.), Actualia strafrecht en criminologie 
(Vol. 4, pp. 473-493). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
79 In the past EULOCS has been criticised for not being able to support actual gathering of 
comparable crime statistics because it does not take account of the limits represented by the 
level of detail in the national data systems. See Savona, E., Lewis, C., & Vettori, B. (2005). 
EUSTOC, Developing an EU STatistical apparatus for measuring Organised Crime, assessing its 
risk and evaluation organised crime policies (Vol. 11). Trento: Transcrime. However, that 
critique fails to appreciate that the ultimate goal is to provide an overview of what could be 
used as a limit to ensure the comparability of crime statistics as a opposed to what can now be 
used to collect comparable crime statistics. Furthermore, as will be elaborated on in the 





To visualise this approach a snapshot of EULOCS is inserted. In doing so a 
first important step towards an EU offence policy was taken: the much needed 
visualisation of the commonalities in criminalisation.  
 
0200 00 Open Category PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
0201 00 
OFFENCES JOINTLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPATION IN 
A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
0201 01 Directing a criminal organisation 
0201 02 
Knowingly participating in the criminal activities, without 
being a director 
0201 03 
Knowingly taking part in the non-criminal activities of a 
criminal organisation, without being a director 
0202 00 
OTHER FORMS OF PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL 
ORGANISATION 
 
Immediately though, a huge restriction for the establishment of the limits of 
comparable crime statistics surfaces. Because the legal basis for the common 
criminalisation acquis is currently limited to the approximation acquis, the 
jointly identified parts of offences in EULOCS reflect the approximation acquis. 
The main limit of an approximation-based EULOCS relates to the main limit of 
the current approximation strategy. Approximating instruments are used to 
ensure the joint criminalisation of a serious offence with a cross-border 
dimension for the future. They are not used to identify what is already commonly 
criminalised in the criminal codes of the member states. As a result the 
approximation acquis is only the tip of the iceberg of common offences in the 
EU.80 Because it is felt that common criminalisation can only be useful if it 
requires that at least some member states have to change their national criminal 
code, approximation is focussed on creating new common offences. The idea 
that a more extended common criminalisation acquis can be useful to delineate 
the scope of comparable crime statistics did not get airborne yet. The possibility 
to extend the scope of comparable crime statistics accordingly might spark the 
interest of the member states to also delineate what is already common and 
subsequently include it in EULOCS. 
                                                                                                                                               
following paragraphs, the argument that member states cannot produce the data requested is 
not acceptable in relation to some of the jointly identified parts of offences. 
80 It has been argued that the approximation acquis gives a false sense of common 
criminalisation due to incomplete and inconsistent implementation in the member states. See 
more elaborately on that discussion in: “Building a classification system” in De Bondt, W., & 
Vermeulen, G. (2012). EULOCS in support of international cooperation in criminal matters. In 
G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. Ryckman (Eds.), Rethinking international cooperation in 
criminal matters.Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. Antwerpen-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 





The limited scope of the jointly identified parts of offences is only a minor 
drawback though. Additionally, there are more fundamental concerns with 
respect to the level of detail in the information systems and the freedom to 
choose an implementation strategy when approximating offences. 
3.3 Level of detail in the national data systems 
Though it may be expected that comparative criminologists use the common 
criminalisation acquis as a basis to delineate the scope of the comparability of 
crime statistics, analysis revealed that another approach is used. Comparative 
criminologists such as e.g. the members of the European Sourcebook group81 are 
confronted with diversity in the national data systems. The level of detail 
included therein is not sufficient to isolate statistical data that relate to the 
common criminalisation acquis. Alternatively, using the organisation of the 
national data systems as a baseline, an alternative definition is come up with; a 
definition that does not reflect the limit of common criminalisation but reflects 
what comes as close as possible to a common definition member states can provide 
data for.82 As a result, data needs to be complemented with a member state 
comment clarifying the extent to which the data provided still deviates from that 
proposed definition.83 This approach does not result in perfectly comparable 
crime statistics but in a data set that is as close to comparability as possible, 
combined with a number of caveats to point to the incomparabilities. Though 
academics are powerless when confronted with the drawbacks in the national 
data systems and are forced to work with what is there, it is inacceptable for a 
policy maker responsible for the architecture of the data systems to use that same 
argumentation to justify why comparability between crime statistics cannot be 
achieved. 
Obviously, the feasibility of using the largest (known) common denominator 
amongst criminalizations as a basis to scope cross-national comparisons of crime 
statistics is fully dependent on the ability of member states to isolate statistical 
data that represent that common denominator. The ability to put theory into 
practice is dependent on the level of detail in the national data systems. To be 
                                                             
81 This group was used as an example because of their significance in the field of statistical data 
collection. This does not mean however that there are no other initiatives that have tackled the 
difficulties related to the criminalisation diversity in another way. Reference can be made to the 
initiatives working with victim surveys in which no legal definitions of crimes appear. 
82 Harrendorf, S. (2012). Offence Definitions in the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics and Their Influence on Data Quality and Comparability. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, 18, 23. 
83 See for a detailed description of that approach Killias, M., Aebi, M., Aromaa, K., Aubusson de 
Cavarlay, B., Barclay, G., Gruszczyñska, B., et al. (2006). The European Sourcebook of Crime 
and Criminal Justice Statistics – 2006. Den Haag: WODC. 





able to assess the scope of the comparability problem, empirical data has been 
gathered in the 2008 study on crime statistics to compare the level of detail in the 
national data systems with the required level of detail to provide data that 
matches the largest (known) common denominator amongst criminalizations as 
included in EULOCS. The results revealed that the current level of detail is a 
major stumbling block to put theory into practice.84  
Ultimately it is the responsibility of the member states to decide whether or 
not the potential of comparing crime statistics is worth the effort to increase the 
level of detail in the national data systems to be able to provide data that match 
the largest common denominator as included in EULOCS. Crime statistics are 
more than a pile of numbers. They are an essential tool in the fight against 
crime.85 Having reiterated once more that “adequate, reliable and comparable 
statistics are a necessary prerequisite, inter alia, for evidence-based decisions on the need 
for action, on the implementation of decisions and on the effectiveness of action,”86 the 
need for comparable crime statistics at least of the EU priority offences87 is 
uncontested and consistent and comprehensive policy making requires that the 
level of detail in the national data systems is adapted accordingly.  
3.4 Freedom to choose implementation strategies 
In light thereof, the liberty member states currently have when it comes to 
the implementation of approximation obligations can be questioned. That is the 
second fundamental concern that needs to be dealt with. When implementing 
the approximation instruments, some member states introduce separate offences 
that mirror the EU minimum criminalisation, whilst others incorporate the 
minimum standards in existing offences that may be more broad than the EU 
minimum obligation. The adoption of minimum standards does not prevent 
member states from upholding a more strict criminalisation policy at national 
                                                             
84 Representatives of the police authorities in each of the 27 member states were asked to 
identify for which of the jointly identified parts of offences in EULOCS corresponding statistical 
data could be produced. See more in detail: Mennens, A., De Wever, W., Dalamanga, A., 
Kalamara, A., Kaslauskaite, G., Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W. (2009). Developing an EU level 
offence classification system: EU study to implement the Action Plan to measure crime and 
criminal justice (Vol. 34, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
85 Stamatel, J. (2009). Contributions of Cross-National Research to Criminology at the Beginning 
of the 21st Century. In M. D. Krohn (Ed.), Handbook on Crime and Deviance (pp. 3-22): 
Springer; Maguire, M. (2007). Crime data and statistics. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan, & R. Reiner 
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (pp. 241-301). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
86 European Council (2010). The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving 
and Protecting Citizens. OJ C 115 of 4.5.2010. 
87 A possible selection of priority offences was elaborated on in De Bondt, W. (in review). 
Evidence based EU criminal policy making: in search of valid data. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research. 





level.88 These more strict policies can cause problems with respect to the 
comparability of crime statistics. The relation between the Belgian definition and 
the EU minimum definition of trafficking in human beings can clarify that 
position. The EU minimum definition stipulates that acts of trafficking in human 
beings are punishable where use is made of coercion, force or threat, including 
abduction [...].89 That requirement represents the minimum standard. At least 
situations where use is made of coercion, force or threat, criminalisation must be 
ensured. Nothing prevents the member states from introducing a more strict 
offence definition that even criminalises acts of trafficking in human beings 
where no use is made of coercion, force or threat. That is the liberty that was 
used in the Belgian definition of trafficking in human beings. The use of 
coercion, force or threat is not included as a constituent element.90 It is irrelevant 
to Belgian law, as a result of which a judge will never look into the use of 
coercion, force or threat let alone mention it in the verdict. This is problematic 
when Belgium is asked to provide statistical data that match the EU minimum 
definition and therefore only relate to convictions for trafficking in human 
beings where use was made of coercion, force or threat. This is a distinction the 
Belgian authorities will not be able to make as a result of the implementation 
strategy that was chosen. Therefore a policy that seeks to ensure comparable 
crime statistics requires that the extent to which member states are free to choose 
an implementation strategy is subject to debate. 
3.5 Policy needs and feasibility 
The need for comparable crime statistics at EU level has been recognised for 
over 15 years. That need is left unanswered because the member states are 
unable to provide comparable data. The choice to call upon the EU to support 
the fight against some forms of crime is far from non-committal. If EU 
intervention with respect to some crime phenomena is sought, comprehensive 
and coherent policy making includes a strategy to ensure the availability of 
comparable crime statistics, the importance of which is repeatedly reiterated in 
policy documents. Using EULOCS as a basis, it can easily be catalogued for 
which jointly identified parts of offences member states should be able to provide 
comparable statistical data. With this case study on crime statistics and the 
importance thereof for EU policy making, the first anchors in the needs 
assessment for an EU offence policy have been placed.  
                                                             
88 This policy consideration is now explicitly included in Art. 83 TFEU. 
89 Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, OJ L 
20 of 1.8.2002; Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101 of 15.4.2011. 
90 Art. 433quinquies-novies Belgian criminal code. 






4 To avoid redundant double criminality testing 
The second obstacle identified relates to avoiding redundant double 
criminality testing. Therefore, the second function for the common 
criminalisation acquis as presented in EULOCS that will be elaborated on is 
avoiding redundant double criminality testing.  
Analysis revealed that member states are struggling with the double 
criminality requirement. On the one hand, double criminality is deemed 
important but a practical need is formulated to avoid time-consuming double 
criminality testing where that is redundant. On the other hand, double 
criminality is deemed outdated in an evolving Union in light of extensive 
approximation efforts. Nevertheless, abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement altogether for the related offence labels proved inacceptable as 
shown by the recent compromis to complement the abandonment with the 
possibility to issue a declaration not to agree to it. The latter possibility is 
criticized for undermining the approximation acquis.  
This doctoral research demonstrated the necessity and feasibility of restoring 
the balance in the double criminality policy, provided that a clear distinction is 
made between cases for which double criminality testing is redundant and cases 
for which double criminality testing is acceptable. 
4.1 Linking common criminalisation to double 
criminality 
Though the needs assessment of an EU offence policy started in the context 
of a crime statistics study, first and foremost approximation (or common 
criminalisation more in general) is brought in relation to double criminality as a 
refusal ground in international cooperation in criminal matters. 
It is said that “the most effective weapon against all forms of crime is 
cooperation,”91 be it that cooperation is hindered by the differences in 
criminalisation. Member states have made the functioning of some forms of 
cooperation dependent on the condition that the underlying behaviour is 
equally criminalised in their member state.92 Not so much the question whether 
                                                             
91 Quote from Flynn, V. (1997). Europol - A Watershed in EU Law Enforcement Cooperation? In 
G. Barrett (Ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European Union: The Creation of a European Legal 
Space (pp. 79-113). Dublin: Institute of European Affairs. 
92 See more detailedly on the double criminality requirement for each of the 7 domains that 
comprise international cooperation in criminal matters: De Bondt, W. (2012). Double criminality 





or not a double criminality requirement is introduced – ultimately, the member 
states decide whether or not they are willing to cooperate beyond double 
criminality – but rather how that requirement is developed, delineated and 
implemented is subject to critical analysis. The weapon needs to be loaded with 
a policy that makes clever use of the common criminalisation acquis.  
Limiting the function of the approximation acquis – and the common 
criminalisation acquis more in general – to the establishment of a certain degree 
of equality between the criminal law systems of the member states that “helps to 
create the mutual trust necessary for cooperation”,93 does not go into the 
relationship between double criminality and common criminalisation. Therefore 
it should be applauded that in the Stockholm Programme the Council invites the 
Commission to further explore “the relationship between approximation of criminal 
offences or their definition and the double criminality rule in the framework of mutual 
recognition”.94 The Commission is invited to make a report to the Council on this 
issue. “One of the issues may be the necessity and feasibility of approximation or 
definition of criminal offence for which double criminality does not apply.” It should be 
noted that a distinction is made between on the one hand approximation as a 
specific technique to create new common offences and avoid loopholes in the 
national criminal codes and on the other hand the more general definition of 
criminal offences that could relate to the establishment of what is already 
common and to which double criminality should not apply. This links in 
perfectly with the suggestion made to extend the knowledge on common 
criminalisation to in parallel extend the scope of possible comparable crime 
statistics. 
The following paragraphs elaborate on what could be the main lines of 
argumentation in the Commission report to the Council. 
4.2 Different double criminality mechanisms 
Two double criminality mechanisms can be found in the current body of 
international instruments. First, there is the traditional double criminality 
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requirement limiting cooperation to situations where the underlying behaviour 
is criminalised in all participating member states. Second, there is the 
introduction of a list of 32 offences for which double criminalisation is assumed 
and the testing therefore abandoned,95 be it that in more recent instruments the 
provisions governing that abandonment have been complemented with the 
possibility for member states to issue a declaration stipulating not to agree with 
that abandonment through which the double criminality requirement can be 
reintroduced.96 
Though the decision to either or not limit cooperation based on a double 
criminality requirement is entirely up to the member states, a comprehensive 
approximation policy does make sure that this refusal ground cannot be used in 
relation to offences that have been subject to approximation.97 Allowing such 
refusal would amount to allowing an infringement of the approximation 
commitments. It is important to explicitly include this limit in double criminality 
provisions in the instruments governing international cooperation in criminal 
matters. At least that consideration should be included when elaborating on the 
relationship between approximation and the double criminality rule in mutual 
recognition instruments. Double criminality is inacceptable where 
approximation exists and additionally, the common criminalisation acquis can 
be further developed should member states wish to extend the basis for the 
abandonment of the double criminality verifications.  
In practice this means that it is even more important to have an easily 
accessible permanently updated overview of the common criminalisation acquis 
so that an issuing / requesting authority can verify whether the case for which 
international cooperation is sought does or does not relate to jointly identified 
parts of offences. If such would be the case, the cooperation request includes the 
reference to the EULOCS category for a jointly identified part of an offence, a 
categorisation that should be recognised by the executing / requested member 
state. If such would not be the case, the cooperation request includes the 
                                                             
95 The introduction of the list of 32 offences for which double criminality is abandoned is often 
characterised as the most controversial feature of mutual recognition. See e.g; Alegre, S., & Leaf, 
M. (2003). Chapter 3: Double Criminality. In S. Alegre, & M. Leaf (Eds.), European Arrest 
Warrant - A solution ahead of its time? (pp. 34-52): JUSTICE - advancing justice, human rights 
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97 See more in detail: “EULOCS & double criminality” in De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2012). 
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beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 





references to the EULOCS category for other parts of offences and sufficient detail 
with respect to the underlying behaviour should be provided to allow the 
executing / requested member state to conduct a double criminality verification. 
Not only does this approach safeguard the approximation acquis, it also ensures 
that member states do not have to engage in a redundant double criminality 
verification if the underlying behaviour is known to be criminalised throughout 
the EU and identified as such in EULOCS. It will be more sufficient to have an 
initial double criminality verification in the issuing / requesting member state as 
opposed to dedicating that task to the executing / requested member state who is 
not (necessarily) as acquainted with the case (yet). 
At first sight, it seems as though the recommendation with respect to the 
unacceptability of double criminality as a refusal ground in relation to offences 
that have been subject to approximation is complied with through the 
introduction of a list of 32 offences for which double criminality verification is 
no longer acceptable. When comparing the offence labels that have been subject 
to approximation through the adoption of framework decisions and post-Lisbon 
directives with the offence labels included in the 32 offence list, it appears that 
double criminality verification is already abandoned for all labels that have been 
subject to approximation. However, this position cannot be supported, not only 
because there is more to approximation than framework decisions and post-
Lisbon directives as a result of which the current approximation acquis already 
extends way beyond the labels included in the 32 offence list,98 but maybe even 
more so because this approach cannot stand the test of time. Especially now Art. 
83 TFEU introduced an open-ended scope limitation to approximation because 
the Council can always add more offence labels to the list of offences that may be 
subject to approximation and approximation can also be used with respect to 
any other offence should approximation be necessary to ensure the efficient 
enforcement of EU policies, it is only a matter of time before new approximation 
instruments sensu stricto will be adopted beyond the offence labels included in 
the list. The ongoing preparations with respect to the approximation of offences 
regarding market abuse and market manipulation are the perfect example 
thereof.99 Finally, the possibility for member states to issue a declaration 
renouncing the abandonment of the double criminality requirement effectively 
undermines the whole idea. From an approximation policy perspective, the 
                                                             
98 When looking into the approximation acquis in 2008, no less than 62 offence labels were 
identified. See more elaborately: De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2009). Esperanto for EU Crime 
Statistics. Towards Common EU offences in an EU level offence classification system. In M. 
Cools (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 2, pp. 87-124). 
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introduction of an unlimited possibility to issue a double criminality declaration 
is rather unfortunate. This policy choice was clearly not well-balanced. 
4.3 Policy needs and feasibility 
Through the policy choices that have been made recently when adopting 
instruments governing international cooperation in criminal matters, member 
states have expressed the need to reconsider the position of the double 
criminality requirement. The approach as currently developed is not received as 
satisfactory. It is feasible however, to accommodate at least part of the concerns 
by using the common criminalisation acquis. 
If member states wish to maintain the double criminality requirement but 
abandon double criminality verification where it is redundant, the knowledge on 
the common criminalisation acquis should be used to its full potential. It can 
support the member states in identifying for which cases double criminality 
verification is redundant due to knowledge on common criminalisation.  
Though it was never expressly mentioned as a need, the analysis revealed the 
need to better safeguard the approximation acquis. Inconsistencies arise where 
member states are allowed to raise a double criminality issue where a double 
criminality obligation exists. The approximation acquis as presented in EULOCS 
has the potential to accommodate that need. It is feasible to safeguard the 
approximation acquis by inserting a standard provision in instruments 
governing international cooperation in criminal matters stipulating that double 
criminality testing is not acceptable where approximation exists as visualised in 
EULOCS. 
 
5 To overcome evidence gathering difficulties 
The third obstacle identified relates to the evidence gathering difficulties. 
Therefore, the third function for the common criminalisation acquis as presented 
in EULOCS that will be elaborated on is overcoming evidence gathering 
difficulties. 
Cross-border gathering and use of evidence is challenging due to significant 
differences between the member states’ legal systems. The member states 
expressed the need for EU intervention through inserting a legal basis thereto in 
Art. 82 (2) TFEU. The doctoral research underpinned that clever use of the 
common criminalisation acquis can support discussions on the feasibility to 
reduce the recourse to offence-limits to use e.g. investigative measures as a 





refusal ground. Furthermore, it can be a guideline when delineating the scope of 
the minimum standards developed to ensure admissibility of evidence. 
5.1 Offence-limits to the use of investigative measures 
The possibility to use the approximation acquis beyond the abandonment of 
the double criminality requirement was first looked into in the context of the EU 
study on the laws of evidence.100 In the European evidence warrant it is 
stipulated that offence-limits to the use of investigative measures are not 
acceptable for house search and seizure in relation to the 32 listed offences.101  
The existence of offence-limits to the use of investigative measures refers to the 
situation where – though having equally criminalised the offence involved – the 
specific investigative measure is not available in the national law of the 
executing member state for that specific offence.  
The opportunity was used to first test the political feasibility of the 
suggestions made with respect to the double criminality requirement. The policy 
option to link the abandonment of the double criminality requirement to the 
approximation acquis as opposed to an undefined set of 32 offence labels was 
received favourably. Furthermore, along that same line of argumentation 
member states where asked whether they considered it to be an acceptable 
future policy option to extend the unacceptability of offence-limits as a refusal 
ground also to other investigative measures if the scope of the unacceptability 
mirrored the approximation acquis. This policy option too was considered to be 
acceptable. 
In light of the acceptability of that policy option, a coherent and consistent 
EU policy would have strived to equally introduce such a limitation in the use of 
the refusal ground when elaborating on the refusal grounds in the European 
investigation order (EIO). Art. 10 of the current political agreement elaborates on 
the refusal grounds.102 According to Art. 10. 1b. (b) cooperation can be refused if 
                                                             
100 In a questionnaire sent to representatives of each of the member states, it was asked to 
elaborate on the extent to which the use of refusal grounds could be limited making use of the 
approximation acquis.The final report of that study was published as Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, 
W., & Van Damme, Y. (2010). EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal 
matters. Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and free movement of 
evidence? (Vol. 37, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
101 Art 14.2. resp. 11.3 (ii) Framework decision of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence 
warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in 
criminal matters OJ L 350 of 30.12.2008. 
102 See: Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia and the Kingdom of 
Sweden for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European 





the use of the measure is restricted under the law of the executing state to a list 
or category of offences or to offences punishable by a certain threshold, which 
does not include the offence covered by the EIO. Using the limitation of that 
refusal ground in the EEW as a baseline, complemented with the political 
feasibility that was demonstrated in the study on the laws of evidence, which 
was subsequently endorsed by the member states at a Commission expert 
meeting103, it would have been logical to stipulate either that member states must 
legislate in a way that makes the listed investigative measures available for the 
offences that have been subject to approximation, or to stipulate that this 
offence-limit inspired refusal ground is inacceptable in relation to offences that 
have been subject to approximation regardless of the relation between the 
approximated offences and the investigative measures in the national law.  
5.2 Minimum standards to ensure mutual admissibility 
of evidence 
Additionally, the EU study on the laws of evidence looked into the obstacles 
with respect to the cross-border admissibility of evidence gathered abroad and 
the possible role for the approximation acquis or more generally the common 
criminalisation acquis therein. The differences in evidence gathering techniques 
and the consequences for the admissibility of evidence have for long been 
subject to debate. The solutions introduced so far have not been able to fully 
tackle the obstacles. Principles such as forum regit actum according to which the 
evidence gathering member state must live up to the procedures and formalities 
requested by the member state in which the court proceeding will take place, 
have been criticized for neglecting the problems related to existing evidence and 
for failing to ensure EU-wide admissibility due to a focus on the one-on-one 
situation between the evidence gathering and prosecuting member state.104 The 
only alternative consists of introducing minimum standards for the gathering of 
evidence complemented with a per se admissibility of evidence gathered 
accordingly. Using the legal basis introduced in Art. 82.2(a) TFEU minimum 
standards can be adopted to ensure mutual admissibility of evidence between 
the member states; it can be agreed which criteria should be met before the 
result of e.g. a house search is admissible as evidence in any court throughout 
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103 European Commission Expert Conference: Experts on Evidence, Brussels 9.2.2010. 
104 See more elaborately: “EULOCS & admissibility of evidence” in De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, 
G. (2012). EULOCS in support of international cooperation in criminal matters. In G. 
Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. Ryckman (Eds.), Rethinking international cooperation in 
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the EU. Admittedly, there is not necessarily a link with the common 
criminalisation acquis, but there could be, if member states prefer a gradual 
approach.  
The question has indeed arisen what the scope of this policy option should 
be; whether it should be limited to offences that are prioritised for representing 
the most serious offences with a cross-border dimension and were subject to 
approximation, or should also apply to any other offence. From an EU policy 
perspective it is important to at least ensure that with respect to those serious 
offences with a cross-border dimension that have been subject to approximation, 
evidence gathering is organised in a way that ensures admissibility throughout 
the EU and in doing so ensures the effective fight against those offences. 
Ultimately the treaty based function of approximation is linked to “the need to 
combat them on a common basis”.105 An effective fight may need a larger common 
basis than only a common criminalisation commitment. A more comprehensive 
policy is required. 
The legal basis provided for in Art. 82.2 TFEU is not limited to offences with a 
cross-border dimension, but to cooperation with a cross-border dimension. 
Therefore, it will not at all be a problem to introduce minimum evidence 
gathering standards in a way that ensures cross-border admissibility of evidence 
with respect to the offences that are prioritised in the EU offence policy. Whether 
those minimum rules will also be introduced for other offences needs to be 
recommended, but ultimately is a choice of the member states. More 
importantly, the formulation of that legal basis does raise questions with respect 
to the possibility to introduce minimum standards with respect to the gathering 
of evidence for the priority offences in a mere domestic situation. What starts out 
as a seemingly mere domestic situation can always amount to a cross-border 
situation in the course of a criminal investigation. It is not uncommon that 
proceedings are subsequently transferred to another member state. Therefore, it 
is also important to ensure that evidence gathered nationally upon a national 
initiative (as opposed to evidence gathered in execution of a cross-border 
cooperation request) is mutually admissible as well. At least for offences that 
reflect the EU priorities, it should be considered to introduce such minimum 
standards anyhow. The questionable legal basis for minimum standards with 
respect to evidence gathering mirrors the questionable legal basis for minimum 
standards with respect to the rights of individuals in criminal proceedings. In 
that context, member states agreed to also introduce the procedural safeguards 
in a mere domestic situation.106  
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5.3 Policy needs and feasibility  
Member states have recognised the need to rethink cross-border evidence 
gathering and admissibility of evidence. The fight against crime needs more 
than approximation to be effective. There are various ways in which the 
common criminalisation acquis as reflected in EULOCS could be supportive. 
When member states want to reduce the use of offence-limits as a refusal ground 
as introduced in the European evidence warrant, it is recommended that the 
current policy is redirected in a way that ensures consistency throughout the 
instruments governing evidence gathering and avoids that the acquis reached in 
previous instruments is lowered in new instruments. 
A comprehensive policy to effectively fight crime on a common basis 
requires that admissibility of evidence is secured where necessary through the 
adoption of minimum standards to the extent the differences in the current 
national mechanisms are an obstacle for admissibility. 
 
6 To clarify the mandates of the EU level actors 
The fourth obstacle that was identified relates to the clarification of the 
mandates of the EU level actors. Therefore, the third function for the common 
criminalisation acquis as presented in EULOCS that will be elaborated on is 
clarifying the mandates of the EU level actors.  
The need to clarify the mandates has been identified and approximation has 
been brought up in that discussion. However the assertion that “approximation 
also helps to ensure that the competences of institutions such as Europol and 
Eurojust can be clearly defined”107, is not sufficiently developed and needs to be 
complemented with a thorough analysis first and foremost on the scope of the 
need for definition and where that need is established on the actual use of the 
approximation acquis to that end. This doctoral research has underpinned the 
need to delineate information exchange obligations and the so-called stronger 
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powers and pointed to the feasibility to use the common criminalisation acquis 
to that end. 
6.1 No general need to clarify the mandates 
The need to clarify the mandates is dependent on the specific task of the EU 
level actor. If the task is limited to one individual case following the choice of a 
member state to call upon the EU level actor for coordination, the delineation of 
the mandated offences is not vital for the EU level actor to be able to properly 
support the member state request. It can be argued that the possibility for the 
member states to call upon the EU level actors for help should not be limited 
based on common offence definitions. A member state confronted with a cross-
border terrorism case should be allowed to seek e.g. the coordinating support 
from Eurojust even where the specific form of terrorism involved falls outside 
the scope of the approximation acquis and is not criminalised throughout the 
EU. For its coordinating tasks the offence labels are indicative and the scope of 
the task dependent on the national definition of the offence labels.  
The situation changes however as soon as the functioning of the EU level 
actor exceeds an individual case and extends to cross-case analyses as is expected 
from the EU level actors when they are tasked with drawing up annual reports 
on specific crime phenomena.108 In addition thereto, a clearly defined mandate is 
even more important to delineate the so-called stronger powers. 
6.2 Delineating information exchange obligations 
Conducting a reliable analysis on the data received from the member states 
with respect to such a specific crime phenomenon, requires that the data set is 
both complete and consists of comparable data. The concerns raised with respect 
to the comparability of crime statistics apply mutatis mutandis also to this 
situation. It is widely accepted that neither of both criteria can be guaranteed 
based on the current data flow to the EU level actors.109 The information flow to 
EU level actors is problematic. At present, it is entirely left to the member states’ 
discretion to decide which cases fall within the scope of the mandates and is 
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therefore sent on to the EU level actors, and which cases are deemed irrelevant 
for the EU level actors. As a result, no one really knows to what extent the data 
included in the information systems is complete and comparable. Based on those 
concerns, changes in the legal framework and organisation of the data flow are 
looked into. With respect to Eurojust, the new Art. 13.6 of the Eurojust Decision 
introduces a mandatory information sharing. It stipulates that “member states 
shall ensure that their national member is informed without undue delay of any case in 
which at least three member states are directly involved and the offence involved [...] is 
included in the following list: trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, drug trafficking, trafficking in firearms, their parts and 
components and ammunition, corruption, fraud affecting the financial interests of the 
European Communities, counterfeiting of the euro, money laundering and attacks 
against information systems.” Through this provision, it is hoped to tackle 
problems of incomplete data sets. Though it is commendable that the problems 
with the information flow are recognised and attempts are made to 
accommodate the problems, it is unfortunate that this opportunity was not 
seized to clearly delineate the scope of the obligation to pass on information and 
in doing so accommodate the problems of comparability of data raised at several 
occasions. Instead of merely referring to an offence label and leaving the 
definition thereof to the discretion of the member states, it be recommended to 
clearly delineate the scope of the offence labels using the approximation acquis 
as a guideline. In that respect, the approach used to delineate participation in a 
criminal organisation as a mandated offence in the original 2002 Eurojust Decision 
can be recalled. In Art. 4 of the original 2002 Eurojust Decision the scope of 
participation in a criminal organisation was delineated by referring to the 1998 
joint action approximating that offence. In doing so, the scope of the mandated 
offence was crystal clear as was the scope of the information obligation in 
relation thereto. However, that technique was not perfect. It has been argued 
that defining the scope of the offences by copy pasting references to 
approximation instruments into other EU instruments, cannot stand the test of 
time,110 because the approximation acquis is not static but rather in constant 
evolution. The joint action referred to has been repealed by a framework 
decision as a result of which a reference thereto would be outdated. Because the 
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approximation acquis changes so rapidly, the easiest way111 to guarantee a 
consistent policy is to lift the scope delineation of offence labels out of the EU 
instruments and alternatively include a reference to EULOCS instead. As 
opposed to complementing each of the offence labels mentioned in Art. 13.6 
Eurojust Decision with a reference to a framework decision, a post-Lisbon 
Directive or any other approximation instrument, it gets preference to 
complement the provision stipulating that ‘the offence labels are to be defined as 
indicated in EULOCS’. This can easily be achieved by complementing the 
EULOCS categorisation with a column in which the scope of the information 
exchange obligations pursuant to Art. 13.6 Eurojust Decision is indicated. 
Additionally, it can be recommended to upgrade the (bilateral) 
communication channels currently used by the member states in such a way that 
ensures that information for those selected (parts of) offences is automatically 
forwarded to relevant EU level actors, at least in such a way that ensures that the 
EU level actors receives a notification of the fact that communication with 
respect to one of its mandated offences is ongoing between member states.  
This recommendation links in with the discussions currently held not only 
with respect to the development of EPRIS, the European Police Records Index 
System that is currently subject to a feasibility study112, but also with respect 
UMF II, short for Universal Message Format II as currently discussed in DAPIX, 
the Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection.  
The main goal of EPRIS is the creation of an index system that allows law 
enforcement authorities to communicate more easily and test – via a hit/no-hit 
system – whether their counterparts in other EU member states have 
information that could be relevant to the case they are working on. All index 
systems have some common fields; regardless of what the specific focus of the 
index system is, there will always be offence fields. There are a lot of advantages 
of using EULOCS as the backbone of the offence fields in the index system. To 
streamline the information exchange with the EU level actors, any 
communication system is built around an offence categorisation that mirrors the 
delineation of information exchanged obligations allows a swift organisation of a 
parallel information flow to the EU level actors. With respect to a system such as 
EPRIS, designing the system in that way ensures that automatic notifications are 
sent to the EU level actors when member states communicate with respect to any 
of the mandated offences for which a mandatory information exchange 
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obligation is introduced. This is where EULOCS has a significant added value. 
Not only will it allow member states to distinguish between cases that relate to 
the jointly identified parts of offences which may be necessary for the correct 
application of some national provisions (cfr. offence-limitations touched upon 
above), it can also ensure correct communication with the EU level actors. If 
EULOCS with its jointly identified parts of offences is used to identify for which 
offences information must be sent to the EU level actors and at the same time 
EULOCS is also used as the backbone of the offence fields in the index system, 
the connection can easily be made. Information can be sent to the EU level actor 
without it requiring any additional effort of the authorities involved. 
Furthermore, the same scope limitation can be used to allow the EU level actors 
access to EPRIS by means of allowing them to enter their own query, specifically 
limited to the offences within their mandate. 
A similar suggestion has been made to DAPIX, the Working Party on 
Information Exchange and Data Protection, currently discussing the Universal 
Message Format II, an integrated gateway that combines the templates of all 
exchange mechanisms into one uniform interface.113 The idea behind UMF II 
starts from the observation that a lot of the communication channels use similar 
templates, at least have a large number of common fields in their templates. 
Here too, the suggestion was made to use EULOCS as the backbone of the 
offence related fields in the uniform template, which was received favourably. It 
will support communication between the member states as it will allow them to 
differentiate between cases that relate to jointly identified parts of offences and 
other cases, and it will allow the creation of a technicality that sends a copy to in 
casu Europol where the case relates to an offence included in its mandate as 
opposed to having to manually put Europol in copy as is done now e.g. in 
Sienna. Additionally, the same uniform gateway could be used by Europol to 
send its own queries to the member states seeking to assess whether or not the 
national authorities hold information with respect to those defined mandated 
offences.  
6.3 Delineating the strong powers 
Especially when actors are awarded autonomous (semi)-operational powers, 
the delineation of those powers in light of the offences they relate to is 
considered to be extremely important. The idea to award Eurojust the power to 
initiate criminal investigations, as well as proposing the initiation of 
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prosecutions conducted by competent national authorities, particularly those 
relating to offences against the financial interests of the Union as foreseen in Art. 
85.1(a) TFEU or to take binding decisions with respect to positive conflicts of 
jurisdiction as foreseen in Art. 85.1(c) TFEU also calls for a clear scope 
demarcation of the offences involved. In light thereof, it is important to 
underline that the scope of those so-called stronger powers does not have to 
encompass the entire approximated offence. Consistent policy making does not 
mean that the same definition is copied all the time. Consistent policy making 
requires that there is a clear and well considered link between all scope 
delineations featuring in EU policies. That is the reason why the idea launched 
by the European Parliament back in 2002 with respect to the delineation of the 
Europol mandate to introduce an automatic link between approximation and 
mandated offences in that the offence labels would be automatically redefined in 
light of the approximated definition for that offence label,114 cannot be 
supported. As argued above in relation to the delineation of the offence labels in 
Art. 13.6 of the Eurojust decision, it is possible to select only some of the jointly 
identified parts of offences depending on the competence involved.  
6.4 Policy needs and feasibility 
Though the need to clarify the mandates of the EU level actors has been 
repeatedly subject to debate, this doctoral research pointed to the fact that there 
is no general need to clarify the mandates. Not all tasks required a strict 
delineation along the common criminalisation acquis. Where there is a need, 
there is a clear added value to using the knowledge on the common 
criminalisation acquis and the jointly identified parts of offences as a guideline. 
Referring to undefined offence labels cannot overcome the problems currently 
experienced with the information exchange to EU level actors. It is perfectly 
feasible to overcome these problems using the EULOCS categorisation as a basis.  
Furthermore, the introduction of stronger powers will only be deemed 
acceptable by the member states if those powers are clearly delineated. The 
current label approach is not considered to be an option. EULOCS categorisation 
is an acceptable alternative. Using a EULOCS which clearly represents the 
approximation acquis and distinguishes between jointly identified parts of 
offences and other parts of offences, and even further differentiates between 
different categories of jointly identified parts of offences, is a feasible way for this 
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scope demarcation to be done in a clear, consistent and above all transparent 
way.115 
 
7 To support the identification of the equivalent 
sentence  
The fifth obstacle that was identified relates to the identification of the 
equivalent sentence. Therefore the fifth function for the common criminalisation 
acquis that will be elaborated on is the support for the identification of the 
equivalent national sentence.  
The doctoral research underpinned that though it has not been explicitly 
expressed in any policy document or literature, here too, there is a need to 
develop a strategy to overcome the obstacles caused by offence diversities. The 
feasibility of using the common criminalisation acquis to that end, is dependent 
on the level of detail in the conviction information. 
7.1 Adaptation complexity 
Knowing which offence a case relates to remains important throughout the 
criminal procedure all the way to the sentence execution stage. International 
cooperation in criminal matters also encompasses the instruments that govern 
the cross-border execution of sentences. Those instruments too contain double 
criminality provisions – the acceptability of which should be excluded for 
offences that have been subject to approximation. In addition thereto, the 
instruments governing cross-border execution contain so-called adaptation 
provisions. Whenever the nature or duration of the sentence is incompatible 
with the law of the executing member state, the latter may adapt the sentence in 
accordance with its national law.116 Practitioners repeatedly expressed their 
concern with respect to the feasibility of correctly applying the adaptation 
provisions.117 
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- Art. 8.1 FD Fin Pen stipulates that [...] the executing state may decide to reduce 
the amount of the penalty enforced to the maximum amount provided for acts of the 
same kind under the national law of the executing state, when the acts fall within the 
jurisdiction of that state; 
- Art. 8.2 and 3 FD Deprivation of liberty stipulate that [w]here the sentence is 
incompatible with the law of the executing state in terms of its duration, the 
competent authority of the executing state may decide to adapt the sentence only 
where that sentence exceeds the maximum penalty provided for similar offences 
under its national law and [w]here the sentence is incompatible with the law of the 
executing state in terms of its nature, the competent authority of the executing state 
may adapt it to the punishment or measure provided for under its own law for 
similar offences; 
- Art. 13.1 FD Supervision stipulates that [i]f the nature of the supervision 
measures is incompatible with the law of the executing state, the competent authority 
in that member state may adapt them in line with the types of supervision measures 
which apply, under the law of the executing state, to equivalent offences; and 
- Art 9.1 FD Alternatives stipulates that [i]f the nature or duration of the relevant 
probation measure or alternative sanction, or the duration of the probation period, 
are incompatible with the law of the executing state, the competent authority of that 
state may adapt them in line with the nature and duration of the probation measures 
and alternative sanctions, or duration of the probation period, which apply, under the 
law of the executing state, to equivalent offences. 
 
The correct application of those adaptation provisions requires that 
sufficiently detailed information is provided on the offence involved to allow the 
executing member state to compare the imposed sentence with the sentence that 
is foreseen in its national law.  
7.2 Policy needs and feasibility 
The introduction of the cross-border execution mechanisms and the 
adaptation provisions therein need to be complemented with a policy that helps 
to identify cases that relate to the common criminalisation acquis and thus for 
which sentence equivalence testing can be automated. In light thereof, it has 
been argued that a reference to a specific EULOCS category when 
communicating the conviction to the executing member state can speed up the 
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process of identifying the corresponding national sentencing provisions and 
support the application of the adaptation provisions.118  
The need to include sufficiently detailed conviction information becomes 
even more apparent when looking into the application of the provisions 
governing the taking account of prior convictions. 
 
8 To scope the taking account of prior convictions 
The sixth obstacle identified relates to taking account of prior convictions. 
Therefore the sixth and final function for the common criminalisation acquis that 
will be elaborated on is scoping the taking account of prior convictions.  
There is a whole range of so-called prior conviction provisions, i.e. legal 
provisions that are to a greater or lesser extent dependent on the existence and 
typology of a person’s prior convictions. The doctoral research underpinned that 
the way the obstacles resulting from the criminalisation diversity need to be 
tackled varies according to the specific context. Though both perfectly feasible, 
the line of argumentation for the taking account of prior convictions in the 
course of a new criminal procedure differs from the line of argumentation for the 
taking account of prior convictions in the course of a public procurement procedure. 
8.1 A range of prior conviction provisions 
What immediately springs to mind when referring to the taking account of 
prior convictions, is that prior convictions are taken into account in the course of 
a new criminal procedure. The existence of prior convictions can have an effect 
in the different stages of that criminal procedure. At the pre-trial stage, the 
existence of prior convictions can influence amongst others the qualification of 
the facts, the application of the ne bis in idem principle and the decision on 
provisional detention. At the trial stage, the existence of previous convictions 
can influence amongst others both the type of the sanction as it may restrict the 
use of suspended sentences as well as the level of the sanction as a result of 
accumulation or confusion with the previous sanction. At the post-trial stage, the 
existence of prior convictions can influence amongst others the application of the 
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rules governing the execution of the sentence in that it may reduce the 
possibility to obtain adjustments of the sanction or be allowed early release.119 
Furthermore, it is often overlooked that the effect of prior convictions also 
extends beyond the criminal procedure. Reference can easily be made to the fact 
that a certificate of non-prior conviction is required for a number of professions. 
So-called vulnerable sectors are protected in that persons with relevant 
convictions are excluded from being professionally active in those sectors. 
Previous research identified amongst others the educational and medical sector 
as being vulnerable.120 Similar provisions excluding convicted candidates can 
also be found in public procurement regulations. Once convicted for an offence 
that has a functional link with procurement in general or the task underlying a 
specific public contract, a candidate will be deemed ineligible. 
Though it may seem as though the reasoning is the same of all these 
examples, there is a fundamental difference between the public procurement 
case and all other examples mentioned. The rules governing the public 
procurement case are inextricably linked to the principles of the proper 
functioning of the internal market, which is dominated by amongst others a very 
strict equal treatment principle. Such an equal treatment principle is not found 
in the other examples mentioned. That consideration clarifies why both the 
taking account of prior convictions in the course of a new criminal procedure 
and the taking account of prior convictions in the course of a public procurement 
procedure were singled out for an in-depth analysis. In doing so, both a criminal 
and a non-criminal procedure is analysed; both a procedure that is and is not 
linked to the functioning of the internal market. 
8.2 In the course of a new criminal procedure 
Firstly, the taking account of prior convictions in the course of a new criminal 
procedure varies significantly throughout the EU because it is governed by the 
different provisions found in the national criminal justice systems of each of the 
member states. Because until recently those national provisions focused mainly 
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on the effect of national convictions in the course of a new criminal procedure, 
they are complemented with the commitment – made in a framework decision – 
to attach to foreign EU convictions effects that are equivalent to the effects 
attached to national convictions.121 It should be stressed that this commitment is 
not unlimited and not just any foreign EU conviction will (need to) be taken into 
account. What is relevant to establish the existence of obstacles caused by 
offence diversities, is the effect of foreign convictions for which the underlying 
behaviour is not criminalised in the member state hosting the new criminal 
procedure. The decision about the effect of such conviction is completely left to 
the discretion of the 27 individual member states. At EU level it was explicitly 
agreed that member states could not be obliged to take account of a foreign 
conviction that could not have existed in their own jurisdiction.122 The choice to 
either or not take account of a foreign conviction for which the underlying 
behaviour does not constitute an offence in the prosecuting member state is 
dependent on the philosophy underlying the prior conviction provisions and 
whether the effect is linked to the offence or the sanction imposed. Some of those 
national provisions are sanction-dependent meaning that the effect of the prior 
conviction is dependent on the sanction imposed in the past. Provisions that 
only take account of the sanction imposed leave the door open to take account of 
convictions for which the underlying behaviour is not criminalised in the 
prosecuting member state. In those jurisdictions offence diversities are not 
necessarily an obstacle. Other national provisions are offence-dependent 
meaning that the effect of the prior conviction is dependent on the specific 
offence underlying the prior conviction. Only a specified combination of an old 
and new offence will fall within the scope of the prior conviction provisions. In 
those situations, taking account of a foreign conviction for which the underlying 
behaviour does not constitute an offence in the prosecuting member state is 
usually not possible.123 As a result, offence diversities can be an obstacle for the 
correct application of the prior-conviction provisions in some member states. 
Consequently, comprehensive, consistent and well-balanced EU policy making 
requires that this obstacle is dealt with in parallel to introducing a taking 
account obligation.  
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The EU has now introduced an obligation which member states cannot live 
up to or at least are destined to struggle with. Analysis has revealed that a 
significant amount of the prior conviction provisions is offence-dependent 
meaning that member states have made the taking account of foreign 
convictions dependent on a double criminality requirement.124 Foreign 
convictions will only be taken into account if the underlying behaviour is 
equally criminalised in the prosecuting member state. This means that the 
correct application of those provisions requires the availability of sufficiently 
detailed prior conviction information so that double criminality verification can 
take place. Precisely the level of detail in the criminal records information is 
where the EU has failed its member states. To obtain information on prior 
convictions, the EU has directed the member states to the existing criminal 
records information exchange mechanisms.125 Even though the criminal records 
landscape has received an important facelift in recent years and ECRIS – short 
for the new European Criminal Records Information System – should be 
operational from April 2012 onwards, the new framework will not be able to 
support the member states when conducting the crucial double criminality 
verifications when seeking to live up to the commitment to take account of 
foreign convictions and attach effects thereto that are equivalent to the effects of 
a national conviction,126 whilst still correctly applying the national prior 
conviction provisions.  
It may be reasonably expected from the EU criminal records policy to have 
anticipated to this problem.  More attention could have been paid to supporting 
double criminality verification when designing ECRIS considering that the 
taking account of prior convictions is to a large extent dependent on a double 
criminality requirement, especially since the importance thereof was elaborated 
on in expert meetings.127 Therefore, the ECRIS coding system has been criticized 
for lacking the detail necessary to support double criminality verification. In 
parallel the potential of EULOCS was highlighted. One of the examples 
elaborated on in the course of the doctoral research relates to money laundering. 
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Whereas ECRIS in its current format only includes one code for all types of 
money laundering, the use of the EULOCS coding system holds great potential 
for it includes a whole range of codes for the different types of money 
laundering, allowing that a distinction is made between a jointly identified part of 
money laundering that falls within the scope of the approximation acquis and is 
therefore known to meet the double criminality requirement, and other parts of 
money laundering, for which an additional description of the facts is necessary 
to allow double criminality verification. It is perfectly feasible to ask a convicting 
judge to always clarify what type of money laundering the conviction relates to. 
It could be made mandatory to include that kind of information in the national 
criminal records data bases and subsequently include it in the criminal records 
information that is exchanged. Especially in cases where the national prior 
conviction provisions stipulate that a prior conviction must128 lead to an 
aggravation of the new sentence provided that the prior conviction relates to 
behaviour that is equally criminalised under its national law, the current 
exchange of criminal records information via ECRIS creates a deadlock. The lack 
of detail in the current criminal records information makes it impossible to 
correctly apply the national prior conviction provisions in the course of the new 
criminal procedure and the prosecuting judge needs to request additional 
information where such a request could have been avoided. That clarifies why 
so much emphasis is placed on the importance of elaborating a criminal records 
exchange mechanism that can support double criminality verification, on the 
weaknesses of the new ECRIS system that was above all introduced with a view 
to facilitating the appreciation of foreign convictions and why the strengths of 
EULOCS were highlighted in that respect. 
A well thought-through EU prior conviction policy takes account of the 
position offences assume in the national criminal justice systems and 
complements the obligations it imposed with the necessary flanking measures to 
in casu ensure the availability of sufficiently detailed criminal records 
information. The obligation to take account of foreign convictions in a new 
criminal procedure and attach effects to those convictions that are equivalent to 
the effects that would be attached to national convictions requires a revision of 
the criminal records policy using a more broad perspective. The development of 
an information exchange mechanism making use of the knowledge on the 
commonalities in criminalisation between the national codes of the member 
states, presupposes that for each prior conviction it is known whether or not the 
behaviour falls within the scope of the approximation acquis as presented in 
EULOCS. In practice a convicting authority could be asked to add a EULOCS 
category to the qualification of the facts and in doing so clarify whether or not 
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the behaviour relates to the approximation acquis. However, the concern with 
respect to the current implementation strategies, as elaborated on when 
discussing the (in)ability of member states to produce comparable statistical data 
with respect to the jointly identified parts of offences resurfaces here. If member 
states – when implementing the minimum rules with respect to the constituent 
elements of an offence – decide to introduce a more strict regime and criminalise 
acts even if one of the minimum constituent elements is not present (cfr. the 
absence of the use of coercion, force or threat with respect to trafficking in 
human beings in the Belgian criminal code elaborated on above), the convicting 
authority will not need to elaborate on that constituent element as a result of 
which it will be impossible to establish whether or not is was present and thus 
whether or not the conviction relates to the jointly identified part of the offence. A 
member state that has included the use of coercion, force or threat into its 
constituent elements of trafficking in human beings will never be able to 
establish whether a Belgian conviction meets the double criminality 
requirement. This means that – in the event the prior conviction provisions 
stipulate that foreign convictions can only be taken into account to the extent the 
double criminality requirement is met – Belgian trafficking conviction can never 
be used as a basis to apply the prior conviction provisions. Though in criminal 
law, the principle that the slightest doubt should be interpreted in favour of the 
person involved and the example with Belgian trafficking conviction must lead 
to disregarding that prior conviction, the question arises whether this situation is 
acceptable.  
Here too the question arises whether the extent to which member states are 
free to choose an implementation strategy should be revisited. Once more the 
question arises whether member states could be obliged to implement the 
approximation instruments in a way that allows them to always differentiate 
between a conviction that relates to the jointly identified part of an offence and a 
conviction that relates to the offence as criminalised in a more extended form in 
that specific member state. 
8.3 In the course of a public procurement procedure 
Secondly, the importance of a clear distinction between convictions that 
relate to jointly identified parts of offences and convictions that relate to other parts 
of offences becomes even more apparent in the case study on the offence-related 
exclusion grounds found in the provisions governing public procurement 
procedures. The national provisions governing the award of public contracts all 
stipulate that candidates convicted for either of the specifically listed offences 





are no longer eligible to participate in a public procurement procedure.129 The 
commonalities found in those provisions are the result of the 2004 Procurement 
Directive which has introduced a set of mandatory offence-related exclusion 
grounds.130 Here too, member states are allowed to introduce a more strict 
regime at national level, as long as they have regard for Community law and the 
principles included in the Directive. 
In contrast to the freedom member states have to decide whether or not to 
also take account of a foreign conviction that does not meet the double 
criminality requirement in the course of a new criminal procedure, no such freedom 
exists in the course of a public procurement procedure, due to the requirement to 
have regard for Community law and the principles included in the Directive. 
What is more, not only are member states not allowed to take account of a 
foreign conviction that does not pass the double criminality test, more generally 
they are not allowed to take account of any conviction – foreign or national – that 
does not pass the double criminality test using the largest common denominator 
in criminalization between the relevant criminal codes as a basis for 
evaluation.131 This complexity is the result of the equal treatment principle that 
governs the functioning of the internal market and in doing so also governs the 
functioning of public procurement procedures.132  
The equal treatment principle requires that the contracting authority treats all 
competing candidates equally by ensuring that equal behaviour has equal 
consequences. This means that their convictions can only be taken into account 
to the extent it can be established that the same behaviour when presented by 
the co-competitors would also have been considered criminal in the jurisdictions 
they operate in and may be expected to equally result in a conviction. A such 
assessment requires that the criminal law applicable to the acts of all competing 
candidates is compared and the largest common denominator of 
criminalizations identified. Ultimately the equal treatment principle requires 
that only convictions are taken into account for which the underlying behaviour 
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relates to the largest common denominator in criminalizations in the 
participating member states.133 Therefore it is not only possible that a foreign 
prior conviction fails the double criminality test and must be disregarded, it is 
also possible that a national prior conviction fails the double criminality 
requirement and must be disregarded.134 This situation further clarifies why it is 
required to include sufficiently detailed information on the underlying 
behaviour in the criminal records information and include also whether or not 
the conviction relates to behaviour that is known to be criminalised throughout 
the EU as part of the approximation acquis. With respect to convictions for 
which the underlying behaviour falls within the approximation acquis it is a 
given that they may be used as a basis to exclude candidates participating in a 
public procurement procedure. With respect to any other conviction, the 
uncertainty of it either or not passing the double criminality test must be lifted 
through an assessment of the underlying behaviour. 
Furthermore, it must be added, that the ‘uncertainty’ escape in favour of the 
person involved as mentioned with respect to the taking account of prior 
convictions in the course of a new criminal procedure cannot be used in the 
context of the taking account of prior convictions in the course of a public 
procurement procedure. As a general rule of (criminal) law, the slightest bit of 
doubt should be interpreted in favour of the person involved. This means that if 
criminal records information is not sufficiently detailed to establish whether or 
not the double criminality requirement is met, the foreign conviction will not be 
used to apply the prior conviction provisions in the course of a new criminal 
procedure. In the event double criminality should be met without it being 
possible to establish, the person involved can benefit from the diversity between 
the criminal justice systems in the member states. That ‘uncertainty’ exception 
can however not be introduced in a public procurement procedure. The situation 
may occur in which a conviction of a person cannot be characterised as either or 
not falling within the scope of the largest common denominator of relevant 
criminalizations because the criminal record information is not sufficiently 
detailed or because the national criminalisation provision does not include one 
of the constituent elements necessary to differentiate between a jointly identified 
form of the offence and a mere national form of the offence. As a result thereof 
the convictions will be disregarded and will not be used as a basis for excluding 
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the candidate. This can jeopardise the equal treatment between that convicted 
candidate and a competitor who has been convicted for the exact same 
behaviour that is – based on the specific criminal records information 
complementing that conviction – identifiable as falling within the scope of the 
largest common denominator and thus giving rise to an exclusion. The 
difficulties in the identification of convictions that either or not relate to the 
largest common denominator of criminalizations should be read together with 
the strict requirements of equal treatment as a result of which the largest 
common denominator of criminalizations that may lead to exclusion should be 
further limited in light of the ability of member states to differentiate their 
national convictions as either or not falling within that scope. Especially here, 
the question arises whether the implementation freedom the member states have 
weighs up to this far reaching consequence. 
8.4 Policy needs and feasibility 
As the EU has insisted that foreign convictions be taken into account when 
applying prior conviction provisions and the application of those prior 
conviction provisions is clearly dependent on the offence involved, an EU policy 
needs to be developed as a complement to the prior conviction commitments.  
The EU policy ought to ensure that sufficiently detailed information is 
available for any prior conviction that needs to be taken into account. It also 
ought to look into ways of finding the right balance between the equal treatment 
principle that ensures the proper functioning of the internal market and the 
desire to exclude candidates for having been convicted for any of the identified 
offences; the right balance also between allowing member states to choose an 
implementation strategy and obliging member states to implement in a way that 
ensures that it is always possible to differentiate between an offence that does or 
does not fall within the scope of the jointly identified part of an offence. 
Furthermore, even where the distinction can be made, it is important to ensure 
that the information on the behaviour underlying the prior conviction is 
sufficiently detailed to establish whether or not the conviction relates to the 
largest common denominator in criminalizations in a later phase. Finally, should 
member states want to increase the scope of offences for which convictions are 
safe to use as a ground for exclusion in light of the strict equal treatment 
principle, here too it could be considered to use the possibility to also delineate 
what is known to be commonly criminalised in the member states as opposed to 
reserving common criminalisation only for the creation of new offences.  
 





9 The only condition: An EU offence policy  
Today, there is no EU offence policy. The closest to such an EU offence policy 
is the current approximation policy, which cannot suffice. Not only does it look 
at approximation from a too narrow perspective (because there is more to 
approximation than framework decisions and post-Lisbon directives), it also 
barely thought about the actual use of the approximation acquis and where it 
did so, the ideas are underdeveloped (there is more to it than avoiding 
loopholes) and more importantly not applied in practice. 
The analysis underlying this doctoral thesis has revealed that there is a need 
for an EU offence policy that uses the knowledge on what is common in terms of 
criminalisation in the member states to avoid deadlocks due to criminalisation 
diversity. In addition thereto, it must not be forgotten that there is a lot more 
commonly criminalised than reflected in the approximation acquis, even when 
the widest possible interpretation is used. Approximation is a technique that fills 
in the gaps to strengthen the fight against crime. It is not used when there are no 
gaps to begin with. It cannot provide insight in the common offences that have 
historically developed.  
The centre piece of an EU offence policy is the common criminalisation 
acquis, in which it is mapped and visualised what is commonly criminalised 
throughout the EU member states, possibly even beyond the approximation 
acquis. Subsequently, the EU offence policy ensures that the common 
criminalisation acquis is deployed where useful or even necessary. To the extent 
that it is considered useful or necessary to expand the common criminalisation 
acquis, either existing common criminalisation can be identified or new common 
criminalisation can be acquired via approximation. In light thereof the flexibility 
regulation that exists with respect to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
will significantly complicate the correct appreciation of the acquis.135 As a result, 
it will need to be to clearly visualised that Denmark is excluded and whether or 
not the United Kingdom and Ireland are included. Keeping track of the 
approximation acquis will only become more difficult for the future which adds 
to the need to establish and maintain a EULOCS that clusters all existing 
knowledge on the criminalisation commonalities between the member states. 
For both techniques (identification or approximation) it is important not to 
limit the effort to the mere delineation of what is common. A parallel debate on 
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the employability of the new addition to the acquis will ensure its added value. 
To ensure the feasibility to use the common criminalisation acquis, the offence 
involved must be described in a sufficiently detailed manner. In the past, the 
description of approximation obligations has been justly criticized.136 Reference 
can be made to the definition of the offences in relation to attacks against 
information systems to support that comment.137 With respect to illegal access to 
information systems, Art. 2.1. of the framework decision stipulates that member 
states must criminalise “at least for cases which are not minor”. Such a 
criminalisation obligation at least requires that it is clarified what makes a case 
minor.138 Additionally, to ensure the feasibility to use the common 
criminalisation acquis, the implementation strategy could be subject to debate. 
Ensuring the feasibility to use the common criminalisation acquis could have 
significant implications on the freedom member states have when deciding on 
the way to implement the approximation instrument. Approximation 
instruments that relate to serious offences with a cross-border dimension for 
which a series of EU level instruments are adopted to support the fight against 
those offences, member states could be required to ensure that implementation 
is done in a way that ensures identification of cases related to those forms of 
crime. It means that statistical data reflecting only the jointly identified part of the 
offence must be able to be produced. Even though approximation does not 
interfere with the possibility of the member states to pursue a more strict 
criminalisation policy and criminalise even beyond the minimum requirements 
included in the approximation instrument, member states could be required to 
ensure that differentiation between cases is always possible.  
 It is all a matter of accepting diversities, appreciating commonalities and 
aligning policies accordingly. 
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EU criminal policy making is a relatively new policy domain and its 
credibility is said to be undermined by the lack of an evidence base. Because the 
EU claims to pursue evidence based policy making, this justifies reviewing the 
mechanisms put in place to that end. To properly evaluate the evidence base in 
EU criminal policy making, an assessment is made of the availability of 
comparable crime statistics. Crime statistics, a vital data source for criminal 
policy making, are considered highly problematic at EU level due to (amongst 
other reasons) the differences in the definition of the offences. In spite of the 
good intentions that can be read into the repeated acknowledgement of the 
importance of crime statistics and the efforts to commonly define EU worthy 
offences, a thorough empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that we are still in 
search of valid EU level data with respect to the EU level offences. The EU as a 
policy maker does not take its responsibility to ensure the availability of the 
necessary comparable crime statistical data serious enough. 
 





Evidence based EU criminal policy making: 
In search of valid data 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper seeks to evaluate the evidence base in EU criminal policy making. 
To that end, the authors assess whether – if any – the EU’s policy to ensure the 
availability of comparable crime statistics is sufficiently developed to support a 
credible and convincing evidence based EU criminal policy. To date, a such 
policy evaluation reviewing the availability of crime statistics from the 
perspective of the EU’s own responsibility in light of its policy making, has not 
been conducted. The following paragraphs aim at contextualising this research 
question and introducing the research design and methodology set up to 
formulate an empirically sound answer to that question. 
For policy decisions to produce better outcomes, they should be based on 
systematically gathered and analysed evidence (Sutcliffe and Court 2005). By 
putting the best available evidence at the heart of policy development, evidence 
based policy making is an approach that helps policy makers to take well informed 
decisions (Lee 2004; Davies et al. 2000; Welsh and Farrington 2007). The impact 
of evidence on policy making is dependent on the political climate and the level 
of democratization in society. The more policy makers will have to account for 
their decisions, the more important evidence based policies will become 
(Parsons 2002; Marston and Watts 2003; Campell 2001; Carr-Hill 1979). 
The kind of evidence needed depends on the specificity of the policy domain 
involved. Despite the fact that there seems to be a continued perception that only 
results from hard ‘exact’ sciences can be used to help policy makers (Young et al. 
2002), undeniably, output from criminological research is useful – even 
indispensable – input for policies related to crime prevention and reduction 
(Knepper 2007; Vito et al. 2006). Unfortunately, it is sometimes reported that 
criminological research (including statistical analyses) is largely ignored, under-
valued and underfunded (Hope 2005; Pfeiffer et al. 1996). Too many criminal 
justice systems and policies have been developed without a clear policy plan 
(Lewis 2012), detached from available evidence. Furthermore, the claim that 
criminal policy making is surrounded by emotions, values, make-belief and even 
plain self interest (van Duyne and Vander Beken 2009) makes the evaluation of 
the evidence base therein more than interesting. It is precisely that tendency of 
emotions running high which makes evidence based criminal policy making so 
important. It is the only means to ensure well-balanced, effective and credible 
criminal policy.  





To that end, it is important to elaborate on what the ‘output from 
criminological research’ can be. Though far from the only output, ever since the 
eighteenth century, it became clear that crime statistics are a vital source of 
information in the challenge to understand and fight crime (Stamatel 2009). 
Crime statistics help governments identify where they need to concentrate their 
focus (Lewis 2012). An often cited major governmental failure is not generating 
the data needed to properly evaluate policy programmes and initiatives. 
Undeniably, good data is a pre-requisite (Banks 2009). Without data, evidence 
based policy making is an illusion and remains “a mere rhetorical devise” (Lee 
2004).  
When it comes to the development of criminal policies, there are many 
players in the field. The EU is a relatively new player in criminal policy making 
and therefore also in working with crime statistics to support that policy 
making. The EU had come into being as an economic and political cooperation 
having its origin in the European Coal and Steel Community and the European 
Economic Community. Criminal policy making did not belong to its original 
portfolio. It was not until the cautious introduction of criminal policy elements 
into the competence sphere of the EU with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the 
EU’s interest into crime statistics started to develop. Because since then EU 
criminal policy making has become more elaborate and more prominent, the 
requirements of evidence based policy making and the importance of using 
crime statistical data in support thereof applies mutatis mutandis also to the EU as 
a policy maker. Therefore, just like any other policy maker, the EU carries the 
responsibility to ensure the availability of the data it needs. It is more than 
justified for example to recommend that the development of new directives is 
supported by a statistical evidence base (Lewis et al. 2004). Even though that 
recommendation is sporadically made in literature, the availability of data is 
never reviewed from that perspective. Therefore, the differences of this 
contribution when compared to the contributions in the special issue on 
European statistics, is the perspective it uses. It does not start from a 
comparative criminological perspective interpreting available data to the best of 
abilities, but alternatively uses the responsibility of the EU policy maker to 
ensure the availability of proper data as a baseline to criticise the comparability 
problems with the current data. A policy should (have) be(en) developed to 
ensure the availability of proper data that needs no comparability caveats. Such 
data should be available to the extent necessary to support its policy making. 
Because the EU is not competent to deal with just any offence and therefore has 
no interest in just any offence, an analysis on the availability of adequate data to 
support EU policy making should first look into identifying the EU’s priority 
offences. Thereafter, data availability can be reviewed. 





There is one fundamental difference between the EU as a criminal policy 
maker and the individual member states as criminal policy makers. Citizens do 
not report crime to the EU; the EU does not carry out criminal investigations; the 
EU does not impose nor execute sentences; the EU does not manage its own 
criminal data system; The EU as a criminal policy maker is dependent on the 
data provided by the member states, who all have their individual criminal 
code, an individual criminal justice system and an individual data system. 
Therefore, it is important that the EU clearly instructs the member states with 
respect to the data it needs. 
It is widely recognised that collecting comparable statistics is almost an 
impossible task (Collmann 1973; Kommer 1995; Gratia 1995; Farrington et al. 
2004; Vettori 2006; Robert 2009; Savona et al. 2005). The EU soon realised this. 
The collection of the comparable statistics on cross-border crime have obtained 
an entry into the treaties with the introduction of Art. K.2.2.d. in the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty (later renamed Art. 30 TEU). That article stipulates that “the 
Council shall establish a research, documentation and statistical network on cross-border 
crime.”  In the following years, the topic gained attention and was recalled in a 
series of policy documents. The 1998 Vienna Action Plan enlists the 
improvement of statistics on cross border crime as an important goal (Council of 
the European Union and European Commission 1999). In the 2000 Millennium 
Strategy, the member states recommended the elaboration of crime statistics and 
called upon the Commission to launch studies in this area (European Council 
2000). Subsequently, the 2003 Dublin Declaration again pointed to the need for a 
common language on European crime statistics (Council of the European Union 
2003). Similarly, in the 2004 The Hague Programme (European Council 2004) it 
was noted that “the European Council welcomes the initiative of the Commission to 
establish European instruments for collecting, analysing and comparing information on 
crime and victimisation and their respective trends in Member States, using national 
statistics and other sources of information as agreed indicators”. The 2006 
Commission Communication on the EU Action Plan to measure crime and 
criminal justice reiterated the ideas in the above mentioned instruments, set up 
an expert group on the policy needs for data on crime and criminal justice and 
stressed that underpinning these objectives were tasks related to the 
establishment of an EU-level Offence Classification System (European 
Commission 2006a). The adoption of this last action plan and the evolution 
towards extending the scope of crime statistics collection initiatives resulted in 
the request for a comprehensive study on crime statistics (European 
Commission 2007). Despite the absence of a clear stance with respect to the need 
to further develop the availability of crime statistics in light of the credibility of 
its own policy making, the recognition of the importance of EU level crime 
statistics has continued also after the delivery of the study in 2009. With a view 
to rendering crime prevention strategies more effective, the Council has 





reaffirmed once more the importance of collection, analysis and dissemination of 
knowledge on crime, including organised crime (including statistics) in the 
Stockholm programme. It is stated that “adequate, reliable and comparable statistics 
are a necessary prerequisite for evidence-based decisions on the need for action, on the 
implementation of decisions and on the effectiveness of action” (European Council 
2010). 
One of the biggest problems in the area of comparative criminology with 
respect to attaining adequate, reliable and comparative crime statistics remains 
the incompatibility of national offence definitions (Jehle 2012). To tackle that 
obstacle comparative criminologists have a tradition of working with standard 
definitions to foster comparability, with the caveat that those definitions cannot 
guarantee comparability (Harrendorf 2012). This problem encountered by 
comparative criminologists who have no means to influence their data 
providers, and the caveat placed with respect to the comparability of the 
different datasets, is something that cannot be accepted when reviewing the 
availability of data from the perspective of the responsibility of the EU as a 
policy maker. The EU must ensure the availability of the data that is needed to 
support its own policy making. It is responsible to ensure the comparability of 
the dataset it works with. If member states unanimously agree that the EU 
should take the lead in developing a criminal policy with respect to a certain 
offence type, and come up with a definition of that offence type that decision is 
far from non-committal and deviation from that definition when requested to 
provide the matching data should not be accepted. 
Therefore, the analysis underlying this paper has followed a three-step 
approach. First, it has identified the EUs priority offences for which a 
comprehensive and comparable statistical dataset is indispensable. Second, it 
has reviewed the current data collection initiatives to assess to what extent the 
EU can directly make use of the data that is currently being gathered. Third, to 
the extent that no data set is available for all identified priority offences, existing 
empirical research on the level of detail available in the national data sets is 
reviewed to assess to what extent the EU can easily start up a complementing 
data collection initiative. In the event the analysis would reveal that the current 
level of detail is inadequate to satisfy the EU’s need for statistical data, there is a 
pressing need for the EU to develop a comprehensive policy plan on the 
availability of statistical data to support its criminal policy making. This three-
step approach will allow to formulate an answer to the central research question 
as to what extent the credibility of the EU criminal policy making is undermined 
by a lacking policy on the availability of data to guarantee an evidence base. 





2 EU priority offences 
To be able to assess to what extent adequate data is available to support the 
EUs criminal policy making, it is important to first identify the priority offences. 
The EU does not need comparable data on just any offence. It needs data with 
respect to the offences for which it is developing an EU policy. There is no 
document that authoritatively lists the EU priority offences. Many offence labels 
appear both in legal and policy documents, without clarifying their status within 
EU policy making. To delineate the scope of the analysis, a set of 10 priority 
offences was selected. To that end, a retrospective discourse analysis was 
performed to map the relative importance of the individual offence types. 
Discourse analyses have become increasingly popular across a wide variety 
of disciplines in recent years (Hammersley 1997, 2003; Gee 2011). It covers a 
multitude of different approaches that vary significantly in the techniques they 
use. To date, there is no common understanding of how a discourse analysis 
should be conducted (Gee 2011; Georgakopoulou and Goutsos 1997), which 
makes discourse analysts vulnerable to criticism, but also allows them to be 
creative and design a tailor made template adapted to the specificity of the 
selected discourse. To accommodate possible criticism it is advised to use 
multiple techniques and scoring templates to test the comparability of the results 
and increase the validity of the discourse analysis.  
More fundamentally, there is no common understanding of what constitutes 
a discourse to begin with. In contrast to other language analysing disciplines, 
discourse analysis does not privilege a certain type of texts and deals with texts 
as heterogeneous as literal and legal texts, interviews, news paper articles and 
even advertisements. The discourse selected for this analysis consists of both 
legal and policy documents, both binding and non-binding texts, both offence 
specific and general texts. The diversity therein is not considered a problem as 
long as that diversity is duly taken into account in the analysis.  
2.1 Constructing the discourse 
The exact content of the discourse to be analysed to identify the top 10 
priority offences for which comparable crime statistics are indispensable to 
support proper policy making, was decided along three considerations.  
First, primary EU legislation was taken into account. The EU’s treaties are its 
supreme sources of law which prevail over any other sources of law and contain 
the legal framework in which the EU operates. Considering that criminal policy 
was entered into the EU’s mandate with the inclusion of police and judicial 
cooperation as a field of interest in the Maastricht Treaty, that treaty, together 





with the following Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty and Lisbon Treaty are 
identified as part of the discourse. 
Second, secondary EU legislation was taken into account. The body of 
secondary legislation consists of countless legal instruments based on the 
treaties in pursuit of the objectives set out therein. To support a justifiable 
selection of the vast amount of instruments therein, the so-called JHA acquis 
(short for Justice and Home Affairs acquis) was used as a starting point. That 
JHA acquis is a list compiling 528 legal instruments relevant for European 
criminal policy making. It is updated annually under the auspice of the 
European Commission and can be consulted online. It is considered to be a good 
starting point when constructing the discourse compilation because the JHA 
acquis is used as a basis to assess new member states in the context of the 
enlargement of the European Union. The obligation or recommendation to 
comply with the instruments included in the JHA acquis is considered to be of 
high symbolic value not to be misunderstood when assessing the importance of 
the texts included and the importance of the development of a policy with 
respect to the offences mentioned therein. It is considered to be the core of EU 
criminal policy making.  
Third, it should be noted that the last integrated version of the JHA acquis 
available dates from October 2009. Unfortunately the document has not been 
updated since the directorate general on justice, freedom and security split into 
two separate directorate generals, one on justice and one on home affairs. 
Therefore, the dated JHA acquis was updated using January 2012 as a cut-off 
date. In doing so, another 37 instruments were added to the discourse, bringing 
the total up to 569 instruments. 
It should be noted that the use of the updated JHA acquis also entails that 
only final documents (or the latest draft versions) were taken into account. 
Inclusion of different draft versions would not necessarily reflect the importance 
and prioritisation of an offence type for it is very much possible that a set of 10 
draft documents points to lengthy discussions in the margin of a policy area 
whereas the existence of only 1 draft document that was immediately adopted 
may point to a high priority content. Additionally, looking into the number of 
preparatory documents that have been produced and the number of times a 
policy initiative was scheduled to be dealt with at a Council meeting runs the 
risk of assessing the importance of offence specific policy making in light of 
other topics of criminal policy making, which would distort the evaluation. After 
all, it is intended to map the importance of offence labels in light of policy 
making with respect to other offence labels and not with respect to any other 
form of criminal policy making. 





(Re)constructing the discourse is only the first step. To correctly interpret and 
appreciate the relative importance of the use of the offence labels in that discourse, it is 
important to not only understand the meaning of the labels but also design a 
comprehensive scoring template reflecting the value of the elements in the discourse. 
2.2 Understanding the meaning of the offence labels 
Properly conducting the discourse analysis, presupposes knowledge on the 
offence labels that are included therein. This is far from self-evident considering 
the absence of a list of offences that are considered within the scope of the EU’s 
competence and further complications caused by the inconsistent use of 
terminology when it comes to elaborating on offences. Prior research on this 
issue led to the identification of a set of 63 offence labels that appear in European 
criminal policy documents (De Bondt and Vermeulen 2009). To complement that 
identification exercise, three phenomena were studied more in-depth to be able 
to interpret the corresponding offence labels correctly, i.e. organised crime, 
cybercrime and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. 
First, it is clear that organised crime for long has been a hot item, the concept 
remains controversial. A wide variety of meanings have been attributed to it 
(Paoli and Fijnaut 2004; Vermeulen et al. 2010). Defining organised crime is 
controversial because of the substantive impact it has on the way laws are 
framed, how mutual legal assistance is or is not rendered, what counter 
measures can be deployed, how resources are allocated (Alach 2011; 
Finckenauer 2005). The tremendous increase in academic work over the past 40 
years has made us learn more about organised crime but has also shattered what 
was once a simple and commonly accepted definition (Alach 2011; Zoutendijk 
2010; Symeanidou-Kastanidou 2008; Fichera 2011). Much can be brought back to 
the dual interpretation of the concept. On the one hand, organised crime can 
refer to the characteristics of the act and thus refer to a crime that was duly 
prepared and organised. On the other hand, organised crime can also refer to the 
typology of the perpetrators and thus mean that the crimes were committed by 
an organised group (Finckenauer 2005; Von Lampe 2008; Symeanidou-
Kastanidou 2008). In this latter interpretation of the concept, it constitutes an 
offence in itself in so far as participation to a criminal organisation is 
criminalised, whereas in the former the organised aspect refers merely to a 
modus operandi that can be linked to virtually any offence type. Because this 
paper and the assessment looks into the availability of offence based crime 
statistics, the decision was taken to limit the scope of organised crime to the 
corresponding offence type, being participation in a criminal organisation. Not 
only should this approach get preference looking at the discourse analysis 
objective to single out the 10 most prioritised offence types (as opposed to the 10 





most prioritised modus operandi), this decision can also be justified looking into 
the EU’s attempt to define organised crime ranging from the adoption of the 
Enfopol 35 (Council of the European Union 1997a) over the joint action (Council 
of the European Union 1998) to the current framework decision on organised 
crime (Council of the European Union 2008), which all relate to participation in a 
criminal organisation as a separate offence. This decision significantly impacts 
on the outcome of the discourse analysis because only references to participation 
in a criminal organisation as a separate offence where taken into account in the 
prioritisation assessment as opposed to including the wider concept of organised 
crime which covers both participation in a criminal organisation as well as 
offences that are committed duly prepared and organised.  
Second, cybercrime is increasingly becoming a buzz word in political 
discourse. The opportunities created by the technological evolution have 
provided several offences with a new dimension and opened a whole new range 
of vulnerabilities (Moitra 2005; De Hert et al. 2000; Mendez 2005). The concept of 
cybercrime suffers from concerns that are very similar to the concerns raised 
with respect to organised crime. Here too a double interpretation is possible. Not 
only can cybercrime refer to the modus operandi and thus the use of computer 
and internet to commit offences, here too a set of separate self-standing offences 
have been created. Whereas the Council of Europe Cybercrime convention 
makes a distinction between (i) offences against confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer data and systems, (ii) computer related offences such as 
forgery and fraud, (iii) content related offences such as child pornography and 
racism and xenophobia, and (iv) copy right and related offences (Council of 
Europe 2001, 2003), the scope at EU level is far more restricted. Because the 2005 
EU framework decision only refers to attacks against information systems 
(Council of the European Union 2005), and in analogy to the choice made for 
organised crime, the concept included in the prioritisation analysis was limited 
in the same way. This too impacts significantly on the outcome of the discourse 
analysis which represents only the strict reference to the separately listed 
offences. Wherever reference is made to cybercrime as an overall concept, the 
context of that reference was analysed in order to understand whether the 
reference symbolised a prioritisation of attacks against information systems or a 
prioritisation of more content related crimes such as child pornography. 
Third, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography are joint 
together for the priority assessment for several reasons. Firstly, a linguistic 
analysis of the texts does not (always) allow them to be separated. It is (often) 
unclear whether the two concepts should be regarded as a whole or as two 
different offence labels. Secondly, besides mere linguistic arguments, the 
decision to join them can be supported by referring to the use thereof in legal 
and policy document. Not only are both combined in approximation 





instruments (Council of the European Union 2004), they are also used as one 
single concept when determining the scope of information to be transmitted in 
Art. 13.6 (a) (ii) of the Eurojust Decision (Council of the European Union 2002a), 
as well as when listing the offence labels for which double criminality may no 
longer be tested, for example in Art. 2.2 4th indent of the framework decision on 
European Arrest Warrant (Council of the European Union 2002b). 
2.3 Designing a scoring template 
Because there is no common understanding on how to conduct a discourse 
analysis, it is important to use multiple scoring strategies to test the 
compatibility of their outcomes and accommodate any criticism, especially 
because the outcome will form the basis for the evaluation of the availability of 
crime statistics. Therefore, three different approaches were combined. 
− First, a simple counting exercise lead to the ranking of the priority offences 
based on the number of offence specific instruments that were adopted.  
− Second, a simple counting exercise lead to the ranking of the priority offences 
based on the number of references to the offences in general instruments.  
− Third, an intricate interpretation of the prioritisation lead to the ranking of 
the priority offences taking account of the characteristics of the instrument 
(i.e. general or offence specific, binding or non-binding) and the justification 
for prioritisation (i.e. whether the importance of EU level action was taken 
for granted or duly motivated).  
This final scoring strategy needs further clarification. To properly conduct 
the discourse analysis, it is important to thoroughly understand the structures 
and processes underlying the selected texts/units (T. A. van Dijk 1998) to 
correctly appreciate and score them. 
First, an in-depth assessment of the prioritisation of an offence in light of the 
instrument the policy discourse is included in, is everything but straight-
forward.  
Firstly, a purely legal assessment of the classification and ranking of legal 
and policy documents in which a treaty would automatically be considered 
more important than a non-binding policy document is not a satisfactory basis 
for the analysis. It is important to stress the relativity of the importance of treaty 
texts in European criminal policy making, both in general as well as in respect to 
the specific objectives of this analysis. On the one hand, from a more general 
European criminal policy perspective, it should be taken into account that the 
European Union often ex post corrects the legal basis provided in the treaties, 
according to the instruments adopted. Analysis reveals that the thematic scope 
of the instruments adopted after the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty 





exceeded the listed offences and still exceed the offences currently listed in the 
Lisbon Treaty even though the offence list has been updated (De Bondt and 
Vermeulen 2009). On the other hand, the specific objectives of this analysis 
consists in assessing the credibility of (the evidence base) in currently developed 
EU level criminal policy initiatives, and not so much the credibility and 
justifiability of the intention to develop an offence specific policy which can be 
read into inclusion of an offence label in a general treaty. Therefore, much more 
importance could be read into an offence specific binding secondary instrument 
as opposed to a primary treaty text.  
Secondly, careful consideration lead to the conclusion that no distinction 
should be made based on the legislative procedure regulating the adoption of 
texts either. Even though it is interesting to note that European criminal policy 
making has moved from a unanimity voting to a qualified majority voting, 
analysis revealed that no reliable conclusions can be drawn in terms of 
prioritisation of offences, using these procedural differences as a basis. After all, 
the fact that a member state does not agree with the adoption of an instrument 
related to a specific offence type, is not necessarily linked to a disagreement with 
respect to the prioritisation of action for the offence type. To the contrary, in the 
majority of cases, resistance against the adoption of a legal instrument will be 
based on the specific content of the proposed measures. Furthermore, reducing 
the importance of an offence type pro rato of the number of member states that 
did not support the adoption of a specific instrument, should also effect the 
prioritisation read into the existence of all other instruments and documents pro 
rato of the number of member states in the Union at the time of the adoption.  
Thirdly, besides the binding or non-binding characteristic of a text included 
in the discourse, another characteristic is taken into account, namely the general 
or specific nature of the instrument. Prioritisation of offence types included in 
general instruments that refer to more than one offence type is less pronounced 
then the prioritisation that speaks from a specific instrument that is entirely 
dedicated to one single offence type. 
These observations have lead to the conclusion that a justifiable distinction 
can be made between general and offence-specific texts, between binding and 
non-binding texts in terms of the relative prioritisation that arises from the 
offences discussed therein, but no further internal distinction is to be made 
within each of those categories. 
Second, regardless of the characteristics of the text, an assessment is made of 
the way reference is made to offence labels. The objective is to not only look into 
normatively prioritising offences by stressing the importance of action (e.g. “It is 
important to take action with respect to this phenomenon.”), but even more so 
look into the manner with which their importance is justified and clarified (e.g. 





“It is important to take action with respect to this phenomenon because [...].)” 
(Hammersley 2003). Within this second level, it was deemed important to 
distinguish between the manner with which importance is justified and clarified 
in general instruments as opposed to the manner with which importance is 
justified and clarified in offence specific instruments. Analysis revealed that in 
some offence specific instrument far more in-depth attention is paid to such 
justification and clarification when compared to other offence specific 
instruments. This creates the impression that a prioritisation evaluation needs to 
uphold a threefold distinction between no attention, attention and significant 
attention. However, this would distort the image of prioritisation because there 
is a direct link between the level of attention in offence specific instruments and 
an inclusion of the offence label into the basic treaties. Seemingly, the Union uses 
this extended attention to counter any form of critique with respect to its 
competence to adopt offence-specific instruments with respect to not-listed 
offence types. Vice versa, the EU only waists little words justifying its actions 
when there is a solid treaty base for EU action with respect to a specific offence 
type. This means that the level of attention paid to clarifying and justifying the 
importance of EU action with respect to an offence type is not (only) an 
expression of the importance and prioritisation of the offence type but is 
(perhaps even more) an expression of potential competence concerns. 
Considering the relatively little attention that will be paid to treaty inclusion of 
offence types as a sign of prioritisation, it is important to neutralise this (in)direct 
effect of treaty inclusion. Therefore, a distinction is made in the assessment of 
the manner with which importance is justified and clarified in general 
instruments as opposed to the manner with which importance is justified and 
clarified in offence specific instruments. For general instruments a distinction is 
made between significant attention, attention and little to no attention whereas 
for offence specific instruments a distinction is only made between attention and 
no attention. 
Table 1 presents the scoring strategy that was designed as the third part in 
the template, based on this assessment of the structures and processes 
underlying the texts/units selected for the discourse analysis.  
 
TABLE 1  Scoring template third approach 
 
Level 1 – Characteristics 
Level 2 – Justification 
Significant Neutral Little to no 
General texts 
Binding 4 3 2 
Non-binding 1 0,75 0,5 
Offence specific 
texts 
Binding 6 4 
Non-binding 1,5 1 
 





2.4 Results of the analysis 
Having reconstructed the discourse, designed the scoring template and 
gained insight into (the meaning of) the offence labels present in the European 
criminal policy discourse, the discourse analysis was conducted with a view to 
selecting the top 10 priority offences for which availability of crime statistical 
data will be reviewed. The outcome will be compared with the current data 
collection initiatives as well as with existing knowledge on additionally available 
comparable data. The presentation of the results takes those subsequent steps 
into account. Because the empirical data used to assess the additional available 
comparative crime statistics was gathered in 2008 in the context of a 
comprehensive study on crime statistics conducted for the European 
Commission, a dual cut-off data was taken into account. The results are 
presented using 31 January 2008 as an interim date corresponding to the start of 
the empirical data collection and 21 January 2012, as the final date, allowing to 
test the stability of the prioritisation over time. 
Table 2 does not only show the EU’s top-10 priority offences resulting from 
the retrospective discourse analysis, it also reflects the scope of the EU’s interest 
in these offences via a reference to binding legal instruments. It should be kept 
in mind that the EU is not interested in any kind of behaviour that could fall 
within the scope of the listed offence labels, but is only interested in behaviour 
that was expressly identified to fall within that scope. The legal basis for this 
limitation is found in the approximation instruments in which the EU has 
clarified what behaviour should (at least) fall within the scope of the offence 
labels. Consequently, when looking into the availability of data to assess the 
credibility of the EU’s criminal policy making, this should only be conducted for 
those parts of offences for which the EU has a legitimate interest. In sum, this 
means that the behaviour included in the EU’s top-10 priority offences was 
limited to the behaviour explicitly prioritised through pursuing EU-wide 
criminalisation via the adoption of approximating instruments. 
 





TABLE 2 The EU’s top 10 priority offences 
 













































































 # # score rank # # score rank 
Trafficking in 
human beings139 
27 25 126 1 31 34 170 1 - 
Illegal 
(im)migration140 
33 13 124 2 35 22 151 3 1 
Drug trafficking141 31 30 118 3 38 40 155 2 1 
Fraud against the 
financial interests of 
the European 
Communities142 
7 22 87 4 8 28 102 5 1 
Terrorism143 12 25 79 5 19 44 134 4 1 
Corruption144 6 18 59 6 13 26 92 6 - 
                                                             
139 As defined in (only applicable for 2012 situation): Joint Action of 24 February 1997 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning action to 
combat trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children repealed and replaced 
by Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings 
(repealed and replaced by Directive of 15 April 2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims) all three to be read 
together with the 2000 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons as well as the Council of Europe Convention of 16 May 2005 on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings 
140 As defined in: Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the 
legal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, as 
complemented by the Council Directive of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence 
141 As defined in (only applicable for 2012 situation): Council Framework Decision of 25 October 
2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and 
penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking 
142 As defined in: Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’ 
Financial Interests 
143 As defined in (only applicable for 2012 situation): Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on combating terrorism (as amended by Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2008 amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism) 
144 As defined in: Convention of 26 May 1997 on the fight against corruption involving officials 
of the European Communities or officials of member states of the European Union 


















































































 # # score rank # # score rank 
Money laundering145 6 22 55 7 8 29 75 7 - 
Participation in a 
criminal 
organisation146 




6 9 33 9 7 19 57 10 1 
Sexual exploitation 
of children and child 
pornography148 
2 10 30 10 4 19 58 9 1 
 
Table 2 shows that though the ranking slightly varies according to the 
approach used, it is fairly stable over time. Looking only into the number of 
instruments in the selection that specifically deals with one of the listed offences 
labels or looking only into the number of references to an offence label in general 
instruments may not accurately reflect the prioritisation for it does not 
differentiate between binding legal instruments and non binding policy 
                                                             
145 As defined in: Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds 
of crime 
146 As defined in (only applicable for 2011 situation): Joint action of 21 December 1998 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on making it a criminal 
offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union 
(repealed and replaced by the Council Framework Decision of 24 October 2008 on the fight against 
organised crime) both to be read together with the 2000 UN Convention on combating 
transnational organised crime. 
147 As defined in: Council Framework Decision of 21 February 2005 on attacks against 
information systems 
148 As defined in: Joint Action of 24 February 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 
K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning action to combat trafficking in human beings 
and sexual exploitation of children repealed and replaced by the Council Framework Decision 
of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, 
repealed and replaced by a new Directive of 13 December 2011 (both to be read together with the 2000 
UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography).  





recommendations or communications. The results from the intricate 
interpretation of the prioritisation of the offence labels in the criminal policy 
discourse point to a stability over time. The top five consists of the same offence 
labels and no offence label has moved more than one place up or down the 
ladder. 
The prioritisation of these offences in both legal and policy documents is far 
from non-committal. If the EU is to develop credible policies with respect to 
those offences, the EU should have data on (at least the incidence of) these 
offences and use the results of criminological ex ante, ad interim and ex post 
analyses as evidence to evaluate the impact of its policies and programmes 
(Böhme 2001; Vermeulen and De Bondt 2009; De Bondt and Vermeulen 2010). 
 
3 Comparison with existing data collection 
initiatives 
Having delineated the scope of the research along the EU’s top-10 priority 
offences, the statistical data collection by existing EU bodies and agencies was 
reviewed for each of the identified priority offences. It is important to underline 
that the following evaluation is not intended to be self-standing evaluate the 
collection initiatives themselves, but intent to evaluate the extent to which they 
suite the very specific needs of the EU criminal policy maker. As a result, the 
evaluation only looks into the data collection with respect to one or more of the 
selected priority offences and ignores any other type of collected data. This 
means that the eligibility of the reviewed data collection mechanisms as reported 
below, should be interpreted only in light of the ability to provide the data 
needed to provide an evidence base for EU criminal policy making.  
It is only logical for this assessment to embark with the review of the three 
data collection initiatives that can be characterised as being landmarks in the 
evolution of EU level crime statistics. 
First, illicit drug use and trafficking caught European attention and following 
the commitments made at the 1990 Dublin European Council the decision was 
taken to set up EMCDDA, short for the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug addiction (Council of the European Union 1993b; Dublin European 
Council 25 and 26 June 1990). It gathers and disseminates information e.g. on the 
demand for and supply of drugs, international trade, producer, consumer and 
transit countries and international cooperation. From an offence based crime 
statistical perspective, EMCDDA is a major player for the compilation of data on 
illicit drug trafficking. In light thereof, Art. 2.6 of its founding Regulation holds 
an important objective. It spells out as its objective to ensure improved 





comparability, objectivity and reliability of data at European level by 
establishing indicators and common criteria of a non-binding nature (Council of 
the European Union 1993b).  Mirroring the scope limitation provided for drug 
trafficking in our priority ranking, EMCDDA refers to the 2004 framework 
decision to define the behaviour that falls within the scope thereof (European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 2010). This means that the 
data set available at EMCDDA perfectly matches the needs of the EU criminal 
policy maker. 
Second, racism and xenophobia caught European attention and following the 
commitments made at the 1994 Corfu European Council the decision was taken 
to set up EUMC, short for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (Corfu European Council 24 and 25 June 1994; Council of the 
European Union 1997b). It gathers and disseminates information on the extent 
and development of the phenomena and manifestations of racism, xenophobia 
and anti-Semitism, their causes, consequences and effects and examples of good 
practice. From an offence based crime statistics perspective, EUMC (later 
transformed into FRA, short for Fundamental Rights Agency) is a major player 
for the compilation of data on punishable acts related to racism and xenophobia. 
Here too, its founding Regulation holds in its Art. 2.2.f the objective to develop 
methods to improve the comparability, objectivity and reliability of data at 
European level by establishing indicators and criteria that will improve 
consistency of information (Council of the European Union 1997b). In spite of 
the attention racism and xenophobia receives, it did not make it to the top 10 
priority offences. Though there is no reference to either the 1996 joint action nor 
the 2008 framework decision in the legal framework shaping this agency and its 
data collection mechanism (Council of the European Union 2007), the explicit 
references in the 8th preamble of the founding Regulation of its predecessor 
(Council of the European Union 1997b) and the 11th preamble of the Racial 
Equality Directive (Council of the European Union 2000a), combined with the 
assertion in the annual report that the data gathered can be directly linked to the 
scope of the framework decision (Fundamental Rights Agency 2010), makes it 
very likely that the available data matches the needs of the European criminal 
policy maker. 
Third and final, organised crime too has always been a top priority in 
European criminal policy making. Already in 1993, the European Council 
recognised the need to issue annual strategic reports on the organised crime 
situation in Europe (Council of the European Union 1993a). The first edition of 
the European OCSR, short for Organised Crime Situation Report, was issued in 
1994 (Vander Beken et al. 2004). Following the commitments made at the 1996 
Dublin European Council the decision was taken to set up an High Level Group 
on Organised Crime, tasked with drawing up a comprehensive action plan to 





further elaborate on a European organised crime policy (Dublin European 
Council 13 and 14 December 1996; Vander Beken et al. 2004). Similar to the 
articles on ensuring improved comparability, objectivity and reliability of the 
data gathered by establishing indicators in the founding Regulation of the above 
mentioned monitoring centres, emphasis is placed on the importance of a well 
constructed data collection mechanism. In the meantime, OCSR has been 
transformed into OCTA, short for Organised Crime Treat Assessment Report, in 
order to execute the commitments enlisted in the Hague Programme (European 
Council 2004). However, the current data collection with respect to organised 
crime is not useful for our analysis as it does not specifically look in to the 
prevalence of “participation in a criminal organisation” which is how organised 
crime was delineated for this assessment. Furthermore, besides the critiques 
with respect to the unreliability and incompleteness of data sets (Vettori 2006; 
van Duyne 2010; Savona et al. 2005) the existing data collection on organised 
crime as a phenomenon is highly criticized for being too focussed on regular 
situation reporting, creating little added value for risk-based evaluations an 
vulnerability studies (van Duyne and Vander Beken 2009). 
Additionally, Eurostat is a relatively new player in this scene. In 2007 the first 
edition of the Crime and Criminal Justice edition of Statistics in focus was 
launched. When reviewing the data that is collected and published by Eurostat, 
it cannot but be concluded that there is a huge discrepancy between what is 
collected and what would be useful for the EU in light of the identified priority 
offences. Eurostat’s Statistics in Focus reports on the following 7 offence 
categories: total crime, homicide, violent crime, robbery, domestic burglary, theft 
of a motor vehicle and drug trafficking (Tavares and Thomas 2007). Apart from 
the latter offence category, the data collected and presented is of little use as an 
evidence source for EU level criminal policy making. However, the added value 
of Eurostat is highly questionable looking at the track record of EMCDDA with 
respect to data on drug trafficking. The publication is clearly intended to 
support national policy making and inform national governments of their 
position with respect to other member states. Additionally, it is intended to 
direct member states towards best practices and support knowledge exchange 
between the member states in order to get ideas on how to best allocate 
resources. Most fundamentally, it should be stressed that Eurostat’s data 
collection is not based on the offence definition that is developed at EU level and 
thus for which the EU has a legitimate data interest with a view to policy 
evaluation. 
To complement the review of the data collection by EU bodies and agencies, 
other initiatives have been included in the assessment. Firstly, the development 
of a European Sourcebook on Crime and Criminal Justice Data, which sprung 
from a Council of Europe initiative, is undoubtedly the most significant. It has a 





long standing history and the datasets it provides were the main source used in 
the contributions of the latest special issue on European statistics. In 1993, the 
Council of Europe challenged a Committee of Experts with the preparation of a 
feasibility study concerning the collection of crime and criminal justice data for 
Europe (Aebi et al. 2002; Killias et al. 2006). For methodological reasons, the 
sourcebook focuses mainly on traditional and high volume crime, including the 
total of criminal offences, intentional homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft, theft 
of a vehicle, burglary, domestic burglary, drug offences and drug trafficking. In 
doing so, the publication links in with the data collection conducted by Eurostat. 
In the latest edition, efforts were made to extend the Sourcebook’s coverage 
beyond ordinary (‘street level’) crimes and to include offences such as fraud, 
offences against computer data and systems, money laundering and corruption. 
Obviously an academic initiative tasked to compile – to the best of their abilities 
– as much comparable crime statistics as possible, is limited by the then available 
data. It has been repeatedly stressed that the members of the European 
Sourcebook Group are confronted with difficulties with respect to the 
comparability of data due to differences in the offence definitions, which was 
tackled by working with standard definitions with the caveat that those 
definitions foster but cannot guarantee comparability (Harrendorf 2012). Despite 
the fact that the members go to great lengths to understand the characteristics of 
the data collected for each country (Lewis 2012), such a limitation is of course 
not acceptable for a policy maker who is responsible to ensure the availability of 
the data it needs to fulfil its task as a policy maker. Data gathered for EU policy 
purposes should perfectly fit the EU definition without any variation.  
Secondly, the use of international surveys to collect data aims at stepping 
away from the official data records and the difficulties that are caused by the 
differences in the national criminal justice and data systems (Blath 2008; Lewis 
2012). Alternatively, these surveys try to overcome those differences by 
collecting new information, across different countries all at once, ensuring data 
collection in a more consistent and systematic way (Stamatel 2009; J. Van Dijk 
2009). These surveys either have a particular focus (e.g. violence against women) 
or a more general focus (e.g. the international crime victim survey). The relevant 
similarity between these surveys and the European Sourcebook is the kind of 
offences that is focused on. Cross-border offences are left aside, because the 
respondent profile does not match the victim profile of those offences. 
Concluding, eligibility of the current data collection initiatives is 
disappointing. The existing data collection mechanisms only marginally meet 
the needs to pursue proper evidence based European criminal policy making. Even 
though they engage in a cross-national analysis of crime statistics, the topic of 
the analysis remains rather national in that phenomena of cross-border crime are 
not included. When one or more EU priority offences are involved in the review, 





the scope delineation proves to be a hurdle to use the data for evidence based 
European criminal policy making. The only offence label that is properly 
covered is drug trafficking by the EMCDDA, potentially complemented with the 
data gathered by the European Sourcebook Group, provided that the standard 
definition used matches the EU level approximated offence definition and no 
variations are allowed. Furthermore, the newest additions to the offences 
covered by the European Sourcebook Group can prove interesting for the EU as 
a policy maker, provided that the data provided by the member states does not 
deviate from the definition jointly agreed upon for EU level policy making. 
However, the fact that the data collected by the current data collection 
initiatives does not match the needs of the European criminal policy maker does 
not mean that the data is not available at the level of the data providers. Because 
an evaluation of the need to adjust the European policy to ensure the availability 
of crime statistics is dependent on the actual ability of the data providers to come 
up with the required data, the evaluation needs to step beyond the content of the 
current data collection initiatives and needs to look into the real availability of 
crime statistics and the feasibility of data providers to meet the scope limitation 
criteria. 
Therefore, a proper evaluation of the feasibility of evidence based European 
criminal policy making requires that all ten of the EU’s priority offences were 
subject to a data availability assessment reviewing the ability of police 
authorities to provide data relevant to support evidence based European 
criminal policy making.  
 
4 Comparison with knowledge on additional 
available data 
Therefore, the third and final step in the research methodology consists of an 
empirical assessment of the ability of police authorities to provide the data 
needed to ensure a proper evidence based European criminal policy making. 
Even though a meaningful statistical data set combines not only data from police 
authorities, but includes data from different actors in the criminal justice chain 
and even beyond, an assessment of police data was considered to provide a 
good starting point and measure because police data is generally accepted as 
being the most detailed. If police authorities are unable to provide the data 
required to support evidence based European criminal policy making, a fortiori 
other authorities will not be able to provide the data either. Such an evaluation 
will allow to draw conclusions with respect to the need to develop or adjust 
availability policies corresponding to the (non)availability of statistical data in 
the data systems of national data providers.  





Though this exercise is particularly relevant for the offence labels for which 
currently no eligible data collection mechanism exists, analysis was conducted 
for all 10 EU priority offences. In doing so, the results can shed light on the 
completeness and accurateness of the data in the existing data collection 
initiatives. 
The empirical data set compiled in 2008 will be used to conduct this 
assessment (Mennens et al. 2009). With the mandate of the European 
Commission (European Commission 2007), all member states were asked to 
provide an integrated answer with respect to the ability of their police 
authorities to provide the requested data. The review was limited to their ability, 
thus without asking them to actually provide data. Two methodological aspects 
should be briefly elaborated on. First, the data gathering methodology 
underlying this assessment accommodates the concerns related to the 
differences in the definition of the behaviour that falls within the scope of the 
offences by working with data that is limited to those parts of offences for which 
double criminality and thus comparability is definite and irrefutable (De Bondt 
and Vermeulen 2009). In doing so, an EU standard definition is used, be it not 
based on the national criminal justice provisions and the architecture of the 
national data systems as a basis, but using the unanimously agreed EU-level 
offence definitions as a basis. Second, respondents were given the opportunity to 
differentiate between column A (short for “Are”, meaning that the requested data 
is currently being produced), column C (short for “Could”, meaning that the 
requested that is not currently produced because there is no need or interest for, 
but the level of detail in the data systems allows the data to be produced upon 
request) and column N (short for “Not possible”, meaning that the level of detail 
in the data system does not allow the data to be produced, even when there is a 
specific request) (Mennens et al. 2009). It is important to underline that the 
presented results reflect the reported availability of statistical data and may 
therefore differ from the actual situation. However, the reported availability of 
statistical data gives valuable insight into the perceived feasibility to produce 
statistical data that is relevant for EU policy making and can therefore be used as 
a pre-impact assessment of EU intervention in this respect. To further avoid a 
distortion in the results due to replying in the socially desired way out of fear for 
a naming and shaming, it was agreed with the respondents not to link the 
replies to the corresponding member state. 
 





TABLE 3 Availability of the EU’s top-10 priority offences 
 
 A C N 
Offences as defined at EU level: n % n % n % 
Trafficking in human beings 16 59,26 7 25,93 4 14,81 
Illegal (im)migration 18 66,67 4 14,81 5 18,52 
Drug trafficking 22 81,48 3 11,11 2 7,41 
Fraud against the financial 
interests of the European 
Communities 
6 22,22 3 11,11 18 66,67 
Terrorism 13 48,15 7 25,93 7 25,93 
Corruption 20 74,07 2 7,41 5 18,52 
Money laundering 18 66,67 6 22,22 3 11,11 
Participation in a criminal 
organisation 
16 59,26 5 18,52 6 22,22 
Offences against information 
systems 
15 55,56 8 29,63 4 14,81 
Sexual exploitation of a child and 
child pornography 
11 40,74 8 29,63 8 29,63 
 
Table 3 shows that the current level of data availability in the EU is worrying 
and inadequate to be used as a credible evidence base for EU criminal policy 
making.  
It is not possible for any of the EU’s top 10 priority offences to produce a full 
EU picture. This means that currently for none of the EU’s top 10 priority 
offences policy initiatives can be based (let alone are based) on the output from 
criminological research conducted on a full set of crime statistics. This is striking 
because it is recognised at EU level that crime statistics are a vital source in the 
fight against crime and thus in criminal policy making (European Council 2010). 
Therefore, it can only be echoed that problems of missing data (Allison 2002) are 
still ongoing. Furthermore, considering that all 10 of the identified priority 
offences are Europol and Eurojust mandated offences, not only the number of 
member states’ police authorities that are unable to provide data is worrying. 
Additionally, the number of member states’ police authorities that are currently 
not producing statistical data (but could do so), sheds an interesting light on the 
data that is transferred to Europol and Eurojust. After all, if that many member 
states’ police authorities are not producing statistical data on those offences, the 
data set available at Europol and Eurojust may be even less complete than first 
anticipated. This finding corroborates with the critique that TE-SAT and OCTA 
reports are (partially unnecessary) based on incomplete data sets (Vettori 2006; 
van Duyne 2010).  





Taking account of the existing data collection initiatives, it comes as no 
surprise that data availability for drug trafficking is the highest with 92,59%. 
Within the top five priority offences, the availability score for terrorism may be 
unexpectedly low. However, the disappointing result does corroborate with 
findings in literature. The vast amount of definitions for terrorism are a huge 
challenge for data collection (LaFree et al. 2010). Almost every data collective 
initiative uses its own definition (Schmid 2004), what makes data production 
particularly challenging for data providers. Likewise, the problematic character 
of the extremely low score for fraud corroborates with findings in literature 
(Levi and Burrows 2008). For corruption on the other hand, an offence type for 
which definitional issues are consistently raised (Zimring and Johnson 2005), an 
availability score of 81,5% is better than anticipated. Likewise, the availability of 
data on offences against information systems is unexpectedly high with its 
85,19%, considering that the implementation deadline for the approximation 
obligation had not passed at the time of the availability assessment. The link 
between the new EU instrument and the existing Council of Europe instruments 
in this field come to clarify this. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the current availability of crime 
statistics in light of the needs for European criminal policy making. First, a lot of 
work remains to be done as for none of the offences a 100% availability is 
reached, not even for offences that have a long data collection history to rely on. 
Second, taking an 80% availability as a minimum benchmark for reliable policy 
making, only six out of the ten priority offences can be subject to evidence based 
policy making. Third, there is no correlation between the priority ranking at EU 
level and the data availability at individual member state level. 
For two of the offence types, the availability results were analysed further not 
only in order to gain a better understanding of their meaning, but also to look 
into possible difficulties that need to be taken into account when designing a 
European data availability policy. The follow up research focussed first on the 
offence type with the poorest result (i.e. fraud against the financial interests of 
the European Communities) and second on the offence type that was ranked as 
the highest priority following the discourse analysis (i.e. trafficking in human 
beings). 
First, follow up research focussed on the poorest result to understand the 
poor availability of data on fraud against the financial interests of the European 
Communities, an offence for which the “interest of the EU” is symbolically very 
high (Delmas-Marty 2000; Xanthaki 2006; Seibert 2008). A shocking 66,67% of the 
member states’ police authorities are unable in whatever way to provide reliable 
data. With only 1/3 of the member states covered, it is absolutely impossible to 
draw any kind of reliable conclusion on the success of the EU’s policy initiatives 
in the fight against this kind of fraud. Analysis revealed two alarming problems.  





Firstly, as is true for all other criminalisation obligations, the obligation 
foreseen in the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European 
Communities’ Financial Interests does not require member states to introduce a 
separate offence. Its Art. 1.2 required member states, where necessary, to adapt 
their national criminal law in such a way that the conduct listed in Art. 1.1. 
constitutes a criminal offence. Consequently, three scenarios are plausible. Either 
no adaptation is required for member states with a broad notion of fraud, or the 
existing offence definition is amended to ensure inclusion of the listed 
behaviour, or a separate offence is specifically designed. The diversity between 
these scenarios and the limited number of member states that have introduced a 
separate offence explains why most national data systems are not designed in a 
way that allows data with respect to the specific conduct listed in Art. 1.1. to be 
separated for policy evaluation. 
Secondly, data availability will not necessarily benefit from a 
recommendation to introduce a separate offence when implementing an 
approximation obligation; not even from the recommendation to organise the 
data system in a way that data can be separated from other types of fraud. 
Strikingly, the follow up analysis revealed that some member states even though 
they have such separation either in the criminal code and/or in the data system, 
have developed a practice that does not use the separate offence for pragmatic 
prosecutorial reasons. It turns out that the way the definition of “fraud against 
the financial interests of the European Communities” is constructed at EU level 
and therefore implemented at national level, places a very high evidential 
burden on the prosecutorial services. As a result thereof policies have emerged 
to choose the line of least resistance and prosecute fraud against the financial 
interests of the European Communities as an ordinary type of fraud. From the 
perspective of the obligation member states have in terms of loyalty to the EU, 
this is not a problem. Because Art. 325. 2 TFEU (ex. Art. 280 TEC) requires 
member states to see to it that fraud against the financial interests of the 
European Communities is prosecuted and convicted in a way that is similar to 
national types of fraud (Jussi 2004), the net ‘punitive’ effect in the long run is the 
same, be it attained more easily. As a result, specific data on “fraud against the 
financial interests of the European Communities” retrieved from the data 
systems will not provide correct incidence and conviction data for behaviour 
listed in Art. 1.1. Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European 
Communities’ Financial Interests. Even though prosecutorial practices fall 
outside the scope of the EU’s competence, if the practices hinder effective EU 
policy evaluation and such hindrance is the direct result of the construction of an 
EU level definition, this should be an EU concern with respect to future 
approximation initiatives. 
 





Second, the assessment of data availability in the data systems of the member 
states’ police authorities was even taken a step further for trafficking in human 
beings, i.e. the offence type that was indicated as the top priority. Considering 
the diversity and complexity of a phenomenon such as trafficking in human 
beings, mere incidence data is useless (Savona and Stefanizzi 2007; Laczko 2005; 
Aronowitz 2001; Vermeulen et al. 2006; Vermeulen and De Pauw 2004). 
Undeniably, to have a valuable dataset that can be used by a policy maker with a 
view to provide an evidence base for criminal policy making, the level of detail 
should be significantly increased, to include at least information on the subject 
and purpose of trafficking.  
Firstly, with respect to the subject of trafficking, a distinction should be made 
between adults and children. This distinction is prompted by the European 
tradition to fight against crimes against children, which can only lead to the 
conclusion that separate data on trafficking of children is indispensible. The 23rd 
Tampere Presidency conclusion placed special emphasis on the problems of 
children in relation to crime (Tampere European Council 15-16 October 1999), 
which was recalled in the 2000 Millennium Strategy (European Council 2000). 
The Hague Programme listed the specific focus for trafficking of children as the 
4th priority in the strategic objectives for 2005-2009 (European Council 2004). 
Currently the promotion and protection of the rights of the child are included in 
Art 3.3. §2 and Art 3.5. TEU as official objectives of the Union. Furthermore, the 
fight against trafficking of children is explicitly mentioned in Art. 79.2.(d) in the 
context of the Union’s migration policy. Additionally, the higher vulnerability of 
children is also consistently stressed in the offence specific instruments, such as 
the framework decision on trafficking in human beings (Council of the European 
Union 2002c), but also the Council of Europe and United Nations instruments 
(Council of Europe 2005; United Nations 1949, 2000, 1989). Finally, specific 
funding programmes have been launched focussing specifically on the 
vulnerability of children (e.g. Daphne Programme). Consequently, the need for 
separate data on offences against children is more than apparent.  
Secondly, with respect to the purpose of trafficking a distinction should be 
made between the different purposes with which trafficking in human beings is 
pursued. In legal instruments a distinction is made between the purpose of 
labour or service exploitation, the purpose of sexual exploitation and the 
purpose of organ or human tissue removal (the latter is included only in Art. 
3(1) I (b) of the 2000 UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography). 
Additionally, specifically with respect to trafficking of children, that UN 
Optional Protocol also refers to the purpose of recruiting child soldiers (in its 
Art. 4) and the purpose of illegal adoption (in its Art. 3(1) a (ii)). Because a strong 
and effective policy to tackle these different forms of trafficking in human beings 





should duly take account of the different purposes for which trafficking is 
pursued, separate incidence data is indispensible. 
When looking at the availability of data at this level of detail as presented in 
table 4, the situation becomes even more worrying. If no reliable EU level 
differentiation can be made between trafficking of an adult as opposed to 
trafficking of a child, nor a differentiation along the purpose of trafficking, 
clearly no specific targeted policy initiatives can be developed. 
 
TABLE 4 Availability of purpose data with respect to  
the EU’s top priority offence 
 
 
A C N 
 
n % n % n % 
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 16 59,26 7 25,93 4 14,81 
TRAFFICKING OF AN ADULT 5 18,52 8 29,63 14 51,85 
For the purposes of labour or services 
exploitation 
5 18,52 5 18,52 17 62,96 
For the purposes of sexual exploitation 8 29,63 4 14,81 15 55,56 
For the purposes of organ or human tissue 
removal 
5 18,52 4 14,81 18 66,67 
TRAFFICKING OF A CHILD 6 22,22 9 33,33 12 44,44 
For the purposes of labour or services 
exploitation of a child  
6 22,22 5 18,52 16 59,26 
For the purposes of sexual exploitation  6 22,22 6 22,22 15 55,56 
For the purposes of organ or human tissue 
removal of a child 
4 14,81 5 18,52 18 66,67 
For the purpose of recruiting child 
soldiers 
1 3,70 1 3,70 25 92,59 
For the purpose of illegal adoption 6 22,22 4 14,81 17 62,96 
 
In order to conduct truly meaningful cross-border phenomenological 
research into the complexity of trafficking in human beings, and provide a solid 
and empirically sound evidence base for policy making, data needs to be refined 
even further (Fehér 2004). From that perspective, a combination with variables 
such as the country of origin and/or destination is still quite basic. In-depth 
phenomenological research will even go beyond these basic variables and 
attempt to also look into the context in which offences are committed. To be able 
to set up an integrated action plan in the fight against trafficking in human 
beings, data is needed on the other offences that are committed in the context of 
trafficking in human beings and that are irrefutably crucial for the success of 





trafficking in human beings. Reference can be made to the falsifications of 
passports or travel documents that are committed ‘in the context of’ trafficking 
in human beings (Vermeulen and De Bondt 2009; Council of the European 
Union 2000b). It goes without saying that an integrated comprehensive action 
plan to fight trafficking in human beings also needs to look into ways to tackle 
these so-called context offences. A such approach obviously requires a data set 
of which today the level of detail is unattainable, even for one of the EU’s most 
researched phenomena and top priority offence 
 
5 Conclusion  
It is clear that there will be no data without a policy to ensure data 
availability. The above analysis clearly revealed that in absence of an explicit 
policy to ensure the availability of high quality crime statistical data, relevant 
data availability is poor. The assertion that it is an important shortcoming of 
most governments not to ensure the availability of the data necessary to evaluate 
their policies also applies to the EU. Because crime statistic are accepted as an 
important (though not the only) source with a view to producing an evidence 
base for sound criminal policy making, this is an important gap in the EU’s 
policy. Undoubtedly, the current gap undermines the credibility of EU level 
evidence based criminal policy making. It is most regrettable, that at the time of 
the development of European criminal cooperation initiatives and at the onset of 
the creation of an EU criminal policy, so little attention was paid to the 
difficulties that are inextricably bound up with the availability of evidence to 
support and evaluate those policy initiatives. Especially in light of the parallel 
evolution promoting evidence based policy making at EU level with a view to 
increasing legitimacy, acceptability and credibility of EU policy making, this is 
most unfortunate. 
Therefore it must be recommended that data availability policies are 
developed on two levels. First, the EU policy maker must demand availability of 
incidence data, at least for the EU’s top-10 priority offences to have a minimal 
evidence base for future policy making. Second, the EU policy maker must 
further support (research) initiatives that aim to increase the availability of more 
detailed data to feed phenomenological studies and have a more extended 
evidence base for future policy making. 





5.1 Ensuring the availability of incidence data 
First, as a baseline, the EU is entitled to have access to incidence data for its 
top-10 priority offences. In spite of the justified claim, the EU is somewhat 
reserved and hesitant and questions its mandate to interfere with the national 
data systems. There is no need for such reservation or hesitation. The minute it is 
felt that individual member state efforts are insufficient to provide an 
appropriate response to a specific crime phenomenon and therefore member 
states unanimously agree that there is a clear need to install increased 
cooperation with respect to a certain offence type, that decision only logically 
entails a – be it implicit – commitment to also ensure the availability of data to 
assess whether the joint response is appropriate or needs to be refined. Member 
states are to see to it that their national data providers can comply with 
corresponding EU data requests. 
Within the EU’s criminal policy sphere, there is a good and obvious basis that 
can be used as the foundation of a data availability policy. For each of the EU’s 
top-10 priority offences, common minimum criminalisation standards have been 
unanimously agreed upon by the member states in the form of an 
approximating framework decision or similar instruments. In these instruments, 
member states listed the behaviour that is most reprehensible in the EU and for 
which criminalisation in each of the member states’ national criminal justice 
systems must be guaranteed. These common criminalisation efforts are the 
obvious basis to collect comparable statistical data. Undeniably, this is the best 
approach to tackle the incomparability of crime statistical data due to national 
criminalisation differences.  
In spite of this theoretical foundation for data gathering and comparability, 
the way in which criminalisation requirements are implemented in the national 
criminal justice systems have a baleful influence on data availability. Two main 
problems have surfaced during the analysis. Firstly, it is important to consider 
future use of a definition when deciding which behaviour falls within the scope 
of an offence label. If not, the definition itself may undermine future functioning 
as was illustrated by the problems related to the implementation of fraud against 
the financial interests of the European Communities for prosecution and 
conviction based on it. Therefore, it is important to appreciate that a decision to 
identify and describe the behaviour for which EU cooperation should be 
stepped-up, should also entail an in-depth consideration of the use of that 
description in a later stage to evaluate the policy initiatives. Secondly, even if a 
suitable definition is provided at EU level, criminalisation remains a minimum 
obligation, which means that member states are free to introduce and/or 
maintain a more stringent regime criminalising beyond the listed behaviour. As 





a consequence, the behaviour identified at EU level is not always easy traceable 
in the national criminal codes. Some member states had already criminalised the 
behaviour spread over one or more articles in their criminal code, others have 
added a paragraph to an existing criminalisation and again others have 
introduced an entirely separate article criminalising the identified behaviour, 
regardless of a possible overlap with existing national criminalisation. This 
patchwork of implementation strategies is perfectly in line with the EU’s 
minimum criminalisation requirements, but hinders the identification of cases 
and convictions for which the underlying behaviour is to be included in EU level 
statistical analyses. This explains why data availability is currently extremely 
poor. However, for the abovementioned reasons, the EU should not put up with 
that. Approximation obligations are currently the only empirically sound basis 
to ensure the collection of comparable data and it is the responsibility of the 
member states to ensure that their data systems are built in such a way to be able 
to separate the data needed to support and evaluate EU level criminal policy 
making. The architecture could distinguish between so-called type 1cases that 
relate to behaviour identified at EU level and type 2 cases that are not linked to 
behaviour identified at EU level. This would significantly facilitate data 
exchange and such separation is the only way to guarantee the credibility of EU 
level criminal policy making and maintain its acceptability for the future. 
Looking at the current organisation of the data systems and the availability of 
integrated crime statistics at national level, it is clear that we will not have the 
data we want by tomorrow. Integrated crime statistics are still a big concern at 
national level. However, it should be equally clear that the EU is justified to 
claim that data today, and should do so even if it were just to raise awareness at 
national level of the importance of developing and maintaining a criminal data 
system that is not just a compilation of data but is organised in a way to support 
and evaluate criminal policy making at national and at EU level. 
5.2 Ensuring the availability of more detailed data 
Second, the EU policy maker must further support (research) initiatives that 
aim to increase the availability of more detailed data. It is vital to combine rather 
legal incidence studies with more criminological phenomenological studies, 
especially when the results are intended to support and evaluate criminal policy 
making. In order to conduct empirically sound phenomenological studies, mere 
incidence data is insufficient and more detailed information is indispensable to 
be able to analyse the phenomenon from a larger contextual perspective. To be 
able to develop a policy to ensure data availability, it is important to first and 
foremost reach consensus on the information needed. The requirements are 
strongly dependent on the phenomenon with which one is confronted. Therefore 
it is crucial to first look into the requests of the phenomenological researchers, 





thereafter into the different data providers that need to be included and finally 
into the data availability in the different data systems. Additionally, completing 
so-called official crime statistical data from actors within the criminal justice 
chain with data from other parties is important to obtain a complete 
phenomenological picture. In goes without saying that research into money 
laundering practices would benefit from data input from banking and insurance 
actors (Bantekas 2006). Similarly, research into illegal immigration would benefit 
from data input from (non)governmental social care and assistance 
organisations. The only phenomenon to date for which this kind of 
groundbreaking research has been conducted is trafficking in human beings. In 
light thereof, it is convenient that the data availability assessment underlying 
this contribution looked into detailed (be it incidence) data for trafficking in 
human beings. It can only be applauded that there is political and financial 
support for studies that aim to increase the availability of more detailed data 
that goes beyond mere incidence data. Reference can be made to e.g. the MON-
EU-TRAF studies (Di Nicola 2004; Savona et al. 2002) and the SIAMSECT study, 
which aimed at elaborating an EU template and data collection plan for 
statistical information and analysis on missing and sexually exploited children 
and trafficking in human beings (Vermeulen et al. 2006). It was funded by the 
European Commission under the Daphne II programme. Additionally, to 
corroborate the research results, the European Commission cooperated with the 
International Labour Organisation to support the DELPHI-research study, also 
aiming at reaching consensus amongst a wide group of experts on a selected list 
of indicators that were required for meaningful data collection and analysis in 
the context of trafficking in human beings (European Commission 2006b). A 
project undertaken by the International Organisation for Migration in 
cooperation with the Austrian Ministry of Interior equally resulted in a 
publication of the core-indicators of trafficking in human beings, including 
information on victims, actors, and other phenomenological characteristics 
(International Organisation for Migration and Austrian Ministry of Interior 
2009). Similarly the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development 
also teamed up with the Czech Ministry of Interior to draw up a handbook on 
data collection and information management (International Centre for Migration 
and Policy Development and Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic 2009). 
Against this background of consecutive research projects, the European 
Commission recently funded the MONTRASEC study that developed an IT tool 
to put the various described data collection mechanisms into practice and test 
the feasibility of actually gathering data to describe, interpret and analyse 
phenomena in a multidisciplinary fashion (Vermeulen and Paterson 2010). It 
proved that it is actually possible to move beyond theoretical discussions 
concerning data collection to a point where all data providers are prepared to 
work within a unified and consistent data collection regime that allows cross-





country analysis and produce evidence that is empirically sound to be used as 
an evidence base for criminal policy making.  
In spite of good intentions, using statistical data to actually support evidence 
based European criminal policy is far from reality. The availability of high 
quality comparable crime statistical data is nowhere near the level needed to 
support and evaluate European criminal policy making and guarantee the 
credibility of evidence based policy making at EU level.  
For long, the development of European criminal policy has been ill-
considered in absence of a long term and consistent policy plan, because 
member states were not prepared to give up part of their sovereignty in the 
context of criminal law. The tailor made decision making procedure in the 
context of the development of the three-pillar structure comes to that testimony. 
The abolishment of the three pillar structure and the decision to apply the 
ordinary decision making procedure also in the context of criminal law is 
nothing less but a true mile stone in the development of the European criminal 
policy area. It is clear that we have passed the stage of infancy and that it is the 
joint responsibility of all EU member states to guide this policy domain to 
become a well-balanced and stable adult. A commitment to do whatever is 
necessary to provide a solid evidence base for its policy making, is the only way 
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Double criminality in international cooperation in 
criminal matters 
 
One of the first questions member states are confronted with in relation to 
international cooperation in criminal matters is what to do with a request that 
relates to behaviour that would not constitute an offence if committed in their 
jurisdiction. Because there is no such thing as an EU criminal code and the 27 
member states have their own distinct criminal codes, differences in substantive 
criminal law are still widespread.149 Situations may occur in which a member 
state receives a cooperation request/order with respect to behaviour that is not 
equally criminalised in its national law and therefore does not pass the so-called 
double criminality test. This chapter will demonstrate that the answer to the 
question whether cooperation is still allowed, required or prohibited in absence 
of double criminality is far from straight forward. 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Double criminality: what’s in a name? 
As an important preliminary note, it must be stressed that there is no 
definition of the concept of double criminality and in literature various “related 
concepts” can be found.150 Analysis reveals that defining the concept is 
challenging because double criminality appears in almost as many shapes and 
sizes as the instruments it is used in. Because it is not clear which requirements 
can or should be brought under the concept of double criminality, describing it 
                                                             
149 Even though there are a lot of similarities in the behaviour that is criminalised throughout 
the criminal codes of the 27 member states, there are a lot of differences. Reference is 
traditionally made to the sensitivity surrounding the inclusion of abortion and euthanasia 
within the scope of murder See e.g. Cadoppi, A. (1996). Towards a European Criminal Code. 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1, 2.. Furthermore, it is incorrect 
to think that EU intervention through the adoption of minimum rules in approximation 
instruments rules out further existence of difference. EU approximation only consists of the 
introduction of minimum standards with respect to offences and leaves it up to the member 
states to introduce a more strict legal regime. 
150 See also PLACHTA, M. "The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal 
matters", in JAREBORG, N., Double Criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 84-134, who 
refers to the terminological chaos caused by the (distinct) use of double criminality, double 
punishability, double penalization, dual (criminal) liability, dual incrimination, double 
prosecutability, double culpability, equivalency of offences and even reciprocity of offences. See 
also WILLIAMS, S. A. "The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A Comparative Analysis." 
Nora Law Review 1991, 3, p 581-623, who also refers to dual criminality or duality of offences. 





as requiring that the behaviour constitutes an offence in both states, may not suffice151, 
when taking account of the diversity illustrated by the following examples.  
- The European Union Conventions on Transfer of Proceedings and the 
Enforcement of sanctions require that the underlying act be an offence in the 
requested state if committed on its territory; 
- In the Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant, it is required 
that the act constitutes an offence under the law of the executing member state, 
whatever the constituent elements or however it is described; This formulation 
does not include a specific reference to territoriality and points to the 
irrelevance of the labelling of the offence; 
- The Council of Europe Conventions on the Transfer of Proceedings and 
International Validity of Judgements require the act to be an offence if committed 
on the territory of the requested state and the person on whom the sanction was 
imposed liable to punishment if he had committed the act there. This formulation 
does not only require that the act involved constitutes an offence, but also 
that the person involved can be held liable for that offence; 
- In the Framework decision on the mutual recognition of confiscation orders, 
it is required that the act constitutes an offence which permits confiscation under 
the law of the executing state, whatever the constituent elements or however it is 
described under the law of the issuing state. This formulation indicates that mere 
double criminality of the act is not enough; even if the act in relation to which 
confiscation is requested constitutes an offence in the requested member 
state, cooperation can still be refused based on the fact that – according to the 
national law of the requested member state – confiscation is only possible in 
relation to a limited set of offences; and 
- In the Council of European Extradition Convention it is stipulated that 
extradition shall be granted in respect of offences punishable under the laws of the 
requesting state and of the requested state by deprivation of liberty or under a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe 
penalty. Where a conviction and prison sentence have occurred or a detention order 
has been made in the territory of the requesting state, the punishment awarded must 
have been for a period of at least four months; This formulation adds sanction 
thresholds to the mere double criminality of the act. 
                                                             
151 ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M. "Chapter 3: Double Criminality", in ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M., 
European Arrest Warrant - A solution ahead of its time?, JUSTICE - advancing justice, human 
rights and the rule of law, 2003, p 34-52; THOMAS, F. De Europese rechtshulpverdragen in 
strafzaken. Gent, Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, 1980, 520p; VAN DEN WYNGAERT, C. 
Kennismaking met het Internationaal en Europees strafrecht. Antwerp - Apeldoorn, Maklu, 
2003, 138p;  





As a result, in literature various attempts have been made to catalogue the 
differences and classify the different types of double criminality. The 
combination between the requirement that the behaviour is punishable in both 
member states and the requirement that the sanction meets a certain threshold, is 
sometimes referred to as a type of qualified double criminality152. However, the 
concept of qualified double criminality is also used to describe the situation 
where the double criminality should not only be assessed from an abstract 
perspective (i.e. whether the behaviour is punishable in both states), but should 
also be assessed from a more concrete perspective (i.e. whether the person would 
have been punishable if the behaviour was committed in the territory of the 
other member state), pointing to the possible influence of differences in 
justification grounds (e.g. self defence, force majeur).153 This latter (less frequent) 
interpretation of qualified double criminality, is more commonly referred to as 
the in concreto double criminality test. Additionally, a distinction is made 
between double criminality in abstracto, referring to the criminalisation of the 
type of the act (be it or not linked to a certain sanction threshold) and the double 
criminality in concreto, looking also into the punishability or prosecutability of 
the perpetrator.154 To avoid confusion, neither the concept of qualified double 
criminality, nor in abstracto or in concreto double criminality are used.  
More important though than the terminological discussions and the attempts 
to classify the different types of double criminality, is an argumentation that can 
either justify or preclude recourse to a double criminality requirement in 
whatever configuration. This discussion is never reflected let alone thoroughly 
analysed in literature.  
1.2 Two-party talk between the member states involved 
First and foremost, the position of the double criminality requirement is the 
result of a talk between the member states involved. The metaphor of a two-
party talk is use to reflect the distinction between the position of the member 
states as issuing/requesting member states and as executing/requested member 
states. 
                                                             
152 See e.g. CLEIREN, C. P. M. and NIJBOER, J. F. Tekst en Commentaar: Internationaal 
Strafrecht. Deventer, Kluwer, 2011, 2366p. 
153 PLACHTA, M. "The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal matters", 
in JAREBORG, N., Double Criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 84-134. 
154 See e.g. FICHERA, M. The implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European Union: 
Law, Policy and Practice. Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, Intersentia, 2011, 253p. or VAN DEN 
WYNGAERT, C. "Double criminality as a requirement to jurisdiction", in JAREBORG, N., 
Double criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 43-56. 





Where double criminality is said to have been originally developed as a 
mechanism to avoid that member states were obliged to cooperate with respect 
to behaviour they did not consider criminally actionable155, there is an important 
recent trend of abandoning the double criminality requirement in favour of 
efficient rendering of justice. Apparently, member states no longer consider it a 
fortiori problematic to cooperate in the event the behaviour underlying the 
cooperation request is not considered to be criminal not even for forms of 
cooperation that were traditionally strongly linked to double criminality.156 
The position of the member states to either or not want to cooperate is 
centred around two main arguments that often though not necessarily coincide: 
the type of cooperation and the capacity implications. 
First, it is important to appreciate that there is an entire spectrum comprising 
different forms of cooperation for which the answer to the double criminality 
question is likely to differ. Double criminality has never been and should never 
become a general requirement throughout cooperation instruments. Though for 
some forms of cooperation double criminality was never an issue, it is 
understandable that member states wanted – and still want – to limit some other 
forms of cooperation based on a double criminality requirement with a view to 
remaining master in their own territory and decide how to deal with certain 
behaviour.157 To be able to provide an overview of the position of double 
criminality in international cooperation in criminal matters that sufficiently 
differentiates between the different forms of international cooperation, a 
distinction was made between 7 domains of cooperation.158 These domains 
                                                             
155 PLACHTA, M. "The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal matters", 
in JAREBORG, N., Double Criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 107. 
156 See e.g. current surrender scene whereas in the context of the traditional extradition scene 
double criminality is said to be a principle of customary international law. 
157 This position is not shared by all academics. See e.g. KLIP, A. "European integration and 
harmonisation and criminal law", in CURTIN, D. M., SMITS, J. M., KLIP, A. and MCCAHERY, 
J. A., European Integration and Law, Antwerp - Oxford, Intersentia, 2006, p147. He has 
elaborated on a proposal that involves complementing the abandonment of the double 
criminality requirement with the introduction of a strict territoriality based jurisdiction. 
158 Older overviews of the position of double criminality in international criminal law make a 
distinction between 5 cooperation types, being extradition, judicial assistance, recognition of 
foreign penal judgments, transfer of criminal proceedings and enforcement of foreign penal 
judgements. See e.g. PLACHTA, M. "The role of double criminality in international cooperation 
in penal matters", in JAREBORG, N., Double Criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 84-134. 
Considering the evolution in European criminal law, it was decided to join recognition and 
enforcement and add three domains, being the transfer of pre-trial supervision, the exchange of 
criminal records and the relocation and protection of witnesses as separate domains for the 
analysis. Additionally, the scope of the joint ‘recognition and enforcement of foreign penal 
judgements’ was extended to ‘international validity and effect of decisions’, to encompass the 
taking account of prior convictions in new (criminal) proceedings and similar forms of making 





mirror the clusters developed when outlining the methodology for this study, 
designed around 7 domains of cooperation, being: (1) mutual legal assistance, (2) 
transfer of pre-trial supervision, (3) extradition and surrender, (4) exchange of 
criminal records, (5) relocation and protection of witnesses, (6) transfer of 
prosecution, (7) international validity and effect of decisions. For each of these 
domains the position of the double criminality requirement will be assessed 
consecutively. Considering the appearance of the concept of ‘extraditable 
offences’ in various cooperation instruments beyond the extradition domain, 
extradition needs to be thoroughly assessed first. Thereafter, the domains will be 
dealt with in the above indicated consecutive order. 
Second, empirical data gathered in a previous study demonstrated – 
especially now the cooperation scene is changing from request-based into order-
based – that capacity issues increasingly gain attention.159 It will be looked into 
to what extent member states should be allowed to engage in a debate on the 
acceptability of upholding a double criminality requirement with respect to 
forms of cooperation that would have a significant operational or financial 
capacity impact. It is a valid concern of member states to want to retain the 
power to decide when a situation is serious enough to justify the use of certain 
investigative capacity. Especially when double criminality is not met, member 
states may deem that the investigative capacity does not weigh up to the relative 
seriousness of the case.160 In parallel it is interesting to assess to what extent it is 
feasible to overcome (double criminality related) capacity concerns by allowing 
the requesting or issuing member state to use its own capacity to complete the 
request or order. From the perspective of the issuing or requesting member state 
it can be reviewed to what extent it may be expected that responsibility is taken 
to execute own requests or orders when a (double criminality related) capacity 
concern leads to refusal. From the perspective of the requested member state, it 
can be reviewed to what extent moving ahead in a criminal procedure is deemed 
to be so important that they ought to accept the presence of another member 
state on their territory. This policy option can be summarised in the feasibility of 
the introduction of an aut exequi aut tolerare principle. 
Based on the (possible) conflict of interest between on the one hand the 
member state that seeks cooperation and on the other hand the member state 
that wishes to retain the power to decide to either or not take up that 
                                                                                                                                               
sure that foreign decisions have effects equivalent to national decisions in a member state’s 
legal order. 
159 See VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W. and VAN DAMME, Y. EU cross-border gathering and 
use of evidence in criminal matters. Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and 
free movement of evidence? Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2010. 
160 Even though capacity objections are linked to double criminality issues in this paragraph, 
capacity can also be a concern in relation to situations where double criminality is met. 





request/order, the current position of double criminality in international 
cooperation in criminal matters can be reviewed. However, the double 
criminality question is not confined to a two-party talk between the two 
(cooperating) member states. The issue is more complex and requires a four-
party talk. Besides the (cooperating) member states, both the European Union in 
its capacity of a policy maker and the person involved deserve a seat at the 
reflection table. 
1.3 The European Union as the third party 
In addition to the member states involved, it would make sense that the EU 
joins as a third party in the discussions on the position of the double criminality 
requirement. Even though the member states are the EU, especially when it 
comes to criminal policy making, the added value of the EU as a third party 
consists of its role to strive for consistency in EU policy making and to that end 
safeguard the approximation acquis. 
The answer to the question to what extent double criminality 
can/should/may limit international cooperation in criminal matters, is closely 
intertwined with the development of an EU criminal policy with respect to a 
limited number of offence labels. Ever since the Amsterdam Treaty introduced 
the possibility to approximate the constituent elements of offences161, the EU has 
adopted several instruments in which it requires member states to ensure that 
the included behaviour constitutes a criminal offence. This obligation inevitably 
also has its influence on the position of double criminality limits to international 
cooperation in criminal matters in relation to those offences. It would be 
inconsistent to require member states to ensure that behaviour constitutes an 
offence and at the same time allow member states to refuse cooperation in 
relation to that behaviour for double criminality reasons.  
To reinforce the approximation obligations and reinforce its policy with 
respect to those offences, the EU has a legitimate reason to prohibit the use 
double criminality as a refusal ground with respect to approximated parts of 
offences. Member states that have complied with the criminalisation obligation 
will not have a double criminality issue and member states that have not 
complied with the criminalisation obligation will not have the right to use their 
lagging behind as an argument to refuse cooperation.  
                                                             
161 See old Art. 31 (e) TEU. 





In order to conduct such an assessment, it is important to know which 
offences have been subject to approximation and thus for which offences the EU 
is building an EU criminal policy. To visualise the current so-called 
approximation acquis162, a table is inserted below providing an overview of the 
offence labels and the instruments in which a definition thereto is included. 
 
Offence label as it has been defined in 
Euro counterfeiting 
Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on 
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other 
sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the 
introduction of the euro as amended by the Council 
Framework Decision 2001/888/JHA of 6 December 2001 
amending Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on 
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other 
sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the 
introduction of the euro 
Fraud and counterfeiting non-
cash means of payment 
Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May 
2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash 
means of payment 
Money laundering 
Joint Action 98/699/JHA of 3 December 1998 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on money laundering, the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation 
of instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime repealed 
and replaced by the Council Framework Decision 
2001/500/JHA of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the 
identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation 
of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime 
                                                             
162 The possibility to approximate offences and sanctions was formally introduced at EU level in 
Artt. 29 and 31(e) TEU as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty. They allowed for the adoption of 
measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and 
to penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. To that end 
Art. 34 TEU introduced the framework decision. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the framework decision has been replaced by the directive. Therefore, this table also includes 
the post-Lisbon directives. For reasons of completeness the table also includes the references to 
the relevant joint actions, that can be characterized as the predecessors to the framework 
decisions. As argued elsewhere, it is important to note that the actual approximation acquis 
extends beyond this traditional framework decision only-view even when it is complemented with 
joint actions and directives. See e.g. DE BONDT, W. and VERMEULEN, G. "Esperanto for EU 
Crime Statistics. Towards Common EU offences in an EU level offence classification system", in 
COOLS, M., Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing, Antwerp - Apeldoorn - 
Portland, Maklu, 2009, 2, p 87-124; DE BONDT, W. and VERMEULEN, G. "Appreciating 
Approximation. Using common offence concepts to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in 
the EU", in COOLS, M., Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing, Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2010, 4, p 15-40 





Offence label as it has been defined in 
Terrorism 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on combating terrorism as amended by Council 
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism 
Trafficking in human beings 
Joint Action 97/154/JHA of 24 February 1997 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union concerning action to combat trafficking 
in human beings and sexual exploitation of children 
repealed and replaced by Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in 
human beings repealed and replaced by Directive 
2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, 
repealing Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA 
Illegal (im)migration 
Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 
November 2002 on the strengthening of the legal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence, as complemented by the 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 
defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit 
and residence 
Environmental offences 
Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law and 
Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA to 
strengthen the criminal-law framework for the 
enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution 
annulled and replaced by Directive 2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law 
Corruption 
Joint Action 98/742/JHA of 22 December 1998 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on corruption in the private sector 
repealed and replaced by the Council Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in 
the private sector 





Offence label as it has been defined in 
Sexual exploitation of a child 
and child pornography 
Joint Action 97/154/JHA of 24 February 1997 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union concerning action to combat trafficking 
in human beings and sexual exploitation of children 
repealed and replaced by the Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography 
repealed and replaced by Directive 2011/92/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. 
Drug trafficking 
Joint Action 96/750/JHA of 17 December 1996 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union concerning the approximation of the 
laws and practices of the Member States of the European 
Union to combat drug addiction and to prevent and 
combat illegal drug trafficking replaced by the Council 
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 
laying down minimum provisions on the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of 
illicit drug trafficking 
Offences against information 
systems 
Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 21 
February 2005 on attacks against information systems 
Participation in a criminal 
organisation 
Joint action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998 adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on making it a criminal offence to 
participate in a criminal organisation in the Member 
States of the European Union repealed and replaced by the 
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight against organised crime 
Racism and xenophobia 
Joint Action 96/443/JHA of 15 July 1996 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, concerning action to combat racism 
and xenophobia  repealed and replaced by the Council 
Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 29 November 2008 
on combating certain forms and expressions of racism 
and xenophobia by means of criminal law 
 
Additionally, because capacity concerns increasingly gain attention – 
especially now cooperation is changing from request-based into order-based – it 
is valid to look into the link between those capacity concerns as refusal grounds 
and the approximation acquis. If member states link (and thus limit) the use of 
capacity concerns to situations in which double criminality is not fulfilled and 
those member states have also unanimously agreed to approximate certain 
offences, it is only logical to formulate the capacity based refusal ground in a 
way that clarifies that it is inacceptable to use double criminality as a refusal 





ground in relation to offences that have been subject to approximation. Hence, 
this means that cooperation for cases in relation to offences that have been 
subject to approximation can never be hindered by capacity concerns. However, 
member states may also decide that it is acceptable to use capacity as a refusal 
ground even when double criminality is met, which means that also cases in 
relation to offences that have been subject to approximation can be hindered by 
capacity concerns. In this scenario it would be interesting for the European 
Union in its capacity of a policy maker to bring the acceptability of the aut exequi 
aut tolerare principle to the table, which would attach consequences to using 
capacity as a refusal grounds in relation to (all or some of the) offences that have 
been subject to approximation. For the issuing or requesting member state, this 
would entail the commitment to use its own capacity to complete the order or 
request; for the requested member state this would entail the obligation to accept 
the presence of and execution by another member state. 
1.4 The person involved as the fourth-party 
The fourth party that deserves a seat at the reflection table is the person 
involved. The answer to the question to what extent double criminality can limit 
international cooperation in criminal matters has a direct impact on the position 
of the person involved; a direct impact on whether or not she will be subject to 
e.g. extradition, investigative measures, cross-border execution of a sentence. 
Obviously, whereas the reservation to cooperate in absence of double criminality 
may form a relatively strong shield163 from being subjected to any kind of 
criminal procedural measure for the person involved, this shield is significantly 
losing its strength with the negotiation and adoption of each instrument in 
which member states agree to cooperate in spite of lack of double criminality. 
This trend is not problematic as a person can never claim the right to benefit 
from the protection of the double criminality shield. The double criminality limit 
to international cooperation is not a vested right.164 
                                                             
163 “Relatively strong” because double criminality has never been a general requirement 
shielding the persons involved from any kind of cooperation in criminal matters. As will 
become clear in the overview provided some forms of cooperation have never been subject to a 
double criminality requirement. 
164 Analysis will reveal that there is no existing international (human rights based) obligation to 
retain double criminality as a refusal ground in any of the forms of internation cooperation in 
criminal matters. 





On the other hand, calling upon a double criminality requirement can also 
run counter the interests of the person involved. The rehabilitation interest that 
is now strongly emphasized in the context of transfer of execution of custodial 
sentences165, can serve as an example here.  
A conflict may rise between the double criminality requirement and the 
rehabilitation interest. If the person involved is found in the convicting member 
state, that member state – though it does not need the cooperation from any 
other member state to ensure execution of its sentence – may wish to call upon 
e.g. the member state of the person’s nationality and residence for the execution 
of the sentence, as is visualised in the figure inserted below. This would fit 
perfectly to the recent focus on the principle of rehabilitation the application of 
which may lead to the conclusion that the person involved would be better off – 












In this particular scenario, the use of double criminality as a refusal ground is 
not linked to either or not executing the sentence, but is linked to the location of 
the execution. Refusal will mean that execution in the country of nationality and 
residence is impossible and will “condemn” the person to execute her sentence in 
the convicting member state, in spite of (potentially) better rehabilitation 
opportunities in the member state of nationality and residence. In this scenario it 
would go against the – rehabilitation inspired – interests of a convicted person to 
                                                             
165 With the coming into office of Ms. Reding as the Commissioner for Justice, rehabilitation has 
assumed a high place on the political agenda. See also: VERMEULEN, G., VAN KALMTHOUT, 
A., PATERSON, N., KNAPEN, M., VERBEKE, P. and DE BONDT, W. Cross-border execution of 
judgements involving deprivation of liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical 
problems through flanking measures. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2011, 310p 
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refuse the transfer of execution to her member state of nationality and residence 
purely based on the lack of double criminality.  
Either or not seeking recourse to double criminality as a limit to international 
cooperation in criminal matters can significantly impact on the position of the 
person involved, both to its advantage as well as to its disadvantage. The 
question arises what the right balance would be between the ability for a 
member state to seek recourse to the double criminality requirement to limit 
international cooperation and the rehabilitation objectives underlying the 
transfer of execution. 
1.5 Four-party talks 
Against the background of those basic considerations with respect to the 
concept of double criminality (i.e. the lack of a proper definition and the variety 
in its formulation and requirements) and in light of the interests of the four 
parties involved, the actual position of double criminality in each of the different 
forms of cooperation will be critically reviewed. 
 
2 Extradition and surrender 
The first domain under review consists of extradition and surrender. After 
detailing the position of the double criminality requirement in this domain, it 
will be argued that (1) the evolution from extradition to surrender has not 
consistently dealt with the fate of the outdated concept of ‘extraditable offences’, 
(2) the abandonment of the double criminality requirement for a set of offence 
labels for which the definition is left to the discretion of the issuing member 
states might have been too much too soon for the executing member states to 
handle, (3) the absence of a link between the double criminality requirement and 
the approximation acquis runs the risk of undermining the acquis if member 
states have not correctly implemented their approximation obligations and (4) 
that there is no vested right for the person involved to benefit from a double 
criminality shield in an extradition or surrender context. 





2.1 Extraditable offences: double criminality as a rule of 
customary law 
Extradition is a form of cooperation through which one member state hands 
over a person that is either a suspected or convicted criminal in another member 
state. Because handing a person over to another member state constitutes a 
significant contribution to a criminal procedure held in another member state, 
this cooperation form has always been dependent on the condition that the 
offence was punishable in both the issuing and the executing member state.166 As 
a result, double criminality is sometimes even referred to as a customary rule of 
international law with respect to extradition.167  
Furthermore, member states have always complemented this double 
criminality requirement with sanction thresholds. CoE Extradition is the first 
relevant multilateral European extradition instrument scrutinized. Art. 2.1. CoE 
Extradition elaborates on the concept of extraditable offences. It explains that 
extradition shall be granted in respect of offences punishable under the laws of 
the requesting state and of the requested state by deprivation of liberty or under 
a detention order for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe 
penalty. Where a conviction and prison sentence have occurred or a detention 
order has been made in the territory of the requesting state, the punishment 
awarded must have been for a period of at least four months. In sum, the in 
abstracto threshold was set at 1 year and the in concreto threshold was set at 4 
months.168 If the request for extradition includes several separate offences each of 
                                                             
166 VERMEULEN, G. VANDER BEKEN, TOM "Extradition in the European Union: State of the 
Art and Perspectives." European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1996, p 
200-225; KONSTANDINIDES, T. "The Europeanisation of extraditions: how many light years 
away to mutual confidence?", in ECKES, C. and KONSTANDINIDES, T., Crime within the Area 
of Freedom Security and Justice. A European Public Order, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2011, p 192-223 
167 See e.g. PLACHTA, M. "The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal 
matters", in JAREBORG, N., Double Criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 84-134. 
However, considering the exceptions that exists for example between the Nordic Countries, 
where extradition is possible without a double criminality verification (see more in detail: 
TRÄSKMAN, P. O. "Should be take the condition of double criminality seriously?", in 
JAREBORG, N., Double criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 135-155) this connotation is 
deemed to be too strong. 
168 Even though the concepts of in abstracto double criminality (i.e. looking only at the 
criminalisation of the underlying behaviour and where applicable the sanction threshold) and 
in concreto double criminality (i.e. looking also at the punishability and prosecutability of the 
person in the concrete case), the terms in abstracto and in concreto will be used in the context of 
the interpretation of the threshold. The provisions regulating the double criminality 
requirement distinguish between on the one hand the situation where the person still has the 
status of a suspect in which case the threshold in the issuing/requesting member state is 





which is punishable under the laws of the requesting state and the requested 
state by deprivation of liberty or under a detention order, but of which some do 
not fulfil the condition with regard to the aforementioned sanction threshold, the 
requested state will have the discretion to decide whether or not to grant 
extradition.169 
Within the EU the concept of extraditable offences was slightly adjusted with 
the introduction of the 1996 Convention relating to extradition between the 
member states of the European Union.170 Art. 2.1. EU Extradition elaborates on 
the concept of extraditable offences and explains that extradition shall be 
granted in respect of offences which are punishable under the law of the 
requesting member state by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a 
maximum period of at least 12 months and under the law of the requested 
member state by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum 
period of at least six months.  
This means that – as shown from the table below – the in concreto threshold 
was raised from four (in Art. 2.1. CoE Extradition) up to six months (in Art. 2.1. 
EU Extradition), without any form of justification, not even when compared to 
existing regional instruments. The Benelux Extradition Treaty for example 
lowered the in abstracto CoE threshold by rendering offences extraditable as soon 
as they are punishable with a deprivation of liberty of at least six months or 
punished with a detention order if a maximum period of at least four months. 
 
 In abstracto 
in the IMS 
In abstracto 
in the EMS 
In concreto 
in the IMS 
CoE Extradition 1 year 1 year 4 months 
Benelux Extradition 6 months 6 months 4 months 
EU Extradition 12 months 12 months 6 months 
 
The coexistence of these instruments created the rather complex situation in 
which the sanction threshold and therefore the scope of the extraditable offences 
was dependent on the ratification process in each of the individual member 
states. 
                                                                                                                                               
assessed in an abstract way, looking into the sanction that might be imposed and on the other 
hand the situation where the person has already been convicted in which case the threshold in 
the issuing/requesting member state is assessed in a concrete way, looking at the sanction that 
was imposed. 
169 For reasons of completeness, it should also be mentioned that political, military and fiscal 
offences are also excluded from the scope of extraditable offences. 
170 Hereafter abbreviated as EU Extradition. 





2.2 Surrenderable offences: double criminality for non-
listed offences 
Nowadays, within the EU, the concept of extraditable offences has lost its 
meaning following the introduction of the FD EAW and the associated evolution 
from extraditing to surrendering. This evolution has important implications for the 
double criminality requirement that was traditionally included as a limit to this 
type of cooperation. The FD EAW introduces a two track approach in that the 
double criminality requirement is maintained for some situations and lifted for 
other situations.  
As a first track, Art. 2.4 FD EAW maintains the double criminality 
requirement in that in general surrender may be subject to the condition that the 
acts for which the European arrest warrant has been issued also constitute an 
offence under the law of the executing member state. The introduction of the FD 
EAW again changed the sanction thresholds. The sanction thresholds that were 
always included in previous instruments have been limited to the perspective of 
the issuing member state. As shown in the table below, Art. 2.1 FD EAW 
stipulates that a European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by 
the law of the issuing member state by a custodial sentence or a detention order 
for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been 
passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months.  
Despite the existence of EU sanction thresholds, those thresholds were not 
copied into the FD EAW. The in abstracto threshold in the issuing member state 
corresponds to the threshold included in EU Extradition, whereas the in concreto 
threshold in the issuing member states corresponds to the threshold included in 
a Council of Europe instrument.171  
 
 In abstracto 
in the IMS 
In abstracto 
in the EMS 
In concreto 
in the IMS 
CoE Extradition 1 year 1 year 4 months 
Benelux Extradition 6 months 6 months 4 months 
EU Extradition 12 months 12 months 6 months 
FD EAW 12 months -- 4 months 
 
                                                             
171 It is not correct to say that the CoE thresholds were copied into the FD EAW, because in 
many member states 1 year is considered to be longer than 12 months (e.g. in Belgian law, 1 
month is considered to be 30 days, as a result of which 12 months is only 360 days, 5 days short 
of a year). 





As a second track, a significant reduction of the double criminality 
requirement is introduced in the clause in between. Notwithstanding the impact 
of surrender and therefore the importance of the double criminality 
requirement, double criminality tests were considered time consuming and 
therefore obstacles to smooth and timely cooperation.172 Member states looked 
into alternative approaches that could facilitate and speed up cooperation. An 
alternative was found by means of the introduction of the so-called 32 offence 
list.173 Art. 2.2 FD EAW is often characterised as the most radical or 
revolutionary change174 brought about by the FD EAW as it reduces the 
possibility of the executing member state to refuse because of not meeting the 
double criminality requirement, in that a list of 32 offences is introduced for 
which double criminality verification is abandoned.  In as far as the offences are 
punishable by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period 
of at least three years and as they are defined by the law of the issuing member 
state, the listed offences are no longer subject to a double criminality verification. 
                                                             
172 This position was chiefly voiced by the European Commission, though never supported with 
convincing empirical evidence. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, 
COM(2000) 495 final of 26.07.2000. 
173 Several authors have commented on the compilation of the list. The offences are 
characterised here as semi-ad random, because no clear policy-consistency-rationale was used 
as a basis for their selection. The list started off with 24 crimes, being eleven crimes considered 
during the discussions of the freezing orders proposal, twelve crimes taken from the Annex to 
the Europol Convention and one additional crime that appeared in the Tampere Presidency 
Conclusions. Later on, the list was complemented with two more so-called Europol offences, an 
offence that had been subject to approximation and one offence following a specific member 
state request. The compilation of the list was finalised by including a final set of four crimes See 
more detailed; PEERS, S. "Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: Has the 
Council got it wrong?" Common Market Law Review 2004, 41, p 35-36; KEIJZER, N. "The Fate 
of the Double Criminality Requirement", in GUILD, E. and MARIN, L., Still not resolved?: 
Constitutional issues of the European arrest warrant, Brussels, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008, p 
61-75; AMBOS, K. "Is the development of a common substantive criminal law for Europe 
possible? Some preliminary reflections." Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
2005, 12 (2), p 173-191 
174 The European Commission itself stated that the Amsterdam Treaty opened the door to a 
radical change of perspective: European Commission, Proposal for a Council framework 
Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between the Member 
States, 24 September 2001, COPEN 51, 12102/01. See also ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M. "Chapter 3: 
Double Criminality", in ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M., European Arrest Warrant - A solution 
ahead of its time?, JUSTICE - advancing justice, human rights and the rule of law, 2003, p 34-52; 
KEIJZER, N. "The Fate of the Double Criminality Requirement", in GUILD, E. and MARIN, L., 
Still not resolved?: Constitutional issues of the European arrest warrant, Brussels, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2008, p 61-75; KLIP, A. European Criminal Law. An integrative Approach. Antwerp 
- Oxford - Portland, Intersentia, 2009, 531p. 





2.3 Viability of ‘surrenderable offences’ as a substitute 
for the ‘extraditable offences’ 
From the perspective of the issuing member state, the evolution from 
extradition to surrender can be criticised for not having dealt with the references 
to the concept of extraditable offence in other cooperation instruments. 
When elaborating on the structure of this chapter, it was clarified that due to 
frequent references to the concept of ‘extraditable offences’ in other legal 
instruments, it was deemed important to first discuss the position of double 
criminality in the context of extradition/surrender and pay attention to the 
evolution from the concept of ‘extraditable offences’ into ‘surrenderable 
offences’. 
It is unclear whether the concept of ‘extraditable offence’ should be 
reinterpreted in light of the development of the ‘extraditable offences’ into 
‘surrenderable offences’ following the introduction of the FD EAW. Art. 31 FD 
EAW that intends to clarify the relation to other legal instruments, remains silent 
on this topic. Considering that all extradition related instruments and provisions 
are (to be) reinterpreted in light of the characteristics of surrender, it seems 
logical to reinterpret ‘extraditable offences’ into ‘surrenderable offences’ in light 
of the scope demarcation in Art. 2 FD EAW. This would mean that within the 
EU an extraditable offence is no longer subject to a double criminality 
requirement complemented with sanction thresholds, but is only subject to a 
double criminality requirement in as far as the offence is not listed amongst the 
32 (provided that the behaviour is punishable with at least 3 years in the issuing 
member state).  
 





The figure inserted below provides an overview of the evolution of 




DCR: double criminality requirement | A: threshold in abstracto |      
C: threshold in concreto | Y: years | M: months | IMS: Issuing member state 
 
In sum, the concept of extraditable offence was introduced in CoE 
Extradition and referred to offences for which the underlying behaviour was 
criminalised in both member states and the sanction threshold was either 1 year 
in abstracto or 4 months in concreto. With the EU Extradition, the concept was 
redefined and the thresholds changed into 12 months in abstracto and 6 months 
in concreto. With the FD EAW a two track approach was introduced. In general, 
the double criminality requirement was maintained, combined with either an in 
abstracto threshold of 12 months or an in concreto threshold of 4 months. With 
respect of the 32 listed offences, the threshold requirement was limited to an in 
abstracto threshold of 3 years in the issuing member state. The question arises 
whether this last set of requirements defines the new concept of ‘surrenderable 
offences’ and can/should be used as a substitute for the existing references to 
‘extraditable offences’. Because – in absence of a clear provision in Art. 31 FD 
EAW – there is no hard legal basis to reinterpret ‘extraditable offence’ in light of 





the boundaries of the new concept of ‘surrenderable offence’, it is deemed 
necessary to test the member state perspectives with respect to the faith of the 
‘extraditable offence’ and the acceptability of a reinterpretation into 
‘surrenderable offences’. The explanatory guide to the member state 
questionnaire briefly situated the outdated character of the concept of 
‘extraditable offences’ as a lead up to a question on the current interpretation 
thereof. The insight into the current situation based on the replies to question 
2.4.1. is reassuring in that none of the member state use a strict historic 
interpretation that would limit the scope of extraditable/surrenderable offences 
to what was extraditable at the time of the adoption of the instrument that refers 
to it. Still 19% of the member states indicate to seek recourse to the original 
meaning of Art. 2 CoE Extradition which is somewhat outdated, but an 
interesting 81% of the member states links the interpretation of the extraditable 





2.4.1 Considering that the concept of extradition has seized to 
exist among the member states of the European Union, how 
do you currently interpret that scope limitation?
We use the definition of Art 2 CoE Extradition to decide what is an 
extraditable offence
Historic interpretation: we look at the status of what used to be extraditable 
offences at the time, because the instrument was intended to be limited in that 
way. 
Evolutionary interpretation: we look at the current status and thus the current 
body of instruments, which means that we use the rules in the EAW 
 
Because the replies to question 2.4.1. reveal that for 81% of the member states 
the concept of extraditable offences has changed in light of Art. 2 FD EAW this 





means that surrender can only be requested for offences that meet the thresholds 
in Art. 2.1 FD EAW in the issuing member state for which a double criminality 
test is still allowed. This double criminality test is however no longer allowed for 
the offences listed in Art. 2.2 FD EAW to the extent they are punishable in the 
issuing member state with at least three years. In light thereof it becomes 
interesting to test to what extent it would be acceptable to amend Art. 31 FD 
EAW and in doing so formally reinterpret the scope of ‘extraditable offence’ in 
such a way. One would expect that at least those 81% of the member states 
would be in favour, maybe even more.  
When testing the acceptability of the future policy option to formalise the 
reinterpretation of extraditable offences into a surrenderable offence in all 
cooperation instruments, it is surprising that – when analysing the replies to 
question 2.4.2 – the number of opponents to an evolutionary interpretation has 
increased from 19% up to 27% (which corresponds to two member states who 
have changed their position). Nevertheless, still 73% of the member states is in 
favour of introducing a solid legal basis for the interpretation of the concept of 




2.4.2 Is it an acceptable future policy option for you to amend 





The high percentage of member states already reinterpreting this concept in 
light of the introduction of the surrender procedure via the FD EAW and the 
amount of member states considering it an acceptable future policy option to 
amend the remaining references to extraditable offences is not without meaning. 
Taking account of the new legislative procedure that would govern the 





amendment of e.g. Art. 31 FD EAW in such a way, this would mean that the 
qualified majority would be reached175 and an amendment is possible.176 
2.4 Too much too soon? 
From the perspective of the executing member state, it can be questioned 
whether it was a good choice to accept the introduction of such a wide list of 
offences for which the decision on the exact scope is left to each of the 27 
individual member states. In spite of the fact that the member states had 
unanimously agreed to abandon the double criminality requirement for those 
offences, it is not clear whether member states where sufficiently aware of the 
impact of such a decision. Problems could have been expected not only with 
respect to the implementation of the list but also with respect to the use of the 
list afterwards. Even a very strong presumption that there will most likely not be 
any significant double criminality issues177 will not preclude double criminality 
issues from occurring, which was incompatible with the national laws of some 
member states considering the nature of surrender.  
At the time of the adoption of the FD EAW the JHA Council had recognised 
the lack of common definitions for the listed offences and anticipated to the 
problems it may cause trying to formulate guidelines for the member states with 
respect to the interpretation of the 32 offence list by clarifying the meaning of 
some of the offence labels.178 
                                                             
175 In absolute numbers 20 member states use an evolutionary interpretation, 5 member states 
uphold a CoE interpretation and 2 member states indicated to use another interpretation in 
reply to question 2.4.1. With respect to question 2.4.2 19 member states indicated to be in 
favour, 7 member states indicated to be against a such reinterpretation and 1 member state 
abstained. 
176 Even against the will of opposing member states. 
177 ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M. "Chapter 3: Double Criminality", in ALEGRE, S. and LEAF, M., 
European Arrest Warrant - A solution ahead of its time?, JUSTICE - advancing justice, human 
rights and the rule of law, 2003, p 34-52; KEIJZER, N. "The Fate of the Double Criminality 
Requirement", in GUILD, E. and MARIN, L., Still not resolved?: Constitutional issues of the 
European arrest warrant, Brussels, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008, p 61-75; VERMEULEN, G. 
"Mutual recognition, harmonisation and fundamental (procedural) rights protection", in 
MARTIN, M., Crime, Rights and the EU. The future of police and judicial cooperation, London, 
JUSTICE - advancing access to justice, human rights and the rule of law, 2008, p 89-104 
178 See 2436th meeting of the Council (Justice and Home Affairs and Civil Protection) held in 
Luxembourg on 13 June 2002, JAI 138, CONS 33, 9958/02, ADD 1 REV 1 – The Council states 
that in particular for the following offences, listed in Article 2(2), there is no completely 
approximated definition at Union level. For the purposes of applying the European arrest 
warrant, the act as defined by the law governing issue prevails. Without prejudice to the 
decisions which might be taken by the Council in the context of implementing Article 31(e) 
TEU, member states are requested to be guided by the following definitions of acts in order to 





In spite of the good intentions in the Council the fact that some member 
states would experience problems with the implementation of the list of 32 MR 
offences was unavoidable.179 This is corroborated by the replies to question 2.2.1 
from which it becomes clear that half of the member states indicate to have 
experienced difficulties with the implementation of the 32 MR offence list. The 
explanatory guide to the questionnaire pointed to the controversial character of 
the 32 MR offence list and more specifically the abandonment of the double 
criminality requirement before asking whether the member states had 
experiences difficulties with the implementation of the 32 MR offence list in 
relation thereto.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
make the arrest warrant operational throughout the Union for offences involving racism and 
xenophobia, sabotage and racketeering and extortion. Racism and xenophobia as defined in the 
Joint Action of 15 July 1996 (96/443/JAI) Sabotage: "Any person who unlawfully and 
intentionally causes large-scale damage to a government installation, another public 
installation, a public transport system or other infrastructure which entails or is likely to entail 
considerable economic loss." Racketeering and extortion: "Demanding by threats, use of force or 
by any other form of intimidation goods, promises, receipts or the signing of any document 
containing or resulting in an obligation, alienation or discharge.” Swindling encompasses inter 
alia inter alia: using false names or claiming a false position or using fraudulent means to abuse 
people's confidence or credulity with the aim of appropriating something belonging to another 
person. Only with respect to racism and xenophobia a reference is made to an approximation 
instrument, even though at the time of the declaration not only 4 more joint actions existed with 
respect to trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of children, corruption in the 
private sector, drug trafficking and participation in a criminal organisation but also three more 
approximation instruments existed for euro counterfeiting, money laundering and fraud and 
counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment. Furthermore, the FD terrorism was adopted on 
the same day as the FD EAW, so that at least a reference to that instrument should have been 
included in the interpretation guide as well. Additionally, a partial political agreement was 
reached with respect to FD trafficking in human beings and proposals had been launched for 
framework decisions related to illegal migration, environmental crime, sexual exploitation of 
children, drug trafficking, offences against information systems and racism and xenophobia. 
179 E.g. in the Czech Republic arson is not a separate offence. Even though the behaviour falls 
within the scope of endangering the public safety, the scope of that offence exceeds the scope of 
arson. See also ZEMAN, P. "The European Arrest Warrant - Practical Problems and 
Constitutional Challenges", in GUILD, E. and MARIN, L., Still not Resolved? Constitutional 
Issues of the European Arrest Warrant, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009, p 107-113; See 
e.g. also the Belgian implementation act which excludes both abortion and euthanasia from the 
scope of the listed offence category ‘murder’. Art.5 §4 Loi du 19 Décembre 2003 relative au 
mandat d’arrêt européen, B.S. 22 Décember 2003; BAPULY, B. "The European Arrest Warrant 
under Constitutional Attack." International Criminal Law Journal 2009, 3, p 1-23; KOMÀREK, J. 
"European constitutionalism and the European Arrest warrant: In search of the limits of 
contrapunctial principles." Common Market Law Review 2007, 44, p 9-40; LECZYKIEWICZ, D. 
"Constitutional Conflicts in the Third Pillar." European Law Review 2008, 33, p 230-242; 







2.2.1 Have you experienced difficulties with the implementation 





Striving for a consistent and well balanced EU policy, the fact that 44% of the 
member states expressly indicate that they have difficulties with the 
implementation of the 32 MR offence list, cannot be ignored. Furthermore, 
follow-up questions to member states that had indicated not to experience 
problems with the implementation revealed that this is partially due to working 
with so-called blank implementation legislation (i.e. simply referring to the EU 
instrument without any form of national interpretation of the provisions 
therein). As a result thereof, interpretation problems will not rise at the time of 
the implementation but will rise only in a later stage in the context of a specific 
case. 
 
When further elaborating on the nature of the difficulties experienced, 
member states had the opportunity to chose one or more of the following 
reasons: constitutional problems (in the questionnaire formulated as we 
experienced problems because our constitution does not allow us to cooperate for acts 
that do not constitute an offence in our criminal law), identification problems (in the 
questionnaire formulated as we experienced problems because for some offence labels 
it was not sure which offences of our criminal code would fall under the scope of that 
offence label) or other problems which respondents could then elaborate on. 
 









What is the nature of the problems you experience with the 






The replies to question 2.2.1 indicate that for 25% of the member states 
experiencing problems with the implementation this has a constitutional reason. 
Especially the number of member states that indicate to have had problems with 
the identification of offences in the national criminal codes that should fall 
within the scope of the 32 listed offences is extremely high. No less than 92% of 
the member states that had indicated to experience problems do so in relation to 
the identification of the offences for which double criminality in the other 
member states is no longer relevant. Because so many member states struggle 
with the identification of the offences illustrates that discussions on the scope of 
the abandonment of the double criminality requirement are unavoidable.  
2.5 Safeguarding the approximation acquis 
From the perspective of consistent EU policy making and the development of 
EU priority offences, it was already argued that in as far as the EU has 
introduced a criminalisation obligation in an approximation instrument, the EU 
has a legitimate reason to also strengthen those criminalisation obligations 
through prohibiting member states to call upon a double criminality based 
refusal ground with respect to those offences.  
An evaluation requires cross-checking the then existing approximation 
acquis with the scope of the abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement. At the time of the adoption of the EAW, a series of approximating 
instruments had been adopted, and more were on the way. 5 Joint actions 
existed with respect to racism and xenophobia, trafficking in human beings and 
sexual exploitation of children, corruption in the private sector, drug trafficking 
and participation in a criminal organisation but also three more approximation 
instruments existed for euro counterfeiting, money laundering and fraud and 





counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment. Furthermore, the FD terrorism 
was adopted on the same day as the FD EAW, which justifies this instrument 
being included in the comparative analysis. Additionally, a partial political 
agreement was reached with respect to FD trafficking in human beings and 
proposals had been launched for framework decisions related to illegal 
migration, environmental crime, sexual exploitation of children, drug trafficking, 
offences against information systems and racism and xenophobia.  
The wide scope of the list of 32 MR offences is much broader than the 
approximation acquis, which means that, at the time, from an EU policy 
perspective, the choice to abandon the possibility to call upon a double 
criminality issue with respect to an offence that had been subject to 
approximation, ruled out the use of the refusal ground for member states 
lagging behind with their implementation obligations.180 
Even though the evaluation is positive at the time of the adoption of the 
EAW, this approach will not be able to stand the test of time. The approximation 
acquis is developing rapidly and therefore the choice for a list of offences 
included ad nominem cannot guarantee that it will never be possible to use 
double criminality as a refusal ground in relation to the approximation acquis. It 
is not unimaginable that new approximation instruments are adopted in relation 
to offences that are not included in the list.181 From that perspective, it would 
have been a better policy option for the EU as a policy maker to include an 
explicit provision that prohibits the use of double criminality as a refusal ground 
in relation to offences that have been subject to approximation, at any given 
time. In doing so, both the approximation instruments adopted at the time as 
well as the new instruments that will be adopted in a later stage are included in 
the provision prohibiting the use of double criminality as a refusal ground.  
                                                             
180 This position has to be nuanced in light of the translation issues that have arisen with respect 
to the offence labels included in the 32 MR offence list. This is elaborated on in GUILD, E. 
Constitutional challenges to the European Arrest Warrant. Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishing, 
2006, 272p. It is clarified that the English version of the 32 offence list for which double 
criminality is abandoned refers to computer-related crime. Similarly, the Dutch version refers to 
informaticacriminaliteit. The French version however refers to cybercriminalité, which is similar 
to the German version which refers to Cyberkriminalität. It has been argued that computer-
related crime is a larger concept when compared to cybercriminalité. A similar argumentation is 
developed for racketeering and extortion, which is translated to racket et extorsion de fonds  in 
French and Erpressung und Schultzgelderpressung in German which seems to mean that 
extortion of other than financial products is not included in the French nor German versions 
where such delineation cannot be substantiated looking only at the English version. 
181 The preparations for the adoption of a post-Lisbon directive on market abuse and market 
manipulation can support that concern. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, 
COM(2011) 654 final, of 20.10.2011. 





To ensure the user friendliness of such a provision and to avoid that 
practitioners need to scan the EU instrumentarium to compile the approximation 
acquis at any given time, it is advised to draw up a separate instrument that 
brings together the approximation acquis (e.g. under the auspice of the 
European Commission) and is permanently updated and accessible for anyone 
to consult. The elaboration of such instrument has been prepared in the context 
of a previous study in which EULOCS (short for EU level offence classification 
system) was developed.182 One of the objectives is precisely to visualise the 
status of the approximation acquis by separating the jointly identified parts of 
offences from other parts of offences. When referring to the approximated parts 
of offences, it can be stipulated in surrender (and other cooperation) instruments 
that member states ought to (1) recognise the classification of the case in either or 
not relating to a jointly identified and approximated part of an offences and (2) 
accept that no double criminality verification is allowed when classified as a case 
for which the underlying behaviour had been subject to approximation. For 
those member states that have implemented the approximation instruments and 
have criminalised the included behaviour, this prohibition to test double 
criminality will constitute a significant time saving measure. Those member 
states that have not (yet) (correctly) implemented the approximation instrument 
and (possibly) have a double criminality issue cannot use their lagging behind as 
a reason to refuse cooperation. Interestingly, the abandonment of the double 
criminality verification based on a list of offences is not as revolutionary as it 
may seem for it can already be found in the old Benelux convention on the 
transfer of criminal proceedings.183 Its Art. 2.1 states that facts can only be 
prosecuted in another state if the double criminality requirement is met, or if it is 
one of the facts included in the list annexed to the convention.184 The annex 
consists of a conversion table providing the offence label and the corresponding 
criminalisation provisions in each of the three cooperating member states. In 
doing so, the double criminality verification is lifted in those situations where 
the criminalisation provision is known in each of the member states, which is 
exactly what is intended with the use of EULOCS as a tool to support the 
abandonment of double criminality verifications. 
                                                             
182 VERMEULEN, G. and DE BONDT, W. EULOCS. The EU level offence classification system : 
a bench-mark for enhanced internal coherence of the EU's criminal policy. Antwerp - 
Apeldoorn - Portland, Maklu, 2009, 212p. 
183 Traité entre le Royaume de Belgique, le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et le Royaume des 
Pays-Bas sur la transmission des poursuites, 11 May 1974, Benelux Official Journal, Tome 4-III. 
Even though it is yet to enter into force, this convention is worth mentioning considering the 
ideas underlying the content of its annex. 
184 Original text: la personne qui a commis un fait […] ne peut être poursuivie dans un autre état 
contractant que si, selon la loi pénale de cet état, une peine ou mesure peut lui être appliquée 
pour se fait ou pour le fait correspondant mentionné sur la liste annexée au présent traité. 





2.6 No obligation to maintain a double criminality-
based limit 
Finally, from the perspective of the person involved it is valid to question 
whether a member state is allowed to grant unlimited cooperation to a surrender 
request if the underlying behaviour does not constitute an offence according to 
its national law. To that end, it is useful to look into Art. 5 ECHR and the case 
law elaborating on its interpretation. Art. 5 ECHR stipulates that “everyone has 
the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save [...] 
in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.” Undeniably, surrender entails a 
form of deprivation of liberty which can be difficult in relation to behaviour that 
is not considered to be criminal. Amongst the exceptions foreseen by Art. 5 
ECHR reference is made in point (f) to “the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”. The case 
law interpreting Art. 5 ECHR for example is clear and stipulates that a lawful 
deprivation of liberty for the purpose of Art. 5. 1 (f) ECHR only requires that 
action is being taken with a view to extradition making it immaterial whether 
the underlying decision can be justified under national law.185 This can be 
interpreted to mean that questions related to the double criminality of the 
underlying decision are immaterial to decide on the lawfulness of the arrest and 
the subsequent extradition.  
In the context of extradition/surrender, there are no situations in which the 
use of double criminality as a refusal ground could run counter the interests of 
the person involved. Hence there is no need for a discussion on the introduction 
of possible legal remedies. 
 
3 Mutual legal assistance 
Secondly, having developed a benchmark for the interpretation of the 
concept of extraditable/surrenderable offence and a template to evaluate the 
double criminality approach introduced in the legal instruments, the same 
analysis was conducted for mutual legal assistance instruments. After detailing 
the position of double criminality in mutual legal assistance, it will be argued 
that (1) due to the fragmented legal framework which does not govern all 
investigative measures, the position of double criminality is not always clear, (2) 
the unlimited possibility to issue a declaration not to accept the abandonment of 
the double criminality requirement effectively undermines the approximation 
                                                             
185 ECtHR, Case of Chahal v. The United Kingdom, application No 22414/93, 15 November 1996, 
§112; ECtHR, Case of Čonka v. Belgium, application No 51564/99, 5 February 2002, §38; ECtHR, 
Case of Liu v. Russia, application No 42086/05, 6 December 2007, §78. 





policy to the extent that double criminality verification is possible in relation to 
offences that have been subject to approximation and (3) there are no 
supranational or international obstacles to cooperate beyond double criminality. 
3.1 No general double criminality requirement in MLA 
In a mutual legal assistance context the double criminality requirement has 
never assumed a prominent position186. The wording of Art.1.1 ECMA supports 
this baseline as it requires member states to afford each other the widest possible 
measure of assistance in proceedings in respect of offences the punishment of 
which, at the time of the request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the 
judicial authorities of the requesting state. This corroborates with the idea 
formulated in the ECMA’s explanatory report that mere legal assistance should 
not necessarily be dependent on a double criminality requirement.187 Double 
criminality is therefore not listed among the refusal grounds included in Art. 2 
ECMA.188 However, some states have issued a reservation with respect to these 
refusal grounds and have added the double criminality requirement thereto.189 
Whereas mutual legal assistance as an umbrella covering different cooperation 
measures is not necessarily limited along a double criminality requirement, the 
extent to which double criminality can be justified will require an assessment of 
each individual cooperation measure brought under that umbrella. 
 
                                                             
186 See also VERMEULEN, G. Wederzijdse rechtshulp in strafzaken in de Europese Unie: naar 
een volwaardige eigen rechtshulpruimte voor de Lid-Staten? Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 
632p; PLACHTA, M. "The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal 
matters", in JAREBORG, N., Double Criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 84-134. 
187 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, Strasbourg 1969, p 14. 
188 Other texts go even further and explicitly say that countries may wish, where feasible, to 
render assistance, even if the act on which the request is based is not an offence in the requested 
State (absence of dual criminality). See e.g. footnote added to Art.4.1 Model Treaty on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/117, subsequently 
amended by General Assembly resolution 53/112.  
189 It concerns: Austria (Austria will only grant assistance in proceedings in respect of offences 
also punishable under Austrian law and the punishment of which, at the time of the request for 
assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authorities), Hungary (Hungary reserves 
the right to afford assistance only in procedures instituted in respect of such offences, which are 
also punishable under Hungarian law) and Lithuania (Lithuania reserves the right not to comply 
with a request insofar as it concerns an offence which is not qualified as a "crime" and 
punishable as such under Lithuanian law), and previously also Bulgaria (Bulgaria declares that 
it will refuse assistance where the committed act is not incriminated as an offence according to 
the Bulgarian criminal law) but this reservation was withdrawn. 





3.2 The search and seizure exception 
The only exception to the general rejection of double criminality limits the 
member states deemed necessary in 1959 is included in Art. 5.1. ECMA and 
relates to search and seizure of property. States may make the execution of 
letters rogatory for search or seizure of property dependent on either a basic 
double criminality requirement or even a more far reaching double criminality 
requirement by limiting it to extraditable offences. This latter option meant at 
the time that the double criminality requirement is linked to a sanction threshold 
as explained above.190  
The intrusive nature of search and seizure as an investigative measure 
justifies retaining double criminality as an optional refusal ground.191 The impact 
of search and seizure is essentially different from the impact of e.g. a 
reconstruction or the hearing of a witness for which a double criminality 
requirement is not necessarily justified. This consideration can also be explicitly 
found in Art. 18(1)f of the 1990 CoE Confiscation. It stipulates that ‘cooperation 
may be refused if the offence to which the request relates would not be an offence under 
the law of the requested state if committed within its jurisdiction. However, this ground 
for refusal applies only in so far as the assistance sought involves coercive action’.  
3.3 Extension to other investigative measures 
This double criminality justification also appears in relation to other coercive 
or intrusive measures. Two different approaches can be distinguished. First, in 
analogy with the approach developed with respect to search and seizure, a series 
of other investigative measures use a references to ‘extraditable offences’ as a 
way to limit the scope of cooperation. Second, some investigative measures use a 
reference to ‘search and seizure offences’ as a way to limit the scope of 
cooperation. As will be explained, the distinction between those two approaches 
                                                             
190 It should be noted that even though at the time, a reference to extraditable offences would 
constitute a more far reaching form of double criminality (i.e. for all offences without exception 
and including sanction thresholds), the analysis of the concept of extraditable offence 
elaborated on above has clarified that ever since the introduction of the EAW, this is no longer 
the case. Not only because the EAW abandons double criminality for the listed offences, but 
also because the rules regulating the sanction thresholds have been redesigned. In doing so, a 
reference to extraditable offences is both more strict and more lenient. It is more strict because 
of sanction requirements for general cases; it is more lenient because of the abandonment of the 
double criminality requirement for the listed offences. 
191 See also: KLIP, A. European Criminal Law. An integrative Approach. Antwerp - Oxford - 
Portland, Intersentia, 2009, 531p, 320-321; TRÄSKMAN, P. O. "Should we take the condition of 
double criminality seriously?", in JAREBORG, N., Double criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 
1989, p 135-155. 





is important for the timing of the abandonment of the possibility to call upon 
double criminality with respect to the list of 32 MR offences. 
First, a number of examples of investigative measures can be listed for which 
reference is made to ‘extraditable offences’ as a way to limit the scope. The 
ECMA and the 2000 EU MLA Convention are the most interesting instruments. 
When seeking to supplement the ECMA provisions and facilitate mutual legal 
assistance between member states of the European Union, the 2000 EU MLA 
Convention was introduced. Reinforcing the position assumed at CoE level, 
member states upheld the baseline not to limit cooperation along the double 
criminality requirement.192 Additionally mirroring the reasoning underlying the 
introduction of the double criminality requirement with respect to search and 
seizure, double criminality was scarcely introduced with respect to a limited set 
of investigative measures that were now explicitly regulated in the EU MLA 
Convention. As a result, Art. 12 EU MLA with respect to controlled deliveries (that 
was in fact copied from Art. 22 Naples II) stipulates that member states are to 
ensure that at the request of another member state controlled deliveries may be 
permitted in its territory in the context of criminal investigations into extraditable 
offences. Considering the meaning of extraditable offences, this means that – at 
the time193 – permitting controlled deliveries was dependent, not only on the 
double criminality requirement but also on meeting the sanction threshold that 
comes with the concept of extraditable offences. When complementing the 
ECMA based on the developments in EU cooperation instruments – by copying 
the EU MLA acquis into the second ECMA protocol – this double criminality 
requirement for controlled deliveries was copied into Art. 18 Second ECMA 
Protocol. 
Similarly, the reference to extraditable offences included in Art. 40.1 CISA 
with respect to cross-border observations was later copied into Art. 17 Second 
ECMA Protocol. Police officers are allowed to continue their observation 
crossing the border into another state only when the person involved is 
suspected of having committed or having been involved in committing an 
extraditable offence. This means that – at the time194 – cross-border observations 
were dependent on a double criminality requirement that was linked to sanction 
thresholds. 
 
                                                             
192 In the context of a previous study 90% of the member states indicated to be willing to 
provide cooperation for non-coercive or intrusive measures. See VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, 
W. and VAN DAMME, Y. EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters. 
Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and free movement of evidence? 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2010. 
193 See supra – comment with respect to the interpretation of ‘extraditable offence’. 
194 See supra – comment with respect to the interpretation of ‘extraditable offence’. 





Similarly, the reference to extraditable offences included in Art. 41.4. CISA 
with respect to cross-border hot pursuit was later copied into Art. 20 Naples II. 
Member states may make the acceptance of police officers continuing their hot 
pursuit across the border into their member state dependent on the fact that the 
person involved is suspected of having committed or having been involved in 
committing an extraditable offence. 
Subsequently, this duality in the appearance and justifiability of the double 
criminality requirement linked to the intrusive or coercive character of the 
investigative measure, is mirrored in the existing mutual recognition 
instruments. Art. 3.4. FD Freezing stipulates that the executing member state 
may either make cooperation dependent on the condition that the acts for which 
the order was issued constitute an offence under its laws, when the cooperation 
request relates to securing evidence, or make cooperation dependent on the 
condition the acts for which the order was issued constitute an offence which, 
under the laws of that state, allows for such freezing, when the request relates to 
subsequent confiscation. Similarly, Art. 14.4 FD EEW stipulates that the 
executing member state may make search and seizure dependent on the 
condition of double criminality. 
Second, besides investigative measures that include a reference to 
extraditable offences to regulate the possibility to call upon double criminality 
issues, there are also investigative measures for which a reference to the 
provisions with respect to search and seizure themselves is made. An example can 
be found in the EU MLA Protocol. The link between on the one hand data 
protection concerns and on the other hand requests for information on bank 
accounts, requests for information on banking transactions and requests for the 
monitoring of banking transactions, justifies making legal assistance dependent 
on a type of double criminality requirement. With respect to information on the 
existence of bank accounts, Art. 1 EU MLA Protocol makes a distinction between 
Europol offences and other offences. For Europol offences, a traditional ‘not 
further specified’195 double criminality requirement is introduced, whereas for 
other offences, a new type of double criminality requirement is introduced: 
cooperation may be made dependent on it being related to an offence that is 
punishable with at least 4 years in the requesting member state and 2 years in 
the requested member state.196 Additionally, Art. 1 EU MLA Protocol refers to 
the offences included in the PIF convention, for which it is obvious that the 
double criminality requirement will be met as a result of the approximation 
obligations included in that instrument. It is Art. 2 EU MLA Protocol related to 
                                                             
195 Meaning that the act should be punishable but no sanction thresholds are introduced. 
196 This augmentation of the sanction thresholds that are linked to the double criminality 
requirement can of course be explained by the nature of the cooperation and the sensitivity that 
surrounds bank account information. 





information on bank transactions with respect to a known and identified bank 
account that refers to the double criminality rules linked to offences that can be 
subject to search and seizure. At the time of the adoption of the protocol in 2001, 
double criminality with respect to search and seizure was governed by Art. 51 
CISA and stipulated that cooperation may be made dependent on being related 
to an offence punishable with at least 6 months. As a result thereof the double 
criminality requirement with respect to sharing information on the existence of 
bank accounts is more strict than the double criminality requirement that 
governs cooperation with respect to sharing information on bank transactions of 
known and specified bank accounts. This makes sense considering that once a 
member state is aware of the existence of a bank account, the issues related to 
information exchange are no longer as sensitive. 
3.4 Limitation by the 32 MR offence list 
The practice of allowing member states to call upon double criminality as a 
limit to cooperation for coercive or intrusive measures was eroded197 by the 
introduction of the 32 MR offences that limit that possibility. As a result of the 
intertwined character of MLA instruments with extradition/surrender 
instruments today’s limits to call upon double criminality issues in the context of 
surrender are also applicable to or copied into mutual legal assistance. For that 
list of offences double criminality can no longer be verified provided that the 
offence is punishable with a custodial sentence of at least three years in the 
issuing member state. The limitation by the introduction of the 32 MR offence 
list for which double criminality can no longer be tested entered the MLA scene 
via two doors. First, there is the introduction of the list in the FD EAW which is 
important for MLA to the extent that a reference to extraditable offences should 
be reinterpreted to surrenderable offences (which also tones down the 
revolutionary character of abandoning double criminality as a refusal ground 
with respect to some investigative measures and clarifies that curing double 
criminality concerns in an MLA context also requires an intervention in either 
the ‘mother documents’ to which MLA provisions refer or the redrafting of the 
MLA provisions altogether). Second, there is the adoption of the FD Freezing 
and the FD EEW, which are applicable specifically with respect to search and 
seizure.  
                                                             
197 This was required for the parts of offences that had been subject to approximation and was 
the additional will of the member states for (those parts of- offences beyond the approximation 
acquis. 





First, as explained above, the concept of extraditable offences was 
significantly reshaped with the introduction of the FD EAW. The figure 




DCR: double criminality requirement | A: threshold in abstracto |      
C: threshold in concreto | Y: years | M: months | IMS: Issuing member state 
 
From the figure, it is clear that when the 2001 EU MLA Protocol refers to 
extraditable offences (e.g. with respect to controlled delivery, cross-border 
observation and cross-border hot pursuit) this meant at the time that these 
investigative measures would be subject to a double criminality test 
complemented with a sanction threshold set at 12 months for penalties in 
abstracto and 6 months for penalties in concreto.198 However, the introduction of 
the FD EAW in the following year significantly reduced the scope of the double 
criminality requirement in that it lifted the possibility to call upon a double 
criminality issue for 32 listed offences provided that the offence is punishable 
with a maximum penalty of at least 3 years in the issuing member state. 
                                                             
198 Art.2.1 CoE Extradition reinterpreted in light of Art.2.1 EU Extradition. 
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Protocol 





Recalling the replies to question 2.4.2. this position is supported by 73% of the 
member states despite the absence of a supporting legal framework. 
Second, this list of offences is also included in Art.3.2. FD Freezing and Art. 
14.2 FD EEW, as a result of which a search or seizure of a listed offence can no 
longer be made dependent on double criminality which means that – in light of 
the absence of clear definitions of the listed offences that will guarantee double 
criminality199 – search and seizure should now be allowed for acts that do not 
constitute an offence in the executing member state. The evolutionary character 
of the limitation through the introduction of the 32 MR offence list to call upon 
the double criminality requirement as a ground for refusal specifically with 
respect to search or seizure, should be assessed taking account of the 
implications the evolution from extraditable to surrenderable offences brought 
about.  
It was already explained that the possibility to refuse a request for search or 
seizure was initially linked to the concept of extraditable offences. However, the 
1990 CISA cut the link between search and seizure on the one hand and 
extraditable offences on the other hand, because its Art. 50 stipulates that states 
may not make the admissibility of letters rogatory for search or seizure 
dependent on conditions other than a double criminality requirement (linked to 
a sanction threshold of 6 months in abstracto) and issues of consistency with the 
law of the requested member state. This means that the link with extraditable 
offences and the conditions related to sanction thresholds and offence types is no 
longer maintained for member states that participate to Schengen. 
To the contrary, for member states that are not party to CISA, the link with 
extraditable offences remains and is as of 2002 – following the introduction of 
the FD EAW – could be reinterpreted as surrenderable offence. This would mean 
that e.g. for the UK and Ireland, search and seizure may be made dependent on 
double criminality requirements in accordance to the limits of the FD EAW. 
Ironically therefore, the UK and Ireland, traditionally two member states that are 
very reluctant with respect to the influences of European (criminal) law, where 
the first two member states that could no longer call upon the double criminality 
requirement for the 32 MR offences in the context of a request for search or 
seizure200, whereas member states that fell within the scope of the CISA were still 
                                                             
199 If the list of offences for which double criminality was abandoned was limited along the 
scope of the offences that are included in approximation instruments, the list would have – in 
its effect – not abandoned the double criminality requirement but would have abandoned the 
double criminality test with respect to the offences for which the double criminality requirement 
is known to be met. 
200 It should be stressed though that in reply to question 2.4.2. neither the UK nor Ireland were 
in favour of reinterpreting the concept of extraditable offence into surrenderable offence 
following the introduction of the FD EAW. 





able to do so in accordance with Art. 50 CISA. This distinction between 
Schengen and non-Schengen member states was lifted with the introduction of 
the FD EEW, which, in analogy to the FD EAW limited the possibility to call 
upon the double criminality requirement along the 32 MR offence list.  
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3.5 Drawing parallels for other investigative measures 
From the perspective of the cooperating member states, analysis reveals that 
for the time being, not all investigative measures have an explicit legal basis in a 
cooperation instrument.201 This means that for a number of investigative 
measures the legal texts do not provide an explicit and immediate answer to 
questions relating to the position of the double criminality requirement. 
Therefore it is important to try and complement the overview of explicitly 
regulated investigative measures – for which it is stipulated that double 
criminality requirements are accepted as an exception to the general rule to 
afford cooperation based on criminalisation in the requesting member state – 
with an overview of investigative measures for which the acceptability of double 
criminality inspired refusal grounds is uncertain. 
First, interpreting the acceptability for member states to attach conditions to 
cooperation as the acceptability for member states to limit cooperation based on  
double criminality requirements, a set of investigative measures can be 
identified for which double criminality is most likely allowed as a limit to 
cooperation.202  
The following investigative measures were identified in the context of the 
previous study as being – most likely – dependent on the double criminality 
requirement. 
- Covert investigations (by officials) – this investigative measure is regulated 
in Art. 23, 3 Naples II and 14, 2-3 EU MLA Convention, stipulating 
respectively that both the conditions under which a covert investigation is 
allowed and under which it is carried out ‘shall be determined by the 
requested authority in accordance with its national law’, and that the 
decision on a request for assistance in the conduct of covert investigations is 
taken by the competent authorities of the requested member state ‘with due 
regard to its national law and procedures’, the covert investigations 
themselves having to ‘take place in accordance with the national law and 
procedures’ of the member state on the territory of which they take place; 
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- Interception of telecommunications if the subject of the interception is 
present in the requested/executing member state and his or her 
communications can be intercepted in that member state, with immediate 
transmission – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 18, 1, a) in 
conjunction with 18, 2, b) and 18, 5, b) EU MLA Convention, the latter 
paragraph stipulating that the requested member state shall undertake to 
comply with an interception request ‘where the requested measure would be 
taken by it in a similar national case’, being allowed to ‘make its consent 
subject to any conditions which would have to be observed in a similar 
national case’; 
- Interception of telecommunications requiring the technical assistance of the 
requested member state (irrespective of whether the subject of the 
interception is present in the territory of the requesting, requested or a third 
member state), without transmission and without transcription of the 
recordings – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 18, 1, b) in 
conjunction with 18, 2, a), b) or c) and 18, 6 EU MLA Convention, the latter 
paragraph stipulating that the requested member state shall undertake to 
comply with an interception request ‘where the requested measure would be 
taken by it in a similar national case’, being allowed to ‘make its consent 
subject to any conditions which would have to be observed in a similar 
national case’; interception of telecommunications requiring the technical 
assistance of the requested member state (irrespective of whether the subject 
of the interception is present in the territory of the requesting, requested or a 
third member state), without transmission and with transcription of the 
recordings – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 18, 1, b) in 
conjunction with 18, 2, a), b) or c), 18, 6 and 18, 7 EU MLA Convention, the 
latter two paragraphs stipulating that the requested member state shall 
undertake to comply with an interception request ‘where the requested 
measure would be taken by it in a similar national case’, being allowed to 
‘make its consent subject to any conditions which would have to be observed 
in a similar national case’, and that it will consider the request for a 
transcription of the recording ‘in accordance with its national law and 
procedures’; 
- Allowing an interception of telecommunications to be carried out or 
continued if the telecommunication address of the subject of the interception 
is being used on the territory of the requested/executing member state 
(‘notified’ member state) in case where no technical assistance from the latter 
is needed to carry out the interception – this investigative measure is 
regulated in Art. 20, 2 in conjunction with 20, 4, a) EU MLA Convention, the 
latter paragraph stipulating under i)-iv) that the notified member state ‘may 
make its consent subject to any conditions which would have to be observed 





in a similar national case’, may require the interception not to be carried out 
or to be terminated ‘where [it] would not be permissible pursuant to [its] 
national law’, may in such cases require that any material already intercepted 
may not be used, or ‘may only be used under conditions which it shall 
specify’, or may require a short extension ‘in order to carry out internal 
procedures under its national law’; 
- Collecting and examining cellular material and supplying the DNA profile 
obtained – this form of legal assistance is regulated in Art. 7 Prüm, 
stipulating under (3) that it can only be provided if, inter alia, ‘under the 
requested contracting party’s law, the requirements for collecting and 
examining cellular material and for supplying the DNA profile obtained are 
fulfilled’; 
Furthermore, there are also investigative measures for which it is expressly 
(and rightly) stipulated that no formalities whatsoever may be attached to them. 
This means that there is no way for member states to deviate from the general 
rule that mutual legal assistance must be afforded regardless of double 
criminality. Therefore, the following investigative measures were identified in 
the context of the previous study as being – most likely – not dependent on the 
double criminality requirement. 
- Interception of telecommunications where the technical assistance of the 
requested/executing member state is needed to intercept the 
telecommunications of the subject of the interception (irrespective of whether 
the latter is present in the territory of the requesting/issuing member state or 
of a third member state) with immediate transmission – this investigative 
measure is regulated in Art. 18, 1, a) in conjunction with 18, 2, a) or c) and 18, 
5, a) EU MLA Convention, the latter paragraph stipulating that ‘the 
requested member state may allow the interception to proceed without 
further formality’; 
- Transfer of detainees from the requested/executing to the requesting/issuing 
member state (provided the requested/executing member state may make 
such transfer dependent on the consent of the person involved) – this 
investigative measure is regulated in Art. 11 ECMA, which does not allow for 
refusal of transfer referring to national law; 
- Transfer of detainees from the requesting/issuing to the requested/executing 
member state (provided the requested/executing member state may make 
such transfer dependent on the consent of the person involved) – this 
investigative measure is regulated in Art. 9 EU MLA Convention, which 
neither foresees possible refusal of transfer referring to national law nor 
allows for entering reservations, to be read in conjunction with Art. 25 of the 
same Convention, according to which member states may not enter 





reservations in respect of the Convention, other than those for which it makes 
express provision; 
- Hearing under oath (of witnesses and experts) – this investigative measure is 
regulated in Art. 12 ECMA, prescribing mandatory compliance by the 
requested party with such request unless its law prohibits it; 
- Hearing by videoconference – this investigative measure is regulated in Art. 
10, 2 EU MLA Convention, pointing out that the requested member state 
shall agree to the hearing where this is not contrary to the fundamental 
principles of its law and on the condition that it has the technical means to 
carry out the hearing; 
- Hearing by telephone conference (of witnesses or experts, only if these agree 
that the hearing takes place by that method) – this investigative measure is 
regulated in Art. 11, 3 EU MLA Convention, pointing out that the requested 
member state shall agree to the hearing where this is not contrary to 
fundamental principles of its law. 
Considering that the abovementioned investigative measures are not 
coercive or intrusive in nature, it is consistent to agree that it is not justified to 
limit the possibility to cooperate based on a double criminality issue.  
The measures listed above are explicitly regulated and can therefore be 
explicitly found in cooperation instruments. However, there are a lot of 
investigative measures for which no explicit regulation is foreseen. Cooperation 
for those kind of unregulated types of investigative measures has a legal basis in 
the general baseline that member states are to afford each other the widest 
measure of assistance.  
Nevertheless, it remains interesting to review the unregulated measures to 
cluster them in those for which a double criminality requirement would be 
justified and those for which a double criminality requirement would not be 
justified. This exercise was conducted in the context of a previous research 
project203 and resulted in the following overview:  
A double criminality requirement will be justified for the following 
investigative measures: 
- registration of incoming and outgoing telecommunication numbers 
- interception of so-called direct communications 
- obtaining communications data retained by providers of a publicly available 
electronic communications service or a public communications network 
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- withholding/intercepting of mail (and reading it) 
- cooperation with regard to electronic communications (other than tele-
communications) (registration of incoming and outgoing communications, 
interception etc) 
- controlled delivery through the territory of the requested/executing member 
state (i.e. across its territory, the territory of destination of the delivery or 
where intervention is envisaged being another member state or a third state) 
The inclusion of this investigative measure in this cluster might not be self-
explanatory, as it may seem that it is regulated in the EU MLA Convention. 
Unlike in the corresponding provision of the 1997 Naples II Convention, 
however, the provision relating to controlled deliveries in the EU MLA 
Convention doe not relate to transit controlled deliveries also, and is limited 
to controlled deliveries ‘on’ the territory of the requested member state. 
- (cross-border) use of (police) informers and civilian infiltrators 
- (cross-border) use of technical devices (camera, electronic/GPS tracking) for 
the purposes of observation  
- entry of premises without consent in view of discrete visual control or search 
- confidence buy (either or not including flash-roll) 
- establishing front business 
- (discrete) photo and video registration 
- assistance in non-procedural protection of protected witnesses and their 
family members (direct and physical protection; placement of a detainee in a 
specialised and protected section of the prison; relocation for a short period; 
- relocation for a longer or indefinite period; change of identity, including the 
concealment of certain personal data by the administrative authorities; lesser 
measures, techno-preventative in nature) 
- carrying out bodily examinations or obtaining bodily material or biometric 
data directly from the body of any person, including the taking of 
fingerprints (other than collecting and examining cellular material and 
supplying the DNA profile obtained: supra) 
- exhumation and transfer of the corpse 
- (exhumation and) forensic anatomist investigation 
- lie detection test (of a non-consenting witness or suspect) 
- line-up (including of a suspect, not consenting to appear) 
A double criminality requirement will not be justified for the following 
investigative measures: 
- conducting analysis of existing objects, documents or data 
- conducting interviews or taking statements (other than from persons present 
during the execution of a European Evidence Warrant (EEW) and directly 
related to the subject thereof, in which case the relevant rules of the executing 
state applicable to national cases shall also be applicable in respect of the 
taking of such statements) or initiating other types of hearings involving 





suspects, witnesses, experts or any other party, other than under oath or by 
video or telephone conference (supra) 
- reconstruction 
- making of video or audio recordings of statements delivered in the 
requested/executing member state 
- video conference hearing of accused persons 
- video conference hearing of suspects 
 
This exercise is of course important in light of the ongoing debates with 
respect to the European Investigation Order because that instrument has the 
ambition to replace the existing MLA framework and to expressly regulate a 
series of investigative measures.  
3.6 Threat of the declaration 
From the perspective of the EU in its capacity of a policy maker who seeks to 
ensure consistency and safeguard the approximation acquis, the possibility to 
issue a declaration to the offence list is an important novelty. What is new in the 
FD EEW compared to the FD EAW204 and could offer relief to the double 
criminality concerns raised from a member state perspective, is the possibility to 
issue a declaration with respect to the double criminality aspects of Art.14.2 FD 
EEW. That possibility was introduced upon the request of – and solely with 
respect to – Germany out of concerns of being forced to cooperate in relation to 
cases that fail the double criminality test.205 It is a striking illustration of the false 
presumption of criminalisation of the listed offences and the abandonment of the 
double criminality requirement. Germany had made the lack of clear and 
common definitions and the possibility of having obligations with regard to 
behaviour not criminalised under German legislation, one of their key issues 
during negotiations. The compromise reached is included in Art. 23 (4) EEW and 
allows Germany – and only Germany – a derogation from the provisions 
relating to double criminality in the FD EEW. The derogation is not applicable to 
the entire list of offences but allows Germany to make execution of an EEW 
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subject to verification of double criminality in the case of the offences relating to 
terrorism, computer-related crime, racism and xenophobia, sabotage, 
racketeering and extortion and swindling. This German demarche would not 
have been necessary, if the abandonment of the double criminality test was 
limited to the approximation acquis (or at most in relation to the behaviour that 
is known to be commonly criminalised even beyond the minimum that is 
included in the approximation instruments). This becomes especially apparent 
when analysing the content of the German declaration. For terrorism, computer-
related crimes and racism and xenophobia a reference is made to existing 
approximation instruments. Interestingly, the definitions of sabotage, 
racketeering and extortion and swindling are copied from the explanation the 
JHA Council had provided in 2002 recognising the concerns related to the lack of 
a harmonised definition.206 
Undeniably however such an individual member state declaration opens the 
door to a full on return to nationally defined offences that may or may not be in 
line with the approximation acquis. Whereas the use of declarations can be 
perceived as the solution from a member state perspective, the reintroduction of 
the traditional double criminality requirement is an important setback for the EU 
policy maker to the extent that the national declaration would reintroduce a 
double criminality requirement also with respect to behaviour that has been 
subject to approximation for that would undermine the possibility for the 
European policy maker to reinforce its approximation obligations via the 
prohibition to test double criminality in relation to those approximated parts of 
offences. Even though the German declaration did not affect the effect of the 
approximation acquis, the unlimited possibility to issue a declaration in the first 
place was a bad choice. The European policy maker should have seen to it that a 
declaration affecting the approximation acquis was legally prohibited by 
allowing the declaration only with respect to the faith of double criminality 
verification in relation to offences beyond the approximation acquis. 
3.7 Impact of capacity as a refusal ground 
Additionally, it can be interesting for the EU policy maker to follow the 
debate on the use of capacity as a refusal ground. Capacity concerns increasingly 
gain attention, especially now cooperation is changing from request-based into 
order-based.  
If member states link (and thus limit) the use of capacity concerns to 
situations in which double criminality is not fulfilled, this means that – in light 
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of the line of argumentation developed with respect to the issuing of 
declarations – it can be important to stipulate that it is inacceptable to use double 
criminality as a refusal ground in relation to offences that have been subject to 
approximation. Hence, this means that cooperation for cases in relation to 
offences that have been subject to approximation can never be hindered by 
capacity concerns.  
However, member states may also decide that it is acceptable to use capacity 
as a refusal ground even when double criminality is met, which means that also 
cases in relation to offences that have been subject to approximation can be 
hindered by capacity concerns. In this scenario it would be interesting for the 
European Union in its capacity of a policy maker to bring the acceptability of the 
aut exequi aut tolerare principle to the table.207 This new principle would attach 
consequences to using capacity as a refusal grounds in relation to (all or some of 
the) offences that have been subject to approximation. For the issuing or 
requesting member state, this would entail a commitment to use its own 
capacity to complete the order or request; for the requested member state this 
would entail the obligation to accept the presence of and execution by another 
member state. If capacity is introduced as a refusal ground with respect to one or 
more investigative measures in the European investigation order, a discussion 
on the parallel introduction of aut exequi, aut tolerare can be considered. 
3.8 Requirements for the formulation of national 
provisions 
From the perspective of the person involved, the use of double criminality as a 
refusal ground can never be against her best interests. If cooperation is refused 
for double criminality reasons she will not be subject to the requested or ordered 
investigative measure. To the contrary, it is important to assess to what extent 
member states can offer their cooperation in absence of double criminality, 
which would constitute a breach in the double criminality shield.  
As argued above, mutual legal assistance is an umbrella that covers a wide 
range of investigative measures amongst which there are measures that are 
intrusive or coercive in nature. Because of the diversity, some measures have 
been subject to specific regulations in the member states. Certain investigative 
measures are reserved for serious situations, that are defined either by a 
reference to (a selection of) offences or an indication of the sanction threshold.  
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The question arises whether these specific provisions preclude the use of 
those investigative measures in absence of double criminality. The answer 
thereto is strongly dependent on the formulation of the national provision. If the 
national provision refers to the article numbers of the national criminal code to 
delineate the situation in which the use of the investigative measure is allowed, 
double criminality is indisputably a requirement. The investigative measure will 
only be possible in relation to behaviour that perfectly matches the behaviour 
described in the selected articles of the national criminal code. If however, the 
national provisions refer to either an offence label (without a reference to a 
specific article in the national criminal code) or a sanction threshold, it can be 
argued that the provision can be interpreted widely to also encompass situations 
where double criminality is not met. The question is then however, whether 
such wide interpretation is acceptable.  
When looking into the case law of the European Court of Human Rights it is 
acknowledged that some investigative measures cannot be deployed for just any 
offence. More importantly, the court sets out rules with respect to the quality of 
the legal basis of those coercive and intrusive investigative measures. Qualitative 
law refers to accessibility and foreseeability of the law and the compatibility with 
the rule of law.208 Whereas a simple reference to using the investigative 
techniques to “fight serious offences” is not specific enough and therefore fails to 
meet the quality criteria209, it is made explicit that the criteria cannot mean that 
an individual must be able to have “a limitative list of offences”.210 The nature of 
the offences for which a specific investigative technique can be used must be laid 
down with “reasonable precision”.211 Though court’s case law does not specifically 
deal with the double criminality issue and is therefore inconclusive on whether 
that reasonable precision can also extent beyond the national double criminality 
test, there are two cumulative reasons why it can be expected that the court 
would except an interpretation that includes cases beyond the national double 
criminality test in the scope of the provision regulating the use of the said 
investigative measure. First, the court has accepted as reasonably precise and 
thus sufficiently detailed, national provisions stipulating that investigative 
measures were possible with respect offences which could reasonably be 
expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more.212 
Similarly, reference to offence labels and families is considered to be sufficiently 
detailed. Second, in the current EU philosophy it is not desirable that national 
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law is interpreted in a way that allows criminals to enjoy the comfort of safe 
havens. From that perspective much can be said for the argumentation that if a 
person commits an offence punishable with a sentence involving deprivation of 
liberty for at least three years in one member state and thereafter travels to a 
member state in which specific investigative techniques are possible for offences 
which could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term 
of three years or more, the person should know that investigative measures are 
possible for the acts he committed in the first member state, even if they are not 
considered criminal in the second. After all, the situation relates to offences of 
which the person involved cannot but reasonably expect that they can be 
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more. 
To make the text of the national provision regulating the use of investigative 
measures even more clear on this point, it can be recommended to use a 
formulation that leaves no room for interpretation. The provision could e.g. read 
that an investigative measure can be used in situations where the acts could 
reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three 
years or more, in any of the member states of the European Union. 
 
4 Transfer of pre-trial supervision  
Thirdly, the mechanism of transfer of pre-trial supervision is assessed. It will 
be argued – in addition to the conclusions deduced from the analysis of the 
position of double criminality in the previous cooperation domains – that (1) the 
introduction of the possibility to issue a declaration with respect to the 32 MR 
offence list with respect to some instruments whereas such option is not foreseen 
in other instruments runs the risk of undermining the order of preference that 
can be read into the objectives of the instruments and (2) the position of the 
person involved is very complex and could have been elaborated on more to 
avoid discussions. 
4.1 Variation on the same theme: a partial double 
criminality limit 
As spelt out in Art. 2.1. b  FD Supervision, the very objective of the 
supervision consists of promoting non-custodial measures for persons who are 
not resident in the investigating or prosecuting member state. Two different 
scenario’s can occur. First the person involved can be found in the member state 
of residence in which case the investigating or prosecuting member state seeks 
assistance from another member state in order to ensure that the person is 
supervised awaiting her trial; Second the person involved can be found in the 





investigating or prosecuting member state which is seeking her transfer to the 
member state of residence, in which case the investigating or prosecuting 
member state seeks assistance from the member state of residence to supervise 
the person awaiting her trial in order to avoid that she is held in pre-trial 
detention. 
The legal instrument makes transfer of pre-trial supervision (partially) 
dependent on the application of the double criminality requirement.213 This 
requirement is included in Art. 14 FD Supervision. Similar to the design of the 
double criminality requirement in the other mutual recognition instruments, it is 
stipulated that the listed offences cannot be subject to a double criminality 
verification if they are punishable in the issuing state by a custodial sentence or a 
measure involving deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least three 
years, and as they are defined by the law of the issuing member state. For 
offences other than those listed, the executing member state may make the 
recognition of the decision on supervision measures subject to the condition that 
the decision relates to acts which also constitute an offence under the law of the 
executing member state.  
Different from the other mutual recognition instruments, the double 
criminality requirement is not linked to sanction thresholds to be met in the 
issuing nor executing member state. When comparing the provisions of the FD 
Supervision to the FD EAW the difference is apparent. Art.2.1 FD EAW reads 
that [...] A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the 
issuing member state by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period 
of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been 
made, for sentences of at least four months. Thereafter the article continues with the 
explanation that a list of offences is introduced for which double criminality 
cannot be tested as soon as the act is punishable in the issuing member state 
with a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years. The 
abovementioned scope limitation included in Art. 21.1 FD EAW is not included 
in the FD Supervision. Art. 14 FD Supervision on the double criminality 
requirement immediately refers to the listed offences. Because there is no reason 
to limit the access to supervision in the home state214 (to avoid pre-trial 
supervision in the investigating or prosecuting member state) should not be 
limited according to the severity of the offence (because especially for minor 
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offences pre-trial detention may be disproportionate), it makes sense not to 
include sanction thresholds to limit cooperation possibilities.  
Finally, here too execution of the orders can have a significant impact on the 
capacity of the executing member state, depending on the type of supervision 
measure and the number of persons a member state must supervise at any given 
time. Therefore, member states can have a good reason to uphold a (partial) 
double criminality requirement in relation to the transfer of pre-trial supervision 
orders. Should the member states decide that – in the future – the practical 
experience with this instrument points to serious capacity issues and therefore it 
should be considered to include capacity as an additional refusal ground, the 
argumentation developed above applies mutatis mutandis, meaning that the EU 
as a policy maker should try and safeguard the approximation acquis from 
cooperation limits following the use of capacity as a refusal ground. 
4.2 Threat of the declarations 
The member states’ concerns raised with respect to having to cooperate in 
relation to behaviour that would not constitute an offence if committed in their 
territory and the exception granted to Germany in relation thereto in the FD 
EEW, lead to the introduction of the general possibility for all member states to 
issue a declaration with respect to the provisions regulating the double 
criminality limits to pre-trial supervision. Therefore the threat of this possibility 
foreseen in the FD Supervision is larger than the threat of the possibility foreseen 
in the FD EEW because there it relates to all member states.  
Because FD Supervision is a relatively young instrument and the 
implementation deadline does not pass until 1 December 2012, no final picture 
can be drawn with respect to the impact of the declarations. Nevertheless, the 
questionnaire included a question with respect to the intention of member states 
to issue a declaration. In reply to question 2.2.2 only 11% of the member states 
indicated that they have issued a such declaration, and another 8% have 
indicated that they are planning to do so in the coming months.  
 









2.2.2 Have you issued a declaration setting out the guidelines 
for the interpretation of the 32 MR offence list (cfr.  Art 14.4 
FD Supervision)?
Yes, because our constitution does not allow us to cooperation for acts that do not 
constitute an offence in our criminal law
Yes, because for some of the offence labels it was not sure which offences of our 
criminal code would fall under the scope of that offence label
Not yet, but we intend to do so because for some of the offence labels it was not sure 
which offences of our criminal code would fall under the scope of that offence label




Even though 81% of the member states does not intent to issue a declaration 
and therefore the threat for the EU policy maker of the possibility created in Art. 
23.4 FD EEW is not likely to be significant, this does not mean that from a policy 
perspective this was the best approach. The EU policy maker should not have 
introduced the unlimited possibility for member states to issue a declaration and 
decide individually on the scope of the abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement. The declarations issued by the member states should only be 
allowed to relate to the acceptability of the abandonment of the double 
criminality requirement beyond the approximation acquis, “existing at any time”. 
The latter nuance is important to ensure that declarations can stand the test of 
time. It indicates that declarations must always be read in light of (and will be 





overruled by) the existing approximation acquis. Only in doing so the progress 
made through approximation can be safeguarded.215 
It must be observed that the currently existing approximation acquis does not 
match the 32 MR offence list. No approximation instrument exists for each of the 
32 offence labels. Therefore, the question arises what to do with the excess 
offences.216 Two options can be considered. Either, the declaration would limit 
the scope of the offence list to match the current approximation acquis, or the 
scope of the current approximation acquis should be further elaborated on to 
match the offences that are currently included in the offence list.  
Even though the ad hoc and semi-ad random compilation of the list is highly 
criticized217 and it is not advisable to use the list as a basis to decide for which 
offences the EU criminal policy should be further developed (encompassing also 
approximation efforts), the replies to question 2.2.5. reveal that 71% of the 
member states are inclined to retain the content of the current offence list and 
use it to support the argumentation that where no common definition exists, one 
should be elaborated.  
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216 For the 32 listed offences, 16 have been subject to approximation (including the crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court) and 16 have not received any kind of 
internationally agreed definition. 
217 See e.g. PEERS, S. "Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: Has the 
Council got it wrong?" Common Market Law Review 2004, 41, p 35-36. 







2.2.5 Would it be an acceptable future policy option to clearly 
define the scope of the 32 MR offence list with common 
definitions?
where no common definition 
exists, one should be elaborated
where no common definition 
exists, the label should be 
removed from the list
 
 
For the offence labels that are included both in the 32 MR offence list as well 
as in the list in Art. 83(1) TFEU, definitions can be further developed, with a two-
thirds majority. However, for each of those offence labels an approximation 
instrument already exists. Technically, it can be considered whether it is 
appropriate to interpret the offence lables in a broad fashion so that they 
encompass more of the lables in the 32 offence list.218 Though not advisable, the 
replies to question 2.2.5 indicate that the necessary two-thirds majority can be 
reached. Technically, to the extent that the excess offences in the 32 MR offence 
list match the offences included in Art. 83(1) TFEU, an approximation 
instrument can be adopted. Additionally, to the extent that the excess offence is 
not included therein, but meets the requirement for it to fall within the 
approximation competence (i.e. that it is a serious offence with a cross-border 
dimension), the Council can identify it as another area of crime for which 
approximation is desirable. Finally however, some of those excess offences will 
not meet the approximation requirement and cannot be subject to 
approximation. In this scenario, though technically approximation is not possible, 
nothing should prevent the existing common criminalisation acquis from being 
identified to scope the redundance of the double criminality verification.  
                                                             
218 It is not unimaginable that the broad organised crime label included in Art. 83(1)2 is used to 
approximate e.g. the organised and armed robbery label included in the 32 MR offence list. 





The replies to question 2.2.5. suggest that the necessary unanimity will not be 
reached, which means that declarations limiting the scope of the abandonment 
of the double criminality requirement to match the approximation acquis will 
always have as an effect that the list of offence labels for which double 
criminality is abandonned is significantly reduced. 
4.3 Possible perverse effect of double criminality as a 
refusal ground 
From the perspective of the person involved, it be noted that – different than 
in the previous cooperation contexts – the use of double criminality in a 
supervision context can run counter her interests. As explained above, two 
scenarios can be distinguished. 
 
4.3.1 Person involved is in the member state of nationality or residence 
In this first scenario, the member state in which proceedings will take place 
might already in the investigating phase want to ensure that the person involved 
will be present at her trial. When that person is found outside its territory, a 
member state has two options: either an EAW can be sent seeking the immediate 
surrender of the person or a supervision order can be sent seeking the assistance 
of another member state to supervise the person involved awaiting a ‘just-in-











Because it is likely that – as a result of an immediate surrender – the person 
involved will end up in pre-trial detention in the prosecuting member state, 






























supervision order to seek assistance from the member state of residence where 
the person was found. If in this scenario a double criminality issue would rise 
and the member state of the person’s residence would refuse cooperation, the 
double criminality requirement would shield the person involved from a 
measure being taken. However, because the double criminality shield applicable 
to the supervision order may differ from the double criminality shield applicable 
to the EAW, following a future member state declaration pursuant to Art. 14.4. 
FD Supervision, this decision is not necessarily in the best interest of the person 
involved. Seeking recourse to an EAW upon refused supervision may be 
successful for the prosecuting member state, depending on the nature of the 
double criminality issue underlying the refused supervision.  
 
If the double criminality issue is not related to any of the listed offences, the 
refusal ground will remain valid with respect to the EAW and will be able to 
shield the person involved from any measure being enforced against her. 
If however the double criminality issue is related to any of the listed offences 
read in combination with a declaration of the member state of residence stating 
that even for the listed offences double criminality is required, this declaration 
will not be valid in a surrender context which means that refusal of an EAW 
would not be possible. This means that refusing to cooperate following the 
supervision order will have as an effect that the person involved will not be 
subject to a supervision measure in her member state of residence, but will have 
to be surrendered to the prosecuting member state following an EAW, where 
she will probably be subject to a pre-trial detention. In this situation it is clear 
that calling upon a double criminality requirement to enforce a supervision 
order is not always in the best interest of the person involved, not even when she 
is located on the territory of the executing member state. Furthermore, it 
illustrates the consequences of the introduction of the possibility to issue a 
declaration with respect to the double criminality requirement only with respect 
to some of the cooperation instruments. It will result in a landscape in which 
double criminality verification is not consistently abandoned throughout the 
legal framework in that it interferes with the intended order of preference 
between the different legal instruments. 
 





4.3.2 Person involved is in the investigating or prosecuting member state 
In this second scenario, the investigating or prosecuting member state will 
seek cooperation from the member state of nationality or residence to supervise 












If the member state of residence refuses cooperation based on a double 
criminality issue219 it is clear that the person involved will be deprived from the 
possibility to enjoy a supervision measure in her member state of residence as 
opposed to likely pre-trial detention in the investigating or prosecuting member 
state. Here too it is clear that seeking recourse to double criminality as a limit to 
cooperation will clearly not always be in the best interest of the person involved. 
Therefore, it could be considered to look into ways to balance the interests of the 
person involved and the member state of residence and into the feasibility of 
introducing a mandatory dialogue either or not followed legal remedy against 
the use of double criminality as a refusal ground. Though a person involved 
should not have the right to choose the location of execution, a dialogue between 
the parties involved should not be ruled out, for some member states may be 
willing to execute in spite of lack of double criminality. A more far-reaching 
option would make the member state’s decision subject to a judicial review. The 
following paragraphs will elaborate on the decision making scheme inserted 
                                                             
219 Either with respect to any of the 32 MR offences for which a declaration has been issued or 































below.220 The hexagonal shapes point to moments where dialogue can take place 




4.3.3 Balancing the interest of the member state and the interest of the 
person involved 
It is legitimate for a member state to be opposed to executing supervision 
measures in relation to behaviour that is not considered to be an offence when 
committed on its territory. Execution of such supervision measures runs the risk 
of creating inconsistencies and disrupting the balance in the national criminal 
policy. However, it is important to balance that interest of the member state with 
the interest of the person involved. In light thereof it is recommended to 
                                                             
220 The scheme starts from the assumption that double criminality is the only refusal ground. 
Obviously there are various other ground that can lead to refusal, but for the purpose of this 
line of argumentation, double criminality is the only refusal ground taken into account. 





consider the introduction of a number of safeguards in the form of dialogues 
and possible judicial reviews. 
Whenever the execution of a supervision order is refused based on a double 
criminality concern, the person involved might be given the right to enter into a 
dialogue with the member state and present her argumentations in favour of 
execution in her member state of residence. When the member state of residence 
upholds double criminality as a refusal ground, the person involved might be 
given the right to start a procedure in front of a judge in the refusing member 
state to seek an exception to the use of that refusal ground.221 In a such scenario, 
the person involved will have the opportunity to elaborate on her arguments in 
favour of execution of the supervision order in spite of lacking double 
criminality. The member state in its turn will have the opportunity to convince 
the judge of the reasons why execution would disproportionately disrupt the 
balance of and consistency within the national criminal justice system. 
Ultimately it will be a judge who will rule on the conflicting interests. If the 
judge decides that the refusal ground is justified when balancing the interests 
involved, execution in the member state of residence is not possible. If the 
person involved successfully challenged the used of double criminality as a 
refusal ground, the member state of nationality or residence might be obliged to 
initiate the execution of the supervision order.  
 
4.3.4 Ensuring an acceptable execution 
Execution in a situation where there is a lack of double criminality is far from 
evident and will inevitably cause problems. Following the standard procedure 
foreseen in the FD Supervision, the executing member state may adapt either the 
duration or the nature of the supervision order to ensure compatibility with its 
national law. Because of the lack of detail in the adaptation provisions, it is 
technically possible following lack of double criminality to ‘adapt’ the duration 
of the measure to nothing, or to drastically change the nature of the supervision 
measure in a way that supervision loses its added value. In both scenarios it is 
possible that the issuing member state deems the adaptation inacceptable and 
withdraws the certificate ordering the supervision.  
In the event such a withdrawal is solely linked to the adaptation of the 
duration of the supervision measure, the person involved might again have the 
right to present her argumentation firstly in a dialogue with the executing 
member state and secondly, if that fails to be successful, also to a judge with a 
                                                             
221 In the above described first scenario this could be to anticipate an EAW, but the possibility 
for judicial review will most likely be used more frequent in the second scenario, in which the 
person involved is situated on the territory of the investigating/prosecuting member state. 





view to waiving her right222 to a reduced duration and seeking to have the 
supervision executed as foreseen in the original order. Completely similar to the 
review procedure described above, the member state will have the possibility to 
convince the judge of the reasons why execution of the original duration would 
disproportionately disrupt the balance of and consistency within the national 
criminal justice system. Ultimately it will be a judge who will rule on the 
conflicting interests. If the person involved successfully challenged the 
adaptation of the duration of the supervision measure, the member state of 
nationality or residence will have to execute of the supervision measure as 
originally foreseen.  If the person involved is not successful, the adaptation of 
the duration will stand and the certificate will most likely be withdrawn. 
In the event such a withdrawal is solely linked to the adaptation of the nature 
of the supervision measure, the situation is more complicated. Obviously, it is 
impossible to require the member state of nationality or residence to execute a 
type of measure that is unknown in the national criminal justice system. In this 
type of situations a dialogue could be considered with the issuing member state 
as to which type of supervision measure described in the national criminal 
justice system of the executing member state would be acceptable.  
From the above argumentation it is clear that balancing the double 
criminality related interests of the executing member state with the interests of 
the persons concerned is very complex and could have been elaborated on more 
in the current legislative instruments. A thorough debate is required in which 
due account is given to the feasibility of strengthening the position of the person 
involved. At least member states should consider not to introduce double 
criminality as a mandatory refusal ground, but to include it as an optional 
refusal ground to allow execution in absence of double criminality. 
 
                                                             
222 The wording of the adaptation provisions do not provide the person involved with a right to 
have the measure adapted. The provisions are drafted from the perspective of the executing 
member state and allow  for an adaptation as soon as the measure is incompatible with the law 
of the executing member state, either with respect to the nature or the duration of the measure. 
However, in a previous study on the FD Deprivation of Liberty, a general concern was raised 
with respect to the formulation of these adaptation provisions. It is felt that a strict lex mitior 
should apply, meaning that measures need to be automatically adopted, leaving the executing 
member state no discretionary power. See G. Vermeulen, A. van Kalmthout, N. Paterson, M. 
Knapen, P. Verbeke and W. De Bondt, “Cross-border execution of judgements involving 
deprivation of liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical problems through flanking 
measures”, Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2011, 310, p 96. 





5 Relocation and protection of witnesses 
Fourthly, relocation and protection of witnesses is analysed, which entails 
both a execution component (e.g. executing protective measures such as 
organising a new identity or physical protection for a witness) and a mutual 
recognition component (i.e. recognising the immunity from prosecution granted 
to a collaborator with justice). It will be argued that double criminality can play 
role in the execution of protection measures and in the recognition of granted 
benefits. 
5.1 Execution of protective measures 
First, when the relocation and protection of witnesses is related to granting 
the protection that is included in a cooperation request of another member state, 
discussions with respect to the position of double criminality are parallel to the 
discussions held in relation to awarding each other mutual legal assistance.223 As 
a baseline, no double criminality requirement is introduced in a mutual legal 
assistances sphere, though it has been observed that member states tend to hold 
on to a double criminality requirement with respect to either intrusive or 
coercive investigative measures or with respect to investigative measures that 
have a significant impact on the capacity of the requested member state. In 
relation to relocation and protection of witnesses, not so much the character of 
the investigative measure as opposed to the capacity implications will give rise 
to the introduction of double criminality as a refusal ground.  
If capacity concerns lead to the introduction of a double criminality based 
refusal ground, this refusal ground will have no impact on the offences that have 
been subject to approximation, provided that it is clearly stipulated that no 
double criminality issues are accepted with respect to cases for which the 
underlying behaviour has been subject to approximation. If however, the 
member states decide to allow the use of capacity as a refusal ground even 
where double criminality is met, a discussion can be opened with respect to the 
acceptability of using that refusal ground in relation of (all or some) offences that 
have been subject to approximation.  
                                                             
223 Relocation and protection of witnessess is currently not regulated which means that it is open 
for discussion to introduce either a request-based (MLA) or an order-based (MR) instrument. 
Besides the fact that it is very unlikely that member states will be willing to make this form of 
cooperation subject to the more stringent MR regime, the objective here is to look into the 
position of the double criminality requirement, regardless of the choice for an MLA or MR type 
of cooperation. See more detailedly in the chapter on stringency in international cooperation in 
criminal matters.  





Furthermore, the question arises what the position of the person involved 
should be. When elaborating on the transfer of pre-trial supervision, it was 
argued that it can be considered to allow the person involved to enter into a 
dialogue with her member state of residence with a view to execution in that 
member state, in spite of double criminality concerns. In the event the dialogue 
does not have the desired result, it can even be considered to allow the person 
involved a judicial review in front of a judge in the member state of residence. In 
that scenario, there is a clear link between the person and the member state 
involved through the residence criterion. Here, in the context of relocation and 
protection of witnesses, the situation is more complex, because at least in a 
relocation scenario, the requested member state will not be the member state of 
residence. Therefore, the line of argumentation developed in the context of 
transfer of pre-trial supervision, cannot be transferred automatically to 
relocation and protection of witnesses without further consideration. 
To the extent that a person has been granted a protection measure in a 
member state other than the member state of residence and execution in the 
member state of residence can be meaningful, a scenario such as the one 
developed in the context of transfer of pre-trial supervision can be considered. 
Just like it can be argued that a person should have the opportunity to enter into 
a dialogue with a member state with a view to seeking execution of pre-trial 
supervision in her member state of residence, it makes sense to allow a person to 
try and convince her member state of residence to execute the protection 
measure, in absence of double criminality even in spite of a capacity burden. In a 
more far-reaching scenario it can be considered to allow the person involved to 
subject the outcome of that dialogue to a judicial review in front of a judge in the 
requested member state. 
If however, execution of the protection measure is only effective outside the 
member state of residence, the possibility to enter into a dialogue and possibly 
submit the outcome thereof to a judicial review is far less evident. 
5.2 Recognition of granted benefits  
Second, protection of witnesses can also refer to the situation where a person 
has been granted the status of collaborator with justice and therefore enjoys the 
benefit of immunity from prosecution. Though not all member states have a 
legal framework for this status, it is most commonly used for persons that have a 
history in participating in a criminal organisation and have decided to 
collaborate with justice in return for immunity from prosecution for their crimes. 
Obviously, mutual recognition of the status of collaborator with justice is 
essential for its success.  The status of collaborator with justice and the immunity 
from prosecution that comes along with it, loses a lot (if not all) of its persuasive 





strength if it is not recognised throughout the EU. In other words, if the status of 
a collaborator with justice is not mutually recognised by all member states, the 
value thereof is significantly eroded. The question arise how to ensure the 
acceptability of a mutual recognition requirement. Even though the concept of a 
collaborator with justice is not included in the criminal justice systems of all the 
member states, analysis did reveal that already in the current instrumentarium224 
traces can be found of the possibility to reduce the sentence. Art. 6 FD Terrorism 
stipulates that member states ought to take the necessary measures to ensure 
that penalties may be reduced if the offender provides the administrative or 
judicial authorities with information which they would not otherwise have been 
able to obtain.  
Taking account of the feedback received with respect to the future of the 32 
MR offence list225, it can be considered to introduce an obligation to mutually 
recognise immunities from prosecution granted to persons providing the 
authorities with information that could not have been otherwise obtained, with 
respect to the EU’s priority offences. Formalising the status of collaborator with 
justice could be part of the EU’s policy with respect to the approximated offences 
for which it has been agreed that European cooperation need to be stepped up. 
Introducing the status of collaborator with justice in relation to those offences 
could have a significant impact on the information that is available for 
prosecutorial services and in doing so would be beneficial for the effective fight 
against these offence types, which is the ultimate goal of the development of an 
EU policy for those offences in the first place.  
Should the member states feel that this obligation is too far reaching to begin 
with, the possibility could be considered to introduce an intervention by 
Eurojust in the sense that it could advise member states prior to granting the 
status of collaborator with justice and the immunity from prosecution linked 
thereto. In this scenario, mutual recognition could be limited to cases that 
received a positive Eurojust advice.  
In parallel thereto, it could also be looked into whether a set of minimum 
rules with respect to granting immunity from prosecution should be introduced. 
These minimum rules would in turn also limit the obligation for member states 
                                                             
224 VERMEULEN, G. EU standards in witness protection and collaboration with justice. 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2005, 280p. 
225 In the context of a previous study, member states had indicated to be open to a discussion 
that aims at lifting the possibility to call upon refusal grounds with respect to a limited set of 
offence labels, provided that they are clearly defined. See VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W. 
and VAN DAMME, Y. EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters. 
Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and free movement of evidence? 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2010. 





to mutually recognise the decision to grant a person the status of collaborator 
with justice. 
Even though nothing has been explicitly regulated with respect to the 
relocation and protection of witnesses, the considerations above illustrate that 
here too the double criminality requirement comes into play and the 
approximation acquis can possibly be used to limit the scope of a mutual 
recognition obligation. 
 
6 Transfer of prosecution 
Fifthly, transfer of prosecution is analysed. Within this domain two entirely 
different situations can be distinguished. First, a transfer of prosecution can take 
place between two member states that were originally competent to initiate 
proceedings. In those cases, transfer of prosecution is characterised as a form of 
legal assistance between member states that have decided amongst them which 
of them is going to initiate proceedings.226 Obviously, this would mean that no 
double criminality concerns can ever exist because a member state can never be 
competent to initiate a proceeding for behaviour that does not constitute an 
offence in its national legal order. Second, transfer of prosecution can take place 
from a member state that is originally competent to a member state that has no 
original competence. It is in this second context that the double criminality 
requirement comes into play.227 It will be argued that it is only logical to 
introduce a double criminality requirement, though an exception thereto can be 
found in the Benelux treaty. 
Considering the impact of a transfer of prosecution both for the person 
involved as well as for the requested member state, it is only logical that this 
technique would be limited along the double criminality requirement. Art. 7 
CoE Transfer Proceedings justly stipulates that proceedings may not be accepted 
by the requested state unless the offence in respect of which the proceedings are 
requested would be an offence if committed in its territory and when, under 
these circumstances, the offender would be liable to sanction under its own law 
also. The corresponding EU instrument is still in a draft phase. The latest version 
                                                             
226 Previous studies have looked into the criteria that can and cannot support the search for the 
best place for prosecution. See e.g.: VANDER BEKEN T. , VERMEULEN G , STEVERLYNCK S. 
and THOMAES S., Finding the best place for prosecution, Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2002, p. 
118. 
227 This explains why in literature often only this second situation is described. See e.g. 
PLACHTA, M. "The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal matters", in 
JAREBORG, N., Double Criminality, Uppsala, Iustus Förlag, 1989, p 84-134. 





dates from November 2009228 and maintains the double criminality requirement. 
Art.11.1 of the Draft stipulates that ‘a request for transfer of proceedings shall not be 
accepted if the act underlying the request for transfer does not constitute an offence 
under the law of the member state of the receiving authority’.  
Consistent EU policy making229 requires that a specific provision is included 
stipulating that it is inacceptable to use double criminality as a refusal ground in 
relation to cases for which the underlying behaviour has been subject to 
approximation. Member states that have correctly implemented the 
approximation instruments will have no double criminality issues in relation to 
those offences; member states that have not (yet) (correctly) implemented the 
criminalisation obligations included in approximation instruments cannot use 
their lagging behind as a justification to seek recourse to double criminality as a 
refusal ground. Interestingly, the abandonment of the double criminality 
verification based on a list of offences can be found in the old Benelux 
convention on the transfer of criminal proceedings.230 Its Art.2.1 states that facts 
can only be prosecuted in another state if the double criminality requirement is 
met, or if it is one of the facts included in the list annexed to the convention.231 
The annex consists of a conversion table providing the offence label and the 
corresponding criminalisation provisions in each of the three cooperating 
member states. It could be recommended to mirror this approach in the EU 
instrument on transfer of prosecution, with respect to the offences that have 
been subject to approximation. 
 
                                                             
228 Council of the European Union, Draft […] on the transfer of proceedings in criminal matters, 
COPEN 231, 16437/09 REV 1 of 24.11.2009. 
229 In this section on the transfer of prosecution only the perspective of the EU in its capacity of a 
policy maker safeguarding its approximation acquis is dealt with. The perspective of the person 
involved is not dealt with because a dialogue-construction as elaborated on in the sections on 
transfer of pre-trial supervision and relocation and protection of witnessess (and supra also in 
relation to transfer of execution of sentences) to do away with the use of double criminality as a 
refusal ground by any of the member states is not opportune, not even with respect to the 
member state of nationality and/or residence. 
230 Traité entre le Royaume de Belgique, le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et le Royaume des 
Pays-Bas sur la transmission des poursuites, 11 May 1974, Benelux Official Journal, Tome 4-III. 
Even though it is yet to enter into force, this convention is worth mentioning considering the 
ideas underlying the content of its annex. 
231 Original text: la personne qui a commis un fait […] ne peut être poursuivie dans un autre état 
contractant que si, selon la loi pénale de cet état, une peine ou mesure peut lui être appliquée 
pour se fait ou pour le fait correspondant mentionné sur la liste annexée au présent traité. 





7 International validity and effect of decisions 
Sixthly, the international validity and effect of decisions is analysed. This 
category comprises two subcategories, first cross-border execution and second 
cross-border effect of prior convictions in the context of a new (criminal) 
proceeding. It will be argued – in addition to the comments made with respect to 
the previous domains – that (1) with respect to the cross-border execution of 
convictions, the position of the person involved is complex and has not been 
sufficiently dealt with when drawing up the cooperation instruments and (2) 
with respect to the cross-border effect of convictions the position of the double 
criminality requirement has not been dealt with thoroughly and follow-up 
research is necessary. 
7.1 Cross-border execution of convictions 
7.1.1 Double criminality limits & the approximation acquis 
Cross-border execution of convictions entails taking over an significant part 
of the criminal procedure as a result of which it is traditionally linked to the 
double criminality requirement.232 Art. 4 CoE Conditional Sentence stipulates 
that the offence on which any supervision request is based shall be one 
punishable under the legislation of both the requesting and the requested state. 
Art.40.1 (b) CoE Validity refers back to Art. 4 that stipulates that a sanction shall 
not be enforced by another contracting state unless under its law the act for 
which the sanction was imposed would be an offence if committed on its 
territory and the person on whom the sanction was imposed liable to 
punishment if she had committed the act there. Similarly Art.3.1. e CoE Transfer 
Prisoners stipulates that a sentenced person may be transferred only if the acts 
or omissions on account of which the sentence has been imposed, constitute a 
criminal offence according to the law of the administering state or would 
constitute a criminal offence if committed on its territory. Finally, Art. 18(1)f CoE 
Confiscation of proceeds of crime stipulates that “the offence to which the request 
relates would not be an offence under the law of the requested party if committed within 
its jurisdiction. However, this ground for refusal applies to cooperation only in so far as 
the assistance sought involves coercive action”.  
                                                             
232 This link was also expressed in the resolution on the IXth International Congress on Penal 
Law, stating that […] la reconnaissance de la sentence étrangère exige en règle générale la 
double incrimination in concreto de l'infraction donnant lieu à la sentence. See DE LA CUESTA, 
J. L. Résolutions des congrès de l'Association International de Droit Pénal (1926 – 2004). 
Toulouse, Éditions érès, 2009, 232p.  





The current EU instruments are adopted in the mutual recognition 
philosophy and partially abandon the double criminality requirement for a list 
of offences. Cross-border execution of convictions is currently governed by four 
mutual recognition instruments with respect to (1) financial penalties, (2) 
confiscations, (3) sentences involving deprivation of liberty and (4) probation 
measures and alternative sanctions. 
Though above reference was always made to a list of 32 MR offences for 
which the double criminality requirement is abandoned, there is one instrument 
that includes a more extended list of offences. Art. 5 FD financial penalties holds 
a list of 39 offences, adding to the list found in the other MR instruments (1) 
conduct which infringes road traffic regulations, including breaches of 
regulations pertaining to driving hours and rest periods and regulations on 
hazardous goods, (2) smuggling of goods, (3) infringements of intellectual 
property rights, (4) threats and acts of violence against persons, including 
violence during sport events, (5) criminal damage, (6) theft and (7) offences 
established by the issuing state and serving the purpose of implementing 
obligations arising from instruments adopted under the EC Treaty or under Title 
VI of the EU Treaty. Ultimately it is up to the member states to decide for which 
offences they see it fit and acceptable to abandon the double criminality 
requirement. 
Taking account of the commitments made when developing the 
approximation acquis, consistency in EU policy making requires that it is seen to 
that the member states do not accept the possibility to use double criminality as 
a refusal ground in relation to offences that have been subject to approximation. 
In parallel to the comments made with respect to the other instruments that 
include a list of offences for which double criminality is abandoned, it can be 
argued that – even though the current approximation acquis is covered by the 
32(39) MR Offences, this approach does not guarantee that this will remain to be 
the case in the future. Considering the rapidly changing nature of the 
approximation acquis it would have been better to expressly include a provision 
that precludes the use of double criminality as a refusal ground with respect to 
offences that have been subject to approximation at any given time, 
complementing that provision with the compilation of a EULOCS like 
instrument that is accessible for anyone to consult and brings together the 
existing approximation acquis. Furthermore, the comments with respect to the 
possibility to issue a declaration with respect to the abandonment of the double 
criminality requirement are mutatis mutandis also valid with respect to the 
instruments regulating the cross-border execution of convictions. Though not all 
instruments governing the cross-border execution of convictions include a 
provision that allows member states to issue a declaration, the inclusion thereof 
in Art. 7 §4 FD Deprivation of Liberty and Art. 10 §4 FD Alternatives constitute a 





threat for the approximation acquis to the extent that it is allowed to declare that 
double criminality will be tested in relation to cases of which the underlying 
behaviour has been subject to approximation. Therefore consistency requires 
that it is stipulated that member states are only allowed to issue a declaration 
with respect to the abandonment of the double criminality requirement beyond 
the existing approximation acquis at any given time. The further development of 
the approximation acquis will always overrule the content of a member state’s 
declaration. It can only be hoped for that the upcoming instrument on 
disqualifications amends the provision governing the possibility to issue a 
declaration accordingly. 233 
 
7.1.2 Position of the persons involved 
Similar to the discussion in the context of pre-trial supervision orders, the 
interests of the persons concerned can conflict with the interests of the executing 
member state. To further elaborate on that complexity, again a distinction needs 
to be made between the situation in which – without cooperation – no execution 
can take place altogether because the person involved is not in the convicting 
member state and the situation in which – without cooperation – execution 
would take place in another member state, because the person involved is in the 
convicting member state. 
 
Person involved is not in the convicting member state  
 
Firstly, if the person involved is not located in the convicted member state 
and thus cooperation with another member state is necessary to ensure 
execution of the sentence, cooperation is a means to ensure that execution in itself 
can take place.  
                                                             
233 The main gap in this field is the cross-border execution of disqualifications. Even though it 
was mentionned as a priority in the Programme of Measures implementing the principle of 
mutual recognition, so far that has not been an instrument regulating the entirety of cross-
border execution of disqualifications, though some of the other instruments briefly touch upon 
it. This gap is subject of a study currently conducted by the project team of which the final 
report is due by the end of February. To the extent a mutual recognition instrument is 
recommended to fill in the current gap in the current EU instruments governing cross-border 
execution, the approach to double criminality suggested, is similar to the approach in the other 
instruments, though takes the main comments thereto into account. See more elaborately: 
VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W., RYCKMAN, C. and PERSAK, N. The disqualification triad. 
Approximating legislation. Executing requests. Ensuring equivalence. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-
Portland, Maklu, 2012, 365p. 





If the member state of nationality and residence refuses cooperation and thus 
execution of the sentence imposed in the convicting member state, the person 











However, the use of that shield will not necessarily have the best result for 
the person involved, depending on the reaction of the convicting member state. 
If the use of double criminality as a refusal ground relates to an offence that is 
not included in the list of offences, that refusal ground will also stand when the 
convicting member state seeks recourse to the EAW to have the person 
transferred to it in order to execute the sentence itself. If however, the refusal 
ground relates to any of the offences included in the 32 MR offence list for which 
a declaration has been issued to complement either the FD Deprivation of 
Liberty or FD Alternatives, that refusal ground will not stand when the 
convicting member state seeks recourse to the EAW. After all, the exceptions to 
the abandonment of the double criminality requirement in relation to the 32 MR 
offence list is not valid in relation to an EAW. This means that the use of the 
double criminality shield in reply to an execution request relating to an offence 
that is included in the 32 MR offence list, can have as an effect that the person 
will not be subject to execution in its member state of nationality or residence 
(where traditionally the prospects for rehabilitation are deemed to be the best)234 
but is transferred to the convicting member state following an EAW. Here too 
the question arises to what extent it should be possible for the person involved 
to argue in favour of execution in its member state of nationality or residence in 
                                                             
234 This position is dealt with more elaborately in the context of a study on detention in the EU. 
See: VERMEULEN, G., VAN KALMTHOUT, A., PATERSON, N., KNAPEN, M., VERBEKE, P. 
and DE BONDT, W. Cross-border execution of judgements involving deprivation of liberty in 
the EU. Overcoming legal and practical problems through flanking measures. Antwerp-































spite of absence of double criminality. Although it remains controversial, 
already in 1968 a provision making such execution possible was introduced in 
the Benelux cooperation sphere. Art. 40 Benelux Execution stipulated that 
execution would still take place even if the underlying behaviour did not 
constitute an offence in the executing state but was included in the list drawn up 
on the basis of Art. 57.235 A similar approach could be considered at EU level. 
 
Person involved is in the convicting member state  
 
Secondly, it must also be recognised that situations can exist in which 
execution in itself is not dependent on cooperation, but only the location of 
execution is dependent on cooperation. In a second scenario, the convicted 
person is found in the convicting member state, which means that execution is 
possible without any form of cooperation. In this scenario cooperation will not 
influence the execution itself but will influence the location of execution. It runs 
counter the best interests of the person involved and especially her rehabilitation 
prospects if her country of nationality and residence would refuse cooperation.  
Upholding a strict double criminality requirement would then mean that 











                                                             
235 Art.40 Benelux Execution: Si la condemnation dont l’exécution est demandée se rapport à un 
fait qui ne constitue pas une infraction selon la legislation de l’état requis, mais est mentionné à 
la liste établie conformément à l’article 57, le juge substitute à la peine ou à la mesure prononcée 
une des peines ou measures qu’il prononcerait en vertu de sa proper legislation pour un fait 
correspondant selon la liste. Traité Benelux sur l'exécution des décisions judiciaires rendues en 
matière pénale, 29 September 1968, Benelux Official Journal, Tome 4-III. Even though it has 
never entered into force, this convention is worth mentioning considering the ideas underlying 
































Mirroring the conflict described when discussing the transfer of pre-trial 
supervision, here too there is a conflict between the interest of the executing 
member state (who wishes to maintain the internal consistency and balance in its 
criminal justice system and therefore opposes to execution of sentences for 
which the underlying behaviour would not constitute an offence in its 
jurisdiction) and the interests of the person involved (who may wish to see her 
sentence executed in her member state of nationality and residence). 
 
Balancing the interest of the member state and the interest of the person involved 
 
It is legitimate for a member state to be opposed to executing sentences in 
relation to behaviour that is not considered to be an offence in its criminal justice 
system. Execution of such sentences runs the risk of creating inconsistencies and 
disrupting the balance in the national criminal policy. However, it is important 
to balance that interest of the member state with the interest of the person 
involved. In light thereof it is recommended to introduce a number of 
safeguards in the form of the possibility to start a dialogue between the person 
and member state involved, the outcome of which can even be subject to a 
judicial review. 
Whenever the execution of a sentence is refused based on a double criminality 
concern, the person involved might be given the right to enter into a dialogue 
with the member state and present her argumentations in favour of execution in 
her member state of residence. When the member state of residence upholds 
double criminality as a refusal ground, the person involved might be given the 
right to start a procedure in front of a judge in the refusing member state to seek 
an exception to the use of that refusal ground.236 The person involved will have 
the opportunity to elaborate on her arguments in favour of execution of the 
sentence in spite of lacking double criminality. The member state in its turn will 
have the opportunity to convince the judge of the reasons why execution would 
disproportionately disrupt the balance of and consistency within the national 
criminal justice system. Ultimately it will be a judge who will rule on the 
conflicting interests. If the judge decides that the refusal ground is justified when 
balancing the interests involved, execution in the member state of residence is 
not possible. If the person involved successfully challenged the used of double 
criminality as a refusal ground, the member state of nationality or residence will 
have to initiate the execution of the sentence.  
                                                             
236 In the above described first scenario this could be to anticipate an EAW, but the possibility 
for judicial review will most likely be used more frequent in the second scenario, in which the 
person involved is situated on the territory of the investigating/prosecuting member state. 






7.1.3 Ensuring an acceptable execution 
Execution in a situation where there is a lack of double criminality is far from 
evident and will be challenging. Following the standard procedure foreseen in 
the both FD Deprivation of Liberty and FD Alternatives, the executing member 
state may adapt either the duration or the nature of the sentence to ensure 
compatibility with its national law. Because of the lack of detail in the adaptation 
provisions, it is technically possible following lack of double criminality to 
‘adapt’ the duration of the measure to nothing, or to drastically change the 
nature of the sentence in a way that it loses its meaning. In both scenarios it is 
possible that the issuing member state deems the adaptation inacceptable and 
withdraws the certificate ordering the execution of the sentence.  
In the event such a withdrawal is solely linked to the adaptation of the 
duration of the sentence, it can be considered to give the person involved will 
again have the right to present her argumentation firstly in a dialogue with the 
executing member state and secondly, if that fails to be successful, also to a 
judge with a view to waiving her right237 to a reduced duration and seeking to 
have the sentence executed as foreseen in the original order. Completely similar 
to the review procedure described above, the member state will have the 
possibility to convince the judge of the reasons why execution of the original 
duration would disproportionately disrupt the balance of and consistency 
within the national criminal justice system. Ultimately it will be a judge who will 
rule on the conflicting interests. If the person involved successfully challenged 
the adaptation of the duration of the sentence, the member state of nationality or 
residence will have to execute of the sentence as originally foreseen.  If the 
person involved is not successful, the adaptation of the duration will stand and 
the certificate will most likely be withdrawn. 
In the event such a withdrawal is solely linked to the adaptation of the nature of 
the sentence, the situation is more complicated. Obviously, it is impossible to 
require the member state of nationality or residence to execute a type of sentence 
                                                             
237 The wording of the adaptation provisions do not provide the person involved with a right to 
have the measure adapted. The provisions are drafted from the perspective of the executing 
member state and allow  for an adaptation as soon as the measure is incompatible with the law 
of the executing member state, either with respect to the nature or the duration of the measure. 
However, in a previous study on the FD Deprivation of Liberty, a general concern was raised 
with respect to the formulation of these adaptation provisions. It is felt that a strict lex mitior 
should apply, meaning that measures need to be automatically adopted, leaving the executing 
member state no discretionary power. See G. Vermeulen, A. van Kalmthout, N. Paterson, M. 
Knapen, P. Verbeke and W. De Bondt, “Cross-border execution of judgements involving 
deprivation of liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical problems through flanking 
measures”, Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2011, 310, p 96. 





that is unknown in the national criminal justice system. In this type of situations 
a dialogue is necessary with the issuing member state as to which type of 
sentence described in the national criminal justice system of the executing 
member state would be acceptable.  
 
From the above argumentation it is clear that balancing the interests of the 
executing member state with the interests of the persons concerned is very 
complex and was insufficiently developed in the current legislative instruments. 
A thorough debate is required in which due account is given to the position of 
the person involved. At least member states should consider not to introduce 
double criminality as a mandatory refusal ground, but to include it as an 
optional refusal ground to allow execution in absence of double criminality. 
7.2 Cross-border effect of convictions 
Second, taking account of prior convictions is the other subcategory within 
the domain of international validity and effect of decisions. It is regulated 
somewhat differently. At CoE level double criminality limits were never 
explicitly included in the international instruments. In Art. 56 CoE Validity it is 
clarified that states should legislate to enable their courts to take account of prior 
convictions handed down in another state with a view to include in the 
judgment “all or some of the effects” which its law attaches to judgments rendered 
in its territory. It is difficult to draw a double criminality-conclusion based on 
the wording that “all or some effects” can be attached to it. It is easy to say that the 
national effects would have been zero if the underlying behaviour is not criminal 
under national law, but the legal framework surrounding the effect of prior 
convictions is usually more complex than that. States in which the effect of a 
prior conviction is based solely on the sanction thresholds in prior convictions, 
might not have a solid legal basis to ignore foreign convictions for double 
criminality reasons.  
The current EU instrument further complicates this matter. The FD Prior 
Convictions – similar to the CoE instrument and different to the other 
framework decisions – holds no specific provision on double criminality as a 
refusal ground. Its Art. 3.1 stipulates that the legal effects that are attached to 
foreign convictions are equivalent to the effects attached to previous national 
convictions, in accordance with national law. Recital 6 clarifies however that the 
framework decision cannot entail the obligation to attach legal effects to a 
conviction if the underlying behaviour could not have lead to a conviction in the 
member state that is conducting the new criminal proceeding. Through this 
provision the Council has opened the door for the introduction of a double 
criminality test at national level. From the perspective of the further 





development of the EU criminal policy with respect to the priority offences that 
have been subject to approximation, this is a missed opportunity to reinforce the 
approximation obligations of the member states and to stipulate that in relation 
to convictions for which the underlying behaviour has been subject to 
approximation, double criminality verification is not allowed. 
The position of double criminality beyond the list of approximated offences 
is strongly dependent on the technicality of the legal provisions regulating the 
effect that is attached to prior convictions in the domestic legal order of each of 
the individual member states. Member states that have introduced significant 
discretion for a judge to take account of a person’s prior offending history whilst 
navigating between the minimum and maximum penalty foreseen for the 
isolated commission of an offence will not be confronted with double criminality 
restraints to taking account of foreign prior convictions that are based on the 
protection of the position of the person involved; Member states that have 
introduced a very technical set of rules that require a certain degree of similarity 
between the offences may need to conduct a double criminality test to allow 
proper application of their national provisions. However, especially with respect 
to member states that use prior convictions as a true aggravating circumstance in 
the sense that the judge can/must impose a penalty that exceeds the maximum 
foreseen for the isolated commission of the offence, double criminality restraints 
may emerge.  
In light of the diversity in the national prior conviction related provisions, 
consistent EU policy making requires insight into the characteristics used as a 
basis for determining the effect a prior conviction will receive in the course of a 
new criminal proceeding. It will provide insight into the likeliness double 
criminality is an issue in relation to those national prior conviction related 
provisions 
From the replies to question 4.2.11. it is clear that not all member states have 
the possibility to call upon double criminality issues simply because their 
national legal system does not use the offence label as an element when 
determining the effect of a prior conviction. With 17 member states indicating 
that the influence of a prior conviction in a new criminal proceedings is based on 
the label of the offence, at least 10 member states are left without the possibility 
to draw the double criminality card, based on the needs to properly apply their 
national provisions. 
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is based on a different mechanism
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conviction
is based on the severity of a specific 
sanction
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is based on the offence label
4.2.11 What characteristic of a prior conviction is used as a 
basis to determine its influence in new criminal proceedings? 
 
 
When analysing the replies to question 4.2.12. it becomes clear that when 
implementing the obligation to attach equivalent legal effects to previous foreign 
convictions as to previous national convictions, the double criminality issue 
seems not to have been a top priority. From the 17 member states that had 
indicated in reply to the previous question that the effect of a prior conviction is 
linked to the offence label, only 10 actually test double criminality within that 
label. 
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4.2.12 How does your national law regulate the equivalent 
national effect foreign convictions ought to receive in the 
course of new criminal proceedings? (Art 3.1 FD Prior 
Convictions)
 
In order to properly assess the extent to which double criminality should be 
an issue in the context of taking account of foreign prior convictions, an in-depth 
follow-up research is necessary with respect to the general approach member 
states take with respect to prior convictions and more specifically with respect to 
the technicality of their prior conviction provisions and the possible legality 
inspired double criminality issues that may arise. 
 
 





8 Exchange of criminal records information 
Seventh and final, exchange of criminal records is analysed. The use of 
criminal records information is largely limited to two applications. First, there is 
the effect of prior convictions in the course of new criminal proceedings and 
second, there is the effect of prior convictions on the access to certain 
professions, which is regulated via so-called certificates of non-prior convictions. 
The importance of prior convictions in those two applications and the double 
criminality limits found therein, warrant the review of the double criminality 
issue in the exchange of criminal records information. It will be argued that 
problems identified here are not so much related to double criminality 
limitations to information exchange238 but to the requirement to anticipate to 
double criminality issues that may rise at a later stage when criminal records 
information is used outside the convicting member state. 
8.1 Diversity in the storage practice 
The exchange of criminal records information too finds its origin in CoE 
instruments. Originally, the exchange of criminal records was regulated by Art. 
13 and 22 ECMA. Based on Art. 13 ECMA a requested state had to communicate 
extracts from and other information relating to judicial records, requested by the 
judicial authorities of another state and needed in a criminal matter, to the same 
extent that these may be made available to its own judicial authorities in a 
similar case. Art. 22 ECMA introduced the obligation for a convicting state to 
inform any other state at least annually of all criminal convictions and 
subsequent measures, included in the judicial records of its nationals. It is 
important to underline that these provisions do not entail a storage obligation. It 
should come as no surprise that in absence of storage obligations member states 
had developed different practices with respect to the handling and storing of 
foreign criminal records information. Some member states did not store any 
foreign information in their national criminal records database whereas others 
only stored foreign criminal records information to the extent the underlying 
behaviour would also constitute an offence in their member state and in doing 
so limited the storing of foreign criminal records information along the double 
criminality requirement.239 Few member states stored all foreign criminal records 
information.  
                                                             
238 Though exchange of information is inextricably bound to the storing of information and 
reportedly in the past, strong foreign convinction information was limited along a double 
criminality requirement (see infra). 
239 Reportedly, in the past Hungary did not store foreign criminal record information on its 
nationals (see Ligeti, K. (2008). The European Criminal Record in Hungaria. In C. Stefanou & H. 





An important side-effect of this limited storing of foreign criminal records 
information is the analogous limited availability thereof in a later stage as shown 
in the figure inserted below. Even where a first convicting member state sends 
the criminal records information to a second member state (the member state of 
nationality of the person involved), a double criminality filter will prevent the 
information being stored in the persons’ criminal record as compiled in the 
member state of the person’s nationality. 
If a third member state requests all available criminal records information 
from the member state of nationality of the person accused of having committed 
a new criminal offence in its jurisdiction, the information it receives will be far 






















                                                                                                                                               
Xanthaki (Eds.), Towards a European Criminal Record (pp. 181-196). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 188), neither did the UK (See Webly, L. (2008). The European Criminal 
Record in England and Wales. In C. Stefanou & H. Xanthaki (Eds.), Towards a European 
Criminal Record (pp. 291-307). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 296). 
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In light thereof, significant progress has been made at EU level, for the EU 
has introduced a storage obligation that is not limited along the double 
criminality requirement. A double criminality filter is not allowed. In contrast to 
the older CoE provisions, Art. 1.2.b FD Crim Records does specify that the 
objective of the framework decision consists of defining storage obligations for 
the member state of the person’s nationality. Looking at the purpose of 
information exchange (i.e. ensuring that information can be used in a later stage 
either in the member state of the persons nationality or in any of the other 
member states), it is only logical for Art. 5 FD Crim Records not to limit the 
storage obligations along the double criminality requirement. Information is 
stored for the purpose of later transmission to another member state. The 
member state of the person’s nationality involved is only a go-between. It acts as 
the facilitator of the compilation and exchange of information relating to a 
person’s criminal record.  
8.2 Anticipating to future double criminality issues 
However, double criminality issues may come into play in a later stage, 
when it is to be decided what the effect of a foreign conviction should be. Taking 
account of a foreign prior conviction in the course of a new criminal proceeding 
or when assessing the access to a profession are examples thereof. Because some 
member states have made the application thereof dependent on being 
prosecuted for the behaviour that falls within the scope of the same 
criminalisation provision, double criminality is important. In light thereof it 
must be recommended that – even though the exchange of information in itself 
is not linked to or limited in light of the double criminality requirement240 – 
already at the stage of criminal records information exchange, double criminality 
issues that can rise in a later stage are avoided and accommodated as much as 
possible.  
The use of an EU level offence classification system that was promoted above 
to limit double criminality testing (as opposed to abandoning the double 
criminality requirement in itself), can have an added value in this context too. 
Using the knowledge on whether or not the behaviour underlying the conviction 
is known to be criminalised throughout the EU to classify, exchange and store 
criminal records information will significantly facilitate the use thereof in a later 
stage. 
                                                             
240 KLIP, A. European Criminal Law. An integrative Approach. Antwerp - Oxford - Portland, 
Intersentia, 2009, 531p, 321. 





The table inserted below visualises how double criminality distinctions could 
be made. If a convicting member state indicates whether or not the underlying 
behaviour is known to be criminal in all other member states, this would 
significantly facilitate the inclusion thereof in the criminal records database of 
the member state of the person’s nationality.  
If the EU level double criminality requirement is met (i.e. EU DC: Yes), then 
the conviction can be included as a type 1 conviction in the criminal records 
database in the member state of the person’s nationality. If EU level double 
criminality is fulfilled national double criminality is also known to be fulfilled. 
Only for convictions for which the convicting member state is not sure that the 
underlying behaviour would constitute an offence in all 27 member states (i.e. 
EU DC: No), a double criminality verification would need to be conducted by 
the authorities in the member state of the person’s nationality to allow a 
distinction between type 2 convictions (i.e. foreign convictions that pass the 
national double criminality test – Nat. DC: Yes) and type 3 convictions (i.e. 
foreign convictions that do not pass the national double criminality test – Nat. 
DC: No).  
In parallel thereto, also national convictions should be entered into the 
national criminal records database, distinguishing between type 1 convictions 
(i.e. national convictions for which the underlying behaviour is known to be 
criminalised in all 27 member states – EU DC: Yes) and type 2 convictions (i.e. 
national convictions for which it is not sure that the underlying behaviour is 
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EU DC: known EU level double criminality | Nat. DC: national double criminality test 
 
A such architecture would facilitate later exchange and use of criminal 
records data. In the context of a new criminal proceeding, all convictions entered 
as a type 1 can be clustered and sent to any requesting member state with the 
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member states (i.e. EU DC: Yes), therefore also in the requesting member state. 
Similarly, all convictions entered as type 2 and type 3 can be clustered together 
with the connotation that it is unclear whether the underlying behaviour will be 
considered criminal in all 27 member states (i.e. EU DC: No). A requesting 
member state – should it wish to do so – must conduct a double criminality 
verification only for type 2 and 3 convictions. 
With respect to assessing the access to a certain profession, the inclusion of a 
such double criminality typology in the architecture of the criminal records 
database could overcome the currently reported difficulties with related 
applications such as the compilation of the certificate of non-prior-conviction.241 
Including type 3 convictions (i.e. convictions for which the underlying behaviour 
does not constitute an offence according to the national legal order) into the 
national criminal records database without adequate identification of that 
double criminality issue, will inevitably cause problems with the issuing of 
national certificates of non-prior-convictions. It is said that those certificates are 
not intended to include type 3 convictions when the certificate is intended to be 
used for national purposes only. Introducing a typology based architecture will 
allow for an easy technical solution to this problem.  
Therefore, even though at first sight double criminality has no role in the 
exchange of criminal records exchange, there are a number of double criminality 
issues that are inherent to the later use of criminal records information. In light 
thereof it must be recommended that already when exchanging and storing 
criminal records information these problems are anticipated as much as possible. 
Though the EU has made progress through introducing storage obligations that 
(correctly) extend beyond double criminality limitations, not anticipating double 
criminality issues in light of later use of criminal records information is an 
important gap in the current approach to exchange criminal records information.  
 
                                                             
241 This difficulty was already identified in a previous study on criminal records databases (i.e. 
VERMEULEN, G., VANDER BEKEN, T., DE BUSSER, E. and DORMAELS, A. Blueprint for an 
EU Criminal Records Database. Legal, politico-institutional and practical feasibility. Antwerp - 
Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2002, 91p) and was confirmed in the discussions during the member state 
visits. 





9 Rethinking double criminality in international 
cooperation 
9.1 Perspective of the issuing member state 
First, when double criminality is lifted with respect to some offence ensuring 
the practical feasibility thereof requires that it is seen to it that an issuing 
member state is able to distinguish between cases that relate to offences for 
which double criminality has been lifted and cases for which the underlying 
behaviour is still subject to a double criminality verification. Whereas initially 
the provisions governing the abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement leave the scope demarcation of the offence labels to the discretion of 
the issuing member state, the newly introduced possibility for the executing 
member states to issue a declaration to the double criminality provisions 
clarifying the scope of the abandonment of the double criminality requirement, 
make that distinction is far from self-evident. Because at least with respect to the 
offences that have been subject to approximation, consistent EU policy making 
requires that no double criminality verification is allowed, an issuing member 
state should – as a minimum – be able to distinguish between cases that relate to 
behaviour that has been subject to approximation and cases that relate to any 
other type of behaviour. 
Second, when it is agreed that double criminality is abandoned with respect 
to a specific form of international cooperation in criminal matters, it is important 
– especially from the perspective of the issuing member state – that this is done 
consistently. At least with respect to the abandonment of double criminality in 
the extradition context as a result of the evolution from extradition to surrender, 
it was argued that the EAW insufficiently dealt with the faith of the references to 
extraditable offences in some other cooperation instruments.  
Third, abandoning the double criminality requirement may require an 
intervention as far as into the national provisions regulating e.g. the use of 
certain investigative measures. Analysis has revealed that the use of some 
investigative measures is reserved for serious situations which can be defined 
either referring to offences or referring to sanction thresholds. Especially from 
the perspective of the issuing member states, consistency in EU policy making 
requires that it is seen to it that the national provisions governing the use of 
those investigative measures are formulated in a way that allows their use even 
in absence of double criminality. 
Fourth and final, if cooperation is truly important for an issuing member 
state, and refusal based on double criminality results in a deadlock, the issuing 





member state must be prepared – at least in a limited set of situations – to 
execute the cooperation order itself. In doing so, the issuing member state takes 
the responsibility for its cooperation order and uses its own capacity to ensure 
the execution thereof. This mechanism represents the effect of the new principle 
aut exequi aut tolerare for the issuing member state. 
9.2 Perspective of the executing member state 
First, there is nothing against allowing member states to limit cooperation 
based on double criminality requirement if cooperation entails the taking over of 
a significant part of the criminal procedure, if it relates to intrusive or coercive 
measures and/or if it would have a significant impact on the national capacity. 
From that perspective, it can be questioned whether the current willingness to 
abandon the double criminality requirement for a list of offences defined by the 
law of the issuing member state was not a step too far too soon. 
Second however, consistent EU policy making does require that it is 
stipulated that under no circumstance can it be acceptable to call upon double 
criminality as a refusal ground in relation to a case for which the underlying 
behaviour has been subject to approximation. In that same line of 
argumentation, member states ought to accept the classification of the issuing 
member state in a case that relates to behaviour that has been subject to 
approximation or a case that relates to behaviour that has not been subject to 
approximation. 
From that perspective it is interesting to look into the current trust in the 
classification of the cases as either or not relating to an offence that is included in 
the 32 MR offence list. The replies to question 2.2.4. show that 31% of the 
member states indicate to sometimes challenge the current classification in the 32 
offence list and the accompanying abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement. 
 







2.2.4 Have you ever challenged a classification in the 32 






Interestingly from the replies to 2.2.3. it is clear that from the issuing member 
state perspective, in the event that the classification in the 32 offence list is not 
accepted by the executing member state, this is due to a deficient scope 
demarcation of the listed offences. In no less than 60% of the cases this is due to 
uncertainty surrounding the listed offence, which is an indication that the 
current approach is problematic because it starts from the false presumption that 
no double criminality concerns will rise with respect to those 32 offences. 
 








2.2.3 Why was your classification in the 32 offence list not 
accepted by the executing member state?
Because the executing member 
state did not agree that the facts 
qualified as the indicated 
offence label
Because the executing member 
state cannot cooperate because 
the offence label on the 32 
offence list was unclear
Because the executing member 




Third and final, as a counterweight to the possibility to call upon double 
criminality as a refusal ground, it can be considered to introduce – at least for 
some forms of cooperation – the obligation for a member state to accept the aut 
exequi aut tolerare principle which entails that a member state tolerates the 
presence and execution of the cooperation order by the issuing member state in 
its territory. 





9.3 Perspective of the EU in its capacity of a criminal 
policy maker 
First, in light of the further development of an EU criminal policy with 
respect to a set of offences that have been subject to approximation, the 
prohibition to refuse cooperation based on double criminality grounds has a 
significant symbolic value in light of reinforcing the criminalisation obligations 
of the member states. Approximation can be reinforced by abandoning the 
double criminality test in relation to cases for which the underlying behaviour 
has been subject to approximation. 
Two recommendations should be made. Firstly, the list abandoning the 
double criminality requirement can be interpreted broadly to cover all the 
offences that have been subject to approximation.242 Additionally though a 
consistent EU approximation policy makes sure that the list of offences for 
which the double criminality is abandoned is able to stand the test of time. 
Anticipating to the adoption of new approximation initiatives, it is advisable to 
draft the provisions abandoning the double criminality in a way that will ensure 
that those new approximation initiatives are included without requiring that the 
provision is amended. The fact that Art. 83(1)2 TFEU holds a list of offences 
which can be subject to approximation may create the false presumption that 
inclusion of those offences will sufficiently anticipate to any new approximation 
initiatives. However, Art. 83(1)3 TFEU also foresees the possibility for the 
Council – acting unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament – to adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime.243 Furthermore, 
approximation can also be pursued via other instruments, the adoption of which 
is not necessarily limited along the offence type.244 Therefore it is advised not to 
include ad nominem the offence labels and definitions for which double 
criminality can no longer be tested, but rather introduce a reference to a separate 
                                                             
242 As clarified above, this position has to be nuanced in light of the translation issues that have 
arisen with respect to the offence labels included in the 32 MR offence list. This is elaborated on 
in GUILD, E. Constitutional challenges to the European Arrest Warrant. Nijmegen, Wolf Legal 
Publishing, 2006, 272p. 
243 The initiative taken with respect to insider trading and market abuse supports this point. 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions 
for insider dealing and market manipulation, COM(2011) 654 final, of 20.10.2011. 
244 See more elaborately: “Approximation: what’s in a name” in the chapter on the ability of 
EULOCS to support international cooperation in criminal matters and previously also in: DE 
BONDT, W. and VERMEULEN, G. "Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence 
concepts to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU", in COOLS, M., Readings On 
Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing, Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2010, 4, p 15-
40. 





instrument that provides a systematic overview of the approximation acquis and 
can be updated in light of new developments. The EU level offence classification 
system that was developed in the context of a previous study can serve this 
purpose and will be elaborated on extensively in one of the following chapters. 
Secondly, to the extent member states wish to be allowed to issue 
declarations, it is important for the EU as a policy maker safeguarding its 
approximation acquis to see to it that the possibility to issue a declaration is 
drafted in a way that precludes member states from reintroducing double 
criminality requirements with respect to offences that have been subject to 
approximation.  
Second, to the extent capacity as a refusal ground is accepted in relation to 
cases that do meet the double criminality test and it therefore constitutes a threat 
for cooperation in relation to cases for which the underlying behaviour has been 
subject to approximation, it can be considered to introduce a new cooperation 
principle: aut exequi, aut tolerare. That principle entails a commitment for the 
issuing member state in that it will execute the order using its own capacity as 
well as a commitment for the requested member state in that it will accept the 
presence and execution in its territory by another member state. 
Third and final, in parallel to the reinforcement of the approximation acquis and 
the abandonment of double criminality testing with respect to cases for which 
the underlying behaviour has been subject to approximation a solid European 
criminal policy also requires that related policies and information exchange 
mechanisms are tailored to support that policy. This means that the architecture 
of the mechanisms developed to exchange criminal records information must 
reflect the acquis to allow e.g. convicting member states to indicate whether or 
not a particular entry in the criminal records data base is linked to the 
approximation acquis as a result of which double criminality with respect to that 
entry is not allowed for example in the context of taking account of prior foreign 
convictions in the course of a new criminal proceeding. The consistent 
development and mutual reinforcement of the policies outlined by the European 
Union can be significantly improved. 
9.4 Perspective of the person involved 
First, there is no such thing as a vested right to enjoy the protection of a 
double criminality shield. In an ever developing European Union it is not 
desirable to maintain the existence of safe havens in which persons can escape 
the effects of a criminal procedure. 
Second, it should be considered to introduce a mechanism to ensure a 
balancing of the interests of the person involved with the interests of the 





member state involved if raising double criminality manifestly runs counter to 
the best interests of the person involved. Analysis has pointed to the usefulness 
to consider the introduction of the possibility to engage in a dialogue with the 
member state involved with a view to accept execution of the order/request in 
absence of double criminality, at least in the context of transfer of pre-trial 
supervision measures and the transfer of execution of sentences. Additionally, it 
can be considered to what extent it is opportune to introduce a similar 
mechanism in the context of relocation and protection of witnesses. 
 
Concluding, double criminality as a limit to cooperation in criminal matters 
is a very complex mechanism in which the interests of the persons involved, the 
EU criminal policy maker and the individual cooperating member states come 
together. From the analysis conducted the has become clear that the use of 
double criminality is insufficiently thought through and requires various 
adjustments in order to correctly balance the diversity of interests it represents 
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EULOCS is short for EU level offence classification system and brings 
together the so-called approximation acquis. It provides an overview of what is 
known to be common in terms of criminalisation between the member states of 
the EU. In several of the preceding chapters, it was observed that the diversity in 
the criminalisation between the member states can make cooperation complex 
and knowledge on what is common can provide some breathing room. The 
application of many mechanisms and principles turn out to be dependent on the 
typology of the underlying behaviour. 
This chapter aims at demonstrating the need for and/or at least the added 
value of a EULOCS in support of international cooperation in criminal matters. 
In doing so, the chapter also looks into the function of the approximation acquis. 
Both in legal and policy documents, the function is barely mentioned and in 
literature hardly elaborated on.245 To ensure a proper understanding of the 
argumentation developed, it is important to first provide a comprehensive 
introduction to EULOCS itself, its origin, its main features, its ambition. To that 
end, this introduction has a double focus. On the one hand approximation is 
elaborated on, clarifying what it entails and what the current approximation 
acquis looks like. On the other hand, the design of EULOCS receives significant 
attention, focussing on the considerations that were taken into account in the 
building phase and the challenges identified to keep EULOCS updated for the 
future. 
                                                             
245 WEYEMBERGH, A. (2005). The functions of approximation of penal legislation within the 
European Union. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12(2), 149.; BORGERS, 
M. J. (2010). Functions and Aims of Harmonisation After the Lisbon Treaty. A European 
Perspective. In C. Fijnaut, & J. Ouwerkerk (Eds.), The Future of Police and Judicial Cooperation 
in the European Union (pp. 347-355). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill. 





1.1 Approximation: what’s in a name? 
The first part of the introduction aims at clarifying what approximation 
means.246  
In essence, approximation is not really a legal term as it is most commonly 
used in exact sciences and mathematics. There it is defined as the inexact 
representation of something that is still close enough to be useful. Surprisingly this 
definition turns out to fit a legal context better than one might expect. For the 
purpose of this chapter, approximation refers to the establishment of common 
minimum standards with respect to the constituent elements of offences.247 This 
means that the approximation acquis is an inexact representation of the 
criminalisation in the member states, for it will only represent a common 
denominator amongst the constituent elements of offences. At the same time it is 
still close enough to be useful for it will provide valuable insight into the 
commonalities in the criminal justice systems of the member states. Especially 
knowledge on and use of those commonalities can facilitate international 
cooperation in criminal matters. Approximation will give you insight in the 
largest common denominator for which a supranational or international legal 
basis supporting that commonality exists. That does however not mean that the 
de facto largest common denominator cannot be even wider than what is found 
in approximation instruments. To the contrary, it is even very likely that the de 
facto common denominator is wider that the de jure common denominator 
provided for by the approximation acquis, because notwithstanding that far 
from all offences have been subject to approximation, there is e.g. some common 
                                                             
246 There is no official definition of approximation, but several scholars have attempted to define 
it: NELLES, U. (2002). Definitions of harmonisation. in KLIP, A. and VAN DER WILT, H. 
Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law. Amsterdam, Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences: 31-43, VAN DER WILT, H. (2002). Some critical reflections on the 
process of harmonisation of criminal law within the European Union. in KLIP, A. and VAN DER 
WILT, H. Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law. Amsterdam, Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences: 77-87, VANDER BEKEN, T. (2002). Freedom, security 
and justice in the European Union. A plea for Alternative views on harmonisation. in KLIP, A. 
and VAN DER WILT, H. Harmonisation and harmonising measures in criminal law. Amsterdam, 
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science: 95-103, WEYEMBERGH, A. (2006). "Le 
rapprochement des incriminations et des sanctions pénales." Revue International de Droit Pénal 
77(1-2): 185, KLIP, A. (2009). European Criminal Law. An integrative Approach. Antwerp - 
Oxford - Portland, Intersentia 
247 Because this chapter elaborates on the EU level offence classification system, the scope of the 
approximation acquis is limited accordingly, in spite of the fact that approximation can also 







understanding of what constitutes theft or murder, though even with respect to 
those seemingly straightforward offences, differences exist.248 
Though all EU member states have developed their own criminal law and 
the decision on what does and does not constitute an offence is (to a large 
extent)249 still a national prerogative, approximation is a valuable tool to identify 
those commonalities. 
The possibility to approximate offences was formally introduced at EU level 
in Artt. 29 and 31(e) TEU as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty. They allowed 
for the adoption of measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent 
elements of criminal acts in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug 
trafficking. The Union’s overall objective is to provide citizens with a high level 
of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common 
action in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters [...]. 
Approximation, where necessary, is considered to be one of the means to 
achieve that objective. The then new provisions were inspired by the conclusions 
of the High Level Group created by the Dublin European Council and tasked to 
examine the fight against organised crime in all its aspects.250 The High Level 
Group spent considerable time discussing the possible contribution legislative 
approximation might offer to the fight against organised crime.251 To that end 
Art. 34 TEU introduced the framework decision as a new instrument specifically 
designed to shape the approximation acquis. The rules governing this 
instrument were carefully chosen as it invites member states to agree on 
common criminal law provisions, leaving them with the discretionary power to 
choose method and means to achieve the stipulated goals. With the coming into 
force of the new legal framework as provided by the Lisbon treaty, directives 
will now be the instruments used to approximate the constituent elements of 
offences. 
                                                             
248 Traditionally, reference is made to the discussions surrounding the criminalisation of 
abortion and euthanasia to substantiate that assertion. Cadoppi, A. (1996). Towards a European 
Criminal Code. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1, 2. 
249 It should be noted that only recently, member states have lost their prerogative to decide 
what does and does not constitute an offence. Whereas before, approximation required 
unanimity amongst member states, the coming into force of the Lisbon treaty has made it 
possible to pursue approximation via a qualified majority voting. As a result, it is now possible 
that a criminalisation obligation is imposed on member states that have voted against a 
particular form of approximation. 
250 EUROPEAN COUNCIL (1996), Dublin Presidency Conclusions. 
251 HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON ORGANISED CRIME (1997), Letter to the Chairman of the Intergovernmental 
Conference Representatives Group, 2 May 1997, CONF 3903/97; Action Plan to combat organized 
crime (Adopted by the Council on 28 April 1997), OJ C 251 of 15.8.1997. 





1.2 Identifying approximation acquis 
Traditionally, as a result of the treaty base provided for approximation, the 
scope of the acquis is limited to those old framework decisions, complemented 
with post-Lisbon directives.252 Framework decisions and post-Lisbon directives 
have been adopted for euro counterfeiting253, fraud and counterfeiting of non-
cash means of payment254, money laundering255, terrorism256, trafficking in 
human beings257, illegal (im)migration258, environmental offences259, corruption260, 
sexual exploitation of a child and child pornography261, drug trafficking262, 
                                                             
252 See also: DE BONDT, W., & VERMEULEN, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using 
common offence concepts to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. In M. COOLS 
(Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 15-40). Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
253 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties 
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 
140 of 14.06.2000 as amended by the Council Framework Decision of 6 December 2001 amending 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other 
sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 329 of 
14.12.2001. 
254 Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash 
means of payment, OJ L 149 of 2.6.2001. 
255 Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, 
tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, OJ L 
182 of 5.7.2001 [hereafter: FD Money Laundering]. 
256 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164 of 22.6.2002 as 
amended by Council Framework Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism, OJ L 330 of 9.12.2008.  
257 Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, OJ L 
20 of 1.8.2002 repealed and replaced by Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101 of 15.4.2011.  
258 Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the legal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, as 
complemented by the Council Directive of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 128 of 5.12.2002. 
259 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law, OJ L 29 of 5.2.2003 and Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA to strengthen 
the criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, OJ L 
255 of 30.9.2005 annulled and replaced by Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ 
L 328 of 6.12.2008.  
260 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector, OJ L 192 of 31.7.2003.  
261 Council Framework Decision of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, OJ L 13 of 20.1.2004 repealed and replaced by Directive 






offences against information systems263, participation in a criminal 
organisation264 and racism and xenophobia265. 
However, even a quick analysis of those approximation instruments in the 
treaty’s sense of the word, reveals that the approximation acquis extends beyond 
those instruments. The 2002 framework decision on the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence comes to testify to that conclusion. 
Whereas the approximation of the penalties is included in that framework 
decision, the approximation of the constituent elements of the offence involved 
is included in a separate (formerly first pillar) directive266, even though the treaty 
had appointed the framework decision as the legal basis for the approximation 
of the constituent elements of offences.267 This duo of complementing 
                                                                                                                                               
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335 of 17.12.2011. 
262 Council Framework Decision of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, OJ L 335 
of 11.11.2004.  
263 Council Framework Decision of 21 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, OJ 
L 69 of 16.3.2005.  
264 Council Framework Decision of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, OJ L 
300 of 11.11.2008 [hereafter: FD Organised Crime]. 
265 Council Framework Decision of 29 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328 of 6.12.2008. 
266 Council Directive of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit 
and residence 
267 Not only does this duo of legal instruments point to the fact that the approximation acquis 
extends beyond the framework decisions, it also indicates that the division of competences 
between the former first and third pillars gave way for complex discussions in the implication 
of those divisions on the competence to approximate the constituent elements of offences and 
sanctions. The complexity is created by the fact that migration is a first pillar competence and 
criminal law is a third pillar competence. Therefore, the approximation competence needed to 
be split accordingly. The identification of the constituent elements of offences fell within the 
competence sphere of the first pillar, whereas the approximation of the penalty remained a 
third pillar competence. As a result, approximation requires the combination of two 
instruments. The discussion on the division of competences between the first and third pillar 
reached its ultimate high with the adoption of the so-called environmental framework 
decisions. The European Court of Justice confirmed the division as applied in the older 
migration file. Because the protection of the environment is a first pillar competence, the 
approximation of the constituent elements of environmental offences should be inserted in a 
first pillar instrument. With respect to the sanctions, that first pillar instrument can only include 
the obligation for the member states to introduce effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions.  See: EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Case 176/03), Commission v. Council, Judgment of 
13.9.2005, Rec. 2005, p. I-7879; EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Case 440/05), Commission v. Council, 
Judgment of 23.10.2007, Rec. 2007, p. I-9097; This discussion has been subject to extensive 
debate in literature. See e.g. S. ADAM, G. VERMEULEN and W. DE BONDT (2008), “Corporate 
criminal liability and the EC/EU bridging sovereignty paradigms for the sake of an area of 
justice, freedom and security” in La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe. Corporate 





instruments clearly illustrates that there is more to approximation than the 
framework decisions and the post-Lisbon directives. 
Furthermore, analysis revealed that within a European Union context, in the 
past approximation was also pursued via other instruments.268 The Union has 
adopted joint actions and conventions that contain substantive criminal law 
provisions. The 1995 Europol Convention for example introduces definitions of 
“illegal migrant smuggling”, “motor vehicle crime” and “traffic in human 
beings”.269 More obvious are the 1995 Convention on the Protection of the 
Communities Financial Interests270 or the 1997 Convention on the fight against 
corruption involving Community Officials271. Finally, the 1998 Joint Action on 
drug trafficking can be mentioned.272 
Finally, it is important to underline that this approach still fails to take into 
account those substantive criminal law provisions that originate from other 
cooperation levels, amongst which the Council of Europe and the United 
Nations are the most significant, even where no such ‘conclusion instrument’ 
exists. The importance of non-EU-instruments for the European Union is 
emphasized through the incorporation of some of them in the so-called JHA-
acquis, which lists the legal instruments, irrespective of the cooperation level at 
which they were negotiated, to which all EU (candidate) member states must 
                                                                                                                                               
Criminal Liability in Europe, La Charte/Die Keure, Bruges, 2008, 501, 373-432; A. DAWES & O. 
LYNSKEY. (2008). The Ever-longer Arm of EC law: The Extension of Community Competence 
into the Field of Criminal Law. Common Market Law Review, 45, 131; L. SIRACUSA, (2008). 
Harmonisation of criminal law between first and third pillar or the EU: Environmental 
protection as a Trojan horse of criminal law in the European first pillar? A new Statement of the 
ECJ. In C. BASSIOUNI, V. MILITELLO, & H. SATZGER (Eds.), European Cooperation in Penal 
Matters: Issues and Perspectives (pp. 62-86). Milan: CEDAM - Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio 
Milani. 
268 See also: WEYEMBERGH, A. (2004). L'harmonisation des législations: condition de l'espace 
pénal européen et rélévateur de ses tensions (Collection "études européennes"). Brussels: 
Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles; DE BONDT, W., & VERMEULEN, G. (2009). Esperanto for EU 
Crime Statistics. Towards Common EU offences in an EU level offence classification system. In 
M. COOLS (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 2, pp. 87-124). 
Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland: Maklu. 
269 Convention of 26 July 1995 on the establishment of a European Police Office (EUROPOL), OJ C 316 
of 27.11.1995. 
270 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection 
of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 316 of 27.11.1995. 
271 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union on the fight 
against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of member states of the 
European Union, OJ C 195 of 25.6.1997. 
272 Joint Action 96/750/JHA of 17 December 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 
K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the approximation of the laws and practices of 
the Member States of the European Union to combat drug addiction and to prevent and combat 






conform.273 An initial impetus for the establishment of an EU JHA acquis can be 
found in the 1996 action plan which lists non-EU instruments to which all 
member states and candidates must comply.274 Because the Union itself 
underlined the importance of these non-EU instruments through the inclusion 
thereof into the EU JHA acquis, the Union may be expected to take those 
instruments into account as part of the approximation acquis. As a result, 
member states must accede to e.g. the United Nations Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs275 or the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism of 27 January 1977.276 
Based on this analysis it is indisputable that within the EU, approximation is 
pursued via various sorts of instruments. It has developed rather fast and 
organically in the sense that it is strongly dependant on the political climate, 
lacking a long term consistent policy plan. When trying to assemble all the 
relevant provisions, analysis of framework decisions alone is insufficient. The 
exercise to map the approximation acquis was conducted in 2008, in the context 
of a study on crime statistics,277 and kept updated ever since. At the time, the 
mapping exercise was intended to provide insight into the extent to which 
offences are known to be common in the member states and therefore there 
would be no definitional problems to compare the crime statistics.278 It resulted 
                                                             
273 Up until 2009, an updated version of the acquis could be consulted on the website of the 
Directorate General Freedom, Security and Justice of the European Commission. Unfortunately, 
the split of that Directorate General into a Directorate General on Justice and a Directorate 
General on Home Affairs has had a baleful effect on the continuation of the JHA acquis. The 
most recent version available dates from October 2009 and can be consulted on the website of 
the Directorate General on Justice.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009) Acquis of The European Union 
Consolidated and completely revised new version Cut-off-date: October 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/doc_centre/intro/docs/jha_acquis_1009_en.pdf 
274 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997), Action Plan to combat organized crime (Adopted by the 
Council on 28 April 1997), OJ C 251 of 15.8.1997. 
275 In the JHA acquis it is clarified that he obligation to accede is not explicit but results from the 
references to this instrument in the EU Action Plan on Drugs (2000-2004) 
276 In the JHA acquis it is clarified that the obligation to accede is not explicit, but results from 
the binding force of secondary legislation, from Council Conclusions or from Article 10 EC. 
277 A. MENNENS, W. DE WEVER, A. DALAMANGA, A. KALAMARA, G. KASLAUSKAITE, G. 
VERMEULEN & W. DE BONDT. (2009). Developing an EU level offence classification system: EU 
study to implement the Action Plan to measure crime and criminal justice (Vol. 34, IRCP-series). 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
278 Though there can be a lot of reasons why crime statistics from one member state cannot be 
compared with the crime statistics of another member state, comparative criminologists argue 
that the problems related to the diversity in offence definitions are the most significant. See e.g. 
HARRENDORF, S. (2012). Offence Definitions in the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics and Their Influence on Data Quality and Comparability. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, 18, 23; LEWIS, C. (1995). International Studies and Statistics on 
Crime and Criminal Justice. In J.-M. JEHLE, & C. LEWIS (Eds.), Improving Criminal Justice 
Statistics (Vol. 15, pp. 167-176). Wiesbaden: Kriminologischen Zentralstelle. 





in the identification of 62 offence labels, for which approximated offence 
definitions existed.279 Already at that time, it was argued that the knowledge on 
the scope of the approximation acquis should be used wisely to support as much 
as possible any policy domain that is offence-dependent, i.e. any policy domain 
in which knowledge on the underlying offence can be crucial to decide on the 
applicable rules.280 
1.3 Building a classification system 
The second part of the introduction aims at clarifying the architecture of 
EULOCS. If it is the intention to use the approximation acquis to its full potential 
and ensure that it can support international cooperation in criminal matters, it is 
important that the acquis is presented in a comprehensive and comprehensible 
way. Mirroring the approach used with respect to the JHA acquis and merely 
listing the instruments that comprise the approximation acquis will not provide 
the insight necessary for it to fulfil its supporting role. A presentation should 
clearly visualise the scope of the acquis and should provide insight into the 
extent of the commonalities in the offence definitions in the member states. It is 
important to immediately show what is common in terms of criminalisation of 
offences and where the criminalisation of offences differs between the member 
states. Taking those considerations into account, the decision was made to 
develop an offence classification system, now known as EULOCS. 
When designing an offence classification system to support (amongst others) 
international cooperation in criminal matters, a number of considerations must 
be taken into account. The following paragraphs will elaborate on considerations 
related to first, the accurateness of what is common in light of its dependence on 
correct and complete implementation by the member states, second, the 
presentation of the distinction between what is common and what is different, 
and third, the compatibility of the classification system with existing 
classification systems. 
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280 See also: DE BONDT, W., & VERMEULEN, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using 
common offence concepts to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. In M. Cools 







The first consideration relates to the accurateness with which the 
approximation acquis provides insight into the common offences in the EU. It 
must be recognised that the approximation acquis as found in the international 
and supranational legal instruments is only an indication of the common 
offences in the member states. The actual existence of common offences is 
dependent on the correct and complete implementation of all approximation 
obligations. Because EU (but also non-EU) instruments suffer from poor 
implementation,281 it is not unlikely that there is a discrepancy between what 
should be common and what is common in terms of criminalisation in the 
member states. However, that complexity is not taken into account in this 
exercise. EULOCS is built using the approximation acquis as a basis, regardless 
of the implementation status in the member states. This is not so much a 
pragmatic choice but a choice that is based on the implications poor 
implementation should have (in the context of international cooperation in 
criminal matters). The choice between either or not taking account of the 
implementation status is dependent on the choice whether or not poor 
implementation can be used as an argument (in the context of international 
cooperation in criminal matters). In the event cooperation is e.g. dependent on 
the double criminality requirement, the question arises whether it is acceptable 
to raise a double criminality issue with respect to an offence that has been 
subject to approximation and would not have caused a double criminality issue 
if the executing member state involved would have complied with its 
approximation obligation. Because that question should be answered negatively 
for it cannot be accepted that a member state uses its own lagging behind in the 
implementation of approximation instruments as an argument to refuse 
cooperation, the implementation status in the member states is not relevant for 
the design of EULOCS. 
The main goal of the development of an offence classification system is the 
later use thereof in support of (amongst others) international cooperation in 
criminal matters; the goal is that the knowledge on what should be common in 
terms of offence definitions is used to facilitate international cooperation in 
criminal matters. EULOCS will be used as a tool to identify not only what is 
common in terms of offence definitions in the member states, but also what 
should be common in light of approximation obligations member states should 
                                                             
281 See e.g. Report on the implementation of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on combating terrorism, COM(2004) 409 final of 12.10.2004; Report from the Commission 
based on Article 12 of the Council Framework Decision of 22 December 2003 on combating the 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, COM(2007) 716 final of 4.12.2007; Report 
from the Commission – Second report based on Article 14 of the Council Framework Decision 
of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, COM(2006) 
65 final of 10.3.2006; See also: Borgers, M. J. (2007). Implementing framework decisions. 
Common Market Law Review, 44, 1361. 





adhere to. Incorrect or incomplete implementation cannot be accepted as an 
argument to limit the scope of the approximation acquis and the added value it 
can have in support of offence-dependent mechanisms in international 
cooperation in criminal matters. Therefore, the approximation acquis in its 
entirety is taken into account regardless of implementation issues. 
The second consideration relates to the clear distinction between what is 
common in terms of the constituent elements of offences and where the offence 
stops being a common offence and turns into an offence for which the 
determination of the constituent elements is a national prerogative. In relation to 
this consideration, it is important to duly take account of the specificities of the 
legislative technique of approximation. The approximating instruments only 
include minimum rules for approximation, they only include those acts for 
which member states must ensure that they are criminalised and punishable 
under their national legislation. Approximation will not lead to unification. The 
fact that the approximation instrument only contains the minimum rules means 
that member states retain the competence to criminalise beyond that minimum. 
Member states can complement the constituent elements included in the 
approximation instrument with an additional set of nationally identified 
constituent elements and bring them all together underneath the same offence 
label. A reference to the offence definition of trafficking in human beings can 
illustrate this. Art. 2 of the 2011 directive on trafficking in human beings 
stipulates that member states must legislate to ensure that the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange or 
transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve 
the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation is considered to be an offence. Exploitation shall include, as a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, including begging, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, 
or the exploitation of criminal activities, or the removal of organs. Because these are 
the minimum requirements of the offence, member states can include other 
forms of exploitation into their national offence definition, or can decide e.g. that 
the use of any kind of force is not necessary for the behaviour to be 
punishable.282 As a consequence, a distinction should be made between on the 
one hand the constituent elements that are known to be common because they 
were jointly identified as acts falling within the scope of an offence label and on 
the other hand other constituent elements that appear in national criminalisation 
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provisions as a result of the specificities of the technique of approximation. To 
that end a distinction was made between jointly identified parts of the offences – in 
the case of trafficking in human beings, this means a criminalization that is 
limited to the said forms of exploitation and requires the use of force – and other 
parts of the offences – which may include other forms of exploitation and 
punishability even beyond the use of force. To clearly visualize (the rationale 
behind) the distinction between those two parts of trafficking in human beings, 
the commonly defined parts of the definition will be complemented with a 
reference to the approximating instrument(s). Each individual externalization of 
trafficking in human beings, i.e. each individual purpose with which human 
beings are trafficked receives a separate code for future reference, and future 
distinction between forms of trafficking in human beings within the jointly 
identified part of the offence and other parts of the offence. Before inserting a 
snapshot of EULOCS to make the distinction between jointly identified and other 
parts of offences more tangible, a third consideration will be dealt with. 
The third consideration relates to the compatibility of the newly developed 
classification system with existing offence classification systems. Within the 
European area of freedom, security and justice, a proliferation of classification 
systems is taking place. Reference can be made to the classification systems that 
form the backbone of the data systems of EU level actors such as Europol and 
Eurojust, but more recently the classification system designed to organise the 
exchange of criminal records information received a lot of attention. ECRIS, 
short for European Criminal Records Information System, is a decentralised 
information technology system that governs the computerised exchange of 
criminal records information.283 The computerised system uses a coded offence 
template similar to EULOCS to classify the criminal records information based 
on the underlying offence. When elaborating on the added value of EULOCS 
with respect to information exchange (infra), the weaknesses of ECRIS will be 
clarified. Nevertheless, a perfect compatibility between EULOCS and ECRIS was 
achieved. To ensure the feasibility of the introduction of a system such as 
EULOCS, it was deemed important to ensure that the new system is perfectly 
compatible with all the existing systems. To that end, the offence categories used 
in the existing systems where catalogued and used either as a basis for the 
development of EULOCS284 or as a way to fine tune and perfect EULOCS in the 
final stage285. This perfect compatibility with existing classification systems is 
important not only to ensure that EULOCS can be used for various purposes and 
                                                             
283 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework 
Decision 2009/315/JHA. OJ L 93 of 7.4.2009. 
284 This was the case for classification systems used e.g. by the European Actors 
285 This was the case for the offence classification system used in ECRIS, which was developed 
by the European Commission in parallel to the development of EULOCS. 





an easy conversion can be guaranteed, it is also important not to jeopardise the 
ongoing implementation of other classification systems. It is important to note 
that ECRIS was developed by the European Commission in parallel to the 
development of EULOCS, and needs to be implemented by the member states 
before the end of April 2012. Taking account of the broader scope and the 
possibility to also use EULOCS as a basis for criminal records exchange, some 
member states expressed concerns with respect to the ongoing efforts to 
implement ECRIS. Whenever a new system is being developed and promoted 
whilst another (older) system is still being implemented, this might have a 
baleful effect on the implementation of the latter.286 In this case however, the 
ongoing implementation processes where not hindered by the promotion of 
EULOCS as an alternative, because the (further) implementation of the existing 
classification systems will ultimately facilitate future transition to EULOCS. 
The construction the EU Level Offence Classification System was finalised in 
2009.287 The table inserted below provides an overview of what EULOCS looks 
like, visualising not only the distinction between jointly identified parts of the 
offence and other parts of the offence, but also the coding system and the 
inclusion of definitions and their sources as elaborated on above. The choice was 
made to insert an example with respect to participation in a criminal 
organisation for it allows visualising the approach that was used in the event the 
EU’s approximation instruments were complemented by non-EU approximation 
instruments. With respect to participation in a criminal organisation, the 2008 
Framework Decision needs to be complemented with the 2000 United Nations 
Conviction on Organised Crime, for the latter also requests member states to 
foresee the punishability of knowingly taking part in the non-criminal activities 
of a criminal organisation, whereas the framework decision only refers to the 
punishability of a person taking part in the criminal activities of a criminal 
organisation.  
                                                             
286 Examples thereof are legio, but today the poor implementation of the European Evidence 
Warrant is the best example. Member state reluctance to go ahead with the implementation of 
the European Evidence Warrant is due to initially the echoes and now the concrete proposals 
for the transformation of the evidence gathering scene via the introduction of the European 
Investigation Order. Member states are awaiting the new instrument to ensure that no 
implementation efforts are in vain. A such implementation deadlock is avoided with respect to 
offence classification systems by stressing the perfect compatibility of the proposed EULOCS 
with all existing classification systems. The efforts put into the implementation of ECRIS will 
have a significant impact on the ease with which EULOCS will be implemented. A full 
overview of the compatibility between EULOCS and the other classification systems is available 
for CIRCA users. 
287 G. VERMEULEN & W. DE BONDT (2009). EULOCS. The EU level offence classification system : 
a bench-mark for enhanced internal coherence of the EU's criminal policy (Vol. 35, IRCP-series). 






Code level 1 PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
Article 1 Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime 
 “Criminal organisation” means a structured association, 
established over a period of time, of more than two persons 
acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a 
maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit; 
“Structured association” means an association that is not 
randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence, 
nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members, 
continuity of its membership, or a developed structure 
Code level 1.1 
OFFENCES JOINTLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPATION IN 
A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
Code level 1.1.1 Directing a criminal organisation 
Article 2 (b) , Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime 
Conduct by any person consisting in an agreement with one or 
more persons that an activity should be pursued which, if 
carried out, would amount to the commission of offences, even 
if that person does not take part in the actual execution of the 
activity. 
Code level 1.1.2 
Knowingly participating in the criminal activities, without 
being a director 
Article 2 (a), Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime  
Conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of 
either the aim and general criminal activity of the organisation 
or the intention of the organisation to commit the offences in 
question, actively takes part in the organisation's criminal 
activities, even where that person does not take part in the 
actual execution of the offences concerned and, subject to the 
general principles of the criminal law of the member state 
concerned, even where the offences concerned are not actually 
committed, 
Code level 1.1.3 
Knowingly taking part in the non-criminal activities of a 
criminal organisation, without being a director 
Article 5 -  United Nations 
Convention on 
Transnational Organised 
Crime (UNTS no. 39574, 
New York, 15.11.2000) 
Conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of 
either the aim and general criminal activity of the organisation 
or the intention of the organisation to commit the offences in 
question, actively takes part in the organisation's other activities 
(i.e. non-criminal) in the further knowledge that his 
participation will contribute to the achievement of the 
organisation's criminal activities. 
Code level 1.2 
OTHER FORMS OF PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL 
ORGANISATION 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
 





1.4 Maintaining the classification system 
Even though the construction of EULOCS was said to be finalised in 2009, the 
approximation acquis is not static and has evolved since then. New 
approximating instruments have been adopted with respect to trafficking in 
human beings288 and also with respect to sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography289. An update of the framework decision on attacks against 
information systems is on its way.290 Additionally, a new instrument is being 
negotiated on market abuse in which the member states are to ensure that are 
punishable as offences.291 The dynamic character of the approximation acquis 
makes it challenging to keep EULOCS updated. To that end it could be 
suggested to set up a panel of experts specifically assigned with that task. 
Furthermore, to guarantee the feasibility of using it in practice, it is required to 
see to it that older versions of EULOCS can still be consulted, as for some of its 
applications it may be important to look into the approximation acquis at any 
given time in the past. 
Two concerns make it complex to keep EULOCS updated.  
The first concern relates to the availability of an updated JHA acquis. Up 
until 2009, an updated version of the acquis could be consulted on the website of 
the Directorate General Freedom, Security and Justice of the European 
Commission. Unfortunately, the split of that Directorate General into a 
Directorate General on Justice and a Directorate General on Home Affairs has 
had a baleful effect on the continuation of the JHA acquis. The most recent 
version available dates from October 2009 and can be consulted on the website 
of the Directorate General on Justice. This means that an update of EULOCS can 
no longer rely on the inclusion of non-EU instruments in the JHA acquis 
available on the Commission website, but requires an analysis of the position of 
non-EU instruments in EU policy documents.292  
                                                             
288 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA.  
289 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA. 
290 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on attacks against 
information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, COM(2010) 517 
final of 6.9.2010 
291 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions 
for insider dealing and market manipulation, COM(2011) 654 final, of 20.10.2011 
292 As illustrated above, some non-EU instruments are considered to be part of the EU JHA 






The second concern relates to the increased flexibility allowed with respect to 
the area of freedom, security and justice. The United Kingdom and Ireland have 
obtained the right to opt-out,293 whereas Denmark is excluded from 
participation.294 This flexibility has significant impact on the way the 
approximation acquis should be dealt with. For each of the approximation 
instruments adopted under the legal framework established with the Lisbon 
Treaty, it must be assessed whether or not the United Kingdom and Ireland have 
opted in. With respect to the new instruments currently adopted, both member 
states have opted in, be it that the United Kingdom initially opted-out with 
respect to the Directive on trafficking in human beings.295 With respect to the 
new proposal for a directive on market abuse, the position of the United 
Kingdom is not clear yet. Because Denmark is always excluded, it is important 
to consistently mention this as a caveat with respect to the newly adopted 
directives. It must be tested to what extent the Danish criminal law already 
foresees the punishability of the offences included in the new approximation 
instruments or is voluntarily adapting its criminal law in accordance with the 
new instrument. 
Having introduced EULOCS – be it in a nutshell – the classification system 
will be brought in relation to various mechanisms to elaborate on the need 
therefore, at least added value thereof. The added value of EULOCS will be 
discussed against the background of first, the double criminality requirement, 
second, the mechanisms that are responsible for enhanced stringency in 
cooperation, third, the complexities surrounding the admissibility of evidence, 
fourth, the information exchange between member states and finally fifth, the 
functioning of the EU level actors. 
                                                                                                                                               
European Union. Other non-EU instruments are considered to be part of the EU JHA acquis due 
to the position they assume in EU policy documents. The UN Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs is an example thereof, included in the EU JHA acquis following the references thereto in 
the EU Action Plan on Drugs (2000-2004) 
293 Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of 
freedom, security and justice, annexed to the Consolidated version of the treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115 of 9.5.2008. 
294 Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Consolidated version of the 
treaty on the functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115 of 9.5.2008. 
295 Commission Decision of 14 October 2011 on the request by the United Kingdom to accept 
Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA 





2 EULOCS & double criminality 
The first context in which EULOCS might be necessary, at least can have an 
added value relates to the position of double criminality in international 
cooperation in criminal matters.296 As elaborated on in the chapter dedicated to 
double criminality, one of the first questions member states are confronted with 
in relation to international cooperation in criminal matters is what to do with a 
request that relates to behaviour that would not constitute an offence if 
committed in their jurisdiction. Though cooperation is important, it is far from 
self-evident that member states cooperate with respect to cases that are not 
criminally actionable in their jurisdiction. Mirroring the structure of that chapter 
on double criminality, the need for at least added value of EULOCS will be 
reviewed using the same three perspectives.297 First, EULOCS will be brought in 
relation to double criminality from the EU’s perspective and the need to strive for 
consistency and safeguard the approximation acquis. Second, EULOCS will be 
brought in relation to double criminality from a member state’s perspective and the 
added value thereof in light of the current double criminality verifications. 
Third, EULOCS will be brought in relation to double criminality from the 
individual’s perspective and the added value thereof in light of the possibility to 
transfer execution of sentences. 
2.1 EU’s perspective: Safeguarding the approximation 
acquis 
Using the perspective of the EU as a policy maker, the link with EULOCS 
consists of ensuring policy consistency and thus safeguarding the approximation 
acquis. It is the responsibility of each policy maker to ensure that the policy 
choices made are adhered to and are not undermined by other policy choices. To 
safeguard the approximation acquis, it is required that double criminality as a 
refusal ground is not used in relation to offences that have been subject to 
approximation. Allowing the use of double criminality as a refusal ground in 
relation to offences that should have been criminalised throughout the EU 
effectively undermines the strength of the approximation acquis. The current 
                                                             
296 See also: DE BONDT, W., & VERMEULEN, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using 
common offence concepts to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. In M. Cools 
(Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 15-40). Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
297 In the chapter on double criminality in international cooperation in criminal matters, a 
distinction is made between the position of the issuing and the executing member state. For the 






approach with respect to double criminality as a refusal ground does not hold 
that guarantee.  
To explain that position, a distinction must be made between instruments 
with a simple double criminality clause and instruments with a more complex 
double criminality system due to the abandonment of the double criminality 
requirement for a list of 32 offences. 
First, as clarified in the chapter on double criminality in international 
cooperation, double criminality is far from a general requirement. Though 
member states have made some cooperation mechanisms dependent on a double 
criminality requirement, other forms of cooperation can be pursued in spite of a 
lacking double criminality. Instruments regulating mechanisms that are made 
dependent on a simple double criminality clause, usually stipulate that the act 
constitutes an offence under the law of the executing member state, whatever the 
constituent elements or however it is described.298 A such formulation however, is 
completely detached from the approximation acquis. Stipulating that 
cooperation may be refused if the act is not criminalised under the law of the 
executing member state fails to appreciate that some offences have been subject 
to approximation and it would therefore be inconsistent to allow member states 
to call upon a double criminality issue in relation those offences. To get a clear 
overview of the approximation acquis and therefore the offences for which 
double criminality as a refusal ground cannot be accepted, EULOCS can have a 
significant added value. The distinction included therein between jointly 
identified parts of offences and other parts of offences immediately reflects the 
boundaries of double criminality as a refusal ground. This gap in the current 
formulation of the refusal ground can be filled by stipulating that “Double 
criminality as a refusal ground is never acceptable with respect to offences that have been 
subject to approximation and identified as such in the EU level offence classification 
system that can be consulted on the website of the European Commission”.  
Second, mutual recognition instruments hold a more complex double 
criminality regime, for it is abandoned with respect to a list of 32 offences and 
maintained for any other offence in a way that is similar to the one described 
above. This means that with respect to the left-over double criminality refusal 
ground in mutual recognition instruments – as a baseline – the same argument 
applies. Double criminality is not acceptable with respect to offences that have 
been subject to approximation. The question arises however, whether the 
approximation argument has not been sufficiently tackled by the introduction of 
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a list of 32 offences for which double criminality is abandoned. After all, if the 
approximation acquis is reflected in the list of offences for which double 
criminality is no longer an acceptable refusal ground, the critique of not 
safeguarding the approximation acquis would not stand. To that end, the labels 
in the approximation acquis must be compared to the 32 labels included in the 
offence list. Analysis reveals that for the offence labels that have been subject to 
approximation in framework decisions or post-Lisbon directives, double 
criminality is abandoned through the introduction of the 32 offence list. As a 
result, as double criminality cannot be raise to limit cooperation, the 
approximation acquis seems to be sufficiently safeguarded. It seems as though 
the approach developed in the mutual recognition instruments is not in need of 
a revision to ensure that the approximation acquis is appropriately safeguarded. 
However, there are two reasons why that conclusion cannot stand in light of 
the scope of the current approximation acquis and the dynamic character 
thereof. 
Firstly, as argued in the introduction, the approximation acquis extends 
beyond what is included in framework decisions and post-Lisbon directives. 
When mapping the approximation acquis in 2008, no less than 62 offence labels 
were identified as having been subject to approximation in the EU.299 Amongst 
those 62 offence labels market abuse can be found, an offence label that has been 
subject to approximation at Council of Europe level and found its way into the 
EU JHA acquis300 and is not included in the list of offences for which the double 
criminality requirement has been abandoned. Furthermore, taking account of the 
dynamic character of the approximation acquis, it is only a matter of time before 
the approximation acquis included in post-Lisbon directives is extended further 
beyond the offence labels included in the 32 offence list. Art. 83(1)2 TFEU allows 
the Council, after the consent of the Parliament and acting with unanimity, to 
extend the list of offences that can be subject to approximation and adopt an 
instrument establishing minimum rules with respect to offences and sanctions 
beyond the 32 offence list. Retaking the example of the current proposal for a 
                                                             
299 This does however not mean that the list of 32 offences should be doubled for it to 
encompass all 62 offence labels. The result of the mapping exercise was presented in a very 
detailed way, referring to all the subcategories that can be found in the approximating 
instruments. For corruption e.g. a distinction was made between active and passive corruption, 
for cybercrime e.g. a distinction was made between illegal access, illegal interception, illegal 
system interference and illegal data interference. As an example of an offence labels included in 
the 2008 mapping exercise and not included in the 32 offence list for which the double 
criminality requirement has been abandoned, reference can be made to market abuse and 
market manipulation. 
300 The approximation instrument is included in the EU JHA acquis, which can be consulted 
online on the website of the European Commission. Council of Europe Convention on Insider 






directive with respect to insider dealing and market manipulation301, it is likely 
that it will not be long before the approximation acquis extends beyond the 
labels included in the 32 offence list.  
Secondly, the possibility introduced to issue a declaration with respect to the 
offence list in which member states can declare not to accept the abandonment of 
the double criminality requirement with respect to all or some of the listed 
offences, opens the possibility that double criminality as a refusal ground is 
reintroduced with respect to offences that have been subject to approximation. 
In the event a member state declares to no longer accept the abandonment of the 
double criminality requirement for e.g. trafficking in human beings, cooperation 
may be refused with respect to trafficking cases for which the underlying 
behaviour does not meet the double criminality requirement, in spite of the fact 
that the behaviour is included in an approximation instrument. Therefore, from 
the perspective of the EU as a policy maker responsible to ensure adherence to 
the policy choices it has made, the unlimited possibility to declare not to accept 
the abandonment of the double criminality any longer, was a bad policy choice. 
As a result, even the 32 offence list read together with the possibility to issue a 
declaration should be complemented with the above introduced provision that 
stipulates that refusal cannot be accepted in relation to offences that have been 
subject to approximation 
In sum, to safeguard the approximation acquis, there is a need to complement 
the current approach with respect to the use of double criminality as a refusal 
ground. The added value EULOCS would bring consists of its simplicity, 
accessibility and ability to stand the test of time. If EULOCS is built in such a 
way that visualises the current approximation acquis at any given time, and is 
updated e.g. under the auspice of the European Commission in cooperation with 
an expert group, it would suffice to introduce a provision in the cooperation 
instruments stipulating that “Double criminality as a refusal ground is never 
acceptable with respect to offences that have been subject to approximation and identified 
as such in the EU level offence classification system that can be consulted on the website 
of the European Commission”  
2.2 Member state’s perspective: Limiting double 
criminality verification 
From the perspective of the cooperating member states, there is a practical 
interest to try and limit the time dedicated to establishing whether or not double 
criminality is met in the event cooperation is dependent on a double criminality 
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requirement. To the extent cooperation is dependent on double criminality, 
member states reportedly loose significant time in establishing double 
criminality in relation to cases for which double criminality is known to be met302 
based on the approximation acquis.303 Immediate recognition of cases that relate 
to offences that have been subject to approximation would limit the double 
criminality verification process to those cases where verification is useful which 
would have the potential of speeding up the cooperation process. 
A such policy option obviously requires that member states seeking 
cooperation are able to identify a case as either or not related to an offence that 
has been subject to approximation. On the other hand, other member states 
would be required to trust and accept the classification of cases in either or not 
relating to offences that have been subject to approximation. In practice, this 
would mean that whenever seeking cooperation, member states not only 
mention the label of the offence for which cooperation is sought, but also 
whether or not the underlying behaviour falls within the scope of the 
approximation acquis or not. To that end, EULOCS could be used as a tool 
against which member states can map the cases for which cooperation in sought. 
Cooperation will not be sought for a case of trafficking in human beings full stop, 
but for a 0401 01 case of trafficking in human beings indicating that it relates to 
behaviour that is jointly identified as trafficking in human beings, or to a 0401 02 
case of trafficking in human beings, indicating that the underlying behaviour 
falls outside the scope of the approximation acquis and might therefore not be 
considered criminal in the other member state. 
This does however not mean that the added value of EULOCS and the 
limitation of the double criminality verification is limited to the approximation 
acquis. It could very well be that member states want to extend the knowledge 
on the fulfilment of the double criminality requirement and bring it together in a 
tool such as EULOCS. It is not unimaginable that member states would want to 
have a more developed and detailed view on the existing double criminality 
with respect to an offence-domain that is frequently subject to cooperation 
initiatives. It is not unimaginable that EULOCS is further elaborated on to also 
visualise and classify the offences for which double criminality is known to be 
met even though there is not legal instrument that can be used as a basis 
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303 During the focus group meetings held in the member states, the time consuming nature of 
double criminality testing was often raised as an issue member states are struggling with. 
Member states are open to look into ways that could facilitate the current approach of double 






therefore.304 In parallel to the trust that member states should have in one and 
other with respect to the classification of a case in either or not relating to 
behaviour that has been subject to approximation, it can be considered by the 
member states whether they are willing to extend that trust beyond the 
categories of offences that have been subject to approximation and also 
encompass behaviour that is known to be criminal all over the EU. If member 
states would be prepared to have that degree of trust in each other, EULOCS 
could constitute a significant added value and the use thereof result in a 
significant saving of time due to the abandonment of the time consuming double 
criminality verifications. 
2.3 Individual’s perspective: Strengthening the position 
of the person involved 
Taking the perspective of the person involved, the double criminality limit to 
cooperation as introduced by the member states has an impact on the position of 
the person involved, which can be both positively and negatively perceived. If 
the member state in which a person is found refuses to cooperation due to a 
double criminality issue, the person involved will benefit from this refusal in 
that no action will be taken against him. If a person wishes to be transferred to 
another member state for the execution of the sentence, but that transfer is 
refused due to a double criminality issue, the person involved will perceive this 
as a disadvantage of the double criminality limit to cooperation. 
It must be reiterated that under no circumstances a person should have the 
right to benefit from a double criminality shield. In an ever evolving European 
Union it is inacceptable that a person would call upon a sort of vested right to 
benefit from the protection of double criminality as a mandatory refusal ground 
for any of the member states. As a baseline, it should be the prerogative of the 
member state to decide whether or not double criminality as a refusal ground 
will be called upon. However, it can be argued that it may be considered to 
grant the person involved the right to request a member state not to call upon 
the double criminality requirement as a refusal ground. This links in with the 
                                                             
304 In this respect it is interesting to point to the future use of approximation instruments. So far, 
approximation instruments have been adopted with a view to ensuring the common 
criminalisation of offences that are considered to be priorities in European policy making; 
Approximation is used as a tool to identify the behaviour that is the most reprehensible in the 
Union and for which common action is required. However, because simple knowledge on 
common offence definitions can prove interesting (amongst others) in light of the verification of 
double criminality as a limit to international cooperation in criminal matters, it would be 
interesting to open the debate as to the acceptability to use approximation also to identify the 
existing commonalities as opposed to approximation being used to establish new commonalities. 





situation described above where a person wishes to be transferred to his 
member state of nationality or residence, but that transfer is blocked for reasons 
of lacking double criminality. Though there might not be an immediate pressing 
need in relation to the position of the person involved, in the chapter on double 
criminality it was suggested to open the debate as to the acceptability and 
feasibility to introduce the possibility for the person involved to enter into a 
dialogue with the refusing member state in order to seek execution in the 
member state of nationality or residence. In the course of that debate, EULOCS 
could have an added value, in the sense that should member states consider a 
step-by-step introduction of this mechanism singling out a limited number of 
offences is a first step. 
To further clarify that suggestion, it must be stressed that EULOCS is more 
than a visualisation of what is common in terms of offence definitions in the 
member states. At times the approximating instruments also provide insight into 
the differences in the offence definitions for they sometimes list the behaviour 
for which the decision to either or not include it in the offence definition is left to 
the member states. A reference can be made to the framework decision on drug 
trafficking as an illustration. In its Art. 2 the crimes linked to trafficking in drugs 
and precursors are listed. Each member state shall take the necessary measures 
to ensure that the conduct when committed intentionally is punishable. 
However, that article also stipulates that the conduct described does not have to 
be punishable when it was committed exclusively for their own personal 
consumption. In doing so the framework decision does not only provide insight 
into the common offence definition for drug trafficking, it also provides insight 
into the diversity that will exist with respect to trafficking with a view to 
organising the personal consumption. Therefore, the framework decision will 
feed not only the jointly identified parts of drug trafficking, but also the other parts 
of drug trafficking, for which common criminalisation is uncertain. A number of 
member states, amongst which the Netherlands is the most obvious example, 
have decided not to criminalise trafficking with a view to organising the own 
personal consumption of drugs. 
Taking the criminalisation of drug trafficking as an example, a situation may 
occur in which a Dutch national is convicted abroad to an imprisonment for 
three years for having trafficked drugs in spite of the fact that it was for own 
personal consumption. Being a Dutch national, it will not be uncommon for the 
person to seek a transfer back to the Netherlands and prefer execution in its 
member state of nationality and residence. To that end, the framework decision 
on the transfer of sentences involving deprivation of liberty can be used. 
However if the Netherlands – for the sake of the argumentation – would make 
execution of the foreign sentences dependent on double criminality, this would 






executed in its member state of nationality, which seems harsh considering that 
the behaviour underlying the conviction is not even punishable in the 
Netherlands 305 This is the reason why it was argued that member states should 
consider introducing double criminality as an optional as opposed to mandatory 
refusal ground, leaving the door open to go ahead with cooperation – in casu 
execution – in spite of a lacking double criminality.  
It is not unimaginable that member states do not want to introduce this 
possibility for all offences and identify a number of offences for which a double 
criminality dialogue is made possible. If this policy option is pursued, the 
categorisation in EULOCS can support the identification of (parts of) offences. 
 
3 EULOCS & proportionality and capacity  
The second context in which EULOCS might be necessary or at least can have 
an added value consists of the mechanisms that intend to balance 
proportionality and capacity concerns in cooperation. Underneath this heading a 
built-in proportionality approach and an alternative to deal with capacity 
concerns will be discussed. 
3.1 Considering built-in proportionality 
The transformation from a request-based into an ordering-based cooperation 
system has sparked concerns with respect to the position of proportionality 
guarantees therein. Member states want to ensure that the cooperation efforts 
expected from them remain within the limits of what is (considered) 
proportionate.  
In the past decade, proportionality concerns have become inextricably linked 
to the European arrest warrant, the mutual recognition instrument with which 
the member states have an extended practical experience. Because there is no 
real proportionality clause included in the European arrest warrant, the 
instrument can be used for almost any case, in spite of the fact that member 
states intended for it to be used only in serious cross-border situations. The 
European Commission has expressed its concern about the evolution to also use 
                                                             
305 The example is oversimplified to avoid an unnecessary complex explanation. Technically, the 
execution of sentences involving deprivation of liberty can be made fully dependent on the 
double criminality requirement if a member state has issued a declaration stating that it will not 
accept the abandonment of the double criminality requirement of any of the listed offences. 





the European arrest warrant for petty crime.306 It appears that the scope 
limitation through stipulating that a European arrest warrant may be issued for acts 
punishable by the law of the issuing member state by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or 
a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months307 is not 
sufficient. Member states are entirely dependent on the way the criminal 
legislation in another member state is formulated and are looking into 
alternatives to ensure a proportionate use of the European arrest warrant and 
more in general the instruments governing international cooperation in criminal 
matters. 
In the recent political debate on the European Investigation Order, this 
proportionality concern has lead to the introduction of a general proportionality 
clause, stipulating that an EIO may be issued only when the issuing authority is 
satisfied that the following conditions have been met: the issuing of the EIO is necessary 
and proportionate for the purpose of the proceedings referred to in Article 4; and the 
investigative measure(s) mentioned in EIO could have been ordered under the same 
conditions in a similar national case.308 A such way of trying to ensure the 
proportionate use of a cooperation instrument still holds little guarantees for the 
receiving member states. Ultimately it is nothing more than a reminder for the 
issuing authority to carefully consider the necessity and proportionality for the 
use of the EU instrument. There is no common EU position on what should be 
considered proportionate and what can be subject to a proportionality debate. 
Alternatively, the proportionality concern could be tackled through working 
with so-called built-in proportionality solutions. A such built-in strategy could 
effectively build the proportionality limits into the instrument. To that end, it 
could stipulate that the use of the instrument is in any event proportionate in 
relation to a selection of jointly identified parts of offences as indicated using 
                                                             
306 See: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European 
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, COM(2011) 175 final of 
11.4.2011. The Commission clarifies that judicial authorities should use the EAW system only 
when a surrender request is proportionate in all the circumstances of the case and should apply 
a proportionality test in a uniform way across Member States. Member States must take positive 
steps to ensure that practitioners use the amended handbook (in conjunction with their 
respective statutory provisions, if any) as the guideline for the manner in which a 
proportionality test should be applied. 
307 Art. 2.1 Framework decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States. OJ L 190 of 18.07.2002. 
308 Art 5a Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of 
Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Kingdom of Sweden for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding 






EULOCS as a reference tool. For any other offence proportionality may be 
subject to debate and proportionality inspired refusal grounds may be 
introduced. To test the feasibility of working with such built-in proportionality 
limits, question 2.1.2 of the questionnaire aimed at gaining insight into the extent 
member states would consider it feasible to limit the scope of the instrument 
along the proportionality requirement. Amongst the possibilities presented to 
the member states were offence-based proportionality limits, meaning that the 
severity of some jointly identified parts of offences proportionality is automatically 
accepted and for other offences proportionality can be subject to debate. The 
replies show that in addition to a requirement for the issuing authority to 
carefully consider the proportionality of each case for which cooperation is 
sought, built-in proportionality with respect to the offences is supported by over 
80% of the member states. To that end EULOCS would proof useful, as its 
classification and coding system would facilitate a detailed indication of the 
offence categories to which the use of the instrument is uncontested or for which 
proportionality cannot be raised as an issue limiting cooperation. 
As the flipside of the coin however, practical implementation of this policy 
option would mean that the stringent use of the instrument is limited based on a 
selection of offences as included in EULOCS beyond which proportionality 
based refusal grounds are acceptable. Vice versa, this means that proportionality 
based refusal grounds are not acceptable in relation to the selected offences. In 
the course of a proportionality debate, the executing member state could bring 
capacity concerns to the table. 
3.2 Recognising capacity concerns 
The second concern relates to capacity issues. It must be mentioned that 
some concerns have not found their way into a refusal ground (yet). Though 
undeniably important in the consideration to either or not afford cooperation, 
financial nor operational capacity are listed as a refusal ground. Nevertheless, as 
argued elsewhere,309 the transition from a request-based into an order-based 
cooperation scene may have very substantial implications on the member states’ 
financial and operational capacity. Whereas before member states had some 
flexibility in dealing with cooperation requests, the transition to an order-based 
cooperation scene entails that member states are to execute the order in the way 
it was formulated by the issuing authority. 
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movement of evidence? (Vol. 37, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 





Therefore, in addition to the future position of refusal grounds in 
international cooperation in criminal matters and the possible added value 
EULOCS can have, it was deemed necessarily to look into the willingness of 
member states to accept semi-mandatory execution of the foreign orders taking 
into account their potential financial and operational capacity impact.  
Two policy options have been developed in this respect. The first relates to 
the acceptability to introduce more capacity-based refusal grounds, or at least a 
capacity-based acceptability to suggest less costly alternatives. The second 
relates to the introduction of the new aut exequi, aut tolerare principle, which 
would entail that a capacity issue results in the execution by the issuing member 
state. 
First, it can be considered to introduce capacity as a refusal ground in 
instruments governing international cooperation in criminal matters. As a result, 
member states would be allowed to refuse cooperation if there would be a 
disproportionate capacity burden when brought in relation to the severity of the 
offence. However, because it is important not to jeopardise cooperation, 
especially with respect to those offences that have been attributed significant 
importance through being subject to approximation, the possibility to call upon 
capacity as a refusal ground should not be unlimited. Mirroring the 
argumentation developed above, the introduction of new capacity based refusal 
grounds should also take that consideration into account.  
Second, the possibility to introduce a principle such as aut exequi, aut tolerare 
to shift the capacity burden to the issuing member state, can also be brought in 
relation to EULOCS as a way to limit the applicability thereof. 
The aut exequi, aut tolerare principle is a new principle that mirrors the aut 
dedere, aut exequi principle found in extradition or surrender instruments. In 
extradition or surrender instruments, the unwillingness or inability of a member 
state to extradite or surrender a person as an obstacle for execution is overcome 
by the introduction of the aut dedere aut exequi principle. This principle 
introduces the obligation for the member state involved to execute the decision 
itself, if it is unwilling or unable to extradite or surrender the person involved.310 
A parallel aut exequi, aut tolerare principle would mean that the executing 
member state is to execute the order of the issuing member state or alternatively 
                                                             
310 See more elaborately: BASSIOUNI, M.C., and WISE, E.M. (1995), Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The 
Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
VAN STEENBERGHE, R. (2011). The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute: Clarifying its Nature. 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9(5), 1089. An example thereof can be found in Art. 6.2 
CoE Extradition which stipulates that [i]f the requested Party does not extradite its national, it shall 
at the request of the requesting Party submit the case to its competent authorities in order that 






tolerate the competent authorities of the issuing member state to conduct the 
order themselves on the other member state’s territory. Though this technique of 
accepting the presence of competent authorities of another member states is not 
as revolutionary as it may seem for it can be found in existing cooperation 
instruments,311 it can be expected that member states are reluctant to further 
introduce this principle in other cooperation instruments. Here too, it can be 
considered to limit the scope of the aut exequi aut tolerare principle to the jointly 
identified parts of offences, as included in EULOCS. 
 
4 EULOCS & admissibility of evidence 
The third context in which EULOCS might be necessary at least has an added 
value comprises the concerns related to the admissibility of evidence. 
As argued elsewhere, it is important to note that the gathering of evidence is 
subject to two completely different regimes.312 On the one hand, there is the 
mutual legal assistance regime represented by the 2000 EU Mutual Legal 
Assistance Convention313 and its protocol314, and on the other hand, there is the 
mutual recognition regime represented by the 2008 European Evidence 
Warrant.315 Underneath this heading, it will be clarified why it is felt that 
admissibility of evidence is insufficiently dealt with in both of those regimes. 
Thereafter, the feasibility of an alternative will be elaborated on.  
                                                             
311 An example thereof can be found in the setting up of joint investigation teams. Art 13.6 EU 
MLA stipulates that [s]econded members of the joint investigation team may, in accordance with the 
law of the member state where the team operates, be entrusted by the leader of the team with the task of 
taking certain investigative measures where this has been approved by the competent authorities of the 
member state of operation and the seconding member state. Similarly Art 23.1 Naples II stipulates 
with respect to covert operations that, [a]t the request of the applicant authority, the requested 
authority may authorize officers of the customs administration of the requesting member state or officers 
acting on behalf of such administration operating under cover of a false identity (covert investigators) to 
operate on the territory of the requested member state. 
312 VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W., & VAN DAMME, Y. (2010). EU cross-border gathering and use 
of evidence in criminal matters. Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and free 
movement of evidence? (Vol. 37, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
313 Convention established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ L 197 of 12.7.2000 [hereafter: EU MLA Convention]. 
314 Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member 
States of the European Union established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the 
Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326 of 21.11.2001. 
315 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence 
warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects,  documents and data for use in proceedings in 
criminal matters, OJ L 350 of 30.12.2008 [hereafter: EEW]. 





4.1 Gaps in the current regimes 
First, with the specific intention to tackle admissibility concerns, the principle 
of forum regit actum was introduced in the 2000 EU MLA Convention. Art 4.1 
stipulates that [w]here mutual assistance is afforded, the requested member state shall 
comply with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the requesting 
Member State, unless otherwise provided in this Convention and provided that such 
formalities and procedures are not contrary to the fundamental principles of law in the 
requested member state. An obligation is placed on the requested member state to 
comply with the requested formalities and procedures. The only exception 
allowed consists of an incompatibility with the fundamental principles of its law. 
The law of the member state that houses the forum (i.e. court) that will rule on the 
case has the power to decide on the applicable formalities and procedures. 
Therefore, Art. 4.1. is also referred to as the clause introducing the forum regit 
actum principle, abbreviated to FRA principle. 
In spite of the good intentions surrounding the introduction of that principle, 
from the very beginning the principle was criticised highlighting its inherent 
flaws and weaknesses. Firstly, the FRA principle only has the potential to tackle 
admissibility concerns with respect to evidence that will be gathered upon an 
explicit request. It cannot accommodate the admissibility concerns related to 
evidence that was already gathered by the requested member state. No solution 
was found to tackle admissibility issues in relation to existing evidence. 
Secondly, the FRA principle lacks ambition in that it only deals with the one on 
one situation between the requesting and requested member state involved. This 
means that evidence gathered by a requested member state in accordance with 
the formalities and procedures explicitly mentioned by the requesting member 
state by no means guarantees that the evidence will be admissible in any of the 
other member states. In a Union where prosecution can be transferred from one 
member state to another, it would make sense to strive for a balance between all 
possible instruments involved, ensure their compatibility and complementarity 
and use this opportunity to introduce an evidence gathering technique that 
ensures admissibility of the evidence regardless of the member state that will 
ultimately host the procedure. What is even more, thirdly, admissibility of the 
evidence is not even guaranteed in the requesting member state. The way the 
FRA principle is formulated, the requesting member state is by no means 
obliged to accept the admissibility of the evidence even if it was gathered in full 
compliance with the formalities and procedures it requested. It is most 
unfortunate that the FRA principle is non-committal and does not result in a per 
se admissibility obligation for the requesting member state. Taking account of 
these weaknesses of the FRA principle, it is regrettable that it is copied into the 






comply with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the issuing authority 
unless otherwise provided in this Directive and provided that such formalities and 
procedures are not contrary to the fundamental principles of law of the executing 
State.316 
Second, also in a mutual recognition context, the concerns related to the 
admissibility of evidence received too little attention, even though it was 
prioritised in several policy documents. Already in the Tampere conclusions it is 
stipulated that the principle of mutual recognition should apply to pre-trial orders, in 
particular to those which would enable competent authorities to quickly secure evidence 
and to seize assets which are easily movable, and that evidence lawfully gathered by one 
member state’s authorities should be admissible before the courts of other member states, 
taking into account the standards that apply there.317 The subsequent programme of 
measures adopted to implement the mutual recognition principle, states that the 
aim, in relation to orders for the purpose of obtaining evidence, is to ensure that the 
evidence is admissible, to prevent its disappearance and to facilitate the enforcement of 
search and seizure orders, so that evidence can be quickly secured in a criminal case.318 In 
spite of the admissibility concerns raised, the EEW remains largely silent on this 
topic. In its 14th preamble it is stipulated that it should be possible for the issuing 
authority to ask the executing authority to follow specified formalities and procedures in 
respect of legal or administrative processes which might assist in making the evidence 
sought admissible in the issuing state, for example the official stamping of a document, 
the presence of a representative from the issuing state, or the recording of times and dates 
to create a chain of evidence. It is obvious though that a stamp will not be able to 
accommodate admissibility restraints that are linked to the way the evidence 
was gathered, the way the investigative measure was carried out.  Considering 
that the EEW relates to existing evidence it is too late for the issuing member 
state to request that certain formalities and procedures are taken into account 
during the evidence gathering. FRA cannot solve the reported problems. 
                                                             
316 Art. 8.2, Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of 
Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Kingdom of Sweden for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding 
the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, doc 18918/11 of 21.12.2011. 
317 §36 Tampere European Council (15-16 October 1999). Conclusions of the Presidency. SN 
200/1/99 REV 1. 
318 Heading 2.1.1. Programme of Measures of 30 November 2000 to implement the principle of 
mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters. OJ C 12 of 15.1.2001. 





4.2 Minimum standards as an alternative  
As an alternative to the FRA principle the way it is found in the mutual legal 
assistance as well as the mutual recognition instruments, is has been argued 
elsewhere that it could be considered to introduce minimum standards with 
respect to the gathering of evidence in the EU.319 Whenever evidence is gathered 
in compliance to those minimum standards, the evidence would be per se 
admissible.320 The practical implementation of this policy option requires that 
minimum standards are developed with respect to each investigative measure. 
Though this may seem a daunting task, it should be noted that the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights can be used as a starting point. In the past, 
the court has already clarified which procedures should be taken into account in 
relation to a number of investigative measures.321 In Van Rossem the ECHR 
elaborated on the standards that should be taken into account during a house 
search.322 In Huvig & Kruslin323 for example the court dealt with the interception 
of telecommunications. In Doorson, Visser and Solakov324 for example the court 
dealt with the testimony of anonymous witnesses.325 
                                                             
319 VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W., & VAN DAMME, Y. (2010). EU cross-border gathering and use 
of evidence in criminal matters. Towards mutual recognition of investigative measures and free 
movement of evidence? (Vol. 37, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
320 It should be noted that the national rules governing the admissibility of evidence vary 
significantly. Besides the way in which evidence was gathered, there can be various other 
elements that influence the admissibility of evidence. The introduction of minimum standards 
is only intended to tackle admissibility concerns that are related to the manner in which 
evidence was gathered. 
321 See also: DE BONDT, W., & VERMEULEN, G. (2010). The Procedural Rights Debate. A Bridge 
Too Far or Still Not Far Enough? . EUCRIM(3), 163; VAN PUYENBROECK, L., & VERMEULEN, G. 
(2010). Approximation and mutual recognition of procedural safeguards of suspects and 
defendants in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union. In M. COOLS, B. DE 
RUYVER, M. EASTON, L. PAUWELS, P. PONSAERS, G. VANDE WALLE, et al. (Eds.), EU and 
International Crime Control (Vol. 4, pp. 41-62). Antwerpen-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
VERMEULEN, G. (2011). Free gathering and movement of evidence in criminal matters in the EU. 
Thinking beyond borders, striving for balance, in search of coherence. Antwerp-Apeldoorn-
Portland: Maklu. 
322 ECtHR, case 41872/89 Van Rossem v. Belgium, 9 December 2004 
323 ECtHR, case 11105/84 Huvig v. France, 24 April 1990 and ECtHR, case 11801/85 Kruslin v. 
France, 24 April 1990 
324 ECtHR, case 20524/92 Doorson v. The Netherlands, 26 March 1996, ECtHR, case 26668/95, 
Visser v. The Netherlands, 14 February 2002, ECtHR, case 47023/99 Solakov v. FYROM, 31 
October 2001 
325 Complexities related to anonymous witnesses was already subject to an in-depth study in the 
past: VERMEULEN, G. (2005). EU standards in witness protection and collaboration with justice 






The introduction of such a set of minimum standards has the potential to 
significantly impact on evidence gathering in the EU.  
Firstly, with respect to evidence gathered upon request, it should not be a big 
problem to convince member states of the added value of executing the mutual 
legal assistance requests in a way that ensures that the evidence is gathered in 
compliance with the minimum standards adopted at EU level. Not only did the 
member states introduce an explicit legal basis in the new treaty text, the 
empirical evidence gathered in the context of this study also revealed that 
member states are willing to use that legal basis and adopt corresponding legal 
instruments. Should member states be unwilling to put in an extra effort and 
introduce the obligation to comply with the minimum standards in relation to 
just any offence, it can be considered to introduce the obligation to gather 
evidence according to the minimum standards for cases that relate to offences 
that have been subject to approximation and introduced under the heading of 
jointly identified parts of the offence in EULOCS. At least for the offences that 
have been subject to approximation and for which it may be expected that 
member states consider it important to strengthen the fight against those 
offences by ensuring that evidence gathered in a way that ensures the per se 
admissibility thereof, the introduction of binding minimum standards should be 
considered. 
Secondly, with respect to evidence that is gathered in a mere national 
context, problems may arise with respect to the interpretation of the legal basis 
for EU intervention. Art. 82.2 TFEU only introduces the competence to adopt 
minimum standards to ensure the admissibility of evidence to the extent that is 
necessary to support cooperation and thus relates to cross-border situations. A 
strict reading of that legal basis does not allow it to be used to introduce 
minimum standards that should be followed with respect to evidence gathering 
in a mere domestic situation. However, the adoption of instruments 
implementing the Roadmap on Procedural Safeguards has illustrated that a 
questionable legal basis does not have to be problematic as long as member 
states are willing to go ahead with the adoption of EU instruments.326 Here too, it 
can be considered to introduce the obligation to gather evidence in accordance 
with the minimum standards agreed to at EU level, either or not with respect to 
a selection of jointly identified parts of offences as included in EULOCS.  
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5 EULOCS & information exchange between 
member states  
The fourth context in which EULOCS might be necessary at least has an 
added value comprises the mechanisms governing the exchange of information 
between the member states; not only criminal records information, but also the 
exchange of conviction information with a view to seeking the execution thereof. 
5.1 Notifying the conviction of an EU foreign national 
Recently, the legal framework governing the criminal records exchange has 
been subject to a make-over. Whereas originally the exchange of criminal records 
information was regulated by Art. 13 and 22 ECMA327, as of April 2012, the 
exchange of criminal records is governed by two new EU instruments, being the 
framework decision on the organisation and content of criminal records328 and 
the complementing decision on the development of ECRIS329, short for the 
European Criminal Records Information System. As clarified in the sixth 
preamble it is argued that such a system should be capable of communicating 
information on convictions in a form which is easily understandable. The decentralised 
computerised system uses a coded offence template similar to EULOCS to 
classify the criminal records information based on the underlying offence. 
Specifically that aim of creating a coding system that ensures that exchanged 
criminal records information can be understood easily is criticized when 
compared to the added value EULOCS could have to achieve that particular 
goal. The table inserted below compares the two coding systems with respect to 
a money laundering conviction.  
                                                             
327 Art. 13 ECMA stipulates that [a] requested Party shall communicate extracts from and information 
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329 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework 






Immediately it becomes clear that EULOCS is far more detailed and offers 
the possibility to choose one out of at least six different codes. The ECRIS coding 
system only includes one single code for money laundering convictions. 
 
Coding system with respect to a money laundering conviction 
ECRIS 1504 MONEY LAUNDERING 
EULOCS 
0906 00 MONEY LAUNDERING 
0906 01 Offences jointly identified as Money Laundering 
0906 01 01 The conversion or transfer of property 
0906 01 02 
The illicit concealment or disguise of property related 
information 
0906 01 03 
The illicit acquisition, possession or use of laundered 
property 
0906 02 Other forms of Money Laundering 
 
The importance of the detailed coding system becomes clear when linking it 
to the objective of information exchange. Criminal records information is not 
exchanged merely for the sake of notifying another member state of having 
convicted one of its nations or notifying another member state of the criminal 
records that is compiled with respect to one of the former’s nationals. 
Information is exchanged for it to be used in a later stage, at a time when 
mechanisms are applied for which the applicable rules are dependent on the 
existence and specific nature of prior convictions.330 Even though the storage of 
criminal records in the databases in itself are not dependent on detailed 
information with respect to the underlying offence, it must be recommended 
that already when exchanging and storing criminal records information the later 
use of that information is anticipated to. The architecture recommended in the 
chapter on double criminality in international cooperation will be retaken and 
brought in relation to both ECRIS and EULOCS to point to the weaknesses of 
ECRIS and highlight the strengths of EULOCS. 
It was argued that inclusion of criminal records into a criminal records 
database should be done preserving as much detail as possible with respect to 
the underlying offence to allow future double criminality testing where relevant. 
                                                             
330 Depending on the formulation of national recidivism provisions, the taking account of prior 
convictions in the course of a new criminal procedure can either or not be dependent on a 
double criminality requirement. Double criminality verification of prior convictions can slow 
down the sentencing phase. Convictions for which it is known that the underlying behaviour 
has been subject to approximation can immediately be set aside as convictions that can be taken 
into account without further ado. 





The scheme developed in the chapter on double criminality and inserted again 








Architecture Nat. DC: Yes Nat. DC: No 
EU DC: Yes Type 1  
EU DC: No Type 2 Type 3 
 
 
EU DC: known EU level double criminality | Nat. DC: national double criminality test 
 
 
To ensure the feasibility to use foreign criminal records information in a later 
stage without having to request additional information, it is required that the 
notification of each foreign conviction is complemented with information that is 
sufficiently detailed to be able to distinguish between convictions for which the 
underlying behaviour is known to be criminalised in all EU member states and 
convictions for which the underlying behaviour should be subjected to a double 
criminality test where relevant.  If the EU level double criminality requirement is 
met (i.e. EU DC: Yes), then the conviction can be included as a type 1 conviction 
in the criminal records database in the member state of the person’s nationality. 
If the EU level double criminality requirement is fulfilled, than national double 
criminality is also known to be fulfilled. Only for convictions for which the 
convicting member state is not sure that the underlying behaviour would 
constitute an offence in all 27 member states (i.e. EU DC: No), a double 
criminality verification would need to be conducted by the authorities in the 
member state of the person’s nationality to allow a distinction between type 2 
convictions (i.e. foreign convictions that pass the national double criminality test 
– Nat. DC: Yes) and type 3 convictions (i.e. foreign convictions that do not pass 
the national double criminality test – Nat. DC: No).  
The currently existing coded classification system developed to support 
criminal records exchange is not sufficiently detailed to make that distinction. 
The ECRIS classification system is detached from the approximation acquis and 
its developers failed to see the added value of working with that acquis. As a 
result, the exchange of criminal records information with respect to a money 


















allow to the receiving member state to decide whether or not that conviction 
should be labelled as a conviction that meets the double criminality requirement 
and should be taken into account as such in any future proceeding or whether 
the conviction might not meet the double criminality requirement, which can be 
decisive for its future use.  
The coded EULOCS is far more detailed. Using EULOCS as a reference index 
when exchanging criminal records information, the money laundering 
conviction will either be complemented with a 0906 01 code indicating that the 
behaviour relates to jointly identified parts of money laundering or alternatively 
with a 0906 02 code indicating that the behaviour relates to other forms of money 
laundering. Such a simple increase in the level of detail in the coding system can 
have a significant facilitating impact on the later use of the said money 
laundering conviction.  
It was also argued that in parallel thereto, national convictions should 
equally be entered into the national criminal records database, distinguishing 
between type 1 convictions (i.e. national convictions for which the underlying 
behaviour is known to be criminalised in all 27 member states – EU DC: Yes) and 
type 2 convictions (i.e. national convictions for which it is not sure that the 
underlying behaviour is criminalised in all 27 member states – EU DC: No). A 
similar argumentation with respect to the added value of the use of EULOCS 
applies. 
5.2 Seeking cross-border execution of a sentence 
Besides notifying another member state of having convicted one of its 
nationals, a member state can also contact its counterparts in another member 
state seeking the execution of the conviction involved. The extent to which cross-
border execution of sentences are subject to double criminality has been 
elaborated on in the chapter on double criminality in international cooperation. 
Linked thereto, the fact that EULOCS can facilitate double criminality 
verification has been dealt with above. What remains is the link between 
EULOCS and the provisions that govern the adaptation of the sentences in case 
there is an inconsistency with the law of the executing member state. 
The mutual recognition instruments governing the cross-border execution of 
sentences hold a provision that regulates the fate of a sentence that is 
incompatible either in nature or duration with the national law of the executing 
member state. 
- Art. 8.1 FD Fin Pen stipulates that [...] the executing state may decide to reduce 
the amount of the penalty enforced to the maximum amount provided for acts of the 





same kind under the national law of the executing state, when the acts fall within the 
jurisdiction of that state; 
- Art. 8.2 and 3 FD Deprivation of liberty stipulate that [w]here the sentence is 
incompatible with the law of the executing state in terms of its duration, the 
competent authority of the executing state may decide to adapt the sentence only 
where that sentence exceeds the maximum penalty provided for similar offences 
under its national law and [w]here the sentence is incompatible with the law of the 
executing state in terms of its nature, the competent authority of the executing state 
may adapt it to the punishment or measure provided for under its own law for 
similar offences; 
- Art. 13.1 FD Supervision stipulates that [i]f the nature of the supervision 
measures is incompatible with the law of the executing state, the competent authority 
in that member state may adapt them in line with the types of supervision measures 
which apply, under the law of the executing state, to equivalent offences; and 
- Art 9.1 FD Alternatives stipulates that [i]f the nature or duration of the relevant 
probation measure or alternative sanction, or the duration of the probation period, 
are incompatible with the law of the executing state, the competent authority of that 
state may adapt them in line with the nature and duration of the probation measures 
and alternative sanctions, or duration of the probation period, which apply, under the 
law of the executing state, to equivalent offences. 
 
 
Assessing whether or not the sentence is compatible in terms of its duration 
and nature with the sentence that would have been imposed in the executing 
member state, presupposes that sufficiently detailed information is available on 
the offence underlying the conviction to be able to determine what the nationally 
imposed sentence would be. Where a custodial sentence for a period of 10 years 
was imposed for a money laundering offence, a simple reference to code 1504 as 
included in ECRIS might not be sufficient to conduct a compatibility test with 
respect to the duration of the sentence. Even a EULOCS code 0906 01 may not be 
sufficient. It is very much possible that different sanction levels are foreseen 
dependent on the type of money laundering offence involved. A specification of 
the underlying behaviour using the more detailed EULOCS coding system can 
provide the level of detail necessary to conduct this compatibility test. Similarly, 
if a person is placed under electronic surveillance for that money laundering 
offence, and the executing member state has not introduced electronic 
surveillance as a sanction measure in its national criminal justice system, it will 
be important that the information on the underlying offence is as detailed as 






line with the nature and duration of the sanction that would have applied under 
the law of the executing member state to equivalent offences.331 
Finally, the automatic lex mitior principle suggested in a previous study, 
should be recalled.332 In their current formulation, the adaptation provisions 
provide the executing member state with the possibility to adapt the nature or 
duration of the sentences in case of incompatibility with the sentence provided 
for in their national legal system. It was argued that it would increase 
consistency in EU policy making if it was considered to reshape adaptation to 
not be a possibility left to the discretion of the member state, but a mandatory 
conversion based on the lex mitior principle. If the issuing member state seeks 
cross-border execution of the sentence it has imposed, the issuing member state 
should accept the consequences thereof, especially if execution is transferred to a 
member state with a more lenient criminal justice system. The person involved 
could be granted the right to benefit from the lex mitior (i.e. the mildest regime). 
Moreover, during the focus group meetings, practitioners have raised concerns 
with respect to the motivation required when either or not adapting a foreign 
sentence. Furthermore, debates on the appropriateness of either or not adapting 
a foreign sentence can be very time consuming. To accommodate those concerns, 
an automatic lex mitior principle could be introduced. Automatic, in the sense 
that no do or don’t discussion is necessary, but also in the sense that member 
states could work towards introducing a system that limits the intervention of a 
judge to those situations where it is absolutely necessary. It light thereof, 
complementing the execution request with a detailed EULOCS code creates the 
possibility for the member states to introduce an automatic conversion system 
that is capable of identifying the (maximum) sentence that could be imposed 
nationally. 
 
                                                             
331 The current EU level policy has not sufficiently dealt with the adaptation of sanctions, 
because no EU level common understanding exists on the severity ranking of the different 
sanctions that can be imposed and the effect of a change in the nature or the duration of the 
sanction. In light thereof, it is somewhat reassuring that the European Commission has 
launched a call for tender on the future policy with respect to the diversity in sanction 
mechanisms in the member states. This gap in the current EU policy was highlighted in the 
project proposal drafted in reply to the call. 
332 See more elaborately, particularly in the context of the cross-border executions of sentences 
involving deprivation of liberty : VERMEULEN, G., VAN KALMTHOUT, A., PATERSON, N., KNAPEN, 
M., VERBEKE, P., & DE BONDT, W. (2011). Cross-border execution of judgements involving 
deprivation of liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical problems through flanking 
measures (Vol. 40, IRCP-series). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 





6 EULOCS & EU level actors 
Finally, EULOCS is brought in relation to the EU level actors to demonstrate 
its added value in that context. Eurojust and Europol are singled out as the EU 
level actors that will be reviewed.333 The link between approximation and the 
mandates of the EU level actors has been made before,334 but the further 
development thereof rarely critically evaluated. First, the added value of 
EULOCS will be reviewed with respect to the delineation of the mandated 
offences. Second, the added value of EULOCS will be reviewed with respect to 
the possible introduction of so-called stronger powers. To that end, the possible 
intervention of Eurojust in finding the best place for prosecution and the award 
of the status of ‘collaborator with justice’ have been singled out to serve as 
examples335 thereof.  
6.1 Delineating mandated offences 
The mandated offences of Eurojust and Europol are closely intertwined due 
to the fact that the Eurojust Decision initially referred to the Europol Convention 
and now refers to the Europol Decision when introducing which offences the 
general competence is comprised of. As the first out of three criteria to delineate 
the scope of the mandated offences Art. 4.1(a) of the original 2002 Eurojust 
Decision336 stipulated that the general competence of Eurojust shall cover the 
types of crime and the offences in respect of which Europol is at all times competent to 
act pursuant to Article 2 of the Europol Convention of 26 July 1995. Art. 4.1(b) added 
a set of additional offences and (c) provided that offences committed together 
with the abovementioned offences are also included. The need to complement 
the Europol offences with a set of additional offences was no longer felt when 
revisiting the Eurojust Decision as a result of which Art. 4 of the consolidated 
new Eurojust Decision now refers to (a) the types of crime and the offences in respect 
of which Europol is at all times competent to act and (b) other offences committed 
together with the types of crime and the offences referred to in point (a).337 Therefore it 
                                                             
333 The argumentation applies mutatis mutandis to the mandate of any other actor such as 
Frontex for example. 
334 WEYEMBERGH, A. (2005). The functions of approximation of penal legislation within the 
European Union. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 12(2), 163.  
335 The argumentation applies mutatis mutandis to any other stronger power that is being 
considered to add to the competence of any of the EU level actors and for which member states 
wish to delineate the scope thereof in light of the offences involved. 
336 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ L 63 of 6.3.2002. 
337 Consolidated version of Council Decision on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending 






is important to first look into the Europol mandated offences before elaborating 
on the Eurojust mandated offences. 
The Europol mandate is composed of two components, being Art. 2 (now 
Art. 4) and the Annex thereto.338 Art. 2 of the original Europol Convention 
stipulated that the objective of Europol consists of preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime 
where there are factual indications that an organised criminal structure is involved 
[...].339 The second paragraph further elaborates on those other forms of serious 
international crime, stipulating that Europol shall initially focus on unlawful drug 
trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal migrant smuggling, 
trade in human beings and motor vehicle crime. Dealing with terrorism is postponed 
for a maximum of two years.340 Additionally, as of 1 January 2002 18 other 
serious forms of international crime clustered underneath three headings in the 
Annex to the Europol Convention formed an integral part of the Europol 
mandated offences.341 Some of those offences have received an independent 
Europol definition whereas others are left undefined. With respect to those 
undefined offences, the Annex clarifies that [t]he forms of crime referred to in 
Article 2 (now Article 4) and in this Annex shall be assessed by the competent 
authorities of the member states in accordance with the law of the member states to 
which they belong.342 
                                                                                                                                               
serious crime as amended by COUNCIL DECISION 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the 
strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view 
to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, Doc 5347/3/09 of 15.7.2009. 
338 For more detail on the development of the Europol mandate see e.g. DE BONDT, W., & 
VERMEULEN, G. (2010). Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence concepts to 
facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU. In M. COOLS (Ed.), Readings On Criminal 
Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 15-40). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu; DE 
MOOR, A. & VERMEULEN, G. (2010) Shaping the competence of Europol. An FBI Perspective. In 
M. COOLS (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 63-94). 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
339 Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention on the establishment of a European 
Police Office, OJ C 316 of 27.11.1995. 
340 See more elaborately on the inclusion of terrorism as a Europol mandated offence and the 
decision to introduce a two-year waiting period: VERBRUGGEN, F. (1995). Euro-cops? Just say 
maybe. European lessons from the 1993 reshuffle of US drug enforcement. European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 3, 150. DE MOOR, A. & VERMEULEN, G. (2010) 
Shaping the competence of Europol. An FBI Perspective. In M. COOLS (Ed.), Readings On 
Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 63-94). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: 
Maklu. 
341 Council Decision of 6 December 2001 extending Europol's mandate to deal with the serious 
forms of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention, OJ C 362 of 
18.12.2001. 
342 Council Decision  2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol), OJ L 121 of 15.5.2009. 





The open-ended nature of the Europol mandate has both advantages and 
disadvantages. First, the main advantage consists of the fact that member states 
are unrestricted in seeking Europol intervention. The door is open to contact 
Europol with respect to the said offences, whatever the definition thereof, as 
long as the requirements in terms of the number of member states involved are 
fulfilled. In spite of the disadvantages that will be dealt with in the following 
paragraph, this flexibility in the mandate of Europol should be maintained for 
the future. There is no need to clearly delineate the mandated offences and thus 
restrict the functioning of EU level actors in relation to all their tasks and 
competences. Second, the main disadvantages relate to the clarity with which 
the mandate is defined.343 Firstly, looking at the need felt when elaborating on 
the original Eurojust mandate to add a set of offences to the offences that fall 
within the Europol mandate, raises questions with respect to the clarity of the 
approach chosen in the then Europol Convention. As already mentioned above, 
Art. 4.1(b) of the original Eurojust Decision added computer crime, fraud and 
corruption and any criminal offence affecting the European Community's 
financial interests, the laundering of the proceeds of crime, environmental crime 
and participation in a criminal organisation to the list of offences that comprise 
the general Eurojust mandate. However, when comparing that list to the 
offences included in the then Art. 2 Europol Convention as complemented with 
the offences included in the Annex344, the need is unfounded. Computer crime, 
fraud, corruption and environmental crime are amongst the offences listed in the 
Annex. Laundering of proceeds of crime is listed in Art. 2.3. Participation in a 
criminal organisation as defined in the then joint action surely falls within the 
scope of organised crime which forms the basis of the Europol mandate. 
Secondly, the lack of definitions for the offences in the Europol mandate has 
been subject to extensive debate. When discussing the extension of the Europol 
mandate to also encompass the offences included in the Annex, the Swedish 
Presidency has expressed its intention to want to discuss whether definitions are 
needed for all forms of crime listed in the Annex.345 Not only the lack of definitions 
                                                             
343 Especially the shift to serious crime more in general gives way for increased concerns. 
Mitsilegas, V. (2009). The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law. Which Direction for EU Criminal 
Justice? European Law Review, 34(4), 523; De Moor, A., & Vermeulen, G. (2010). The Europol 
council decision : transforming Europol into an agency of the European union. Common Market 
Law Review, 47(4), 1089. 
344 The Europol competence was extended to encompass also the offences included in the Annex 
as of 1 January 2002: Council Decision of 6 December 2001 extending Europol's mandate to deal 
with the serious forms of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention, OJ 
C 362 of 18.12.2001. 
345 Point 3.1.b), Note from the Swedish Presidency on the possible amendments to the Europol 
Convention and the possible extensions of Europol’s competence, Doc 5555/01 of 22.1.2001; This 






should be criticized, also where definitions are introduced, this is done in 
complete isolation of the existing common offence definitions. From an offence 
policy perspective, the delineation of the Europol mandated offences should be 
criticised for not taking account of the existing EU definitions and developing a 
set of internal Europol definitions for its offences. A reference to the Europol 
definition for trafficking in human beings can serve as an example here. In the 
original 1995 Convention, traffic in human beings receives an autonomous 
Europol definition and is defined as the subjection of a person to the real and illegal 
sway of other persons using violence or menaces or by abuse of authority or intrigue 
with a view to the exploitation of prostitution, forms of sexual exploitation and assault of 
minors or trade in abandoned children. Without any reference to this Europol 
definition, a Joint Action is adopted in 1997 providing the EU definition for 
trafficking in human beings to support the fight against that crime, stipulating 
that trafficking should be understood as any behaviour which facilitates the entry 
into, transit through, residence in or exit from the territory of a member state, for the 
purpose of the sexual exploitation of either a child or an adult.346 In addition thereto, 
sexual exploitation is further elaborated on. In spite of the EU wide definition of 
trafficking in human being, developed specifically to support the fight against 
that crime type, the Europol definition of trafficking in human beings was 
adapted in 1999, without any reference to the joint action. The Europol definition 
of trafficking in human beings now includes the production, sale or distribution of 
child-pornography material.347 In doing so, the distinction between the Europol 
definition and the other EU definition is maintained, for slight differences in the 
definition still exists without them being clarified let alone justified. When the 
joint action was repealed and replaced with a framework decision in 2002, the 
opportunity was not seized to coordinate the existing definitions for trafficking 
in human beings. More recently, the transition to the Europol Decision has again 
not been seized as a coordinating opportunity.348 The definition in the Annex now 
defines trafficking in human beings as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
                                                                                                                                               
Europol is to give priority in accordance with Article 2(1) of the Decision, the Council will give a 
description of those areas. German Statement with respect to the Draft Council Decision extending 
Europol’s mandate to deal with the serious forms of international crime listed in the Annex to 
the Europol Convention, Doc 14196/01 of 4.12.2001. 
346 Joint Action of 24 February 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union concerning action to combat trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of children, OJ L 63 of 4.3.1997. 
347 Council Decision supplementing the definition of the form of crime "traffic in human beings" 
in the Annex to the Europol Convention, OJ C 26 of 30.1.1999. 
348 It will be clarified in the following paragraphs that coordination should not be read as 
copying. There is no need for the definitions to be exactly the same scope. 





of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, as a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or 
other forms of sexual exploitation, the production, sale or distribution of child-
pornography material, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs349, which does not fully correspond to the 
definition included in the 2002 framework decision.350  
A clear definition of the mandated offences is particularly important in light 
of the operational competences of EU level actors. Clearly defined (semi-) 
operational competences require clearly defined offence definitions. In light 
thereof, the approach used in the original 2002 Eurojust decision to delineate the 
scope of participation in a criminal organisation referring to the 1998 joint action 
should be applauded.351 At the same time though, it must be recalled that the 
inclusion of full references to approximation instruments in other EU 
instruments runs the risk of being outdated rather soon. However, no so much 
the fact that a different definition is used to delineate the scope of the Europol 
mandated offences is considered problematic, but the fact that it is detached from 
the approximation acquis, and it is therefore not transparent what the difference 
between both definitions is. It should be stressed that it is very much possible 
that the Europol mandated offence only reflects part of the approximation 
acquis. It would not be illogical to limit certain strong powers (infra) of EU level 
actors to only some forms of trafficking in human beings. From that perspective, 
the suggestion made by the European parliament that if the Council adopts 
framework decisions determining the constituent elements of individual criminal 
offences these shall replace the corresponding provisions of the Europol Convention and 
the Annexes thereto352 comes close but is not a good solution. Alternatively, 
whenever adopting an instrument in which constituent elements of offences are 
defined, a discussion should be held on the relation between those newly 
defined offences and the mandates of the EU level actors. For each 
                                                             
349 Council Decision  2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol), OJ L 121 of 15.5.2009. 
350 Framework decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings OJ L 203 of 
1.8.2002. 
351 It is unfortunate however that the Eurojust Decision fails to refer to the 1995 Convention on 
the Protection of the European Communities' Financial interests (OJ C 316 of 27.11.1995),  nor to 
the 1997 Convention on the fight against corruption involving Community Officials (OJ C 195 of 
25.6.1997). Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the reference was not updated when the 1998 
joint action was repealed by the 2008 FD on organised crime (OJ L 300 of 11.11.2008). 
352 European Parliament legislative resolution on the initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium and 
the Kingdom of Sweden with a view to adopting a Council decision extending Europol's 
mandate to deal with the serious forms of international crime listed in the Annex to the Europol 






approximation instrument, it should be clarified what the relation thereof is with 
the mandates of the EU level actors.  
In sum, the practical implementation of that approach results in a system that 
delineates the mandated offences using a double approach. For the purpose of 
allowing the member states to seek the intervention of the EU level actor, the 
offence labels are left undefined at EU level and shall be assessed by the competent 
authorities of the member states in accordance with the law of the member states to 
which they belong, as currently stipulated in the Europol Annex. Additionally, 
when it comes to delineating the scope of (especially) the strong powers of the EU 
level actors, the offences will be delineated referring to the coded EU level 
offence classification system, which will be used to indicate for which offence 
categories member states have accepted a strong power. To make this latter 
recommendation more tangible, two possible strong powers for which it can be 
considered to add them to the Eurojust competences, are briefly elaborated on in 
the following paragraphs. 
6.2 Finding the best place for prosecution 
The first example of a stronger power that can be granted to Eurojust relates to 
the decision on the best place for prosecution. Especially when dealing with 
cross-border crime, it is not uncommon that more than one member state has the 
jurisdiction to deal with the case. Even more, the jurisdiction clauses in the 
approximation instruments require that member states legislate in a way that 
establishes its jurisdiction to deal with the approximated offences, not only 
where (a) the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory, but also (b) the 
offence is committed on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft registered there, (c) 
the offender is one of its nationals or residents, (d) the offence is committed for the benefit 
of a legal person established in its territory or (e) the offence is committed against the 
institutions or people of the member state in question or against an institution of the 
European Union or a body set up in accordance with the Treaty establishing the 
European Community or the Treaty on European Union and based in that member 
state.353 By making extraterritorial jurisdiction mandatory, the EU creates positive 
jurisdiction conflicts. In light thereof, it is not illogical for the EU to also 
introduce a system to settle those jurisdiction conflicts.  
With its 2003 annual report, it became clear that Eurojust was developing 
into a centre of excellence when it comes to the settlement of jurisdiction 
conflicts. The Annex holds [g]uidelines for deciding “which jurisdiction should 
                                                             
353 This formulation was copied from Art. 9 Framework decision of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism OJ L 164 of 22.06.2002. Similar provisions can be found in other approximation 
instruments. 





prosecute”. A set of criteria is elaborated on that can be used to decide which of 
the competent jurisdictions should get preference, reflecting the conclusions of a 
seminar organised to discuss and debate the question of which jurisdiction 
should prosecute in those cross border cases where there is a possibility of a 
prosecution being launched in two or more different jurisdictions.354 
Taking account of the prominent role Eurojust already plays advising 
member states how to settle a jurisdiction conflict and taking account of the 
explicit introduction of the possibility to extend the Eurojust mandate with the 
strengthening of judicial cooperation, including by resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction 
in Art. 85.1(c) TFEU, the momentum could be seized to extend the Eurojust 
mandate accordingly. It could be considered to introduce an obligation for 
member states to present a jurisdiction conflict to Eurojust for a binding 
settlement thereof. However, considering that it would not be wise to flood 
Eurojust with settlement cases and considering that member states would not 
accept such a binding settlement for any offence, not even all offences in the 
general Eurojust mandate, it is important to clearly delineate the offences for 
which this competence is introduce. Different than the technique used in Art. 
13.6 of the revised Eurojust Decision to delineate the offences to which the strict 
rules governing the exchange of information apply, the scope of the offences 
could be clearly delineated using the EULOCS categories as a reference. As 
clarified above when criticising the introduction of an independent Europol 
definition for trafficking in human beings, it is very much possible that this 
competence to settle jurisdiction conflicts is introduced not for any form of 
trafficking in human beings, not even for the approximation acquis for 
trafficking in human beings, but only with respect to a selection of jointly 
identified parts thereof.  
6.3 Awarding the status of collaborator with justice 
The second example of a stronger power that can be granted to Eurojust relates 
to the award of the status of collaborator with justice. As elaborated in the 
chapter on double criminality, a person granted the status of collaborator with 
justice enjoys the benefit of immunity from prosecution. It is important to note 
that not all member states have a legal framework for this status, and where the 
status exists, it is most commonly used for persons prosecuted for participation 
in a criminal organisation and who have decided to collaborate with justice with 
a view to being immune for prosecution for their crimes. It was argued that 
mutual recognition of the status of collaborator with justice is essential for its 
                                                             
354 See also the recommendations formulated in VANDER BEKEN, T., VERMEULEN, G., 
STEVERLYNCK, S., & THOMAES, S. (2002). Finding the best place for prosecution (Vol. 12, IRCP-






success. The status of collaborator with justice and the immunity from 
prosecution that comes along with it, loses a lot (if not all) of its persuasive 
strength if it is not recognised throughout the EU. In other words, if the status of 
a collaborator with justice is not mutually recognised by all member states, the 
value thereof is significantly eroded. Per se recognition of the immunity from 
prosecution is the only way to guarantee the success of awarding a person the 
status of collaborator with justice. 
The outcome of the focus group meetings in the member states have clarified 
that member states are not unconditionally willing to accept such a per se 
recognition of the immunity from prosecution. Member states have indicated 
that immunity from prosecution should only be granted in exceptional cases in 
which it is clear that the help of the person involved is crucial for the 
investigation and prosecution of the facts and the severity of the offences 
involved justify the granted immunity. It is clear that member states are not 
willing to accept this status with respect to minor offences. The categorisation of 
offences in EULOCS can prove to be a welcome tool used to identify for which of 
the jointly identified parts of offences, member states are willing to accept 
immunity from prosecution. Furthermore, the member states have indicated that 
the award of the status of collaborator should be further restricted. In light 
thereof, it can be recommended to appoint Eurojust as the independent body 
deciding on the appropriateness of the award of such a status. The possibility 
could be considered to introduce a mandatory consultation of Eurojust in the 
sense that it could advise member states prior to granting the status of 
collaborator with justice and the immunity from prosecution linked thereto. In 
this scenario, mutual recognition could be limited to cases that received a 
positive Eurojust advice. Perceived from a Eurojust mandate perspective, this 
would mean that Eurojust is given the competence to decide on the 
appropriateness of the award of the status of collaborator with justice and the 
immunity from prosecution that comes along with it, with respect to a selection 
of jointly identified parts of offences as indicated in EULOCS. 
 






Member states are struggling with the offence diversity between the national 
criminal codes when they are engaging in international cooperation in criminal 
matters. Part of that struggle can easily be avoided if the knowledge on the 
approximation acquis is used to its full potential.  
EULOCS proves to be a useful tool at least to identify the offences: 
− for which cooperation can be speed up by lifting redundant double 
criminality verification because double criminality is known to be met based 
on the approximation acquis and allowing a double criminality based refusal 
would be inconsistent from an approximation perspective; 
− for which cooperation could be stepped up if the request to deploy a specific 
investigative measure would be considered per se proportionate (vice versa, it 
also provides insight into the offences in relation to which a cooperation 
request can be subject to a proportionality discussion); 
− for which it could be considered to prohibit capacity issues from being raised 
and/or for which an aut exequi, aut tolerare principle could be introduced; 
− for which the rules governing admissibility of evidence gathered abroad (be 
it or not following a cross-border request) should be drawn up; 
− for which criminal records information exchange could be reorganised to 
ensure inclusion of sufficiently detailed information with a view to 
facilitating later use of the criminal records information; 
− for which the identification of the equivalent sentence could be automated to 
support the application of the adaptation provisions prior to the start of the 
execution of a foreign sentence; and 
− that form the basis for the delineation of the mandated offences of the EU 
level actors and thus clarify the scope of some of their tasks and 
competences. 
Consistent EU policy making supports cooperation between member states 
where it can, especially when such support also helps safeguard the 






8 Annex: EULOCS 
This annex includes the original version of EULOCS as published in Vermeulen, G., 
& De Bondt, W. (2009). EULOCS. The EU level offence classification system: a bench-
mark for enhanced internal coherence of the EU's criminal policy (Vol. 35, IRCP-series). 
Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland: Maklu 
 
0100 00 Open Category 
CRIMES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, 
permanent court that tries persons accused of the most serious 
crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.  The ICC is based on a treaty, joined 
by 106 countries. The jurisdiction and functioning of the ICC are 
governed by the Rome Statute. 
0101 00 GENOCIDE 
Article 6 of the Statute of 
the ICC 
“Genocide” means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
0102 00 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
Article 7 of the Statute of 
the ICC 
“Crime against humanity” means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack: 
(a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation 
or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty 
in violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender [...] or 
other grounds [...] 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 





causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
(a) ‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a 
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1 [...]; 
(b) ‘Extermination’ includes the intentional infliction of 
conditions of life, inter alia [...]; 
(c) ‘Enslavement’ means the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person [...]; 
(d) ‘Deportation or forcible transfer of population’ means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned [...]; 
(e) ‘Torture’ means the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the 
custody or under the control of the accused; [...]; 
(f) ‘Forced pregnancy’[...] 
(g) ‘Persecution’ means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of 
the identity of the group or collectivity; 
(h) ‘The crime of apartheid’ means inhumane acts of a character 
similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the 
context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression 
and domination by one racial group over any other racial group 
or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that 
regime; 
(i) ‘Enforced disappearance of persons’ means the arrest, 
detention or abduction of persons [...]. 
0103 00 WAR CRIMES 
Article 8 of the Statute of 
the ICC 
“War crimes” means: 
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions [...]: 
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable 
in international armed conflict, within the established 
framework of international law: [...] 
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international 
character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts committed against persons taking no active part 
in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause: [...] 
(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an 
international character and thus does not apply to situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. 
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable 
in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the 
established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts: [...] 






international character and thus does not apply to situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It 
applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a 
State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups. 
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the 
responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-establish law 
and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial 
integrity of the State, by all legitimate means. 
0104 00 CRIMES OF AGGRESSION 
0200 00 Open Category PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
Article 1 Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime 
 “Criminal organisation” means a structured association, 
established over a period of time, of more than two persons 
acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a 
maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit; 
“Structured association” means an association that is not 
randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence, 
nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members, 
continuity of its membership, or a developed structure 
0201 00 
OFFENCES JOINTLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPATION IN 
A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
0201 01 Directing a criminal organisation 
Article 2 (b) , Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime 
Conduct by any person consisting in an agreement with one or 
more persons that an activity should be pursued which, if 
carried out, would amount to the commission of offences, even 
if that person does not take part in the actual execution of the 
activity. 
0201 02 
Knowingly participating in the criminal activities, without 
being a director 
Article 2 (a), Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime  
Conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of 
either the aim and general criminal activity of the organisation 
or the intention of the organisation to commit the offences in 
question, actively takes part in the organisation's criminal 
activities, even where that person does not take part in the 
actual execution of the offences concerned and, subject to the 
general principles of the criminal law of the member state 
concerned, even where the offences concerned are not actually 
committed, 
0201 03 
Knowingly taking part in the non-criminal activities of a 
criminal organisation, without being a director 





Article 5 -  United Nations 
Convention on 
Transnational Organised 
Crime (UNTS no. 39574, 
New York, 15.11.2000) 
Conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of 
either the aim and general criminal activity of the organisation 
or the intention of the organisation to commit the offences in 
question, actively takes part in the organisation's other activities 
(i.e. non-criminal) in the further knowledge that his 
participation will contribute to the achievement of the 
organisation's criminal activities. 
 
0202 00 
OTHER FORMS OF PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL 
ORGANISATION 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0300 00 Open Category OFFENCES LINKED TO TERRORISM 
Article 1 - Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA, on 
combating terrorism 
(2002/475/JHA) 
Terrorist offences are those offences committed with a specific 
intent: i.e. "committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a 
population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the 
fundamental" 
0301 00 PARTICIPATION IN A TERRORIST GROUP 
Article 1 Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime 
A terrorist group is an organised criminal group, committing 
offences with a terrorist intent. 
A criminal organisation shall mean a structured association, 
established over a period of time, of more than two persons, 
acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a 
maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, 
whether such offences are an end in themselves or a means of 
obtaining material benefits;  
0301 01 Offences jointly identified as participation in a terrorist group 
0301 01 01 Directing a terrorist group 
Article 3 - Framework 




0301 01 02 
Knowingly participating in the activities of a terrorist group, 
without being a director 
 
Participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by 
supplying information or material resources, or by funding its 
activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such 
participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the 
terrorist group 







Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0302 00 OFFENCES LINKED TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES 
0302 01 Offences jointly identified as linked to terrorist activities 
Article 3 - Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA, on 
combating terrorism 
(2002/475/JHA) 
As amended by: 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision of 28 





0302 01 01 Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision of 28 




Distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the 
public, with the intent to incite the commission of one of the 
offences listed in Article 1(1)(a) to (h) of the Framework Decision 
on Terrorism (i.e. EULOCS cat 0303 01 until 0303 09), where 
such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist 
offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be 
committed;                                                                                                                   
0302 01 02 Recruitment for terrorism 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision of 28 




To solicit another person to commit one of the offences listed in 
Article 1(1) (a) to (h) (i.e. EULOCS cat 0303 01 until 0303 09), or 
in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision on Terrorism 
0302 01 03 Training for terrorism 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision of 28 




To provide instruction in the making or use of explosives, 
firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, 
or in other specific methods or techniques, for the purpose of 
committing one of the offences listed in Article 1(1) (a) to (h) (i.e. 
EULOCS cat 0303 01 until 0303 09), knowing that the skills 
provided are intended to be used for this purpose 
0302 01 04 Aggravated theft with the view of committing a terrorist offence 
0302 01 05 Extortion with the view of committing a terrorist offence 
0302 01 06 
Drawing up false administrative documents with the view of 
committing a terrorist offence 
0302 01 07 Financing of terrorism 
0302 02 Other offences linked to terrorist activities 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 





uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0303 00 TERRORIST OFFENCES 





Terrorist offences are "Offences under national law, which, 
given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country 
or an international organisation where committed with the aim 
of: 
- seriously intimidating a population, or 
- unduly compelling a Government or international organisation 
to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an 
international organisation" 
The Framework Decision lists provides us with a list with the 
absolute minimum of what shall be deemed to be terrorist 
offences: That list is used to make the break down structure in 
the classification and now constitute the subcategories in this 
section: 
0303 00 Offences jointly identified as terrorist offences  
Article 1 of the Framework 




0303 01 Terrorist attacks upon a person’s life 
0303 02 Terrorist attacks upon a person's physical integrity 
0303 03 Terrorist kidnapping or hostage taking 
0303 04 Causing extensive terrorist destruction 





Causing extensive terrorist destruction to a Government or 
public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, 
including an information system, a fixed platform located on the 
continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to 
endanger human life or result in major 
economic loss; 
0303 05 Terrorist seizure of transport 
0303 06 Terrorist activities related to weapons 





Manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of 
weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons, as well as research into, and development of, 
biological and chemical weapons 
0303 07 
Terrorist release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, 
floods or explosions 





Terrorist release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, 








Terrorist interfering with or disrupting the supply of a 
fundamental natural resource 





Terrorist interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, 
power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of 
which is to endanger human life 
0303 09 Threatening to commit any of the terrorist acts listed 
0304 10 Other terrorist offences 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0400 00 Open Category TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA of 19 July 
2002 on combating 
trafficking in human 
beings 
“Trafficking in human beings” shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring, subsequent reception of a 
person, including exchange or transfer of control over that 
person, where: 
(a) use is made of coercion, force or threat, including abduction, 
or 
(b) use is made of deceit or fraud, or 
(c) there is an abuse of authority or of a position of vulnerability, 
which is such that the person has no real and acceptable 
alternative but to submit tithe abuse involved, or 
(d) payments or benefits are given or received to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person for the 
purpose of exploitation of that person’s labour or services, 
including at least forced or compulsory labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude, or for the 
purpose of the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, including in pornography. 
0401 00 TRAFFICKING OF AN ADULT 
Article 1.4 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA of 19 July 
2002 on combating 
trafficking in human 
beings 
Adult shall mean: "any person of 18 years of age or above" 
0401 01 Offences jointly identified as trafficking of an adult 
0401 01 01 For the purposes of labour or services exploitation 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA of 19 July 
2002 on combating 
trafficking in human 
beings  
Article 4 - Council of 
Europe Convention on 
Labour or services exploitation shall constitute at least what is 
defined by the subcategories in this section:  
- Forced or compulsory labour or services 
- Slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude, which is 
defined as: The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves 
from one country to another by whatever means of transport, or 
of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the 
laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons 





Action against Trafficking 
in Human Beings 
(Warsaw, 16.V.2005) 
convicted thereof shall be liable to very severe penalties 
0401 01 02 For the purposes of sexual exploitation 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA of 19 July 
2002 on combating 
trafficking in human 
beings 
Article 1 of the 1949 UN 
Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic 
in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others 
Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation: Sexual exploitation of an 
adult contains at least: (a) Procuring, enticing or leading away, 
for purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the 
consent of that person; (b) Exploiting the prostitution of another 
person, even with the consent of that person; (c) Keeping or 
managing, or knowingly financing or taking part in the 
financing of a brothel; (d) Knowingly letting or renting a 
building or other place or any part thereof for the purpose of the 
prostitution of others 
0401 01 03 For the purposes of organ or human tissue removal 
In analogy with: Article 
3(1) I (b) of the 2000 UN 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution 
and child pornography 
A human tissue is a collection of interconnected cells that 
perform a similar function within an organism. This category 
also includes the removal of a single cell. 
0401 04 Other forms of trafficking of an adult 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0402 00 TRAFFICKING OF A CHILD 
Article 1.4 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA of 19 July 
2002 on combating 
trafficking in human 
beings 
Child shall mean: "any person below 18 years of age" 
0402 01 Offences jointly identified as trafficking of a child 
0402 01 01 For the purposes of labour or services exploitation of a child 
Article 2 Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
 
Article 3(1) I (b) of the 
2000 UN Optional 
Labour or services exploitation shall constitute at least what is 
defined by the subcategories in this section:  
- Forced or compulsory labour or services 
- Slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude, which is 
defined as: The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves 
from one country to another by whatever means of transport, or 
of being accessory thereto, shall be a criminal offence under the 
laws of the States Parties to this Convention and persons 






Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 
on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and 
child pornography   
0402 01 02 For the purposes of sexual exploitation 
Article 2 Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
Prostitution and Sexual Exploitation of a Child: Sexual 
exploitation of a child shall contain at least  (a) Coercing or 
recruiting a child into prostitution or into participating in 
pornographic performances, or profiting from or otherwise 
exploiting a child for such purposes and (b) Engaging in sexual 
activities with a child; where use is made of coercion, force or 
threats, where money or other forms of remuneration or 
consideration is given as payment in exchange for the child 
engaging in sexual activities, where abuse is made of a 
recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the child 
0402 01 03 For the purposes of organ or human tissue removal of a child 
Article 3(1) I (b) of the 
2000 UN Optional 
Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 
on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and 
child pornography 
A human tissue is a collection of interconnected cells that 
perform a similar function within an organism. This category 
also includes the removal of a single cell. 
0402 02 Other forms of trafficking of a child 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0402 02 01 For the purpose of recruiting child soldiers 
Article 4 of the 2000 UN 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution 
and child pornography   
Child Soldiers: Armed groups that are distinct from the armed 
forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or 
use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years. States Parties 
shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and 
use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary to 
prohibit and criminalize such practices. 
0402 02 02 For the purpose of illegal adoption 
Article 3(1) a (ii) of the 
2000 UN Optional 
Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 
on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and 
child pornography   
Illegal Adoption: Each State Party shall ensure that, as a 
minimum, the following acts and activities are fully covered 
under its criminal or penal law, whether such offences are 
committed domestically or transnationally or on an individual 
or organized basis:  
(a) In the context of sale of children as defined in article 2(ii)  
Improperly inducing consent, as an intermediary, for the 
adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal 
instruments on adoption                                                                                                      
0402 02 03 For other or unknown purposes 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 





only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0500 00 Open Category SEXUAL OFFENCES 
 
Sexual offences is a main cluster, including, sexual assault, 
sexual exploitation, prostitution and pornography 
0501 00 SEXUAL ASSAULT 
 
Sexual assault consists of any verbal, visual or other act that 
forces a person to join in or be confronted with unwanted sexual 
attention or contact 
0501 01 Rape 
 
Rape constitutes any act of sexual penetration (per vaginam or 
other) by whatever means, of a person against his or her will 
0501 01 01 Rape of an adult 
 
Rape of an adult constitutes any act of sexual penetration (per 
vaginam or other) by whatever means, of any person above 18 
years of age against his or her will 
0501 01 02  Rape of a child 
 
Rape of a child constitutes any act of sexual penetration (per 
vaginam or other) by whatever means, of any person below 18 
years of age against his or her will 
0501 02 Sexual harassment 
 
Sexual harassment constitutes any threatening or disturbing 
behaviour or unwelcome sexual attention, requests for sexual 
favours and other verbal or physical conduct – other than 
penetration – typically in a work or educational environment 
0501 02 01 Sexual harassment of an adult 
0501 02 02 Sexual harassment of a child 
0501 03 Indecent exposure 
 
Indecent exposure is the deliberate exposure by a person of a 
portion or portions of his or her body under the circumstances 
where a such exposure is likely to be seen as contrary to the 
standards of decency 
0501 04 Other forms of sexual assault 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0502 00 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, PROSTITUTION AND 
PORNOGRAPHY 
0502 01 Sexual exploitation 
0502 01 01 Offences jointly identified as sexual exploitation of an adult 
Article 1 and 2 of the 1949 
UN Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic 
in Persons and of the 
“Adult” means any person above 18 years of age; this offence is 
defined by following subcategories 
- Procuring, enticing or leading away, for purposes of 






Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others 
person 
- Exploiting the prostitution of another person, even with the 
consent of that person 
- Keeping or managing, or knowingly financing or taking part in 
the financing of a brothel 
- Knowingly letting or renting a building or other place or any 
part thereof for the purpose of the prostitution of others 
0502 01 02 Offences jointly identified as sexual exploitation of a child 
Article 2 (a) and (b) 
Council framework 
decision of 22 December 
2003 on combating the 
sexual exploitation of 
children and child 
pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
“Child” means any person below 18 years of age; Sexual 
exploitation of a child entails coercing or recruiting a child into 
prostitution or into participating in pornographic performances, 
or profiting from or otherwise exploiting a child for such 
purposes; 
- Where use is made of coercion, force or threats 
- Where money or other forms of remuneration or consideration 
is given as payment in exchange for the child engaging in sexual 
activities 
- Where abuse is made of a recognised position of trust, 
authority or influence over the child 
0502 01 03 Other forms of sexual exploitation 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0502 02 Soliciting by a prostitute 
 
Soliciting by a prostitute shall mean offering of sexual activities 
in exchange for money or other forms of remuneration 
0502 03 Procuring for prostitution or sexual act 
 
Procuring for prostitution or sexual act shall mean the offering 
of money or other forms of remuneration to an adult in 
exchange for engaging in sexual activities 
0502 04 Child Pornography 
Article 1 (b) Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
Offences related to indecent images of children or “child 
pornography” shall mean pornographic material that visually 
depicts or represents: (i) a real child involved or engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or the pubic area of a child; or (ii) a real person 
appearing to be a child involved or engaged in the conduct 
mentioned in (i); or (iii) realistic images of a non-existent child 
involved or engaged in the conduct mentioned in (i); 
0502 04 01 Offences jointly identified as Child Pornography 
0502 04 01 01 Possessing child pornography 
Article 3 (d) 2 Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
Possessing pornographic material that visually depicts or 
represents: (i) a real child involved or engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or the pubic area of a child; or (ii) a real person appearing to be a 
child involved or engaged in the conduct mentioned in (i); or 
(iii) realistic images of a non-existent child involved or engaged 





(2004/68/JHA) in the conduct mentioned in (i); 
0502 04 01 02 Producing child pornography 
Article 3 (a) Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
Producing pornographic material that visually depicts or 
represents: (i) a real child involved or engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or the pubic area of a child; or (ii) a real person appearing to be a 
child involved or engaged in the conduct mentioned in (i); or 
(iii) realistic images of a non-existent child involved or engaged 
in the conduct mentioned in (i); 
0502 04 01 03 Offering or making available of child pornography 
Article 3 (c) Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
Offering or making available pornographic material that 
visually depicts or represents: (i) a real child involved or 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or the pubic area of a child; or (ii) a real 
person appearing to be a child involved or engaged in the 
conduct mentioned in (i); or (iii) realistic images of a non-
existent child involved or engaged in the conduct mentioned in 
(i); 
0502 04 01 04 Distributing or transmitting child pornography 
Article 3 (b) Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
Distributing or transmitting pornographic material that visually 
depicts or represents: (i) a real child involved or engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or the pubic area of a child; or (ii) a real person 
appearing to be a child involved or engaged in the conduct 
mentioned in (i); or (iii) realistic images of a non-existent child 
involved or engaged in the conduct mentioned in (i); 
0502 04 01 05 Procuring child pornography for oneself or for another person 
Article 3 (d) 1 Council 
framework decision of 22 
December 2003 on 
combating the sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA) 
Procuring pornographic material that visually depicts or 
represents: (i) a real child involved or engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or the pubic area of a child; or (ii) a real person appearing to be a 
child involved or engaged in the conduct mentioned in (i); or 
(iii) realistic images of a non-existent child involved or engaged 
in the conduct mentioned in (i); for oneself or for another person 
0502 04 02 Other offences related to child pornography 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0600 00 Open Category OFFENCES RELATED TO DRUGS OR PRECURSORS 
0600 01 OFFENCES RELATED TO DRUGS 
0600 01 01 Cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant 
Article 2.1 (b) – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
Opium poppy means the plant of the species Papaver 
somniferum L. 
Coca bush means the plant of any species of the genus 
Erythroxylon. 






the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking and  
Article 1 (b), (c), (o) UN 
Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic 




0600 01 01 01 Exclusively for own personal consumption 
Article 2.2 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
The conduct is not included in the scope of the framework 
decision when it is committed by its perpetrators, exclusively for 
their own personal consumption as defined by national law 
0600 01 01 02 Not exclusively for own personal consumption 
0600 01 02 Production 
Article 2.1 (a) – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
Production includes  manufacture, extraction and preparation 
0600 01 02 01 Exclusively for own personal consumption 
Article 2.2 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
The conduct is not included in the scope of the framework 
decision when it is committed by its perpetrators, exclusively for 
their own personal consumption as defined by national law 
0600 01 02 02 Not exclusively for own personal consumption 
0600 01 03 Transport 
Article 2.1 (a) – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
Transport includes dispatch, dispatch in transit, importation and 
exportation  
Import means the entry into customs territory of the 





October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
Article 2 (c) and (d) 
COUNCIL REGULATION 
(EC) No 111/2005 of 22 
December 2004 laying 
down rules for the 
monitoring of trade 
between the Community 
and third countries in 
drug precursors 
Community, including temporary storage, the placing in a free 
zone or free warehouse, the placing under a suspensive 
procedure and the release for free circulation within the 
meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 
establishing the Community Customs Code 
Export means the departure from the customs territory of the 
Community, including the departure that requires a customs 
declaration and the departure after their storage in a free zone of 
control type I or free warehouse within the meaning of 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the 
Community Customs Code 
0600 01 03 01 Exclusively for own personal consumption 
Article 2.2 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
The conduct is not included in the scope of the framework 
decision when it is committed by its perpetrators, exclusively for 
their own personal consumption as defined by national law 
0600 01 03 02 Not exclusively for own personal consumption 
0600 01 04 Distribution 
Article 2.1 (a) – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking and article 
1.2(b) COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE 92/109/EEC of 
14 December 1992 on the 
manufacture and the 
placing on the market of 
certain substances used in 
the illicit manufacture of 
narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances 
Distribution or placing on the market means any supply against 
payment or free of charge to third parties including offer, offer 
for sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage and sale. 
0600 01 05 Possession and purchase 
Article 2.1. (c) - Council 
Framework Decision 
This category includes the possession and purchase of drugs 






2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
distribution of drugs. 
0600 01 05 01 Exclusively for own personal consumption 
Article 2.2 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
The conduct is not included in the scope of the framework 
decision when it is committed by its perpetrators, exclusively for 
their own personal consumption as defined by national law 
0600 01 05 02 Not exclusively for own personal consumption 
0600 01 06 Other offences related to drugs 
0600 01 06 01 promoting the consumption of drugs 
0600 01 06 02 
knowingly letting or renting a building or other place where 
public have access for the purpose of consumption of drugs 
0600 01 06 03 other 
0600 02 
OFFENCES RELATED TO PRECURSORS AND OTHER 
ESSENTIAL CHEMICALS 
Article 1.2 – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
Precursors shall mean any substance scheduled in the 
Community legislation giving effect to the obligations deriving 
from Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 20 
December 1988 
0600 02 01 Manufacture 
Article 2.1 (d) – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
This category refers to manufacture of precursors, knowing that 
they are to be used in or for the illicit production of drugs 
0600 02 02 Transport 
Article 2.1 (d) – Council 
Framework Decision 
This category refers to transport of precursors, knowing that 
they are to be used in or for the illicit production of drugs 





2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
Article 2 (c) and (d) 
COUNCIL REGULATION 
(EC) No 111/2005 of 22 
December 2004 laying 
down rules for the 
monitoring of trade 
between the Community 
and third countries in 
drug precursors 
Transport includes dispatch, dispatch in transit, importation and 
exportation 
Import means the entry into customs territory of the 
Community, including temporary storage, the placing in a free 
zone or free warehouse, the placing under a suspensive 
procedure and the release for free circulation within the 
meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 
establishing the Community Customs Code 
Export means the departure from the customs territory of the 
Community, including the departure that requires a customs 
declaration and the departure after their storage in a free zone of 
control type I or free warehouse within the meaning of 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the 
Community Customs Code 
0600 02 03 Distribution 
Article 2.1 (d) – Council 
Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on 
the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties 
in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking and article 
1.2(b) COUNCIL 
DIRECTIVE 92/109/EEC of 
14 December 1992 on the 
manufacture and the 
placing on the market of 
certain substances used in 
the illicit manufacture of 
narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances 
This category refers to distribution of precursors, knowing that 
they are to be used in or for the illicit production of drugs 
Distribution or placing on the market means any supply against 
payment or free of charge to third parties including offer, offer 
for sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage and sale. 
0600 02 04 Other offences related to precursors 
0700 00 Open Category 
FIREARMS, THEIR PARTS AND COMPONENTS, 
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES, not committed or likely to 
be committed in the course of terrorist activities 
Article 3(a) of the Protocol 
against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, 
their Parts and 
Components and 
Ammunition 
“Firearms” shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that 
expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel 
a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, 
excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms 
and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic 
law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms 
manufactured after 1899; “Parts and components” shall mean 
any element or replacement element specifically designed for a 
firearm and essential to its operation, including a barrel, frame 






device designed or adapted to diminish the sound caused by 
firing a firearm; “Ammunition” shall mean the complete round 
or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant 
powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in a firearm, 
provided that those components are themselves subject to 
authorization in the respective State Party 
0701 00 ILLICIT MANUFACTURING  FIREARMS 
Article 3(d) of the Protocol 
against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, 
their Parts and 
Components and 
Ammunition, 
supplementing the 2000 
UN Palermo Convention 
The offences related to the manufacturing or assembly of 
firearms, their parts and components or ammunition, listed in 
the Protocol supplementing the 2000 UN Palermo Convention, 
are used to introduce the sub categories in this section: 
(i) From parts and components illicitly trafficked; 
(ii) Without a licence or authorization from a competent 
authority of the State Party where the manufacture or assembly 
takes place; or 
(iii) Without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture, in 
accordance with article 8 of this Protocol (article 3d)The 
definition actually includes the subcategories of illicit 
trafficking)                                                                                                                 
0702 00 
FALSIFYING OR ILLICITLY ALTERING THE MARKING(S) 
ON FIREARMS 
Article 5(c) of the Protocol 
against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, 
their Parts and 
Components and 
Ammunition, 
supplementing the 2000 
UN Palermo Convention 
Falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing or altering the 
marking(s) on firearms required by article 8 of this Protocol.                           
According to article 8 1. For the purpose of identifying and 
tracing each firearm, States Parties shall: 
(a) At the time of manufacture of each firearm, either require 
unique marking providing the name of the manufacturer, the 
country or place of manufacture and the serial number, or 
maintain any alternative unique user-friendly marking with 
simple geometric symbols in combination with a numeric 
and/or alphanumeric code, permitting ready identification by all 
States of the country of manufacture; 
(b) Require appropriate simple marking on each imported 
firearm, permitting identification of the country of import and, 
where possible, the year of import and enabling the competent 
authorities of that country to trace the firearm, and a unique 
marking, if the firearm does not bear such a marking. The 
requirements of this subparagraph need not be applied to 
temporary imports of firearms for verifiable lawful purposes; 
(c) Ensure, at the time of transfer of a firearm from government 
stocks to permanent civilian use, the appropriate unique 
marking permitting identification by all States Parties of the 
transferring country. 
2. States Parties shall encourage the firearms manufacturing 
industry to develop measures against the removal or alteration 
of markings 
0703 00 ILLICIT TRAFFICKING FIREARMS 
Article 3(e) of the Protocol 
against the Illicit 
“Illicit trafficking” shall mean the import, export, acquisition, 
sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and 





Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, 
their Parts and 
Components and 
Ammunition, 
supplementing the 2000 
UN Palermo Convention 
components and ammunition from or across the territory of one 
State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States 
Parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the 
terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in 
accordance with article 8 of this Protocol 
 
 
0704 00 UNAUTHORISED ACQUISITION 
0705 00 UNAUTHORISED POSSESSION OR USE 
0706 00 OTHER 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0800 00 Open Category 
HARMING THE ENVIRONMENT AND/OR PUBLIC 
HEALTH not committed or likely to be committed in the course of 
terrorist activities 
0801 00 
OFFENCES JOINTLY IDENTIFIED  AS ENVIRONMENTAL 
OFFENCES 
0801 01 
Offences related to a quantity of materials or ionizing 
radiation 
Article 3 - Directive 
2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the 
protection of the 
environment through 
criminal law 
Offences related to a quantity of materials or ionizing radiation 
which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any 
person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the quality of 
soil, the quality of water or to animals or plants. Including: 
- the unlawful discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity 
of materials or ionising radiation into air, soil or water 
0801 02 Offences related to waste 
Article 3 - Directive 
2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the 
protection of the 
environment through 
criminal law 
Offences related to waste, including the supervision of the 
hereafter named operations and the after-care of disposal sites, 
and including actions taken as a dealer or a broker (waste 
management) which causes or is likely to cause death or serious 
injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, 
the quality of soil, the quality of water or to animals or plants: 
- the unlawful collection of waste 
- the unlawful transport, export or import of waste 
- the unlawful recovery of waste 
- the unlawful disposal of waste  
- the shipment of waste, where this activity falls within the 
scope of Article 2(35) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on 
shipments of waste and is undertaken in a non-negligible 
quantity, whether executed in a single shipment or in several 
shipments which appear to be linked; 
0801 03 







Article 3 - Directive 
2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the 
protection of the 
environment through 
criminal law 
Offences related to a plant in which a dangerous activity is 
carried out and which, outside the plant, causes or is likely to 
cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial 
damage to the quality of air, the quality of soil, the quality of 
water, or to animals or plants: 
- the unlawful operation of such a plant 
0801 04 
Offences related to nuclear materials or other hazardous 
radioactive substances 
Article 3 - Directive 
2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the 
protection of the 
environment through 
criminal law 
Offences related to nuclear materials or other hazardous 
radioactive substances which causes or is likely to cause death 
or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the 
quality of air, the quality of soil, the quality of water, or to 
animals or plants. Including: 
- the unlawful production of nuclear materials or other 
hazardous radioactive substances 
- the unlawful processing, handling and use of nuclear materials 
or other hazardous radioactive substances 
- the unlawful holding and storage of nuclear materials or other 
hazardous radioactive substances 
- the unlawful transport, export or import  of nuclear materials 
or other hazardous radioactive substances 
- the unlawful disposal of  nuclear materials or other hazardous 
radioactive substances 
0801 05 Offences related to protected fauna and flora species 
Article 3 - Directive 
2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the 
protection of the 
environment through 
criminal law 
Offences related to protected fauna and flora species or parts or 
derivatives thereof except for cases when the conduct concerns a 
negligible quantity of such specimens and has a negligible 
impact on the conservation status of the species. Including: 
- the unlawful killing of protected wild fauna and flora species 
- the unlawful destruction of protected wild fauna and flora 
species 
- the unlawful possession of protected wild fauna and flora 
species 
- the unlawful taking  of protected wild fauna and flora species 
- the unlawful trading of or in protected wild fauna and flora 
species 
0801 06 Offences related to habitats 
Article 2 (c) and 3 - 
Directive 2008/99/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the 
protection of the 
environment through 
criminal law 
Offences related to habitats, including 
- the unlawful significant deterioration of a  habitat within a 
protected site 
‘habitat within a protected site’ means any habitat of species 
for which an area is classified as a special protection area 
pursuant to Article 4(1) or (2) of Directive 79/409/EEC, or 
any natural habitat or a habitat of species for which a site is 
designated as a special area of conservation pursuant to 
Article 4(4) of Directive 92/43/EEC; 
0801 07 Offences related to ozone-depleting substances 





Article 3 - Directive 
2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the 
protection of the 
environment through 
criminal law 
Offences related to ozone-depleting substances 
- the unlawful production of ozone-depleting substances 
- the unlawful importation or exportation of ozone-depleting 
substances 
- the unlawful placing on the market of ozone-depleting 
substances 
- the unlawful use of ozone-depleting substances 
0801 08 
Offences related to illicit trafficking in hormonal substances 
and other growth promoters 
0802 00 
OTHER OFFENCES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT OR 
HARMING PUBLIC HEALTH (NOT-DRUG RELATED) 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0802 01 Offences related to consumer protection 
0802 02 Other offences 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0900 00 Open Category OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY 
0901 00 THEFT 
 
Theft means depriving a person/ organisation of property with 
the intent to keep it. 
0901 01 Theft with violence or intimidation 
0901 02 Theft without violence or intimidation 
0902 00 UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION 
 
Unlawful appropriation is the act of unlawfully taking 
possession of or assigning purpose to properties or ideas 
0902 01 Racketeering and extortion 
 
Racketeering unlawfully obtaining either money, property or 
services from a company through compelling a person or 
manipulating them to behave in an involuntary way (whether 
through action or inaction) by use of threats, intimidation or 
some other form of pressure or force, typically in exchange of 
the service of "protection" Extortion is the unlawfully obtaining 
either money, property or services from a person, entity, or 
institution, through compelling a person or manipulating them 
to behave in an involuntary way (whether through action or 
inaction) by use of threats, intimidation or some other form of 
pressure or force 
0902 02 
Knowingly concealing or retaining property resulting from an 
offence 
Article 24 of the 2003 UN 
Merida Corruption 
Convention 
Knowingly concealing or retaining property resulting from an 
offence: Article 24 of the 2003 UN Merida Corruption 






concealment or continued retention of property when the 
person involved knows that such property is the result of any of 
the offences 
0902 03 
Embezzlement, concealment of assets or unlawful increase in 
a company's liabilities 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Embezzlement (the act of dishonestly appropriating goods, 
usually money, by one to whom they have been entrusted); 
concealment of assets or unlawful increase in a company's 
liabilities, (this is an ECRIS category) 
0902 04 Unlawful dispossession 
 
“Unlawful dispossession” means any interference with another 
person's property  
0902 05 Other forms of unlawful appropriation 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0903 00 ILLICIT DEALING IN OR CONCEALING GOODS 
0903 01 Illicit trafficking in cultural goods 
Annex to the Convention 
of 26 July 1995 on the 
establishement of a 
European police office and  
Article 2 (2) - Council 
Framework Decision of 13 
june 2002 on the European 
arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures 
between member states 
Illicit trafficking in cultural goods including antiques and works 
of art, is a category in the Europol Annex and in article 2(2) of 
the European Arrest Warrant 
0903 02 Dealing in stolen goods 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Dealing in stolen goods is an ECRIS category 
0903 03 Other forms of illicit dealing in or concealing goods 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 





only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0904 00 CRIMINAL DAMAGE 
Article 5 – Council 
framework decision of 24 
February 2005 on the 
application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to 
financial penalties 
This category is listed in article 5 of the said framework 
decision, without further explanation. 
0904 01 Destruction 
 
Unlawful destruction of property; destruction is the act of 
damaging something beyond use or repair, including: 
- Arson is defined as the maliciously, voluntarily, and wilfully 
setting fire to the building, buildings, or other property of 
another, or of burning one's own property for an improper 
purpose, as to collect Insurance 
- Explosion is a sudden increase in volume and release of energy 
in an extreme manner, usually with the generation of high 
temperatures and the release of gases. An explosion creates a 
shock wave 
0904 02 Sabotage 
 
Sabotage is a deliberate action of  subversion, obstruction, 
disruption, and/or destruction 
0904 03 Smearing 
 
This includes for example graffiti 
0904 04 Other forms of criminal damage 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0905 00 CORRUPTION 
Annex to the Convention 
of 26 July 1995 on the 
establishment of a 
European police office 
This category is listed without further explanation. 
0905 01 Offences jointly defined as corruption 
0905 01 01 
Active corruption in the public sector involving a EU public 
official 
Article 3.1 of the 
Convention of 26 May 
1997 on the fight against 
corruption involving 
officials of the European 
Communities or officials 
of member states of the 
European Union  
The deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, directly 
or through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind 
whatsoever to an official for himself or for a third party for him 
to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the 
exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties shall 
constitute active corruption. 
EU public official (community official) shall mean  any person 
who is an official or other contracted employee within the 






Communities or the Conditions of Employment of other 
servants of the European Communities; or any person seconded 
to the European Communities by the member states or by any 
public or private body, who carries out functions equivalent to 
those performed by European Community officials or other 
servants 
0905 01 02 
Passive corruption in the public sector involving a EU public 
official 
Article 2.1 of the 
Convention of 26 May 
1997 on the fight against 
corruption involving 
officials of the European 
Communities or officials 
of member states of the 
European Union  
The deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an 
intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any kind 
whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise 
of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance 
with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his 
official duties shall constitute passive corruption.  
EU public official (community official) shall mean  any person 
who is an official or other contracted employee within the 
meaning of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European 
Communities or the Conditions of Employment of other 
servants of the European Communities; or any person seconded 
to the European Communities by the member states or by any 
public or private body, who carries out functions equivalent to 
those performed by European Community officials or other 
servants 
0905 01 03 Active corruption in the private sector 
Article 2.1(a) of the 
Council Framework 
Decision 2003/568/JHA 
of 22 July 2003 
on combating corruption 
in the private sector  
promising, offering or giving, directly or through an 
intermediary, to a person who in any capacity directs or works 
for a private-sector entity an undue advantage of any kind, for 
that person or for a third party, in order that that person should 
perform or refrain from performing any act, in breach of that 
person's duties 
0905 01 04 Passive corruption in the private sector 
Article 2.1(b) of the 
Council Framework 
Decision 2003/568/JHA 
of 22 July 2003 
on combating corruption 
in the private sector 
directly or through an intermediary, requesting or receiving an 
undue advantage of any kind, or accepting the promise of such 
an advantage, for oneself or for a third party, while in any 
capacity directing or working for a private-sector entity, in order 
to perform or refrain from performing any act, in breach of one's 
duties 
0905 02 Other forms of corruption 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0906 00 MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
“Money laundering” or laundering of proceeds of crime 
"proceeds", consists of any economic advantage from criminal 
offences. 
0906 01 Offences jointly identified as Money Laundering 
0906 01 01 The conversion or transfer of property 





Article 6(1) of the the CoE 
Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from 
Crime  
The illicit conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is proceeds, for the purpose of concealing or disguising 
the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is 
involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the 
legal consequences of his actions 
0906 01 02 
The illicit concealment or disguise of property related 
information 
Article 6(1) of the the CoE 
Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from 
Crime  
The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, 
property, knowing that such property is proceeds 
0906 01 03 The illicit acquisition, possession or use of laundered property 
Article 6(1) of the the CoE 
Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from 
Crime  
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the 
time of receipt, that such property was proceeds. 
0906 02 Other forms of Money Laundering 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0907 00 VIOLATON OF COMPETITION RULES 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Violation of competition rules is an ECRIS category 
0908 00 FRAUD AND SWINDLING 
Annex to the Convention 
of 26 July 1995 on the 
Establishement of a 
European police office 
This category is listed without further explanation. 
0908 01 Offences jointly identified as fraud and swindling 
0908 01 01 Counterfeiting and piracy products 
Annex to the Convention 
of 26 July 1995 on the 
Establishement of a 
European police office 






0908 01 02 
Forgery (i.e. Counterfeiting) and trafficking of administrative 
documents 
Article 2 (2) - Council 
Framework Decision of 13 
june 2002 on the European 
arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures 
between member states 
Forgery (i.e. Counterfeiting) of administrative documents and 
trafficking therein, includes: 
- Possession of a devise for the forging of public or 
administrative documents 
- Forging (i.e. counterfeiting) of public or administrative 
documents 
- The supply or acquisition of a forged public or administrative 
document 
- Using forged public or administrative documents 
- Trafficking in forged administrative documents 
0908 01 03 Forgery (i.e. Counterfeiting) of means of payment 
Article 40(7) – Convention 
Implementing The 
Schengen Agreement of 14 
June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States 
of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and 
the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks 
at their common borders 
Listed as an offence category, without further explanation. 
0908 01 03 01 Forgery (i.e. Counterfeiting) of cash means of payment 
Article 3 - Council 
Framework Decision of 29 
May 2000 on increasing 
protection by criminal 
penalties and other 
sanctions against 
counterfeiting in 
connection with the 
introduction of the euro 
Cash means of payment or currency means paper money 
(including banknotes) and metallic money, the circulation of 
which is legally authorised including euro banknotes and euro 
coins, the circulation of which is legally authorised pursuant to 
Regulation (EC) 974/98) 
Forgery (i.e. Counterfeiting) of cash means of payment includes: 
- Any fraudulent making or altering of currency, whatever 
means are employed (“currency” means paper money 
(including banknotes) and metallic money, the circulation of 
which is legally authorised including euro banknotes and euro 
coins, the circulation of which is legally authorised pursuant to 
Regulation (EC) 974/98) 
- The fraudulent uttering of counterfeit currency (“currency” 
means paper money (including banknotes) and metallic money, 
the circulation of which is legally authorised including euro 
banknotes and euro coins, the circulation of which is legally 
authorised pursuant to Regulation (EC) 974/98) 
- The import, export, transport, receiving, or obtaining of 
counterfeit currency with a view to uttering the same and with 
knowledge that it is counterfeit; 
- The fraudulent making, receiving, obtaining or possession of 
(i) instruments, articles, computer programs and any other 
means peculiarly adapted for the counterfeiting or altering of 
currency, or holograms or other components of currency which 





serve to protect against counterfeiting. (“currency” means paper 
money (including banknotes) and metallic money, the 
circulation of which is legally authorised including euro 
banknotes and euro coins, the circulation of which is legally 
authorised pursuant to Regulation (EC) 974/98) 
0908 01 03 02 Forgery (i.e. Counterfeiting) of non-cash means of payment 
Article 1 - Council 
Framework Decision of 28 
May 2001 combating fraud 
and counterfeiting of non-
cash means of payment 
“Non-cash payment instrument” shall mean a corporeal 
instrument, other than legal tender (bank notes and coins), 
enabling, by its specific nature, alone or in conjunction with 
another (payment) instrument, the holder or user to transfer 
money or monetary value, as for example credit cards, euro 
cheque cards, other cards issued by financial institutions, 
travellers' cheques, euro cheques, other cheques and bills of 
exchange, which is protected against imitation or fraudulent 
use, for example through design, coding or signature; Forgery 
(i.e. Counterfeiting) of non-cash means of payment is defined by 
following subcategories: 
- The fraudulent uttering of a payment instrument 
- Receiving, obtaining, transporting, sale or transfer to another 
person or possession of a stolen or otherwise unlawfully 
appropriated, or of a counterfeited payment instrument in order 
for it to be used fraudulently 
- Performing or causing a transfer of money or monetary value 
and thereby causing an unauthorised loss of property for 
another person, with the intention of procuring an unauthorized 
economic benefit for the person committing the offence or for a 
third part 
- The fraudulent making, receiving, obtaining, sale or transfer to 
another person or possession of (i) instruments, articles, 
computer programmes and any other means peculiarly adapted 
for the commission of any of the offences described under 
Article 2(b); 
0908 01 04 
Fraud affecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities 
Article 1 of the 
Convention of 26 July 1995 
on the protection of the 
European Communities’ 
Financial Interests 
Fraud affecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities, includes: 
Expenditure fraud meaning: 
- The use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete 
statements or documents, which has as its effect the 
misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds from the 
general budget of the European Communities or budgets 
managed by, or on behalf of, the European Communities 
- The non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific 
obligation, with the same effect 
- The misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those 
for which they were originally granted 
Revenue fraud means: 
- The use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete 






diminution of the resources of the general budget of the 
European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, 
the European Communities 
- The non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific 
obligation, with the same effect 
- The misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, with the same 
effect 
0908 02 Other forms of fraud and swindling 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0908 02 01 Tax offences 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
A tax is a financial charge or other levy imposed on an 
individual or a legal entity by a state or a functional equivalent 
of a state. “Tax offences” an ECRIS category. 
0908 02 02 Social Security or Family Benefit Fraud 
0908 02 03 Custom offences 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Customs is an authority or agency in a country responsible for 
collecting and safeguarding customs duties and for controlling 
the flow of goods including animals, personal effects and 
hazardous items in and out of a country (this is an ECRIS 
category) 
 
0908 02 04 Fraudulent insolvency 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Insolvency exists for a person or organization when total 
financial liabilities exceed total financial assets (this is an ECRIS 
category) 
0908 02 05 Other 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 





only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0909 00 OFFENCES AGAINST INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
0909 01 
Offences jointly identified as offences against information 
systems 
0909 01 01 
Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data and systems 
Article 2 of the 2001 CoE 
Cybercrime Convention  
Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data and systems: "computer system" means any 
device or a group of interconnected or related devices, one or 
more of which, pursuant to a program, performs automatic 
processing of data; "computer data" means any representation of 
facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing 
in a computer system, including a program suitable to cause a 
computer system to perform a function;  "service provider" 
means any public or private entity that provides to users of its 
service the ability to communicate by means of a computer 
system, and any other entity that processes or stores computer 
data on behalf of such communication service or users of such 
service. "traffic data" means any computer data relating to a 
communication by means of a computer system, generated by a 
computer system that formed a part in the chain of 
communication, indicating the communication’s origin, 
destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of 
underlying service, 
- Illegal Access: the access to the whole or any part of a 
computer system without right 
- Illegal interception: the interception without right, made by 
technical means, of non-public transmissions of computer data 
to, from or within a computer system, including electromagnetic 
emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data 
- Data interception: the damaging, deletion, deterioration, 
alteration or suppression of computer data without right 
- System interference: the serious hindering without right of the 
functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, 
damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing 
computer data 
- Misuse of devises:  committing intentionally and without right: 
(a) the production, sale, procurement for use, import, 
distribution or otherwise making available of a device, 
including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily 
for the purpose of committing any of the above mentioned; or a 
computer password, access code, or similar data by which the 
whole or any part of a computer system is capable of being 
accessed, with intent that it be used for the purpose of 
committing any of the above mentioned offences; and  (b) the 
possession of an item referred to in paragraphs a.i or ii above, 
with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of 






0909 01 02 Computer-related offences 
 
Computer-related offences include 
- the input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer 
data, resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be 
considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were 
authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly readable 
and intelligible 
- committing intentionally and without right, the causing of a 
loss of property to another person by: a) any input, alteration, 
deletion or suppression of computer data, b) any interference 
with the functioning of a computer system, with fraudulent or 
dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an economic 
benefit for oneself or for another person 
0909 01 03 Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights 
0909 01 04 
Production, possession or trafficking in computer devices or 
data enabling commitment of computer related offences 
0909 02 Other forms of offences against information systems 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
0910 00 OTHER OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
1000 00 Open Category 
OFFENCES AGAINST LIFE, LIMB AND PERSONAL 
FREEDOM, not committed or likely to be committed in the course of 
terrorist activities and other than offences against the state, nation, 
state symbol or public authority 
1001 00 CAUSING DEATH 
1001 01 Intentional 
Derived from European 
SourceBook 
Intentional homicide means intentional killing of a person. 
Where possible, the figures include assault leading to death, 
euthanasia, infanticide, but exclude assistance with suicide 
1001 01 01 not further specified 
1001 01 02 causing death at the request of the victim 
 
Euthanasia is causing death at the request of the victim 
1001 01 03 causing death of the own child during or immediately after birth 
 
Infanticide is causing death of the own child during or 
immediately after birth 
1001 01 04 offences related to suicide 
1001 01 05 illegal abortion 
 
Illegal abortion  is the removal or expulsion of an embryo or 
fetus from the uterus, resulting in or caused by its death 
1001 02 Unintentional 






Unintentional killing (manslaughter ) 
1002 00 CAUSING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND/OR BODILY INJURY 
1002 01 Torture 




"torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person 
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions. 
1002 02 Causing psychological and bodily injury, other than torture 
1002 02 01 Causing grievous bodily injury 
1002 02 02 Causing minor bodily injury 
1002 02 03 Threatening behaviour 
1002 02 04 Other 
1003 00 FAILURE TO OFFER AID 
 
Failure to offer aid excludes torture and failure to stop after a 
road accident 
1004 00 
EXPOSING TO DANGER OF LOSS OF LIFE OR GRIEVOUS 
BODILY INJURY 
 
Exposing to danger of loss of life or grievous bodily injury 
includes neglect or desertion of a child or a disabled person 
1005 00 
KIDNAPPING, ILLEGAL RESTRAINT AND HOSTAGE-
TAKING 
Annex to the Convention 
of 26 july 1995 on the 
establishment of a 
European police office  
Kidnapping or hostage taking; Kidnapping is the taking away or 
aspiration of a person against the person's will; Hostage-taking 
is the seizing of a person in order to compel another party such 
as a relative, employer or government to act, or refrain from 
acting, in a particular way, often under threat of serious physical 
harm to the hostage(s) after expiration of an ultimatum; Illegal 
restraint is the holding of  the person in false imprisonment, a 
confinement without legal authority 
1006 00 INSULT, SLANDER AND DEFAMATION 
 
Insults is an expression, statement or behaviour that is 
considered degrading; Defamation or slander is the 
communication of a statement that makes a false claim, 
expressively stated or implied to be factual, that may give an 
individual, business, product, group, government or nation a 
negative image 






1100 00 Open Category 
OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE, PUBLIC ORDER, 
COURSE OF JUSTICE OR PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
1101 00 
OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE AND/OR PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES 
1101 01 Attempt against life or health of the head of State 
1101 02 Insult of the State, nation or State symbols 
1101 03 Insult or resistance to a representative of public authority 
1101 04 Assault on a representative of public authority 
1101 05 Unlawful impersonation of a person or an authority 
1101 06 Espionage 
 
Espionage is the obtaining of information that is considered 
secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the 
information 
1101 07 High treason 
 
Criminal disloyalty to one’s country constitutes high treason 
1101 08 Offences related to elections and referendum 
 
Offences related to elections and referendum 
1101 09 Obstructing of public tender procedures 
 
Obstructing of public tender procedures to generate competing 
offers from different bidders looking to obtain an award of 
business activity in works, supply, or service contracts 
1101 10 
Obstructing or perverting the course of justice, making false 
allegations, perjury 
 
Obstructing or perverting the course of justice, making false 
allegations, perjury 
1101 11 Abuse of function 
1101 12 Other offences against the state and/or public authorities 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
1102 00 OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE/PUBLIC ORDER 
1102 01 Violence during sports events 
Article 5 – Council 
framework decision of 24 
February 2005 on the 
application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to 
financial penalties 
This category is listed in article 5 of the said framework 
decision, without further explanation 
1102 02 Violence during international conferences 
1102 03 
Public abuse of alcohol or drugs, other than related to road 
traffic regulations 
1102 04 Offences related to illegal gambling 





1102 05 Disturbing public order through racism and xenophobia 
1102 05 01 Publicly inciting to racist or xenophobic violence or hatred 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision of 28 
November 2008 on 
combating certain forms 
and expressions of racism 
and xenophobia by means 
of criminal law  
Publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group 
of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to 
race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin 
includes: 
- Publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group 
of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to 
race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin by 
public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other 
material 
- Publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group 
of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to 
race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin 
through other means 
1102 05 02 
Denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of genocide 
or crimes against humanity 
Article 1 – Council 
Framework Decision of 28 
November 2008 on 
combating certain forms 
and expressions of racism 
and xenophobia by means 
of criminal law  
Denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of genocide 
or crimes against humanity 
1102 05 03 
Other offences disturbing public order through racism and 
xenophobia 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
1200 00 Open Category OFFENCES AGAINST LABOUR LAW 
1201 00 UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT 
1201 01 Unlawful employment of an EU national 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Unlawful employment of an EU national, this distinction is 
made by the ECRIS classification system 
1201 02 Unlawful employment of a third country national 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
Unlawful employment of a third country national, this 








System (ECRIS) in 




OFFENCES RELATING TO REMUNERATION INCLUDING 
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Offences relating to remuneration including social security 
contributions, is an ECRIS category. 
1203 00 
OFFENCES RELATING TO WORKING CONDITIONS, 
HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Offences relating to working conditions, health and safety at 
work, is an ECRIS category. 
1204 00 
OFFENCES RELATING TO ACCESS TO OR EXERCISE OF A 
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Offences relating to access to or exercise of a professional 
activity, is an ECRIS category. 
1205 00 
OFFENCES RELATING TO WORKING HOURS AND REST 
TIME, other than road traffic offences 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
Offences relating to working hours and rest time, other than 
those in road traffic regulations, is an ECRIS category 





System (ECRIS) in 




OTHER OFFENCES AGAINST RIGHTS OF THE 
EMPLOYEES 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy (e.g.  the right to form and 
join trade unions) 
1300 00 Open Category 
MOTOR VEHICLE CRIME AND OFFENCES AGAINST 
TRAFFIC REGULATIONS, other than theft, misappropriation 
and trafficking in stolen vehicles 
Article 5 – Council 
framework decision of 24 
February 2005 on the 
application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to 
financial penalties and  
4th indent of the Annex to 
the Council Act of 26 July 
1995 drawing up the 
Convention on the 
establishment of a 
European Police Office 
Conduct which infringes road traffic regulations include 
breaches of regulations pertaining to driving hours and rest 
periods and regulations on hazardous goods. 
"Vehicle" shall mean any motor vehicle, trailer or caravan as 
defined in the provisions relating to the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) 
1301 00 DANGEROUS DRIVING 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Dangerous driving is an ECRIS category and  includes: 
- Driving over the speed limit 
- Driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs 
- Driving without seat belts or child seat 
1302 00 
DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENCE OR WHILE 
DISQUALIFIED 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Driving without a licence or while disqualified is an ECRIS 
category 






Article 41(4) – Convention 
Implementing The 
Schengen Agreement of 14 
June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States 
of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and 
the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks 
at their common borders 
Failure to stop after a road accident which has resulted in death 
or serious injury 
1304 00 AVOIDING A ROAD CHECK 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Avoiding a road check is an ECRIS category 
1305 00 OFFENCES RELATED TO ROAD TRANSPORT 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Offences related to road transport, including breaches of 
regulations pertaining to driving hours and rest periods and 
regulations on hazardous goods 
1306 00 
OTHER OFFENCES RELATED TO VEHICLES AND ROAD 
TRAFFIC REGULATIONS 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
1400 00 Open Category OFFENCES AGAINST MIGRATION LAW 
Article 2, 1 (b) of 
Regulation (EC) No 
862/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 July 2007 on 
Community statistics on 
migration and 
international protection 
and repealing Council 
"Immigration" means the action by which a person establishes 
his or her usual residence in the territory of a member state for a 
period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having 
previously been usually resident in another member state or a 
third country. "Emigration" means the action by which a person, 
having previously been usually resident in the territory of a 
member state, ceases to have his or her usual residence in that 
member state for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 
12 months; 





Regulation (EEC) No 
311/76 on the compilation 
of statistics  
1401 00 
OFFENCES JOINTLY IDENTIFIED AS OFFENCES 
AGAINST MIGRATION LAW 
1401 01 Unauthorised entry, transit and/or residence 
Article 3(b) of the Council 
Decision of 24 July 2006 
Article 5 Council 
Regulation (EC) No 
562/2006 of the European 
Council and of the 
European Council of 15 
March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the 
rules governing the 
movement of persons 
across borders. 
Illegal (unauthorised) entry’ is defined as crossing borders 
without complying with the necessary requirements for legal 
entry into the receiving State. It includes: 
- Unauthorised entry, transit and/or residence for fictitious 
scientific research 
- Unauthorised entry, transit  and/or residence for fictitious 
studies 
- Unauthorised entry, transit  and/or residence for fictitious 
pupil exchange 
- Unauthorised entry, transit  and/or residence for fictitious 
unremunerated training 
- Unauthorised entry, transit  and/or residence for fictitious 
voluntary service 
- Unauthorised entry, transit  and/or residence for fictitious 
family reunification - family reunification’ means the entry into 
and residence in a member state by family members of a third 
country national residing lawfully in that member state in order 
to preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship 
arose before or after the resident's entry; 
- Unauthorised entry, transit  and/or residence for fictitious 
pursuit of activities as self-employed person - ''Activity as a self-
employed person` means any activity carried out in a personal 
capacity or in the legal form of a company or firm within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the EC Treaty 
without being answerable to an employer in either case 
1401 02 Facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence 
Article 1 of the Council 
Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 
November 2002 defining 
the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit 
and residence 
Facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence 
includes: 
- Assisting a person who is not a national of a member state to 
enter, or transit across, the territory of a member state in breach 
of the laws of the State concerned on the entry or transit of 
aliens, either in order to obtain a financial or other material 
benefit (i.e. smuggling of migrants), or irrespective of a financial 
or other material benefit (e.g. marriage of convenience: this is a 
marriage contracted for reasons other than the reasons of 
relationship, family, or love. Instead, such a marriage is 
orchestrated for personal gain or some other sort of strategic 
purpose, such as immigration.) 
- Intentionally assisting a person – for financial gain - who is not 
a national of a member state to reside within the territory of a 
member state in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the 







OTHER OFFENCES RELATED TO IMMIGRATION/ALIEN 
LAWS 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
1500 00 Open Category OFFENCES RELATED TO FAMILY LAW 
1501 00 OFFENCES RELATED TO FAMILY LAW, not further specified 
 
Rest category: included to allow member states to provide 
additional information if they collect data on other types of 
offences. 
1502 00 BIGAMY 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Bigamy is the act or condition of a person marrying another 
person while still being lawfully married to a second person. 
Bigamy is an ECRIS category. 
1503 00 
FAMILY ABANDONMENT BY EVADING THE ALIMONY 
OR MAINTENANCE OBLIGATION 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Family Abandonment via evading the alimony or maintenance 
obligation, is an ECRIS category. 
1504 00 
REMOVAL OF A CHILD OR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
AN ORDER TO PRODUCE A CHILD 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
Failure to comply with an order to produce a minor or removal 
of a minor, is an ECRIS category 
 






1600 00 0pen Category OFFENCES AGAINST MILITARY OBLIGATIONS 
The ECRIS Classification is 
attached to the Proposal 
for a Council Decision on 
the establishment of the 
European Criminal 
Records Information 
System (ECRIS) in 
application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA 
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From 15 August 2010 onwards cross-border recidivism is supposed to be a fact 
in the European Union for member states agreed that during the sentencing 
stage foreign convictions will generate an effect similar to national convictions. 
However, theory and practice do not always correspond. This article 
demonstrates that the prior conviction policy – which forms the base of cross-
border recidivism – is inextricably linked not only to the approximation policy 
(to the extent that taking account of foreign convictions is limited along a double 
criminality requirement), but also to the information exchange policy (because 
foreign convictions can only be taken into account to the extent information is 
available). Therefore  these three policy domains form a so-called policy triangle 
that supports cross-border recidivism. Analysis reveals that the policy triangle is 
anything but balanced and the European policy maker failed to appreciate the 
links between those three policy domains. The prior conviction policy 
insufficiently safeguards the approximation acquis, the information exchange 
policy does not take account of the needs of a smooth functioning prior 
conviction policy, amongst others because it does not reflect the approximation 
acquis in the architecture of the criminal records databases nor in the templates 
supporting the information exchange. Therefore, in practice, cross-border 
recidivism is far from reality. 
 









Cross-border Recidivism: fact or fiction?  




1.1 Birth of cross-border recidivism 
For the purpose of this article cross-border recidivism refers to ‘crossing the 
border’ in the sentencing stage and take account of not only national but also 
foreign convictions. Though record-based sentencing is still subject to debate 
amongst criminological theorists (Von Hirsch 2002; Ashworth 2010), a scan of 
the existing criminal justice provisions leads to the conclusion that having 
proper information on a person’s criminal track record is important for the 
application of several criminal law concepts during the pre-trial, trial and even 
the post-trial stage. At the pre-trial stage, the existence of prior convictions can 
influence amongst others the qualification of the facts, the application of the ne 
bis in idem principle and the decision on provisional detention. At the trial stage, 
the existence of previous convictions can influence amongst others both the type 
of the sanction as it may restrict the use of suspended sentences as well as the 
level of the sanction as a result of accumulation or confusion with the previous 
sanction. At the post-trial stage, the existence of prior convictions can influence 
amongst others the application of the rules governing the execution of the 
sentence in that it may reduce the possibility to obtain adjustments of the 
sanction or be allowed early release. The provisions that govern the effect of 
prior convictions in the course of new criminal proceedings are referred to as 
‘prior conviction provisions’. For the purpose of this article, the prior conviction 
provisions governing the fate of foreign convictions during the sentencing stage 
are singled out as a case study. 
As a consequence of the increased mobility of the European citizens and thus 
the increased likeliness that a person subject to a criminal proceeding has 
previously been convicted in a member state other than the now proceeding 
member state, questions arise with respect to the fate of those foreign prior 
convictions when applying prior conviction provisions. From 15 August 2010 
onwards that question seems to be answered as cross-border recidivism is 
supposed to be a fact in the European Union. With the adoption of  Framework 
Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 (abbreviated to FD Prior Convictions)355 
                                                             
355 On 15 August 2010, the implementation deadline for the Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA 
of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in 
the course of new criminal proceedings, OJ L 220 of 15.08.2008 (abbreviated to FD Prior 





the member states agreed that during the sentencing stage foreign convictions 
will generate an effect similar to national convictions. Cross-border recidivism is 
not an EU invention, but – as announced in the 2000 Programme of Measures356 – 
the logical next step considering the pre-existing policy at Council of European 
level. Via Art. 56 of the 1970 European Convention on the International Validity 
of Criminal Judgements357, the European states had already taken the 
commitment to enable courts to take a foreign prior conviction into consideration. 
States should legislate so that judges are able to give foreign prior convictions all 
or some of the effects given to national convictions. Even though politically it was 
decided that Art. 56 of the Council of Europe Convention should be interpreted 
to mean that a complete refusal by a state to take account of foreign prior 
convictions was excluded358, the wording of that article does not introduce any 
formal obligation with respect to foreign prior convictions. Such a formal 
obligation is now included in FD Prior Convictions, making cross-border 
recidivism an irreversible part of the European criminal justice acquis. 
 
1.2 Cross-border recidivism & double criminality  
Cross-border recidivism is not unconditional. As soon as the criminal codes 
of different member states come into contact with each other, questions arise on 
the way to cope with the differences between them. With respect to cross-border 
recidivism, questions will arise with respect to the fate of foreign convictions for 
which the underlying behaviour would not have constituted an offence when 
committed in the territory of another member state. It was therefore expected 
that within those recidivism provisions, double criminality filters would be 
identified. A lot of member states make the application of their recidivism 
provisions either explicitly or implicitly dependent on a double criminality 
requirement and in doing so legislate that convictions will only be taken into 
account to the extent the underlying behaviour would also have constituted an 
offence when committed in the jurisdiction of the sentencing state. So-called 
                                                                                                                                               
Convictions) passed. Though Art. 3 FD Prior Convictions entails a broad range of provisions 
that require information on the person’s prior convictions (See more elaborately Proposal for a 
Council Framework Decision on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the 
European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings, COM (2005) 91 final of 17.3.2005 
included in Doc 7645/05, COPEN 60 of 30.3.2005) for the purpose of this article, the recidivist 
sentencing provisions are singled out as a case study. 
356 Measure 2 in Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 21 of 15.1.2001. 
357 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements, ETS n°70 of 
28.5.1970. 
358 Explanation to Art. 56 – Explanatory Report to the European Convention on the International 






further reaching foreign convictions for which the underlying behaviour does not 
pass the double criminality test, are excluded from the scope of cross-border 
recidivism. Firstly, an explicit exclusion of further reaching foreign convictions 
can be found, amongst others359, in Art. 75 (3) of the Portuguese criminal code 
which stipulates that “sentences passed by foreign courts count for recidivism as stated 
in the above articles, provided that the act constitutes a crime under Portuguese law.” 
Similarly, Section 143 (6) (a) of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act 2003 as amended in 
2009 only considers foreign convictions to be relevant “if the offence would 
constitute an offence under the law of any part of the United Kingdom if it were done in 
that part at the time of the conviction of the defendant for the current offence”. 
Secondly, an implicit exclusion can be found in sentencing provisions that require 
a specifically detailed similarity between the previous and new offence. 
Similarity can refer to offences included in the same chapter of the criminal code, 
as can be found in Art. 66 (5) of the Spanish criminal code. The application 
thereof will filter out further reaching foreign convictions. Similarity can also be 
clarified listing the provisions of the criminal code that are deemed to describe 
similar offences. Art. 132-16 to Art. 132-16-2 of the French criminal code list the 
offences that are considered to be the same for the application of the rules 
governing recidivism. Finally, similarity can also be limited to the exact same 
offence, as can be found in Art. 204 (4) of the Romanian criminal code which 
relates to a specific type of trafficking in human beings and its (5) clarifies that 
“if the act is committed repeatedly, the maximum penalty shall be increased by 2 years”. 
The same is true for Art. 562 of the Belgian criminal code. For those sentencing 
provisions, interpretation is clear, further-reaching foreign convictions are 
filtered out and will not be taken into account. 
On the other hand, some sentencing provisions (implicitly) open the door for 
taking account of further reaching foreign convictions. It be noted therefore, that 
double criminality filtering to limit the effect of cross-border recidivism is not a 
general practice in all 27 member states. Firstly, some criminal codes require 
similarity between the offences, without further clarification. Amongst others, 
this requirement can be found in Art. 28 of the Bulgarian criminal code which 
stipulates that aggravating effect is linked to being “convicted with a sentence that 
has entered into force for another similar crime”. Similar wording can be found in 
Chapter 6, Section 5 (1) 5 of the Finnish criminal code and Art. 64 of the Polish 
criminal code. Member states that have introduced such a very broad similarity 
concept, can use that broadness to allow the taking into account of further 
                                                             
359 For the purpose of this article, the recidivism provisions of each of the 27 member states were 
thoroughly reviewed and compared. However, the inclusion of references to provisions in the 
national criminal codes to serve as examples was preferred over an exhaustive overview of all 
provisions. Though necessary for the underlying analysis, the line of argumentation does not 
require such exhaustiveness. 





reaching foreign convictions. It can be argued that even when the constituent 
elements of the underlying offences do not have a national counterpart and the 
behaviour would not have constituted an offence in their jurisdiction, the 
offences may still be similar enough. The same is true for member states that have 
clarified the meaning of similarity in a very broad fashion. Art. 43 b of the Dutch 
criminal code lists the provisions which are to be considered as similar for the 
application of the recidivism provisions. This provision is written in a very open 
fashion stating that at least those offences should be considered similar, which 
leaves the door open for an interpretation that allows taking account of further 
reaching foreign convictions.  
 
1.3 Cross-border recidivism & the policy triangle 
The EU’s prior conviction policy should not be considered a stand-alone 
policy. Cross-border recidivism calls for the combination of three policy 












The first side of the policy triangle consists of the EU’s prior conviction policy 
itself. As symbolised by the birth of cross-border recidivism, in an evolving 
European Union in which a single area of freedom, security and justice is being 
installed, limiting the scope of prior conviction provisions to national 
convictions only is outdated. 
The second side of the policy triangle is the result of the identification of 
double criminality filters in recidivism provisions. Double criminality filtering 
aims at ensuring that foreign convictions for which the underlying behaviour 
would not have constituted an offence in the sentencing member state, are not 
taken into account. To a large extent, member states have the autonomy to 
decide what behaviour constitutes an offence and what behaviour does not. 
From that perspective to a large extent, member states have the autonomy to 









convictions are filtered out for double criminality reasons. However, in relation 
to some behaviour, member states have lost that autonomy following the 
adoption of an approximation instrument, i.e. an instrument in which member 
states commit themselves to ensuring that certain behaviour constitutes an 
offence in their jurisdictions. The entirety of these instruments forms the 
approximation acquis which symbolises the loss of the member states autonomy 
to individually decide whether behaviour should constitute an offence or not.360 
Inevitably, double criminality filtering links in with the EU’s approximation 
acquis, for filtering will not be acceptable in relation to approximated offences. 
Member states will not be allowed to raise double criminality based objections in 
relation to behaviour for which they have agreed to make it a criminal offence 
across the EU. The acquis formed through the approximation policy therefore 
comprises the second side of the policy triangle.  
The third side of the policy triangle is made up of the information exchange 
policy. Foreign convictions cannot be taken into account of no adequate criminal 
records information is available. Furthermore, the exchange policy will need to 
be tailored to match the needs of the prior conviction policy as well as the 
approximation policy; It needs to be tailored to facilitate double criminality 
filtering to the extent that filtering is accepted in view of the approximation 
acquis. Therefore, the level of detail in the criminal records policy will need to be 
evaluated in light of the conclusions with respect to the acceptability of double 
criminality filtering. 
The combination of these three policy domains leads to the creation of a 
policy triangle that needs to be well balanced to ensure the viability of cross-
border recidivism in the national sentencing practices. 
 
2 Acceptability of double criminality filtering 
To be able to set the base of the policy triangle, an analysis is required to 
decide whether double criminality filters are still acceptable or outdated as a 
limit to the application of a concept such as cross-border recidivism in an 
evolving European Union. The question arises whether the decision included in 
Recital 6 FD Prior Convictions that the framework decision does not entail an 
obligation to attach legal consequences to a foreign conviction if the underlying 
behaviour would not have been an offence in the prosecuting member state and 
therefore “a national conviction would not have been possible regarding the fact” needs 
                                                             
360 For reasons of clarity, it must be noted that the existing approximating framework decisions 
have been adopted with unanimity and therefore member states have unanimously accepted 
that they will no longer have the autonomy to individually change the criminal nature of the 
identified behaviour in the future. 





to be supported and in doing so allow double criminality filtering. This analysis 
can be done both from a theoretical as well as from a policy consistency 
perspective. 
 
2.1 Theoretical perspective 
Firstly, if double criminality filtering proves inacceptable from a theoretical 
perspective and member states are willing to accept the consequences thereof 
and thus adapt their national recidivism provisions, the hypothesis of the 
existence of a policy triangle would no longer stand. Therefore it needs to be 
evaluated whether there are theoretical containdications against the use of 
double criminality filtering when taking account of a person’s prior convictions 
during the sentencing stage. Amongst the sentencing theorists three big 
theoretical schools can be distinguished. 
As a first theoretical school, there is what Roberts calls the Exclusionary 
School (2010) or what Ashworth calls flat-rate sentencing, in which sentencing is 
governed by the crime and not the offenders prior record (2010). Because prior 
convictions should not affect sentencing in the first place, it is only logical that 
this school has not developed an argumentation with respect to the fate of 
further reaching foreign convictions. They list several reasons why recidivism 
should not affect the sentencing of new offences. Firstly, the deserved 
punishment of the previous conviction has been suffered and debt has been paid 
to society (Bagaric 2000) and secondly, it is argued that punishment should fit 
the crime and not the criminal (Fletcher 2000). Thirdly, recidivism premiums are 
said to be inconsistent with the absorption theories in multi-count cases (Tonry 
2010). The argumentation upheld by the followers of this school is completely 
opposite the content of the existing prior conviction provisions found in the 
national codes of the member states and can therefore be of no use to determine 
the acceptability of double criminality filtering and therefore the fate of further 
reaching foreign convictions. 
As a second theoretical school, there is the First Offender School, that argues 
that not so much the recidivist deserves attention, but rather the focus should be 
on first offenders, who deserve a mild penalty regime. In doing so they 
introduce the technique of the progressive loss of mitigation (Ashworth 2010; 
Roberts 2010), which consists of two parts. Firstly, first offenders should receive a 
reduction of their penalty and secondly, second and subsequent offenders should 
progressively loose that mitigation. Because it is not clear whether this 
progressive loss of mitigation is linked to the rule breaking behaviour or the 
return to court, the impact on double criminality filtering is unclear. 






criminality filtering. If linked to rule breaking behaviour, it is still unclear 
whether it is linked to breaking any rule anywhere, or breaking a rule (also) 
upheld by the sentencing state. If linked to the return to court, it is unclear 
whether a previous visit to any court is taken into consideration or only a 
previous visit to a court in the sentencing state. The theoretical framework 
developed by the First Offender School can therefore be of no use to decide that 
double criminality filtering is unacceptable. 
As a third and final theoretical school, there is the Recidivist Premium 
School, that argues that recidivism warrants the imposition of a penalty that 
exceeds the initially foreseen maximum (Lee 2010). They argue that firstly, 
repeat offenders are aware of the consequences of their acts and secondly a 
series of offences causes greater social harm than the harm associated with each 
individual offence. This latter argument is used as a justification for a true 
aggravation of the sentence and thus increase of the maximum. Here too, in 
absence of a clear position on the fate of further reaching foreign convictions, the 
argumentation can be interpreted in various ways. Stipulating that a person is 
aware of the consequences of his acts can be read as precluding the use of 
foreign convictions altogether because a foreign conviction only makes him 
aware of the consequences attached to the behaviour in another jurisdiction and 
in no way prepares him for the consequences in the own jurisdiction. Less strict, 
it can be interpreted as suggesting that a recidivist premium can only be applied 
when the person involved commits the exact same behaviour which warrants 
the use of a double criminality filter. More broadly however, it can be read as 
being aware that breaking the law is not without consequences which does not 
require a double criminality filter at all. Therefore also this last theoretical school 
can be of no use as a basis to preclude double criminality filtering when taking 
account of foreign convictions. 
As a result, from a theoretical perspective Recital 6 FD Prior Convictions 
justly stipulates that the framework decision does not entail an obligation to 
attach legal consequences to a foreign conviction if the underlying behaviour 
would not have been an offence in the prosecuting member state and therefore 
“a national conviction would not have been possible regarding the fact”. There is no 
theoretical reason to decide that double criminality filtering is an unacceptable 
limit to cross-border recidivism. 
 
2.2 Consistency perspective 
Secondly, questions can arise whether a decision on the acceptability of 
double criminality filtering in a cross-border recidivism context needs to mirror 
the position of double criminality in other European policy areas such as 





international cooperation in criminal matters; whether the acceptance of double 
criminality filtering in a cross-border recidivism context would be inconsistent 
when compared to the acceptance of double criminality filtering in other 
contexts. 
A thorough review of the position of double criminality in international 
cooperation instruments learns that filtering cannot be characterised as a general 
practice, though a number of international cooperation mechanism are limited 
along a double criminality requirement (Jareborg 1989; De Bondt 2012). In 
general, if cooperation entails only a small contribution to a criminal proceeding 
member states are usually more willing to cooperate, when compared to their 
willingness with respect to a type of cooperation that entails taking over a 
proceeding or executing foreign convictions. From that perspective, taking 
account of a person’s prior conviction when deciding on the sentence to be 
attached to new facts definitely ranks within the same class as the more far-
reaching forms of cooperation. Possibly raising a person’s sentence is not as non-
committal as taking a witness statement upon the request of another member 
state. It requires a level of understanding and acceptance of another member 
state’s criminal justice system that is comparable with the execution of the 
foreign conviction. Therefore accepting double criminality filtering in the context 
of cross-border recidivism is not at all inconsistent with the acceptance of double 
criminality filtering in international cooperation in criminal matters. 
Interestingly more recently member states have limited their possibility to 
invoke double criminality as a refusal ground, first in the EAW (Keijzer 2008; 
van Sliedregt 2009) and later copied into other mutual recognition instruments 
currently governing a large part of international cooperation in criminal matters. 
A list of 32 offences has been introduced for which double criminality can no 
longer be used as a refusal ground if the offence is punishable with a deprivation 
of liberty of at least 3 years in the issuing member state. Member states have 
agreed to recognise and execute foreign financial penalties, confiscations, 
alternative measures and even measures involving deprivation of liberty in spite 
of lacking double criminality. This evolution raises questions with respect to the 
appropriateness of the introduction of a similar list in other EU instruments even 
beyond international cooperation in criminal matters e.g. in the context of taking 
account of foreign convictions in the course of a new criminal proceedings. The 
question arises whether consistent European policy making would not require a 
provision stipulating that foreign convictions in relation to any of the 32 listed 
offences are to receive effect in any of the other member states regardless of 
double criminality issues. However, the introduction of the list of 32 offences 
and the subsequent abandonment of double criminality filtering in relation 
thereto is still subject to a lot of criticism in the context of international 






make use of the list, the policy line is still in full development. The introduction 
of the possibility to issue a declaration stating not to agree with the 
unacceptability of double criminality filtering in the most recent mutual 
recognition instruments comes to testify that.  
In addition to the fact that consistency arguments are not strong enough to 
render double criminality filtering unacceptable in the context of cross-border 
recidivism, the introduction of a list of 32 offences in its current form would not 
necessarily change anything in the member states’ practice. Should the 
introduction of a list of 32 offences be considered, this would likely be 
complemented with the possibility to issue a declaration not to agree with it as is 
done in the most recent mutual recognition instruments. In effect, a such 
provision would be equal to the current Recital 6 FD Prior Convictions which 
stipulates that the framework decision does not entail an obligation to attach legal 
consequences to a foreign conviction if the underlying behaviour would not 
have been an offence in the prosecuting member state and therefore “a national 
conviction would not have been possible regarding the fact”. Member states that wish 
to refrain from double criminality filtering (in line with the limitation of the 
acceptability thereof in international cooperation in criminal matters embodied 
by the list of 32 offences) can do so, member states that wish to retain the 
possibility to use the double criminality filter (in line with the possibility to 
declare not to accept the abandonment thereof in international cooperation in 
criminal matters) can also do so. Hence, introducing a list of 32 offences for 
which double criminality filter is not accepted for questionable consistency 
reasons, would not change the practice of cross-border recidivism. 
 
3 Enforcing approximation commitments 
Having set the base of the policy triangle and having decided that there are 
no theoretical nor consistency argumentations to in principle be opposed to 
double criminality filtering in cross-border recidivism cases, that first side of the 
policy triangle needs to be linked to the EU’s approximation policy which 
constitutes the second side of the policy triangle. Analysis will reveal whether or 
not the policy decision to approximate certain (parts of) offences should have a 
consequence for the acceptability of double criminality filtering in cross-border 
recidivism cases. 
The EU’s approximation policy gained its current shape with the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty. Art 29 and 31 (e) TEU introduced the possibility 
to approximate the constituent elements of offences, in the fields of organised 
crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking, which entails that member states are 
to ensure that the behaviour included in the approximation instrument 





constitutes a criminal offence in their jurisdiction. Art. 34 TEU introduced the 
framework decision, a new instrument specifically designed to that end. 
Approximating framework decisions have been adopted with respect to euro 
counterfeiting, fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, money 
laundering, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, illegal (im)migration, 
environmental offences, corruption, sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography, drug trafficking, offences against information systems, 
participation in a criminal organisation and finally racism and xenophobia. One 
of the fundamental critiques with respect to approximation as a legal tool is the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms (Borgers 2007; Hinarejos 2008). The Union 
remained powerless in the event implementation was late, incorrect and/or 
incomplete. This lacunae in the European legal framework was filled with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which now includes the approximation 
provisions in Art. 83 TFEU, introduces the directive as the applicable legal 
instrument, changes the unanimity requirement into a qualified majority voting 
and also foresees the possibility for the European Commission to start an 
infringement procedure to deal with implementation problems. Through the 
infringement procedure the Union can enforce the approximation commitments. 
However, the approximation commitments can also be enforced through 
explicitly prohibiting the use of double criminality filters in relation to offences 
that have been subject to approximation. It would be inappropriate to allow 
member states to use their lagging behind with respect to their approximation 
commitments as an excuse to be allowed to use the double criminality filter. 
Therefore, the European Union in its capacity of a policy maker enforcing the 
approximation acquis failed to appreciate the possibilities to enforce the 
approximation commitments beyond the either or not existence of an 
infringement procedure, through limiting the acceptance of double criminality 
filtering.  
 
4 Availability of criminal records information 
Furthermore, the commitment to honour cross-border recidivism requires 
adequate information on both national and particularly foreign prior 
convictions. Not wasting too many words on the matter, Art 3.1 FD Prior 
convictions suffices by referring to the criminal records information obtained 
under applicable instruments on mutual legal assistance or on the exchange of 
information extracted from criminal records. In doing so, that provision establishes 
the link between the prior conviction policy and the policy that ensures the 
availability of criminal records information. Therefore, the third side of the 






A person’s criminal record is compiled in the member state of the person’s 
nationality. In theory, information on all the prior convictions is stored, 
regardless of the nationality of the convicting authority. A single question 
directed to the criminal records authority of the member state of the person’s 
nationality should suffice to obtain a complete overview of existing prior 
convictions. However, theory and practice do not always correspond. The 
inclusion of information on foreign conviction is far from self-evident and is 
strongly dependent not only on the exchange of information when a member 
state hands down a conviction against a national of another member state, but 
also on the will of the receiving member state to store foreign conviction 
information of its nationals. Because the implementation deadlines of the new 
EU level instruments have not passed yet, the current legal framework is still 
largely based on the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance 
(abbreviated to ECMA)361, which has two important weaknesses that are baleful 
for the inclusion of information on foreign convictions and therefore the 
availability thereof for later use in cross-border recidivism cases.  
First, even though Art. 22 ECMA stipulates that states shall inform one and 
other of all criminal convictions and subsequent measures in respect of nationals 
of another state party at least once a year and in spite of the full ratification 
thereof, the exchange of criminal records information is considered problematic. 
The ECMA provisions are deemed to be inadequate362 and states simply do not 
seem to go through the trouble of complying with this commitment (Xanthaki 
2008). Because the flow of information on foreign convictions to the member 
state of the person’s nationality was not guaranteed, judges could not rely on the 
content of the criminal record kept in the member state of a person’s nationality 
and had to send a request to each of the other 26 member states.  
Second, with a view to ensuring that foreign convictions are taken into 
account in the course of new criminal proceedings, the other concern relates to 
the absence of an obligation to store foreign conviction information on own 
nationals. It comes as no surprise that when there is no obligation to store 
information there is no guarantee that national criminal records databases will 
include foreign criminal record data on their nationals. Only few countries 
stored information without further restrictions,  many member states filtered 
along a double criminality criterion and only included those convictions of their 
nationals for which the underlying behaviour would also have constituted an 
offence if committed in their jurisdiction and some member states stored no 
information at all. Reportedly, in the past Hungary did not store foreign criminal 
record information on its nationals (Ligeti 2008), neither did the UK (Webly 
                                                             
361 European Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters ETS n°30 of 20.4.1959. 
362 Recital 8 Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA on the organisation and content of the 
exchange of information from the criminal record between Member States. OJ L 93 of 7.4.2009.  





2008). Therefore, even if member states notify their counterparts in the member 
state the person’s nationality, the completeness of the information in the 
person’s criminal record is undermined by the lack of storage guarantees. As a 
result of these two weaknesses, the information with respect to foreign 
convictions actually included in a person’s criminal record – at the time of the 
adoption of FD Prior Convictions – is partial and unreliable and therefore 
insufficient to support the commitment to take account of foreign convictions in 
the course of a new criminal proceeding. To obtain a full overview of a person’s 
prior criminal history, a request needs to be directed to the criminal records 
authorities of each of the 26 other member states in order to learn whether a 
conviction has been handed down against that person in that particular member 
state. This is far from the ideal starting point to guarantee an effective cross-
border recidivism practice. 
 
5 Future criminal records prospects 
5.1 Tackling the weaknesses 
Within the European Union, the member states decided to take matters to the 
next level and tackle the two main weaknesses. Though the sequence in the 
adoption of the instruments cannot be free from critique363, consensus was 
reached with respect to two simultaneous instruments to step up the criminal 
records exchange mechanism amongst the member states in the year following 
the adoption of FD Prior Convictions. A framework decision (abbreviated to FD 
Crim Records) has been adopted on the organisation and content of the 
exchange of criminal records, and has been complemented by a decision 
designing the European Criminal Records Information System (abbreviated to 
ECRIS Decision).364  
Through the introduction of quasi real-time information exchange and a 
general storing obligation the main weaknesses with respect to the Council of 
                                                             
363 Recital 4 FD Crim Records and Recital 3 ECRIS Decision clarify that the need to improve the 
exchange of criminal records information was prioritized in the 2004 European Council 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism and was subsequently reiterated in the 2004 Hague 
Programme and its complementing 2005 Action Plan. Nevertheless it was not until after the 
adoption of the FD Prior Convictions political consensus was reached. 
364 Respectively Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA on the organisation and content of the 
exchange of information from the criminal record between Member States. OJ L 93 of 7.4.2009 
and Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal 
Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 






Europe ECMA are tackled for the future. Regrettably no retroactive completion 
of the existing criminal records is foreseen, so that in practice a fully functioning 
cross-border recidivism concept will only apply to convictions handed down at 
the latest from 7 April 2012 onwards, the deadline for implementation. 
 
5.2 Fine-tuning the exchange template 
5.2.1 Deducing requirements 
 
However, the criminal records policy would not serve its purpose if it would 
limit its objectives to only ensuring the exchange and storing of criminal records 
information. Such objectives do not necessarily guarantee the level of detail 
needed with respect to foreign prior conviction information. Information is not 
merely exchanged to be stored, or stored to be exchanged. That is the minimum 
minimorum that can be expected from a European policy. The information flow 
essentially aims at ensuring that the information can actually be used at a later 
stage. Therefore, to be able to develop a well considered policy with respect to 
the exchange of criminal records information, finds the right balance with the 
two other sides of the policy triangle. A well balanced policy takes account of the 
requirements originating from both the prior conviction policy as well as the 
approximation policy. 
A threefold requirement can be deduced from the analysis above. 
First, because double criminality filtering is inacceptable with respect to 
behaviour that have been subject to approximation, convictions that relate to 
such behaviour must be easily distinguishable, to be able to exclude them from 
any filtering process. On the one hand, member states that have correctly 
implemented the approximation instruments, will not have a problem with the 
fact that the said conviction will not be put through to the double criminality 
filter. On the other hand, member states that have not correctly implemented the 
approximation instruments should not be allowed to use their lagging behind as 
a reason to be allowed to filter out the conviction. 
Second, to facilitate double criminality filtering, it would be useful to compile 
the existing knowledge on behaviour that is known to pass through any of the 
double criminality filters in all member states, even beyond what has been 
subject to approximation. 
Third, when convictions relate to behaviour that has not been subject to 
approximation nor is known to be criminalised throughout the EU for another 
reason, it must be considered to require the mandatory inclusion of a short 





description of the behaviour to complement exchange and storing of 
information. 
5.2.2 Evaluating ECRIS 
 
Upon the passing of the implementation deadline on 7 April 2012, criminal 
records information exchange in the EU will be governed by FD Crim Records 
and the complementing ECRIS Decision. ECRIS – short for the European 
criminal records information system – introduces templates to facilitate the 
exchange of criminal records information which is an important novelty when 
compared to the existing exchange mechanisms. To overcome the difficulties 
experienced with the interpretation and so-called nationalisation of foreign 
convictions, the choice was made to introduce a reference index which would be 
the backbone of criminal records exchange and against which all member states 
could map their criminalisation provisions. Recital 12 ECRIS Decision highlights 
its ambition to have classified all possible offences/behaviour for which one can 
be convicted and has introduced a reference code for each of those offence(s) 
(categories).  
To implement the European criminal records information system, each 
member state has to develop a conversion table linking each and every one of 
the provisions of its criminal code to the ECRIS coding system. As a result, in a 
fictitious example, a member state will know that the behaviour criminalised 
under Art. X of its national criminal code corresponds to the behaviour that is 
included in code 111 of the ECRIS template. Similarly, the behaviour 
criminalised under Art. Y of its national criminal code corresponds to the 
behaviour that is included in code 222 of the ECRIS template. As soon as each of 
the 27 member states has developed a conversion table, ECRIS will become a 
sort of Esperanto that can be used as a language that is understood by each of 
the member states. 
Subsequently, Art. 4 ECRIS Decision requires that criminal records 
information exchange is based on those codes. When sending information on a 
conviction for which the underlying behaviour is criminalised in Art. X of the 
national criminal code, the sending criminal records authority will indicate that 
the conviction relates to the ECRIS code 111. At the receiving end, the receiving 
authority will know to which provision in his national criminal code a 
conviction corresponding to ECRIS 111 will relate.  
However, in spite of the good intentions, analysis leads to the conclusion that 
this technique does not suffice when reviewed in light of the double criminality 







Considering the existence of double criminality filters, be it explicit such as 
the one found in Art. 75 (3) of the Portuguese criminal code, or implicit when 
defining the meaning of similarity between the offences, the ECRIS classification 
system – and therefore also its coding system is – not detailed enough. The 
following example clarifies this concern. In the event a person is convicted for an 
offence related to child pornography, ECRIS code 1009 00 which comprises 
offences related to child pornography will be used when exchanging criminal 
records information. However, though it may seem that a reference to that code 
gives very specific information on the behaviour underlying the conviction, it 
should be noted that all member states have a different conception of the 
offences they relate to child pornography (Gillespie 2010). Therefore, in spite of 
that code, the underlying behaviour is still not clear enough to apply the double 
criminality filter found in cross-border recidivism provisions. It can hardly be 
disputed that the diversity in the member states’ incriminations is common 
knowledge, because it has been explicitly recognised by the then framework 
decision (abbreviated to FD Child Pornography) and has been reinforced by the 
new directive (abbreviated to Dir Child Pornography)365, when defining child 
pornography. Art. 3.2 FD Child Pornography lists the behaviour member states 
may exclude from the scope of the incrimination, affirming that at least for that 
behaviour, the criminal codes will differ. Similarly, Art 5.7 and Art 5.8 Dir Child 
Pornography stipulate that member states retain the discretion to decide 
whether the included behaviour is considered to be criminal or not. Therefore a 
reference to ECRIS code 1009 00 will not be (nor become) sufficient to establish 
whether or not the double criminality requirement has been fulfilled. This lack 
of detail is highly problematic in light of existing double criminality filters. 
When receiving foreign conviction information to store in a person’s criminal 
record or to take it into account in the course of a new criminal proceeding, the 
reference to code 1009 00 will not have any added value whatsoever when 
deciding whether the conviction may be passed through a double criminality 
filter nor when evaluating whether double criminality is met or not. 
 
                                                             
365 Respectively, Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating the 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ L 13 of 20.1.2004 and Directive 
2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating 
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335 of 17.12.2011. 
 
 





6 Conclusion: Between fact and fiction 
A strictly national interpretation of prior conviction provisions is outdated in 
an evolving European Union in which the effect of borders in fading away and a 
single area of freedom, security and justice is being installed. Representing those 
prior conviction provisions, cross-border recidivism as a concept influencing the 
sentence imposed at the end of a new criminal proceeding was singled out as a 
case study. Either or not limiting the application of cross-border recidivism 
along the double criminality requirements is an individual member state 
decision. There are no theoretical or consistency inspired contraindications 
against the use of double criminality filtering as such. From that perspective, the 
policy line found in FD Prior Convictions in which it is anchored that – in spite 
of the fading borders and growing recognition of foreign convictions – there 
cannot be an obligation to take account of a foreign conviction if the underlying 
behaviour would not have constituted an offences in the proceeding member 
state, needs to be supported. However, two fundamental critiques have surfaced 
in relation to that policy line, when reviewing it in light of the policy triangle 
required to support the viability of cross-border recidivism. 
First, the policy line regulating the taking account of prior convictions is 
completely detached from the policy line aiming to approximate offences, 
though these two policy lines should meet when introducing a double 
criminality filter. Though nothing prevents the introduction of double 
criminality filtering as a general limit to taking account of prior convictions, this 
filtering process should not be unlimited. To the extent member states have 
agreed to approximate and thus ensure criminalisation of certain behaviour they 
have also – though implicitly – agreed that the use of a double criminality filter 
in relation to that behaviour is no longer acceptable. Therefore, in light of the 
critiques raised with respect to the lack of enforcement mechanisms in case of 
incorrect implementation of the approximation instruments, it is a missed 
opportunity to explicitly introduce a limit to the use of double criminality 
filtering as an indirect enforcement tool. This first critique can easily be tackled. 
Because relying on exemplary implementation of the approximation instruments 
is naive, it must be recommended to amend the current double criminality 
provision (i.e. Recital 6 FD Prior Conviction) and complement it with a clause in 
which it is stipulated that under no condition double criminality filtering is 
acceptable in relation to offences that have been subject to approximation.  
Second, the information exchange policy is not tailored to fit the needs of 
cross-border recidivism. Besides the obvious critique with respect to the 
sequence in which the instruments have been adopted as a result of which the 
mandatory taking account of prior convictions required sending out 






single question to the member state of nationality, the new architecture of 
criminal records information exchange will not provide the practitioners with 
the level of detail in the prior conviction information they need for the 
application of their prior conviction provisions. The level of detail in the coding 
system introduced with ECRIS is far from adequate.  
However, though ECRIS has its obvious weaknesses, with the 
implementation deadline in sight it would be inappropriate to throw away the 
baby with the bathwater. Such a radical intervention is not even necessary. The 
coding system can easily be redesigned in a way that strikes the right balance 
between ensuring swift information exchange, safeguarding the approximation 
acquis and supporting the prior conviction policy. It can easily be redesigned in 
a way that restores the links with the two other domains that are part of the 
policy triangle. Two design criteria need to be taken into account: firstly it must 
allow immediate identification of cases that relate to behaviour that has been 
subject to approximation and can therefore under no circumstances be filtered 
out and cases for which double criminality is uncertain. Secondly, to facilitate 
the taking into account of a foreign conviction in the course of a new criminal 
proceeding and thus to apply cross-border recidivism, it should be 
recommended to even differentiate as much as possible and preserve as much 
detail as possible on the foreign conviction by introducing a level of detail that 
matches the detail included in approximation instruments.  
Retaking the example of a prior conviction for child pornography, the first 
criterion calls for a distinction between types of child pornography for which 
criminalisation is made mandatory in the FD or Dir Child Pornography (e.g. 
using the code 1009 01 and in doing so introducing suffix 01) and types of child 
pornography for which criminalisation is uncertain due to the exclusion 
possibilities listed in Art. 3.2 FD Child Pornography (e.g. using the code 1009 02 
and in doing so introducing suffix 02). Following that distinction a conviction 
with a reference to ECRIS code 1009 01 in the context of criminal records 
exchange will immediately be recognised as a foreign conviction that has been 
subject to approximation and therefore should be taken into account as possible 
cross-border recidivism. The second criterion, to facilitate the application of the 
cross-border recidivism provisions, calls for a level of detail in the information 
exchange templates that mirrors the level of detail included in the 
approximation instruments to preserve as much detail as possible on the prior 
convictions. The approximation instruments distinguish between the (a) 
production, (b) distribution, dissemination or transmission, (c) supplying or 
making available and (d) acquisition or possession of child pornography. Each 
of those subcategories should receive an individual code that can be used for 
information exchange and in doing so provide the sentencing judge detailed 
information on the foreign conviction that could facilitate the decision on the 





impact of the prior conviction on the new sentence. Building a template that 
includes that level of detail is exactly what has been done when developing 
EULOCS, short of EU level offence classification system (Vermeulen and De 
Bondt 2009). Additionally, to the extent that the behaviour underlying the 
conviction does not match any of the approximated offence categories, a code 
1009 02 used to characterise the conviction should be complemented with a short 
summary of the facts to avoid that follow-up questions to obtain additional 
information on the facts are no standard necessity. 
Due to the flaws in the policy triangle that is supposed to support it, cross-
border recidivism is floating between fact and fiction. In theory, based on the 
obligation included in FD Prior conviction, it is a fact, in most member states 
limited along a double criminality requirement. It is regrettable that the 
criminalisation commitments included in approximation instruments are not 
enforced via a mandatory taking account of related convictions in the course of a 
new criminal proceeding. As a result, cross-border recidivism for approximated 
offences is possibly a fiction. Most disturbing are the innovations with respect to 
criminal records exchange. The gaps formed in the pre-ECRIS era are not filled 
and the information exchanged based on the new ECRIS templates lack the 
required level of detail. As a result, taking account of foreign convictions places 
a high burden on sentencing judges who have to put in a lot of effort into 
obtaining the information needed to apply their national prior conviction 
provisions. Therefore, it can only be hoped for that the ECRIS templates are 
revisited using the possibility thereto foreseen in Art. 6.1 ECRIS Decision and at 
least make a distinction between a conviction for behaviour which is known to 
be criminalised in all member states and a conviction for behaviour for which no 
legal basis exists that guarantees double criminality. Only in doing so, the right 
balance can be struck between the three domains that form the policy triangle 
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Rethinking public procurement exclusions in the EU 
 
1 Introduction 
The case study∗ on public procurement seeks to test the applicability of the 
recommendations developed to increase the effect of disqualifications in the EU. 
Public procurement refers to the government’s activity of setting up public 
procedures for the purchasing of the services, goods and/or work which it needs 
to carry out its functions.366 When a government seeks to renovate a building 
with a view to house an administrative department, the purchasing of services 
will refer to the architectural advice preceding the renovation, the purchasing of 
goods will refer to the building materials necessary for the renovation and the 
purchasing of work to the actual man-hours to complete the renovation. The 
public procedure aims at ensuring that the best available product is purchased at 
the best available price.  
The reason why public procurement is singled out as a case study in this 
analysis of the future of disqualifications as sanction measures in the EU can be 
found in the mandatory exclusion grounds that are inserted in the revised legal 
framework. Member states are to legislate that candidates convicted for any of 
the listed offences are disqualified from participating in public procurement 
procedures. Those disqualifying exclusion grounds are subject to analysis in this 
case study. 
The current EU legal framework governing public procurement procedures 
has a long history. Already in the 70s the then EC decided to approximate the 
national provisions governing public procurement procedures. Approximation 
was considered necessary for an effective public procurement policy which is 
considered fundamental for the common market to be successful in achieving its 
objectives.367 Art. 2 TEC states that the Community has as its task the 
establishment of a common market, a goal to be reached – as explained in Art. 3 TEC 
– by the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital. The main concern has always been to eliminate any possible form of 
unequal treatment and discrimination amongst others in the field of public 
                                                             
∗ This first case study was developed by Wendy De Bondt in the context of her doctoral 
research.  
366 S. ARROWSMITH (1998), National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public 
Procurement: Harmony or Conflict?, in S. ARROWSMITH and A. DAVIES (eds.), Public 
Procurement: Global Revolution, London: Kluwer Law International. 
367 COM(85) 310, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, 28-
29.6.1985, § 81, http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf; 
Green Paper on Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the way forward, 
Communication adopted by the Commission on 27 November 1996. 





procurement. All policy documents called for the elimination of restrictions with 
respect to foreigners only, which exclude, limit or impose conditions upon the 
capacity to submit offers or to participate in public tender procedures.368 To that 
end, a series of directives was adopted. 
The first coordinating directives adopted are related to public works 
contracts369 and public supply contracts370. It must be said that – in spite of the 
large political consensus on their importance – the implementation of this first 
set of directives was far from successful.371 Looking to boost the debate on the 
regulation of public procurement in the EU, the 1985 White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market contained a chapter on Public Procurement 
and served as a catalyst for the amendments made in the following years.372 It 
was not until 1992 a directive was adopted with regard to the public service 
contracts.373 The establishment of the procurement trilogy374 did not mean the 
end of the debate on this topic. In 1996 a Green Paper375 was issued followed in 
1998 by a Commission Communication376 recognising the need to further 
                                                             
368 D. MEDHURST, (1997) EC Public Procurement Law, Sussex: Blackwell Science, 24, P. TREPTE, 
(2007) Public Procurement in the EU. A Practitioner’s Guide, Oxford: University Press, 28. 
369 Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the coordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, OJ L 185 of 16.8.1971 [hereafter: Works Directive]. 
370 Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 1976 concerning the coordination of procedures 
for the award of public service contracts, OJ L 13 of 15.1.1977 [hereafter: Supply Directive]. 
371 COM(85) 310 final, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, 28-
29.6.1985, § 83 http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf.  
J.M. FERNANDES MARTIN (1996), The EC Public Procurement Rules, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 93-
146. 
372 COM(85) 310 final, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Milan, 28-
29.6.1985, http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf.  
§ 84 reads: The Commission will open discussions with the Member States and through them 
with the awarding entities on the application of the Directives. 
§ 85 reads: In order to stimulate a wider opening up of tendering for public contracts, there is a 
serious and urgent need for improvement of the Directives to increase transparency further. 
Priority should be given to a system of prior information; to publication of the intention to use 
single tender procedures; to publication of the awards of contracts; and to improve the quality 
and frequency of statistics. [...] Besides, more visible action by the Commission in policing 
compliance with existing law will increase the credibility of the Community’s efforts to break 
down the psychological barriers to crossing frontiers. 
373 Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public service contracts, OJ L 209 of 24.7.1992. [hereafter: Service Directive]. 
374 The procurement trilogy consisted of the Works Directive as amended by Council Directive 
89/440/EEC of 18 July 1989,  the Supply Directive as amended by Council Directive 88/295/EEC 
of 22 March 1988  and the Service Directive. 
375 Green Paper on Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the way forward, 
Communication adopted by the Commission on 27 November 1996. 
376 COM(l998) 143 final, Commission Communication on Public Procurement in the European 






consolidate and integrate, modernise and simplify the legal framework. It took 
until 2004 to adopt a consolidating directive which coordinates the three 
procurement domains, comprises the revised legal framework for public 
procurement in the member states and introduces – as one of the novelties – 
mandatory exclusion grounds for candidates convicted for any of the listed 
offences.377 From the preamble it becomes clear that the main objective remains 
the creation of the conditions of competition necessary for the non-
discriminatory award of public contracts, the rational allocation of public money 
through the choice of the best offer presented, suppliers’ access to a truly single 
market with significant business opportunities and the reinforcement of 
competition among European enterprises. This is important to keep in mind, for 
it will be argued that an incorrect interpretation and application of the exclusion 
grounds might jeopardise that objective. 
In January 2011, the European Commission launched a new Green Paper on 
the modernisation of the EU’s public procurement policy, in which it is 
stipulated that exclusion of bidders is a powerful weapon to punish – and also to 
a certain extent prevent – unsound business behaviours. However, a number of 
questions relating to the scope, interpretation, transposition and practical 
application of this provision remain open, and member states and contracting 
authorities have called for further clarification. It should be examined in particular 
whether the exclusion grounds in Article 45 are appropriate, sufficiently clear (notably 
the exclusion ground of "professional misconduct") and exhaustive enough, or if further 
exclusion grounds should be introduced. Contracting authorities also seem to be faced 
with practical difficulties when trying to obtain all relevant information on the personal 
situation of tenderers and candidates established in other member states and their 
eligibility according to their national law. Furthermore, the scope for implementing 
national legislation on exclusion grounds will probably need to be clarified. Providing for 
member states to introduce additional exclusion grounds in their national legislation 
might enable them to tackle specific problems of unsound business behaviours linked to 
the national context more effectively. On the other hand, specific national exclusion 
grounds always entail a risk of discrimination against foreign bidders and could 
jeopardise the principle of a European level playing field.378 Considering that those 
concerns receive little attention in the results of that latest consultation379, the 
                                                             
377 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts." OJ L 143 of 30.4.2004 [hereafter: Procurement Directive]. 
378 COM(2011) 15 final, Green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy 
Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market, Communication adopted by the 
European Commission on 27 January 2011. 
379 The synthesis of the replies only rephrases the concern raised in the Green Paper itself, 
providing that there is consensus amongst all stakeholder groups that Article 45 of Directive 
2004/18/EC is a useful instrument to sanction unsound business behaviours. Nevertheless, certain 





exclusion grounds introduced in the 2004 Procurement Directive will be 
critically assessed against the background of the recommended disqualification 
triad to increase the effect of disqualifications in the EU, which consists of:  
 
- Approximating exclusion grounds for approximated offences; 
- Attaching equivalent effect to foreign convictions; and 
- Executing a mutual recognition request.  
 
 
2 Approximated exclusion grounds for 
approximated offences 
The first policy recommendation within the disqualification triad consists of 
introducing approximated disqualifications as sanction measures for a set of 
approximated offences. Applied in the context of public procurement, the 
disqualification as a sanction measure relates to the exclusion from participating 
in a procurement procedure. Once convicted for identified approximated 
offences, a person is no longer eligible as a candidate in a public procurement 
procedure and will be excluded from participation. In the current EU legal 
instruments, an exclusion can be found for having been convicted for 
participation in a criminal organisation, fraud, corruption and money 
laundering. In doing so, disqualification upon being convicted for certain 
approximated offences is guaranteed throughout the EU, regardless of attaching 
an equivalent effect to a foreign conviction or cross-border execution of foreign 
convictions, which are the second and third policy recommendation that will be 
elaborated on below.  
The analysis of the way this policy recommendation is currently developed 
in the EU’s legislative instruments revealed three issues that need further 
elaboration. The first issue relates to the legal instruments used to approximate. 
Whereas traditionally approximation is found in (former third-pillar) framework 
decisions or post-Lisbon directives380, analysis reveals that approximation with 
                                                                                                                                               
clarifications are considered useful by many respondents, notably with regard to generic notions such as 
"professional misconduct", as well as rules on a maximum duration of the debarment, Green Paper on 
the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more efficient European 
Procurement Market, Synthesis of replies, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
consultations/docs/2011/public_procurement/synthesis_document_en.pdf. 
380 For reasons of completeness, it must be added that approximation extends beyond what is 
regulated in framework decisions (complemented with the post-Lisbon directives) and the 
complementing first-pillar instruments. See more elaborately: W. DE BONDT and G. VERMEULEN 






respect to procurement procedures is found in (former first-pillar) directives. 
The second issue relates to the approach used to delineate the scope of the 
disqualification ratione materiae, i.e. the delineation of the offences that give rise 
to a disqualification from participation in a procurement procedure. The third 
issue relates to the necessary flanking measures with respect to the availability 
of information to live up to the commitments with respect to the approximated 
disqualifications. 
2.1 Framework Decisions & Directives 
The first issue relates to the instruments used to approximate. When 
reviewing approximation in criminal matters, focus is directed towards 
framework decisions. In parallel to the introduction of the possibility to 
approximate the constituent elements of offences and sanctions in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the framework decision was introduced as the new 
instrument specifically designed to develop an approximation acquis. Art. 31.1 
(e) TEU stipulated that common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
shall include progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to 
the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, 
terrorism and illicit drug trafficking and was complemented by Art. 34.2 (b) TEU 
which stipulated that the Council may adopt framework decisions for the purpose of 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the member states. Framework decisions 
shall be binding upon the member states as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to 
the national authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct 
effect. In the mean time, post-Lisbon directives have to be added to the list of 
instruments in which approximation provisions can be found. The coming into 
force of the Lisbon treaty – which lead to the disappearance of the three pillar 
structure and a corresponding restructuring of the legal instruments381 – has 
designated the directive as the instrument to be used for approximation in the 
future. Therefore, as suggested by the subtitle of this section, an analysis of the 
approximation acquis requires looking into the content of both framework 
decisions as well as directives. Approximation instruments have been adopted 
for euro counterfeiting382, fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
                                                                                                                                               
judicial cooperation in the EU. In M. COOLS (Ed.), Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law 
& Policing (Vol. 4, pp. 15-40). Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu.  
381 See more elaborately on the changes brought about by the Lisbon treaty: S. Peers (2008). EU 
Criminal Law and the Treaty of Lisbon. European Law Review, 33(4), 507; W. DE BONDT and A. 
DE MOOR, De Europese Metamorfose? De implicaties van het Verdrag van Lissabon voor het 
Europees Strafrecht. Panopticon, 1, 31; C. JANSSENS (2009). Europees strafrecht en het Verdrag 
van Lissabon. Een verhaal van déjà vu's, dwarsliggers en compromissen. Nullum Crimen, 1, 14. 
382 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties 
and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 





payment383, money laundering384, terrorism385, trafficking in human beings386, 
illegal (im)migration387, environmental offences388, corruption389, sexual 
exploitation of a child and child pornography390, drug trafficking391, offences 
against information systems392, participation in a criminal organisation393 and 
racism and xenophobia394.  
                                                                                                                                               
140 of 14.06.2000 as amended by the Council Framework Decision of 6 December 2001 amending 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other 
sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro, OJ L 329 of 
14.12.2001. 
383 Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash 
means of payment, OJ L 149 of 2.6.2001. 
384 Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, 
tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, OJ L 
182 of 5.7.2001 [hereafter: FD Money Laundering]. 
385 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164 of 22.6.2002 as 
amended by Council Framework Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
combating terrorism, OJ L 330 of 9.12.2008.  
386 Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, OJ L 
20 of 1.8.2002 repealed and replaced by Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101 of 15.4.2011.  
387 Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the legal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, as 
complemented by the Council Directive of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 128 of 5.12.2002. 
388 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law, OJ L 29 of 5.2.2003 and Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA to strengthen 
the criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, OJ L 
255 of 30.9.2005 annulled and replaced by Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ 
L 328 of 6.12.2008.  
389 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector, OJ L 192 of 31.7.2003.  
390 Council Framework Decision of 22 December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, OJ L 13 of 20.1.2004 repealed and replaced by Directive 
2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating 
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335 of 17.12.2011. 
391 Council Framework Decision of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, OJ L 335 
of 11.11.2004.  
392 Council Framework Decision of 21 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, OJ 
L 69 of 16.3.2005.  
393 Council Framework Decision of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, OJ L 
300 of 11.11.2008 [hereafter: FD Organised Crime]. 
394 Council Framework Decision of 29 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 






Within those framework decisions and directives, provisions can be found 
instructing member states to legislate in a way that allows certain sanctions to be 
imposed on natural persons as well as on legal persons. With respect to natural 
persons, the approximated sanctions are mainly sanctions involving deprivation 
of liberty. Art. 4.2 FD Corruption stipulates that [e]ach member state shall take 
the necessary measures to ensure that the conduct referred to in Article 2 is 
punishable by a penalty of a maximum of at least one to three years of 
imprisonment. With respect to legal persons, the approximated sanctions are 
mainly mandatory financial sanctions and a set of optional alternative sanctions. 
Art. 6 FD Corruption stipulates that [e]ach member state shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that a legal person held liable pursuant to Article 5(1) is 
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which shall 
include criminal or non-criminal fines and may include other penalties such as 
exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid [...]. Unfortunately, the 
exclusion from participation in a public procurement procedure is not listed as a 
possible sanction. Nevertheless, this would be the place where approximation of 
sanctions would be expected.  
However, this does not mean that exclusion from participation in a public 
procurement procedure has not been subject to approximation. Whereas 
traditionally review of approximation in criminal matters is limited to the above 
mentioned framework decisions and post-Lisbon directives, approximation is 
also pursued via former first pillar directives. As clarified when elaborating on 
the built-up to the current EU framework governing public procurement, the 
approximation of mandatory exclusion from being able to participate in a public 
procurement procedure is precisely one of the novelties of the consolidating 
2004 Procurement Directive. 
Besides consolidating the then existing legal framework, a number of 
novelties were introduced395, one of them being the mandatory character of 
certain conviction related exclusion grounds. In the old directives, contracting 
authorities were allowed to exclude candidates for having been convicted for an 
offence concerning their professional conduct.396 In addition to this optional 
conviction related exclusion ground,397 Art. 45(1) introduces a mandatory 
exclusion ground applicable to any contractor who has been subject of a 
conviction by final judgement for one or more of the listed offences, in as far as 
                                                             
395 For a complete overview, see e.g. S. ARROWSMITH (2004). As assessment of the new legislative 
package on public procurement. Common Market Law Review, 41, p 1277-1325; 
396 Art. 29(c) Dir 92/50/EEC, Art. 20(c) Dir 93/36/EEC and Art. 24(c) Dir 93/37/EEC can be 
criticised for not clarifying which specific behaviour they relate to. See e.g. E. PISELLI, (2000) The 
scope for excluding providers who have committed criminal offences under the E.U. 
Procurement Directives. Public Procurement Law Review, 6, p 267-286. 
397 Now included in Art 45(2)(c) Procurement Directive. 





the contracting authority is aware of it. In doing so an approximated 
disqualification is introduced for a selection of offences. These four offences are 
participation in a criminal organisation, corruption, fraud against the financial 
interests of the European Communities and money laundering. They were 
singled out because public procurement is said to be particularly vulnerable to 
those offences.398 
It must be said, that in light of the discussions on the division of competences 
between the former first and third pillar, it is surprising to find approximating 
provisions with respect to sanctions in a first pillar instrument. The position of 
the Court of Justice has always been that – in the event the competence with 
respect to a policy domain in shared between the first and third pillar (e.g. when 
third pillar criminal law are wanted to strengthen the legal framework with 
respect to a first pillar domain) – approximation of the offence can be done in a 
first pillar instrument whereas approximation of the sanction should always be 
done in a third pillar instrument.399 Though there are old examples in which the 
split has not caused any problems400, there has been considerable debate401 with 
respect to the legal basis for an instrument on the protection of the environment 
                                                             
398  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a 
Union Policy Against Corruption. COM (1997) 192 final of 21.05.1997 and Communication from 
the Commission on Public Procurement in the European Union. COM(1998) 143 final, of 
11.03.1998 See also: S. WILLIAMS (2009) Coordinating public procurement to support EU 
objectives - a first step? The case of exclusions for serious offences", in ARROWSMITH, S. and 
KUNZLIK, P., Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p 479-498, P.-A TREPTE (2007). Public Procurement in the EU. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 338; E. MANUNZA (2002) EG-aanbestedingsrechtelijke 
problemen bij privatisering en bij de bestrijding van corruptie en georganiseerde criminaliteit. 
Een beschouwing over de vraag of privatiseringsoperaties en de bestrijding van corruptie en 
georganiseerde criminaliteit een belemmering vormen voor de voltooiing van de Europese 
markt voor overheidsopdrachten Deventer: Kluwer, p245. 
399 ECJ, Case C-176/03, Commission v Council, 13 September 2005; ECJ, Case C-440/05, 
Commission v Council, 23 October 2007. 
400 Reference can be made to the 2002 framework decision on the strengthening of the penal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (OJ L 328 of 
5.12.2002) as complemented with the 2002 directive defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence (OJ L 328 of 5.12.2002). 
401 See e.g. DAWES, A., & LYNSKEY, O. (2008). The Ever-longer Arm of EC law: The Extension of 
Community Competence into the Field of Criminal Law. Common Market Law Review, 45, 131; 
CENTER, E. L. S. (2007). Approximation of European Environmental Criminal Laws: Within of 
beyond the European Community Competence? Columbia Journal of European Law, 13, 747; 
WENNERÅS, P. (2008). Towards an ever greener Union? Competence in the field of the 






through criminal law.402 The inclusion of a disqualification measure in the 2004 
Procurement Directive is contrary to that policy line. 
In any event, the current approximation acquis governing the 
disqualification from participation in a public procurement procedure requires a 
combination not only of the approximating framework decisions and the new 
approximating directives, but additionally needs to be combined with the 
approximating provisions that can be found in other EU instruments. Based on 
the analysis above, two types of directives exist. For the purpose of this case 
study, the directives in which the constituent elements of offences, will be 
referred to as the approximating directives; the directive in which the 
procurement procedures are ‘approximated’ will be referred to as the 
Procurement Directive, to clearly distinguish between the two types of directives 
currently included in the relevant EU instrumentarium. 
It remains regrettable though, that the approximation of sanctions is not 
bundled into one instrument, but requires the combination of multiple 
instruments. There have been a number of missed opportunities to better 
coordinate the coexistence of the various instruments. Considering that the 2004 
Procurement Directive for example introduced the obligation to exclude 
candidates for having been convicted for participation in a criminal 
organisation, it is unfortunate that no references to that obligation is included 
when reviewing the approximation instrument that specifically deals with 
participation in a criminal organisation. When looking into the sanctions 
included in the 2008 FD Organised Crime, Art. 3 with respect to natural persons 
refers to traditional sanctions involving deprivation of liberty and Art. 6 with 
respect to legal persons refers to the traditional sanctions including criminal and 
non-criminal fines and a set of suggested alternative sanctions. 
The fact that disqualification from participation in a public procurement 
procedure is not included as a sanction in FD Organised Crime can be explained 
by the diversity in the approach member states have developed with respect to 
that and other types of disqualifications. Whereas some member states have 
included it into their criminal justice system as a sanction that can be imposed by 
a judge in the course of a criminal procedure, other member states have 
implemented it through restricting the access to in casu procurement procedures 
for persons that have been convicted in the past. In doing so, the 
disqualifications from participating in a public procurement procedure is not a 
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sanction sensu stricto for it is not imposed by a judge. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recall that approximation consists of aligning the result, leaving the 
choice of form and methods up to the member states. From that perspective, it is 
very much possible to introduce a disqualification from participation in a public 
procurement procedure as a mandatory sanction for both natural and legal 
persons in the approximating Directives, leaving it up to the member states to 
decide whether this disqualification will be imposed in the course of a criminal 
justice procedure or will be implemented into the national law as a restriction 
with respect to the eligibility to participate in a public procurement procedure.  
The recommendation to include the exclusion from participation in a public 
procurement procedure into the instruments that approximate the constituent 
elements of offences and their sanctions, would increase cross-instrument 
consistency. However, there are two other issues with respect to the interaction 
between the relevant EU instruments that require anticipation to ensure the 
proper applicability of these instruments. The second issue relates to the 
delineation of the offences in the procurement directive and linked to that the 
delineation of the mandatory exclusion grounds. The third issue relates to the 
availability of sufficiently detailed criminal records information to single out the 
convictions for which exclusion is mandatory following the provisions in the 
procurement directive. 
2.2 Delineation of the approximated offences 
The second issue relates to the delineation of the offences in the procurement 
directive and linked to that the delineation of the mandatory exclusion grounds. 
Interestingly, the scope of the offences and thus the exclusion obligations in the 
procurement directive is explicitly clarified through the introduction of a 
reference to an approximation instrument. At first sight this provision perfectly 
matches the first policy option developed above when elaborating on the 
disqualification triad, namely the introduction of approximated disqualifications 
for approximated offences. 
 
- First, for participation in a criminal organisation, reference is made to the 
behaviour included in Art. 2(1) of the Council Joint Action 98/33/JHA; 
- Second, for corruption, reference is made to the behaviour included in Art. 3 
of the Council Act of 26 May 1997 and Art. 3(1) of the Council Joint action 
98/742/JHA;  
- Third, for fraud, a reference is made to Art. 1 of the Convention relating to 






- Fourth for money laundering, reference is made to Art. 1 of the Council 
Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purpose of money laundering. 
 
Though the references may reflect the status of approximation at the time of 
adoption of the Procurement Directive403, the approximation acquis develops 
rapidly and it is only a matter of time before the scope (at least the legal basis) of 
the approximated parts of the offence labels included in the list has changed. 
This raises a number of concerns. 
The first concern relates to the reference to Council Joint Action 98/33/JHA on 
participation in a criminal organisation to delineate the scope of participation in 
a criminal organisation.404 The joint action referred to has been repealed and 
replaced by Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on organised crime405. 
Fortunately, Art. 9 FD Organised Crime elaborates on the faith of outdated 
references to the joint action and clearly stipulates that “references to participation 
in a criminal organisation within the meaning of Joint Action 98/733/JHA in measures 
adopted pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community shall be construed as references to participation 
in a criminal organisation within the meaning of this new Framework Decision”. Even 
though from a technical legal perspective, there is no real problem and the 
reference to the joint action in the procurement directive should now be read as 
a reference to the framework decision, this approach requires that whoever is 
using the Procurement Directive is fully aware of any changes in the 
approximation acquis. This presumption or requirement of knowledge about the 
approximation acquis is far from ideal. The approximation acquis changes 
rapidly and procurement experts cannot be expected to be experts on offence 
approximation as well. At least, striving for consistent and user friendly policy 
making, it would make sense to warn the user of the Procurement Directive for 
the fact that the references are not kept updated. This can be done for example, 
by stipulating that the offence is defined in accordance to an identified article in 
any of the approximation instruments “and the provisions amending and replacing 
that instrument”406. There are two options to accommodate this concern. A first 
                                                             
403 It is important to note that in the following paragraphs it will be made clear that even at the 
time of the adoption of the 2004 Procurement Directive, the instruments referred to provide an 
incorrect overview of the approximation acquis. 
404 Joint action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal 
organisation in the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 351 of 29.12.1998. 
405 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised 
crime, OJ L 300 of 11.11.2008. 
406 This approach is copied from the approach used in the Europol Convention and the new 
Decision to define the unlawful drug trafficking. It is defined as the criminal offences listed in 





option would be to introduce provisions into the approximation instruments 
that truly amend the references to repealed and replaced approximation 
instruments in any other EU instrument. Instead of stipulating that references to 
old instruments shall be construed as references to new instruments, the 
references are actually amended and replaced by a reference to the new 
instrument. This requires a thorough analysis of the entirety of the EU 
instrumentarium to catalogue all references to approximation instruments in 
other EU instruments and includes the inherent risk to miss some of the 
references. A second option would be to keep track of the approximation acquis 
in a separate document so that the specific reference to an approximation 
instrument can be lifted out of the procurement directive and replaced with a 
single reference to the approximation acquis as a whole, stipulating that the 
exclusion obligation relates to the said offence labels to the extent that they have 
been subject to approximation. To ensure transparency and not jeopardise the 
user-friendliness of the instrument, this approach requires that a consolidated 
approximation acquis is easily available for anyone to consult.  
The second concern is more pressing. Whereas the first concern mainly 
relates to the user-friendliness of the procurement directive, and the 
presumptions of knowledge on the changes in the approximation acquis, the 
second concern relates to the questions that can rise when changes in the 
approximation acquis are not complemented with a provision stipulating that all 
references to the older instrument must be construed as references to the newer 
instrument. An example thereof can be found in the Council Joint Action 
98/742/JHA on corruption in the private sector407 which has been repealed by the 
Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA408. Unfortunately though, no explicit 
replacement provision – as found in the instruments on organised crime – is 
included in the instrument on corruption. Even though the framework decision 
can be interpreted to have the intention to replace the joint action so that 
references to the joint action should be construed as references to the framework 
decision, there is no explicit legal basis for a such interpretation, which might 
give rise to a legal conflict when determining whether or not a candidate falls 
within the scope of the mandatory exclusion grounds. If a new instrument 
changes the constituent elements of the offence and broadens the definition, 
there is no explicit legal basis to expand the scope of the exclusion ground 
accordingly. A candidate convicted for a type of corruption that has been added 
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to the offence definition in the new framework decision, will argue that his 
conviction falls outside the scope of the mandatory exclusion from participation 
in a public procurement procedure for his behaviour is not included in the 
definition found in the joint action that is referred to in the procurement 
directive, and the new approximating instrument does not stipulate that 
references to the old joint action should be construed as references to the new 
framework decision. Art. 8 FD Corruption for example merely stipulates that the 
joint action is repealed. It does not stipulate that the joint action is repealed and 
replaced as is done in some other framework decisions, let alone that it explicitly 
stipulate that references should be construed as references to the new FD 
Corruption. Taking account of this complexity, it is most unfortunate that the 
2004 procurement directive includes a reference to a joint action that at the time 
of the adoption had already been repealed by the 2003 FD Corruption.409 This 
discussion could have been avoided if the most recent approximation 
instrument was used to delineate the scope of the mandatory exclusion ground. 
This unfortunate introduction on an outdated reference comes to testify how 
challenging it can be to keep pace with the rapidly evolving approximation 
acquis. 
The third concern relates to the potential coexistence of multiple definitions 
for the same offence label. To delineate the scope of money laundering, the 
procurement directive refers to Art. 1 of the Council Directive 91/308/EEC on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering.410 That instrument has copy pasted the definition of laundering 
offences as introduced in the 1990 Council of Europe Money Laundering 
Convention411 into a EU instrument. Because a copy pasting exercise detaches 
the EU definition from the Council of Europe definition, an autonomous EU 
definition is created, be it at the time a perfect copy of the Council of Europe 
definition. However, in the following years also other EU instruments with 
respect to money laundering were adopted. Instead of using the existing EU 
definition as a basis to further develop the EU money laundering policy, a 
reference to the definition in the 1990 Council of European Convention was 
included in the 1998 Joint Action412 which was subsequently repealed by the 2001 
                                                             
409 This observation was also made by: Arnáiz, T. M. (2006). Grounds for exclusion in public 
procurement: measures in the fight against corruption in the European Union. International 
Public Procurement Conference Proceedings, 329. 
410 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system 
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Treaty on European Union, on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing 
and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime, OJ L 333 of 8.12.1998. 





Framework Decision413. This means that two different approaches co-exists with 
respect to the definition of money laundering: on the one hand a copy pasted 
and therefore autonomous EU definition and on the other hand a referenced and 
therefore Council of Europe-dependent EU definition. Though currently still 
matching, this double approach runs the risk of creating two co-existing 
definitions at EU level in the event the definition at Council of Europe level is 
adapted and that adaptation would be pulled into the EU framework through 
the reference to the Council or Europe instrument included in the latest 
approximation instrument. Especially when the definition of money laundering 
is used to delineate the scope of obligations imposed on the member states, 
consistent EU policy making would strive to have one approximated EU 
definition (be it or not linked to the Council of Europe definition) that is used as 
a basis throughout EU policies. 
The concerns with respect to the delineation of the approximated offences 
that in their turn delineated the scope of the mandatory exclusion from 
participating in a public procurement procedure, raise questions on the 
feasibility to tackle them and improve the approach currently used. Though it is 
necessary to clearly delineate the scope of the offences and the use of the 
approximation acquis to that end should be applauded, including explicit 
references to the approximation instruments cannot stand the test of time – as 
illustrated by the replacement of the joint action on organised crime with a 
framework decision on organised crime – and even runs the risk of being 
outdated to begin with – as illustrated by the reference to the 1997 joint action 
which was already repealed by the 2003 framework decision at the time the 2004 
procurement directive was adopted. Alternatively, in order to avoid any 
discussion on the scope of the approximated offences and the legal basis to be 
used, a well-considered policy would stipulate that the offences are to be 
delineated as indicated in a separate instrument that contains an overview of the 
approximation acquis at any given time. To that end, information on the 
approximation acquis should be compiled in a separate instrument that is kept 
up to date and made available for any practitioner confronted with the situation 
that requires application of the approximation acquis. The recommendation to 
lift the references to approximation instruments out of the Procurement 
Directive and replace them with a single reference to the approximation acquis 
as a whole stipulating that the offences are to be interpreted in light thereof, 
could be further explored and elaborated on. Specifically with that added value 
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in mind, EULOCS – short for EU level offence classification system – should be 
included in the discussion.414  
EULOCS is a classification system that presents an overview of the 
approximation acquis. It makes a distinction between those parts of offences that 
have been subject to approximation and those parts of offences for which 
criminalisation is subject to national discretion. Additionally, each offence 
category is provided a code and for the approximated parts a reference to the 
legal basis is included as well as an updated version of the behaviour that has 
been subject to approximation.  
Considering that mandatory exclusion grounds have been introduced for 
participation in a criminal organisation, fraud, corruption and money 
laundering, the following table is intended to provide insight into what EULOCS 
looks like. 
 
0200 00 Open Category PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
Article 1 Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime 
 “Criminal organisation” means a structured association, 
established over a period of time, of more than two persons 
acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a 
maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit; 
“Structured association” means an association that is not 
randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence, 
nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members, 
continuity of its membership, or a developed structure 
0201 00 
OFFENCES JOINTLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPATION IN 
A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 
0201 01 Directing a criminal organisation 
Article 2 (b) , Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
against organised crime 
Conduct by any person consisting in an agreement with one or 
more persons that an activity should be pursued which, if 
carried out, would amount to the commission of offences, even 
if that person does not take part in the actual execution of the 
activity. 
0201 02 
Knowingly participating in the criminal activities, without 
being a director 
Article 2 (a), Council 
Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 
October 2008 on the fight 
Conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of 
either the aim and general criminal activity of the organisation 
or the intention of the organisation to commit the offences in 
question, actively takes part in the organisation's criminal 
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against organised crime  activities, even where that person does not take part in the 
actual execution of the offences concerned and, subject to the 
general principles of the criminal law of the member state 
concerned, even where the offences concerned are not actually 
committed, 
0201 03 
Knowingly taking part in the non-criminal activities of a 
criminal organisation, without being a director 
Article 5 - United Nations 
Convention on 
Transnational Organised 
Crime (UNTS no. 39574, 
New York, 15.11.2000) 
Conduct by any person who, with intent and with knowledge of 
either the aim and general criminal activity of the organisation 
or the intention of the organisation to commit the offences in 
question, actively takes part in the organisation's other activities 
(i.e. non-criminal) in the further knowledge that his 
participation will contribute to the achievement of the 
organisation's criminal activities. 
 
0202 00 
OTHER FORMS OF PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL 
ORGANISATION 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 





0905 00 CORRUPTION 
Annex to the Convention 
of 26 July 1995 on the 
establishment of a 
European police office 
This category is listed without further explanation. 
0905 01 Offences jointly defined as corruption 
0905 01 01 
Active corruption in the public sector involving a EU public 
official 
Article 3.1 of the 
Convention of 26 May 
1997 on the fight against 
corruption involving 
officials of the European 
Communities or officials 
of member states of the 
European Union  
The deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives, directly 
or through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind 
whatsoever to an official for himself or for a third party for him 
to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the 
exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties shall 
constitute active corruption. 
EU public official (community official) shall mean any person 
who is an official or other contracted employee within the 
meaning of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European 
Communities or the Conditions of Employment of other 
servants of the European Communities; or any person seconded 






public or private body, who carries out functions equivalent to 
those performed by European Community officials or other 
servants 
0905 01 02 
Passive corruption in the public sector involving a EU public 
official 
Article 2.1 of the 
Convention of 26 May 
1997 on the fight against 
corruption involving 
officials of the European 
Communities or officials 
of member states of the 
European Union  
The deliberate action of an official, who, directly or through an 
intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any kind 
whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise 
of such an advantage, to act or refrain from acting in accordance 
with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his 
official duties shall constitute passive corruption.  
EU public official (community official) shall mean any person 
who is an official or other contracted employee within the 
meaning of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European 
Communities or the Conditions of Employment of other 
servants of the European Communities; or any person seconded 
to the European Communities by the member states or by any 
public or private body, who carries out functions equivalent to 
those performed by European Community officials or other 
servants 
0905 01 03 Active corruption in the private sector 
Article 2.1(a) of the 
Council Framework 
Decision 2003/568/JHA 
of 22 July 2003 
on combating corruption 
in the private sector415  
promising, offering or giving, directly or through an 
intermediary, to a person who in any capacity directs or works 
for a private-sector entity an undue advantage of any kind, for 
that person or for a third party, in order that that person should 
perform or refrain from performing any act, in breach of that 
person's duties 
0905 01 04 Passive corruption in the private sector 
Article 2.1(b) of the 
Council Framework 
Decision 2003/568/JHA 
of 22 July 2003 
on combating corruption 
in the private sector 
directly or through an intermediary, requesting or receiving an 
undue advantage of any kind, or accepting the promise of such 
an advantage, for oneself or for a third party, while in any 
capacity directing or working for a private-sector entity, in order 
to perform or refrain from performing any act, in breach of one's 
duties 
0905 02 Other forms of corruption 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 
uphold a more strict criminal policy 
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0906 00 MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
“Money laundering” or laundering of proceeds of crime 
"proceeds", consists of any economic advantage from criminal 
offences. 
0906 01 Offences jointly identified as Money Laundering 
0906 01 01 The conversion or transfer of property 
Article 6(1) of the CoE 
Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from 
Crime  
The illicit conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is proceeds, for the purpose of concealing or disguising 
the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is 
involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the 
legal consequences of his actions 
0906 01 02 
The illicit concealment or disguise of property related 
information 
Article 6(1) of CoE 
Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from 
Crime  
The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, 
property, knowing that such property is proceeds 
0906 01 03 The illicit acquisition, possession or use of laundered property 
Article 6(1) of the CoE 
Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from 
Crime  
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the 
time of receipt, that such property was proceeds. 
0906 02 Other forms of Money Laundering 
 
Rest category, as the jointly identified forms an on offences type 
only constitute a minimum definition, and States are allowed to 





0908 00 FRAUD AND SWINDLING 
0908 01 04 
Fraud affecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities 
Article 1 of the 
Convention of 26 July 1995 
on the protection of the 
European Communities’ 
Financial Interests 
Fraud affecting the financial interests of the European 
Communities, includes: 
Expenditure fraud meaning: 
- The use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete 
statements or documents, which has as its effect the 
misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds from the 






managed by, or on behalf of, the European Communities 
- The non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific 
obligation, with the same effect 
- The misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those 
for which they were originally granted 
Revenue fraud means: 
- The use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete 
statements or documents, which has as its effect the illegal 
diminution of the resources of the general budget of the 
European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, 
the European Communities 
- The non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific 
obligation, with the same effect 
- The misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, with the same 
effect 
 
In practice, using EULOCS as a reference tool would mean that legal 
instruments such as the procurement directives would no longer need to include 
an ad nominem reference to the approximation instrument that constitutes the 
legal basis for the scope demarcation of the mandatory exclusion grounds, but 
include a reference to EULOCS and clarified that in EULOCS it is indicated 
which approximated parts of offences416 are included in the scope of the 
mandatory exclusion ground. 
In accordance to the old approach, the scope of the exclusion ground will be 
delineated stipulating that participation in a criminal organisation is defined in 
Art. 2(1) of the Council Joint Action 98/33/JHA; In accordance to the suggested 
EULOCS approach, it would be stipulated that the scope of participation in a 
criminal organisation as an exclusion grounds is to be delineated as indicated in 
the EU level offence classification system. 
 This also means that discussions on the adoption or alternation of 
approximation instruments should include the relation between the new or 
altered approximated offence and the mirroring scope of the approximated 
disqualifications. By working with EULOCS as a reference tool, it will also be 
possible to extend the scope of the approximated offence, i.e. extend the 
obligation for member states to criminalise the behaviour included in the 
instrument, but at the same time stipulate that the obligation to attach a 
disqualifying effect to a conviction in the course of a public procurement 
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selection within an approximated offence. It is not a given that the extension of the 
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works with a categorisation system that differentiates between different categories of behaviour 
included in one offence label, it is possible to use that level of detail in the identification of the 
behaviour  for which conviction should lead to exclusion.  





procedure remains the same. In other words, the inclusion of approximated 
behaviour in separate categories of EULOCS allows for a very detailed 
differentiation between offences for which a conviction is automatically 
complemented with a disqualification from entering in a procurement procedure 
and a conviction for which no such mandatory exclusion is foreseen. This 
recommendation rounds out the discussion on the second issue, being the 
delineation of the offences for which exclusion is mandatory. 
2.3 Access to detailed information 
The third issue relates to the availability of sufficiently detailed criminal 
records information to single out the convictions for which exclusion is 
mandatory following the provisions in the procurement directive. Besides the 
clear demarcation of the scope of the approximated offences and thus the 
approximated disqualification obligation, the proper functioning of 
disqualification obligations is also dependent on the availability of (sufficiently 
detailed) conviction information to determine whether or not a case falls within 
the scope of the disqualification obligations. In spite of the extensive critiques 
raised with respect to the functioning of these mandatory exclusion grounds 
(e.g. with respect to the scope ratione personae417, the scope ratione temporis,418 the 
scope ratione auctoritatis419 and the outdated character420 of the references to clarify 
the scope of the offence labels), analysis has never touched upon the feasibility 
to adhere to the obligation and disqualify a candidate that has been convicted 
for any of the listed offences due to the unavailability of sufficiently detailed 
criminal records information. Adhering to the obligation to exclude a candidate 
                                                             
417 See e.g. T. M. ARNÁIZ (2006) Grounds for exclusion in public procurement: measures in the 
fight against corruption in the European Union. International Public Procurement Conference 
Proceedings, p 329-352; S. ARROWSMITH, (2004) As assessment of the new legislative package on 
public procurement. Common Market Law Review, 41, p 1277-1325, P.-A. TREPTE (2007), Public 
Procurement in the EU. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
418 See e.g. S. ARROWSMITH, (2004) As assessment of the new legislative package on public 
procurement. Common Market Law Review, 41, p 1277-1325, , P.-A. TREPTE (2007), Public 
Procurement in the EU. Oxford: Oxford University Press at 341; T. M. ARNÁIZ (2006) Grounds for 
exclusion in public procurement: measures in the fight against corruption in the European 
Union. International Public Procurement Conference Proceedings, p 329-352; E. PISELLI, (2000) The 
scope for excluding providers who have committed criminal offences under the E.U. 
Procurement Directives. Public Procurement Law Review, 6, p 267-286. 
419 It has been argued that a strong criminal policy essentially needs to include the private sector 
in the regulatory framework. See e.g. I. CARR, (2007) Fighting Corruption through Regional and 
International Conventions: A Satisfactory Solution? European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice, p 121-153 
420 T. M. ARNÁIZ (2006) Grounds for exclusion in public procurement: measures in the fight 
against corruption in the European Union. International Public Procurement Conference 






for having been convicted for any of the listed offences requires that convictions 
for those offences can be identified and singled out in the midst of other existing 
convictions. This requires a review of the level of detail in the conviction 
information that is (made) available to contracting authorities. 
When reviewing the access to criminal records information for sensitive 
sector-actors such as contracting authorities in a procurement context, different 
regimes were identified. Some member states allow the contracting authorities 
direct access to the criminal records databases. Other member states work with 
certificates of non prior conviction. Either way it is important that the 
information provided can differentiate between offences that have been subject 
to approximation and offences for which no approximated definition and 
therefore no approximated disqualification exists. Based on previous research on 
the architecture and content of the national criminal records databases421, it is 
safe to say that in the current format, member states cannot make a distinction 
between a money laundering conviction that relates to money laundering as 
found in the approximation instrument and a money laundering conviction that 
relates to a type of money laundering that is nationally criminalized under the 
label of money laundering beyond the minimum requirement. Though a lot has 
happened with respect to criminal records in the last decade, the new policy 
with respect to criminal records information cannot positively adjust that 
presumption. The limited importance attached to completing information on an 
existing conviction with detailed information on the underlying offence when 
designing the new European Criminal Records Information System illustrates 
this. From 7 April 2012 onwards, the criminal records information exchange will 
be governed by the 2009 framework decision on the organization and content of 
criminal records databases422 complemented by the 2009 decision on the 
development of ECRIS423, short for European criminal records information 
system. When reviewing the level of detail introduced in the coding system that 
will govern the future criminal records exchange, it is clear that it is not deemed 
important to be able to distinguish between convictions that relate to an 
                                                             
421 See e.g. G. VERMEULEN, T. VANDER BEKEN, E. DE BUSSER, A. DORMAELS (2002) Blueprint for an 
EU criminal records database, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Maklu; SCHMITZ, P.-E., MENNENS, A., 
VANHECKE, R., DE WEVER, W., AISOLA, K., FLAMMANG, M., BOURJAF, A., DUBOIS, O., VERMEULEN, 
G., VAN PUYENBROECK, L., (2006) Review of National Criminal Records Systems in the European 
Union, Bulgaria and Romania with the view to the Development of a Common Format for the Exchange 
of Information on Criminal Records, Brussel: Unisys:  STEFANOU, C., & XANTHAKI, H. (2008). 
Towards a European Criminal Record. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
422 Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and 
content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member 
States, OJ L 93 of 7.4.2009. 
423 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework 
Decision 2009/315/JHA, OJ L 93 of 7.4.2009 





approximated part of an offences and convictions that relate to behaviour that 
were nationally added to an offence label. For money laundering, only one 
reference code is included in the ECRIS coding system, namely 1504 covering 
laundering of proceeds from crime. The lack of detail that results from it is most 
unfortunate considering that for a lot of mechanisms that take account of 
convictions such as exclusion grounds, more detailed information on the 
behaviour underlying the convictions is necessary. From this perspective the 
information exchanged can only provide an indication of an existing conviction 
that may result in an exclusion and always requires that additional information 
is sought. Nevertheless, the ECRIS coding system can be easily upgraded by 
introducing a distinction between convictions related to the jointly identified part 
of money laundering and convictions related to other forms of money laundering, 
mirroring the approach used when developing EULOCS.  
It can therefore be concluded that the lack of sufficiently detailed criminal 
records information constitutes a significant obstacle to the proper functioning 
of the approximated exclusion grounds for the approximated offences found in 
the legal instruments governing the access to public procurement proceedings. 
In today’s reality, it is not possible to make the necessary distinctions to uphold 
the exclusion obligation. Based on the information available in the criminal 
records information systems it will never be possible to determine whether or 
not the behaviour underlying the conviction matches with the behaviour that 
should give rise to exclusion from participation in a procurement procedure. In 
practice, that knowledge can only be gathered when conducting a case analysis, 
looking into the description of the facts in the conviction. 
In light of this limited detail in the criminal records information available in 
general and therefore also available to the contracting authorities in a 
procurement procedure, the question arises to what extent it is a problem to 
exclude candidates for having been convicted for offences beyond the minimum 
requirements found in the procurement directives. After all, mandatory 
exclusion grounds found therein are only a minimum requirement. Member 
states are allowed to introduce a more stringent regime at national level. If 
member states legislate that candidates are excluded for having been convicted 
for any type of money laundering, the minimum requirement is surely fulfilled. 
The question therefore arises whether knowing that someone was convicted for 
‘a’ money laundering offence corresponding to code 1504 in ECRIS cannot 
suffice and automatically lead to exclusion. This discussion on the acceptability 
of legislation that will exclude candidates for having been convicted for 
behaviour beyond the approximation acquis forms the central question with 
respect to the functioning of attaching equivalent disqualifications to foreign 
convictions as attached to national convictions and will therefore be dealt with 






in a public procurement procedure and mutual recognition will be dealt with as 
the final item of this case study. 
 
3 Attaching an equivalent disqualifying effect to 
foreign convictions 
The second policy recommendation consists of extending the requirement to 
attach to a foreign conviction a disqualifying effect that is equivalent to the 
disqualifying effect a national conviction would evoke. That policy option links 
in with the equivalency principle underlying the framework decision on the 
taking account of foreign convictions in the course of new criminal proceedings 
(abbreviated to FD Prior Convictions), that recently entered into force.424  
In the 2008 FD Prior Convictions, the member states committed themselves to 
take account of foreign prior convictions in the course of new criminal 
proceedings and attach effects to them that are equivalent to the effects attached 
to a prior national conviction. Art. 3 reads that previous convictions handed down 
against the same person for different facts in other Member States are taken into account 
to the extent previous national convictions are taken into account, and that equivalent 
legal effects are attached to them as to previous national convictions, in accordance with 
national law. The effect of a prior conviction in a new criminal procedure can be 
dependent on the underlying offence and/or the sanction imposed.425 As a 
second branch of the disqualification triad, it is recommended to extend that 
commitment to encompass also the obligation to take account of foreign 
convictions in the course of a procurement procedure. Considering the inherent 
cross-border character of the EU procurement directives which are intended to 
support and facilitate participation in procurement procedures outside the 
candidate’s member state426 and considering that conviction related exclusion 
grounds are introduced at EU level to protect the contracting authority from 
entering into a contractual relationship with an unreliable candidate427, an 
                                                             
424 Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions 
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425 See more in detail: W. DE BONDT (forthcoming), Cross-border recidivism in the EU: Fact or 
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extension of the equivalency principle to procurement procedures is in line with 
the philosophy underlying the elaboration of an EU procurement policy. 
3.1 Transferability concerns  
Prior to transferring a principle from one context into another, it must be 
assessed whether the specificities of the new context give rise to transferability 
concerns. In other words, it is important to thoroughly assess to what extent it is 
feasible to transfer an existing principle into another context and to what extent 
it is necessary to adapt the principle or complement it with correction or 
flanking measures for it to work properly. The transferability concern here 
relates to the position of duality with respect to the underlying offence or the 
imposed sanction when taking account of foreign convictions in the course of a 
procurement procedure. In the following paragraphs, the line of argumentation 
will be developed in relation to the duality with respect to the underlying 
offence (i.e. the double criminality requirement). That line of argumentation 
applies mutatis mutandis also to the duality with respect to the imposed 
sanction. 
Double criminality is not a mandatory but an optional requirement when 
taking account of foreign convictions in the course of a criminal procedure. 
When analyzing the equivalency principle as introduced in the FD Prior 
Convictions, it becomes clear that the commitment to take account of foreign 
convictions is not unlimited. Recital 6 clearly provides that the obligation to take 
account of and give effect to foreign convictions does not stretch to encompass a 
conviction that could not have existed under national law for reasons of lacking 
double criminality. It stipulates that this framework decision contains no obligation 
to take into account such previous convictions […] where a national conviction would 
not have been possible regarding the act for which the previous conviction had been 
imposed […]428. This means that the member states are not obliged to take account 
of a foreign conviction if the underlying behaviour is not equally criminalized 
under their national law. However, the framework decision does not prohibit 
such effects. Therefore, it is left up to the member states to decide whether or not 
effects are attached to foreign prior convictions that do not meet the so-called 
double criminality test. In the course of a criminal proceeding it is possible to 
take account of foreign convictions – even beyond the double criminality 
                                                                                                                                               
Review, 6, p 267-286 at 268; S. WILLIAMS. (2009). The Mandatory Contractor Exclusions for 
Serious Criminal Offences in UK Public Procurement. European Public Law, 15(3), at 432. 
428 The sentence continues with ‘or where the previously imposed sanction is unknown to the national 
legal system’ supporting that the argumentation developed applies mutatis mutandis also to the 






requirement – to the extent that the national law of the prosecuting member state 
allows it. Double criminality is an optional refusal ground. 
The question arises whether double criminality should be a mandatory or 
optional refusal ground when taking account of foreign convictions in the course 
of a public procurement procedure. The relevance of that question can be 
illustrated using the following example. Two candidates – applying for the same 
public contract – operate under the jurisdiction of two different member states. 
The difference in jurisdiction can raise double criminality issues in that the same 
behaviour may be qualified differently. Whereas one candidate can present 
behaviour without criminal consequences, the other candidate risks criminal 
proceedings because the behaviour is criminalized in the jurisdiction it operates 
in. Not only will prosecution and conviction for the said behaviour be regarded 
as unfair when the candidate compares itself with its competitors operating 
under the jurisdiction of another member state, the situation will be regarded as 
even more unfair if the conviction results in being excluded from participation in 
a procurement procedure, whereas the other candidate could never have been 
convicted – let alone excluded – while presenting the exact same behaviour. 
Especially when the main objective underlying the public procurement 
directives in the EU relate to creating the conditions of competition necessary for 
the non-discriminatory award of public contracts, access to a true single market 
and the reinforcement of competition amongst European enterprises429, this 
feeling of unfair and unequal treatment cannot be ignored. It should be noted 
that this concern therefore extends beyond the question whether foreign 
convictions can be taken into account if the underlying behaviour is not equally 
criminalized in the jurisdiction of the contracting authority. The question is 
broader and looks into whether convictions – foreign or national – can be taken 
into account if the underlying behaviour is not equally criminalized in the 
jurisdictions in which the other candidates operate, regardless of the jurisdiction 
of the contracting authority. To that end, the position of double criminality in the 
national implementation legislation should be carefully analysed. 
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3.2 Different national approaches 
The application of the equivalency principle as found in the context of taking 
account of foreign convictions in the course of a criminal procedure is dependent 
on the formulation of the national law. Therefore a transfer to apply it also in the 
context of taking account of foreign convictions in the course of a public 
procurement procedure will be equally dependent on the formulation of the 
national law. In light thereof, it is necessary to first look into the provisions in 
the national law of each of the member states to assess to what extent the double 
criminality requirement has received a central position therein, and whether the 
question on the faith of both foreign and national convictions for which the 
underlying behaviour is not equally criminalized in the jurisdictions in which 
co-competitors operate has not been already sufficiently and adequately tackled. 
The procurement directive has introduced mandatory exclusion grounds for 
candidates that have been convicted for participation in a criminal organization, 
fraud, corruption and/or money laundering, avoiding feelings of unequal 
treatment by limiting the scope of the exclusion ground to approximated 
offence. It is interesting to see how member states have implemented that 
provision and to what extent member states have tackled the questions related 
to the position of foreign convictions and the double criminality requirement 
more in general. 
The fact that the Procurement Directive provides little guidance on how to 
implement this provision and how wide member states are allowed to introduce 
mandatory exclusion grounds for convicted candidates, has led to different 
implementation approaches. When assessing how member states have used 
their implementation discretion, roughly two different approaches can be 
distinguished. 
A first type of member states has clearly identified the behaviour for which 
convictions will lead to exclusion. On the one hand reference can be made to 
Sweden who has introduced minimalist exclusion grounds through limiting the 
scope thereof to the offences the way they are commonly defined in the 
European instruments.430 In doing so Sweden has limited the scope of the 
exclusion grounds to having been convicted for behaviour that is known to be 
criminalised throughout Europe. Because exclusion is only based on convictions 
for which the underlying behaviour is known to be criminalised throughout 
Europe, double criminality is guaranteed and the exclusion grounds are in effect 
exactly the same for all competing candidates. There will be no feelings of 
unfairness when applying the Swedish exclusion provisions. Apparently, 
                                                             






Sweden did not consider it problematic not to be able to exclude candidates for 
having been convicted in Sweden for behaviour that is not included in the 
minimum requirement introduced in the procurement directive. Germany on 
the other hand too has clearly identified the behaviour for which a conviction 
will lead to exclusion, but it has not used references to EU level instruments to 
clarify the scope of the exclusion grounds, but referred to provisions in its own 
criminal code to determine the behaviour for which conviction will lead to 
exclusion. §11a 2(1) German Procurement Law lists the relevant provisions of 
the criminal code. The first exclusion ground stipulates that convictions will lead 
to exclusion if they relate to “§ 129 of the Criminal Code (criminal organizations, 
education), § 129a of the Criminal Code (Formation of terrorist organizations), § 129b of 
the Criminal Code (criminal and terrorist organizations abroad)”. This means that the 
scope of the exclusion ground is not necessarily limited to the behaviour 
included in the EU level instruments and Germany has used its discretion to 
introduce a more severe policy at national level, also excluding convictions for 
behaviour that is not included in the approximation instruments. Bulgaria too 
has complemented the national offence labels with the references to its national 
criminal code.431  
In doing so, double criminality will only be guaranteed in one direction. 
Candidates with a foreign conviction will only be excluded to the extent double 
criminality is guaranteed with respect to the national (in casu German) criminal 
law of the contracting authority. However, this does not guarantee that their 
conviction will only be taken into account to the extent that the underlying 
behaviour is equally criminalised in the jurisdictions in which the competitors 
operated, for double criminality is only tested using the criminal law of the 
(German) contracting authority as a guideline, regardless of double criminality 
with the jurisdictions in which competitors have operated. Similarly, candidates 
with a national (German) conviction will not have the guarantee that their 
conviction will only be taken into account to the extent that the underlying 
behaviour is equally criminalised in the jurisdictions in which the competitors 
operated. Situations may occur in which a candidate is excluded for having been 
convicted in Germany for behaviour that does not constitute an offence in the 
other member states, which may be perceived as unfair. 
A second type of member states has not explicitly indicated for which 
underlying behaviour convictions will lead to exclusion. The use of undefined 
offence labels leaves significant room for interpretation. Some member states – 
though having copied the wording of Art. 45(1) of the Procurement Directive – 
have not bothered to also copy the references to the European instruments into 
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their national implementation legislation and have merely copied the offence 
labels. In doing so, Lithuania and Romania have not given any indication on 
how to interpret the offence labels.432 leaving us with the presumption that they 
should be interpreted in light of the national (criminal) meaning thereof, though 
much can be said also for an interpretation in light of the mother provision in the 
directive, and even an interpretation including any criminalisation underneath 
that label in any other member state can be defended. Other member states have 
reinterpreted the offence labels itself in accordance with the labels used in their 
national criminal code, suggesting that the scope of the labels must be 
interpreted in light of the scope of the criminalisation in the national criminal 
code. The Czech Republic has clarified that candidates will be excluded for 
having been finally sentenced for “crimes committed to the benefit of a criminal 
conspiracy, by participation in criminal conspiracy, legislation on proceeds of criminal 
activity, accessoryship, accepting bribes, bribery, indirect bribery, fraud, loan fraud.”433 
Even though the reformulation of the offence labels strengthens the presumption 
that their scope is to be interpreted in light of the criminalisation provisions in 
the national criminal code, from a strict legal perspective the wording of the 
national implementation provision is technically inconclusive. 
Within those two implementation typologies (i.e. either or not explicitly 
including for which behaviour a conviction will lead to exclusion) only few 
national implementation legislations explicitly deal with the differences in the 
criminalisation legislation of the member states. In doing so, the Hungarian 
legislation falls within the second category described above. Interestingly, in 
addition to clarifying how it will deal with national situations, Art. 60(3) 
Hungarian Public Procurement Law clarifies that for candidates established in 
another member state of the European Union, the exclusion grounds will be as 
mentioned in Art. 45(1) of the Procurement Directive.434 The Hungarian 
implementation legislation takes account of the fact that in a public procurement 
procedure, it might be confronted with foreigners and foreign convictions. For 
those foreigners the scope of the exclusion ground is limited in the same way 
Sweden has limited the exclusion grounds – mirroring the minimum 
requirement introduced in the directive – though Sweden did not differentiate 
between national and foreign candidates. This approach can be criticised 
though, for the applicability of criminal law is not dependent on the nationality 
of the person involved. It may very well be that a person established abroad is 
                                                             
432 Art. 33 Lithuanian Public Procurement Law (Law of 13 August 1996 on Public Procurement, 
I-1491 as amended by Law 22 December 2005, X-471), and Art. 180 Romanian Public 
Procurement Law (Law regarding the award of the public procurement contracts, public works 
concession contracts and services concession contracts, Official Gazette 15 May 2006, I-418). 
433 §53 (1)(a) Czech Public Procurement Law (Act No 137 of 14 March 2006 on public contracts, 
last amended by Act 178/2010). 






convicted by a Hungarian judicial authority. Technically, this means that the 
Hungarian conviction cannot be used as a ground for exclusion when it relates 
to behaviour that is not included in the approximation instruments. 
Alternatively, whilst Art. 23(1) a-e UK’s Public Procurement Law reinterprets 
the offences listed in Art. 45(1) in light of the UK criminal law435, its Art. 23(1) f 
adds that also convictions for “any other offence within the meaning of Art. 45(1) of 
the Directive as defined by the national law of any relevant state” will lead to 
exclusion. In doing so, the UK’s Public Procurement Law does not differentiate 
between national and foreign candidates, but between national and foreign 
convictions. With respect to national convictions, the national criminal law 
applies and with respect to foreign convictions, foreign criminal law applies, 
though that foreign law is limited to mirror the scope of the mandatory 
exclusion grounds in the procurement directive. 
The fact that some member states have not dealt with the topic of foreign 
convictions in their national legislation and other member states have not 
developed a uniform way to deal with foreign convictions and more broadly the 
concerns related to the double criminality requirement, necessitates an analysis 
on whether or not the feeling of unfair treatment when excluded for having been 
convicted for behaviour that is not equally criminalized in the jurisdictions in 
which the competitors operated can be substantiated to give rise to an unequal 
treatment problem that would stand in court. 
3.3 Equal treatment limits to exclusion grounds 
The feeling of unfair treatment originates from the argumentation that 
candidates are not treated equally because they could not have been convicted 
equally for the same behaviour (i.e. the underlying the conviction) for it is not 
criminalised equally throughout the jurisdictions they operate in. 
Equal treatment is a basic principle in European law.436 Its importance in the 
context of public procurement is recognised by its explicit inclusion in Art. 2 
Procurement Directive, and additionally the Court of Justice has clarified that 
even where it is not explicitly included in the body of the text, the principle is so 
fundamental, that procurement cannot function without it. In the Storebælt case 
the ECJ had to judge a Danish call for tender with respect to the construction of a 
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bridge, which required all candidates to use as much as possible Danish 
resources. One of the candidates took this matter to court arguing that such a 
requirement would result in the unequal treatment of foreign candidates. It was 
argued that Danish resources are better known and more accessible for Danish 
candidates. With the Storebælt case, the ECJ clarified that even where directives 
do not expressly mention in casu the principle of equal treatment of candidates, 
the duty to observe that principle lies at the very heart of the directive whose 
purpose it is to ensure the development of effective competition in the field of 
public contracts and which lays down criteria for selection and for award of the 
contracts by means of which such competition is to be ensured.437 The principle 
requires an objective comparison of the tenders submitted by the various 
candidates.438 The same reasoning can also be found in several other cases.439 
Undeniably, equal treatment is a fundamental principle in a public procurement 
context and the interpretation and application of procurement legislation should 
be done with respect for the equal treatment principle. 
Equal treatment requires that equal situations are treated in an equal manner 
and different situations are treated in a different manner.440 Though that might 
seem self-evident as a baseline, the application thereof in practice is far from self-
evident. The difficulty in this case study with respect to conviction-related 
exclusion grounds consists of determining which situations should be compared 
and assessed for equality. Should the behaviour be used as a baseline, or should it 
be the criminalisation/conviction.  
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The table inserted below is meant to illustrate how that would influence the 
outcome of the equality assessment.  
 
 Behaviour  Criminalization 
Candidate 1 Same  Yes 
Candidate 2 Same  No 
Interpretation 
Same behaviour  
= same situation  
= same treatment? 
Different criminalization  
= different situation  
= different treatment? 
 
When taking the behaviour itself as a basis, equal treatment would mean that 
the same behaviour is regarded as the same situation and thus requires the same 
treatment. This means that considering the behaviour is not criminalized in one 
of the jurisdictions under which one of the candidates operates, and therefore no 
(conviction) information is available on whether or not that candidate has 
presented the behaviour, the said behaviour cannot lead to an exclusion. Same 
behaviour should have the same consequences in the context of a public 
procurement situation. 
When taking the criminalization as a basis, the situations are different in that 
candidates 1 has committed criminalized behaviour and candidate 2 has not 
committed any criminalized behaviour. Taking this perspective as a baseline, the 
situations are different and therefore a difference in treatment can be justified.  
To decide which of both scenarios results in equal treatment as required by the 
Court of Justice, it is required to look into the court’s case law. To that end, it is 
interesting to first examine the court’s opinion with respect to the 
criminalization diversity in the member states. If the mere fact that behaviour is 
criminalized in one member state and is not in another gives rise to an unequal 
treatment problem, the choice between both scenarios would be clear. In that 
case, diversity in criminalization amounts to unequal treatment, which would 
mean that the only acceptable scenario is a scenario in which convictions are 
only taken into account to the extent that the underlying behaviour would also 
lead to a conviction in the other member states. The question whether or not the 
diversity in criminal law amounts to unequal treatment was subject to debate in 
the Hansen & Søn case. That Danish transport and logistics company was being 
prosecuted in its capacity as the employer of a driver on the grounds that the 
latter had infringed certain provisions with respect to the maximum daily 





driving period and the compulsory daily rest period.441 The Danish legislator 
had introduced a system of strict criminal liability of legal persons when 
implementing the European minimum standards with respect to those driving 
regulations. Hansen & Søn argued that the risk of being convicted is now greater 
in Denmark when compared to that risk in another member state as a result of 
which competition within the common market is distorted.442 The court however 
clarifies that the economic consequences of an infringement vary not only 
according to the system of criminal liability introduced by the member state in 
question but also according to the level of the fine imposed and the degree of 
effectiveness of the checks carried out. Accordingly, the introduction of a system 
of strict criminal liability does not in itself involve a distortion of the conditions 
of competition.443 Unfortunately, what would involve a distortion of the 
conditions of competition in the internal market is not included in the 
judgment.444 Hansen & Søn have not asked the right question to receive an 
answer thereto. The mere diversity in criminal law is not the problem, neither is 
the application thereof. Anyone operating under the jurisdiction of the Danish 
criminal law will be treated equally. Anyone operating under the jurisdiction of 
any other criminal law system that has introduced a different system of 
attributing liability to (legal) persons will be treated equally. There is no 
overarching obligation for all member states to legislate and criminalise 
behaviour in the same manner. Each member state is the master of his own 
criminal justice system and has the prerogative to decide which behaviour is 
criminalised and which behaviour is kept outside the criminal justice sphere.  
Even though the diversity in itself does not involve a distortion of the 
conditions of competition, this does however not mean that the diversity in 
criminalisation cannot amount to unequal treatment in a specific context, 
especially a context that does require that everyone is treated equally. Where no 
overarching obligation exists to criminalise behaviour equally throughout the 
Union, an obligation does exist to ensure the equal treatment of all competing 
candidates in a procurement procedure. It is submitted that not the difference in 
itself is problematic, but the consequences of that difference in a procurement 
procedure are problematic. As soon as candidates with convictions handed 
down by different member states are compared in a public procurement 
procedure – in which equal treatment is a fundamental principle – the 
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differences must be neutralised to ensure that competition is not distorted by the 
diversity in criminalisation in the member states. 
Equal treatment in its purest form requires that the differences between the 
criminal justice situations of the member states are neutralized and account is 
taken of the behaviour that has been presented by the candidates.  
The implementation thereof requires that behaviour is only taken into 
account to the extent that reliable information on the commission of that 
behaviour is available regardless of the jurisdiction in which a candidate 
operates, i.e. to the extent that information on convictions for that behaviour is 
available, i.e. to the extent that the behaviour is criminalized throughout the EU. 
Differently put, this means that convictions can only be taken into account to the 
extent that they relate to behaviour that would equally constitute an offence in 
the jurisdictions in which the other actors operate. Exclusion can only be based 
on convictions that relate to behaviour that represents the largest common 
denominator amongst the criminalizations.  
In practice, the identification of the largest common denominator can be 
done in two ways: either the largest common denominator is identified prior to 
the start of the public procurement procedure based on the largest common 
denominator in the entirety of the EU, or the largest common denominator is 
identified ad hoc using the background of the tendering candidates within a 
specific public procurement case as a basis.  
The first option would result in a common denominator from an EU wide 
perspective, reflecting the common denominator amongst the 27 member states. 
This option is a maximalist option, for it includes all 27 member states in the 
analysis. However, the more member states involved in the analysis, the smaller 
the largest common denominator will be. The biggest advantage of this 
approach is the fact that the largest common denominator will be the same for 
each public procurement procedure, regardless of the member state in which the 
procedure takes place. Exclusion is transparent and predictable. This also means 
that the quest to identify the largest common denominator can be a common 
project supported by each of the 27 individual member states, in cooperation 
with the European Union. An overview needs to be produced clearly delineating 
the behaviour that is criminalized throughout the EU. An important step in that 
direction was taken with the development of the EU level offence classification 
system, abbreviated to EULOCS.445 As clarified above, EULOCS is a classification 
system that provides an overview of the offences that have been subject to 
approximation and in doing so provides an overview of the behaviour that was 
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jointly identified as criminal and other forms of behaviour that may be subject to 
criminalization upon a national decision to do so. The approximation acquis as 
presented in EULOCS will provide valuable information for the identification of 
the largest common denominator amongst the member states as it provides an 
overview of the smallest common denominator. At least those offences that have 
been subject to approximation are common. Because the set of offences for which 
approximating instruments have been adopted is relatively limited, it is highly 
likely that a lot more will be common. Should the member states want to be able 
to exclude candidates for offences beyond what is approximated, additional 
comparative legal analysis will be necessary to delineate the largest common 
denominator.446 
The second option would result in an ad hoc identification of the largest 
common denominator, taking account of the specific profiles of the candidates 
participating in a specific public procurement procedure. After all, equal 
treatment must be ensured between the actual participants in a public 
procurement procedure and does not need to be ensured in relation to 
hypothetical candidates that did not participate. Based on the specific profiles of 
the participating candidates, the number of member states in the analysis may 
be reduced. A such analysis might result in an ad hoc largest common 
denominator that includes behaviour that would not make it to the EU largest 
common denominator. The identification of such an ad hoc largest common 
denominator requires taking account of the criminal law of the member states 
represented by the nationalities of the competing candidates as well as the 
‘nationality’ of the convictions they hold.  
In sum, the reasoning based on the equal treatment principle leads to the 
conclusion that attaching equivalent disqualifying (in casu excluding) effect to 
foreign prior convictions in the course of a public procurement procedure is 
compatible with the equal treatment requirement under the condition that 
disqualifying (in casu excluding) effect is only attached to convictions for which 
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the underlying behaviour falls within the largest common denominator of what 
is criminalized throughout the EU or a set of relevant jurisdictions. This 
conclusion raises questions not only with respect to the availability of 
information but also with respect to the position of the member states with 
respect to the consequence that the situation can occur in which a contracting 
authority cannot take account of a national conviction if it relates to behaviour 
that is not equally criminalized in the jurisdictions in which the other candidates 
operate. 
3.4 Availability of information 
If the use of prior convictions as exclusion grounds in the context of a public 
procurement procedure is limited to the largest common denominator amongst 
the criminalizations, this requires that the information on the prior convictions is 
sufficiently detailed to be able to decide whether or not the conviction falls with 
the scope of that largest common denominator. 
This has a considerable impact on the required level of detail in the prior 
conviction information. If member states decide to allow exclusion in their 
jurisdiction for the predefined “common denominator” across the criminal codes 
of the entirety of the EU, that common denominator can be modelled to match 
the existing knowledge deduced from the approximation obligations. The 
difficulties related to the availability of information with respect to this policy 
option mirror the difficulties with respect to the availability of information 
elaborated on above in relation to the introduction of approximated exclusion 
grounds for approximated offences. The current level of detail in criminal 
records information cannot suffice; Striving for a comprehensive, consistent and 
well-balanced EU approach, it could be recommended to require member states 
to be able to distinguish between a conviction that relates to behaviour that has 
been subject to approximation and another conviction. 
Alternatively, if the member states decide to further develop the EU largest 
common denominator beyond what jointly identified as (to be) criminalized in 
the national law of each of the member states and wish to exclude candidates for 
behaviour that is currently not included in the approximation acquis, similar 
flanking measures with respect to the availability of sufficiently detailed 
information are necessary. The same is true when member states decide to work 
with maximalist option and establish work with ad hoc largest common 
denominators based on the specific profiles of the tendering candidates. 





3.5 Acceptability of exceptions to the equal treatment 
limitations 
Following the conclusion that equal treatment requires a limitation in the 
convictions that are eligible for use as a ground for exclusion of the tendering 
candidate, the question arises to what extent exceptions to that policy 
recommendation are acceptable. Based solely in the equal treatment principle, it 
is possible that a candidate convicted nationally for a money laundering offence 
may not be excluded from participating in a public procurement procedure, for 
the behaviour underlying the money laundering conviction is not equally 
criminalized throughout the relevant jurisdictions.  
At first sight it seems as though the decision on the fate of the national 
convictions is the sole competence of the individual member state, relying on the 
purely internal rule.447 According to that purely internal rule, the EU principles 
related to free movement and equal treatment cannot be applied to situations 
that are confined to a single member state. However, such conclusion cannot be 
supported for two main reasons. First, the ‘national’ character of the conviction 
does not reveal any information on the nationality of the person involved and 
whether or not use was made of the free movement right. At least to the extent 
the national conviction is imposed to a foreign national, the purely internal rule 
cannot be applied. Second, with respect to the national candidates the purely 
internal rule cannot prevent the applicability of the equal treatment principle 
either. Acting as a participant in a public procurement procedure governed by 
EU law establishes the required link with EU law. Furthermore, the requirement 
to treat candidates equally is introduced in the Procurement Directive, 
indiscriminately and should therefore apply equally to foreign and national 
candidates, to foreign and national convictions.  
The question arises whether a contracting authority can argue that 
disregarding a national conviction for money laundering simply because the 
underlying behaviour is not equally criminalized throughout the relevant 
jurisdictions in which the competitors operate, would not be acceptable. 
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It is important to understand that two interests collide. On the one hand, the 
interest of the tendering candidates consists of adhering to the principle of equal 
treatment. On the other hand, the interest of the contracting authority consists of 
allowing the exclusion of convicted candidates. Considering the importance of 
equal treatment of the tendering candidates for the proper functioning of public 
procurement in a European internal market, adhering to the equal treatment 
principle should be considered to be the baseline. However, to the extent that it 
can be motivated, an exception can be allowed to safeguard public order, 
national security or the integrity of the contracting authority. Therefore 
exceptions are only acceptable to the extent they can be motivated in light of a 
specific procurement procedure (no general motivation is allowed) and to the 
extent that an independent judicial review of the exclusion is available for the 
tendering candidates.  
Two questions arise. First, what would be the impact of the acceptance to 
include national convictions in the scope of convictions that result to exclusion? 
Second, would it be acceptable to also want to be allowed to exclude a candidate 
for having been convicted for behaviour that does not constitute an offence 
under the national criminal law of the member state of the contracting authority?  
First, if duly motivated, a contracting authority can be allowed to extend the 
scope of the exclusion grounds to include also its national money laundering 
convictions for reasons of public order, national security or the integrity of the 
contracting authority. In that situation the question arises how the scope of the 
exclusion ground with respect to money laundering is extended. It can be 
extended to encompass the largest common denominator complemented with 
the national money laundering convictions, or it can be extended to encompass 
the largest common denominator complemented with any conviction for which 
the underlying behaviour corresponds to the behaviour national criminalized as 
money laundering. The first would only sacrifice the equal treatment with 
respect to national money laundering convictions and in doing so maintain 
equal treatment between all other candidates. In doing so, a form of unequal 
treatment would be created between candidates with a national conviction and 
candidates with a foreign conviction for the exact same behaviour. The second 
would sacrifice the equal treatment with respect to all candidates that have a 
conviction – foreign or national – for the behaviour that is nationally 
criminalized, ensuring equal treatment between candidates with a conviction for 
the said behaviour, but creating a more extended form of unequal treatment in 
relation to candidates that fell within the jurisdiction of a member state that does 
not criminalize the said behaviour. Choosing the least bad option is not easy, 
because it is not clear which option is the least bad. Striving for a 
comprehensive, coherent and well-balanced system, it could be recommended to 
extend the exclusion ground in a way that best reflects equal treatment which is 





the second option. In sum, if duly motivated a contracting authority can be 
allowed to extend the scope of the largest common denominator to encompass 
also other offences as criminalized in its national law, provided that the scope 
extension applies to all candidates’ convictions. Differently put, when compared 
to the largest common denominator, so-called further reaching national convictions 
can be used as a basis for exclusion, provided that the scope extension applies to 
all the candidates’ convictions, national or foreign.  
Secondly, the question may arise whether a contracting authority can be 
allowed to exclude candidates from participation in a procurement procedure 
for having been convicted for committing behaviour that is criminalized abroad 
though not it its own member state. Differently put, the question would be 
whether, when compared to the largest common denominator, so-called further 
reaching foreign convictions can be used as a basis for exclusion. Not only will it be 
more difficult to motivate this extension of the exclusion ground for reasons of 
public order, national security or the integrity of the contracting authority, a 
such extension could amount to a form of indirect discrimination as a result of 
which the exception will be even more difficult to motivate. 
The link with indirect discrimination is complex and requires further 
clarification. It is commonly accepted that in the EU all citizens are equal before 
law, and no discrimination based on a person’s nationality is allowed. This 
principle is enshrined in Art. 18 TFEU (ex Art. 12 TEC) which stipulates that 
“discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited”. This means it is not 
allowed to stipulate in national implementation provisions that with respect to 
national candidates, national criminal law shall apply to determine the scope of 
the exclusion grounds and with respect to foreign candidates, foreign criminal 
law shall apply to determine the scope of the exclusion grounds. A such 
formulation clearly distinguishes based on nationality and – considering the 
diversity between the criminalization in the criminal codes of the member states 
– declares different rules applicable depending on the person’s nationality. This 
would mean that the scope of the exclusion grounds would not be the same for 
nationals and foreigners. To the extent that foreign criminal law criminalizes 
behaviour that is not criminalized in the criminal law of the contracting 
authority, this would mean that the foreign national is treated less favourably 
because the access requirements to enter the public procurement procedure 
would be stricter. This less favourable treatment of foreign candidates is not 
allowed. 
However, at first sight, this is not what the member state or contracting 
authority intends to do. The member state or contracting authority wishes to 
foresee that all EU citizens will be excluded if their money laundering conviction 






other member state. This means that the same exclusion ground applies to all EU 
citizens, without a distinction based on their nationality. Differently put, this 
means that with respect to national convictions (not national candidates), national 
criminal law shall apply and with respect to foreign convictions (not foreign 
candidates), foreign criminal law shall apply regardless of the nationality of the 
persons involved. However, this provision is an example of a so-called 
seemingly neutral provision that in its effect entails a discrimination based on 
nationality which is – in analogy to the courts’ settled case law – not allowed. 
Though the suggestion is not directly discriminating, it is so in effect, and is 
therefore indirectly discriminating. This problem has been recognised by the 
Court of Justice in several cases.448 A frequently used example is the Schönheit 
case, relating to the differential treatment of part-time and full-time employees. 
The rules governing the pension of part-time workers were different than the 
rules governing the pension of full-time workers. The disadvantageous pension 
regime of part-time workers was applicable to all workers, regardless of 
nationality, age, sex or any other protected criterion. However, because in 
practice, around 88% of the part-time workers are female, the rule will be 
discriminatory in its effect, because it will lead to a disadvantageous treatment 
of female employees.449 This latter example of indirect discrimination on grounds 
of sex will be used as a basis for the argumentation to reject the reformulation of 
the provision on exclusion grounds. 
In his opinion with respect to the Nolte case, Advocate General Léger 
summarised the position of the court when he stated that “in order to be presumed 
discriminatory, the measure must affect ‘a much greater number of women than men’450, 
‘a considerable lower percentage of men than women’451 or ‘far more women than men’452. 
Cases suggest that the proportion of women affected by the measure must be particularly 
marked.453 The court has never specified as of which percentage a measure is 
considered to be discriminatory, but has clearly held that the effect does not 
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have to be exclusively related to a protected category of persons to be 
discriminatory. The fact that there were also male part-time workers did not 
prevent the measure from being discriminatory on grounds of sex. 
Applied to the wish of the member state or contracting authority, the 
appreciation of its discriminatory nature is dependent on the effect of the 
application thereof. Upholding that with respect to national convictions (not 
national candidates), national criminal law shall apply and with respect to 
foreign convictions (not foreign candidates), foreign criminal law shall apply, will 
only be discriminating based on nationality if national convictions are 
predominantly handed down against nationals and foreign convictions are 
predominantly handed down against foreigners. If, in spite of the increased 
mobility in the European Union, convictions are still predominantly handed 
down against the nationals of each of the respective member states, then, the 
policy option should – in its effect – be read as “With respect to national 
convictions (meaning mostly national candidates), national criminal law shall 
apply and with respect to foreign convictions (meaning mostly foreign 
candidates), foreign criminal law shall apply”. A such provision would not be 
allowed in light of the prohibition to discriminate on grounds of nationality, to 
the extent that this would lead to a less favourable treatment of non-nationals 
and thus would lead to excluding candidates with further-reaching foreign 
convictions and no objective and reasonable justification (e.g. referring to a 
public order issue) is available. 
Therefore, a correct appreciation of the policy option requires looking into 
the national conviction statistics to be able to determine whether convictions are 
or are not predominantly handed down against a Member State’s own nationals. 
Because data gathered under the auspice of UNODC reveals that indeed, 
convictions are predominantly handed down against a Member States own 
nationals454, the suggestion is not neutral in its effect and entails a prohibited 
form of discrimination in as far as the protected group would be disadvantaged 
and no objective and reasonable justification is available. This means that it 
would amount to discrimination if the protected group, in casu the foreign 
nationals, are excluded more easily and have to fulfil more requirements then 
nationals.  
Due to this additional discrimination complication, an exception to the equal 
treatment requirement to limit the scope to the offences for which the 
underlying behaviour represents the largest common denominator in the 
national criminal law provisions applicable to the convictions of the competing 
candidates, will be difficult to sufficiently motivate.  
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It can therefore be concluded that the introduction of the obligation to attach 
equivalent effect to foreign convictions in the course of a public procurement 
procedure is not unlimited. Whereas taking account of foreign convictions in 
criminal procedures may be limited along a double criminality requirement – as 
desired by the individual member state – the taking account of foreign 
convictions in the course of a procurement procedure should be limited along an 
overarching455 criminality requirement in absence of objective and reasonable 
justifications for exceptions. Convictions – foreign or national – can only be 
taken into account to the extent the underlying behaviour is included in the EU 
or ad hoc largest common denominator, to the extent that no public order 
exception can be substantiated. The adequate motivation of an exception with 
respect to convictions related to behaviour that is nationally criminalised and 
penalised with an exclusion from participation in a public procurement 
procedure will be more plausible than the motivation seeking to be allowed to 
exclude a candidate for having been convicted for behaviour that is not even 
criminalised in a national context. 
3.6 Interpreting the national approaches 
It was argued that roughly two approaches can be distinguished when 
analysing the national legislation with respect to the exclusion grounds.  
A first type of member states has clearly identified for which behaviour 
conviction will lead to exclusion from participation in a public procurement 
procedure. It was clarified that Germany introduced references to its own 
national criminal code to delineate the scope of the exclusion grounds. An 
interpretation thereof in line with the equivalent effect principle as elaborated on 
means that German contracting authorities can only take account of convictions, 
national or foreign, for which the underlying behaviour matches with the 
German criminal code. A German contracting authority cannot exclude a 
candidate for having been convicted for e.g. a type of participation in a criminal 
organisation that is not criminalised under German criminal law. Having 
selected the prior convictions reflecting on the delineation included in the 
national criminal code, it is still important to adhere to the equal treatment 
principle, which means that the selected convictions can only have an excluding 
effect to the extent they fit into the largest common denominator. Exception 
thereto is only allowed to the extent a public order issue can be motivated. 
Taking account of the delineation of the exclusion grounds, such a public order 
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exception cannot result in the exclusion of a candidate based on a conviction for 
which the underlying behaviour is not criminalised under German law. 
A second type of member states has not explicitly identified for which 
behaviour a conviction will lead to exclusion. This means that there is no 
limitation to the exclusion grounds based on the national criminal law. Those 
member states have left the door open for a public order motivation that seeks to 
be allowed to exclude a candidate for having been convicted for behaviour that 
is not criminalised in a national context. 
 
4 Mutual recognition of exclusion from 
participating in a procurement procedure 
The third policy recommendation within the disqualification triad consists of 
supporting mutual recognition for disqualifications as a sanctioning measure. 
Mutual recognition in criminal matters hardly needs any introduction.456 It is 
well known that in the context of cooperation in the European Union, the 
principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters was first brought up by Jack 
Straw at the Cardiff European Council in 1998.457 At the time, the Council was 
asked to identify the scope for greater mutual recognition of decisions of each 
other’s courts. The momentum grew in the course of the following year and was 
used to launch mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation at 
the Tampere European Council in 1999.  
                                                             
456 See also three recent PhD studies: Suominen, A. E. (2011). The principle of mutual 
recognition in cooperation in criminal matters. A study of the principle in four framework 
decisions and in the implementation legislation in the Nordic Member States: Intersentia; 
Ouwerkerk, J. (2011). Quid Pro Quo? A comparative law perspective on the mutual recognition 
of judicial decisions in criminal matters. Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland: Intersentia; Janssens, C. 
(2011). The principle of mutual recognition in the EU internal market and the EU criminal 
justice area : a study into the viability of a cross-policy approach. Antwerpen: Universiteit 
Antwerpen. 
457 Programme of Measures of 30 November 2000 to implement the principle of mutual 
recognition of decisions in criminal matters. OJ C 12 of 15.1.2001; See also more elaborately in S. 
PEERS (2004). Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: Has the Council got 
it wrong? Common Market Law Review, 41, p 5-36; V. MITSILEGAS (2006) "The constitutional 
implications of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the EU. Common Market Law Review, 
43, p 1277-1311, I. BANTEKAS (2007). The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal Law. 
European Law Review, 32 (3), p 365-385, W. De BONDT and G. VERMEULEN, (2011). First things 
first: Characterising mutual recognition in criminal matters. In M. COOLS (Ed.), EU Criminal 







Even though it has been cited at countless occasions, the importance of 
paragraph 33 of the Tampere Presidency conclusions, justify it being cited once 
more: 
  
Enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements and 
the necessary approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation 
between authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights. The 
European Council therefore endorses the principle of mutual recognition 
which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of judicial co-
operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. The 
principle should apply both to judgements and to other decisions of 
judicial authorities458  
 
To implement the principle of mutual recognition in practice, mutual 
recognition instruments have been adopted with respect to a series of sanction 
measures. Though no instrument exists yet that specifically and exclusively 
deals with the mutual recognition of disqualifications as sanctioning measures, 
the main features in the other mutual recognition instruments can be used as a 
baseline to determine what mutual recognition of a disqualification in casu the 
exclusion to participate in a procurement procedure would look like. To draw 
the parallel with the principles in the existing mutual recognition instruments, 
the framework decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition 
to [...] alternative sanctions will be used as a basis.459 
In the following paragraphs it will become clear that the technique of mutual 
recognition in the specific case of being excluded from participating in a public 
procurement procedure will have only very limited added value when 
compared to the technique of ensuring equivalent effect as elaborated on above. 
The reason can be found in the specific characteristics of mutual recognition, but 
also in the fact that only few member states have introduced the ‘sanction’ of 
being excluded from participation in a public procurement procedure in their 
criminal law system. Most member states have opted for a system that limits the 
access to participation in a public procurement procedure via the provisions 
governing the procurement procedure itself.  
When interpreting the replies to question 1.2 specifically in relation to the 
exclusion from participation in a procurement procedure, only a minority of 
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member states have indicated that the exclusion from participation in a 
procurement procedure is imposed or added in the course of a criminal 
procedure. In 68% of the member states the disqualifying effect of a conviction 




1.2 Is the disqualification from participating in a public procurement 




This finding has a significant impact on the possibility to use mutual 
recognition in relation to being excluded from participating in a public 
procurement procedure. More importantly, the specific characteristics of mutual 
recognition play a crucial role in limiting the added value mutual recognition 
can have in relation to attaching equivalent effect. To clarify that position, the 
following paragraphs will elaborate on those specific characteristics. To that end, 
a distinction will be made between  
- the situation in which a mutual recognition request is received in relation to 
an offence that would nationally also give rise to an exclusion from 
participation in a public procurement procedure; and  
- the situation in which a mutual recognition request is received in relation to 
an offence that would nationally not give rise to an exclusion from 







4.1 National exclusion foreseen 
The first situation that will be discussed relates to a mutual recognition 
request received for an offence that would nationally also give rise to an 
exclusion from participation in a public procurement procedure. Whenever a 
member state receives a mutual recognition request that perfectly mirrors the 
national situation in that the sanction imposed corresponds to the sanction that 
would be imposed in a national situation, execution of the mutual recognition 
request will not be a problem. If, for example, a member state has foreseen in its 
national legislation that a conviction for a (particular form of) money laundering 
results in being excluded from participation in a public procurement procedure, 
the execution of a request to do just that will not create any problems. However, 
the question arises whether the mutual recognition request was at all necessary 
to achieve that result. After all, if the foreign money laundering conviction is 
taken into account via the technique of attaching effects to a foreign conviction 
that are equivalent to the effect a national conviction would bring about, the 
person involved would have been excluded from participation in a public 
procurement procedure based on the national legislation of the member state in 
which the public procurement procedure takes place, even in absence of a 
mutual recognition request. From that perspective, the mutual recognition 
request only doubles the basis upon which exclusion will take place, and can 
bring no added value in relation to the technique of attaching equivalent effect 
to foreign convictions.  
However, the overlap between equivalent effect and mutual recognition is 
not complete. There is one situation in which the mutual recognition request can 
have an added value when compared to the technique of attaching equivalent 
effects to foreign conviction. There is one situation in which the exclusion based 
on mutual recognition extends beyond the exclusion based on equivalent effect. 
The situation may occur in which the duration of the foreign imposed execution 
from participation in a public procurement procedure exceeds the duration that 
is foreseen in the national legislation of the executing member state. It is 
important though that this situation is further elaborated on, for not every 
exceeding duration will automatically create an added value for mutual 
recognition. 
In the current mutual recognition instruments, provisions are included on 
how to deal with situations in which the duration imposed in the issuing 
member state exceeds the duration known in the executing member state. Art. 9 
FD Alternatives clarifies that if the nature or duration of the relevant probation 
measure or alternative sanction, or the duration of the probation period, are incompatible 
with the law of the executing State, the competent authority of that State may adapt 





them in line with the nature or duration of the probation measures and alternative 
sanctions, or duration of the probation period, which apply, under the law of the 
executing State, to equivalent offences. This means that the member states have the 
discretion to decide on the faith of the execution of in casu being excluded from 
participation in a public procurement procedure for a duration that exceeds the 
duration foreseen in the national legislation of the executing member state. 
Where the member states have decided that the duration will be limited to the 
duration foresee in the national legislation, again mutual recognition of the 
foreign conviction will have no added value whatsoever to attaching equivalent 
effects to the foreign conviction, for the net effect will be the same: an exclusion 
corresponding to the national legislation of the executing member state. Where 
member states have decided to execute a foreign decision even where the 
duration exceeds the maximum duration foreseen in their national legislation, 
mutual recognition may have an added value when compared to attaching 
equivalent effects to foreign convictions, provided that one more condition is 
satisfied.460 
Even where the duration of the foreign exclusion exceeds the duration 
foreseen in the national legislation of the executing member state, and that 
member state has provided in its national legislation to be willing to execute 
foreign convictions regardless of exceeding durations, still it is not guaranteed 
that mutual recognition will be able to have an added value compared to 
attaching equivalent effects to that foreign conviction. After all, as soon as the 
decision is taken to execute the foreign conviction and exclude the person 
involved from participating in a public procurement procedure, it must be 
assessed whether or not proceeding with the execution would not jeopardize the 
equal treatment principle that is fundamental to the proper functioning of the 
public procurement procedure. This means that a contracting authority can only 
take account of the exceeding duration to the extent that such would not result 
in an unequal treatment of the candidate involved. To that end, it must be 
assessed whether or not the duration does not exceed the largest common 
denominator of exclusion durations as provided for in the relevant jurisdictions 
of the competitors in the public procurement procedure. Only when the duration 
– though exceeding the duration foreseen nationally in the legislation of the 
member state in which the public procurement procedure takes place – does not 
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exceed the duration foreseen in the jurisdictions of the other (relevant) member 
states, can mutual recognition actually take place. Only in this very specific 
situation, mutual recognition will have an added value compared to the 
technique of attaching equivalent effects to foreign convictions.  
4.2 National exclusion not foreseen 
The second situation that will be discussed relates to a mutual recognition 
request received in relation to an offence that would nationally not give rise to 
an exclusion from participation in a public procurement procedure. There are 
two reasons why the offence would not give rise to an exclusion in a national 
situation: either the offence is not punishable according to the national law of the 
executing member state and therefore is not sanctioned with an exclusion from 
participation in a public procurement procedure; or the offence – though 
criminalized under the national law of the executing member state – is not 
punished with an exclusion but with a different sanction under national law. 
These two possibilities will be dealt with consecutively. 
First, the situation may occur in which a mutual recognition request relates to 
a conviction for which the underlying behaviour is not criminalized under the 
national law of the executing member state. A such situation will give rise to a 
double criminality concern. Whether or not the mutual recognition request will 
be executed is dependent on the specificities of the underlying behaviour, and 
more specifically dependent on either or not abandoning the double criminality 
requirement for that offence type.  
Firstly, the abandonment of the double criminality requirement for a set of 32 
listed offences is one of the most controversial features of the mutual recognition 
instruments.461 Member states have agreed to draw up a list of offences for which 
the differences in criminalization are deemed considerable enough to hinder 
cooperation and execution of foreign judgments. The fact that national exclusion 
is not foreseen because the underlying behaviour is not criminalized in the 
national legislation is completely irrelevant in case the behaviour underlying the 
conviction is included amongst those 32 offence labels. This means that mutual 
recognition might have an added value when compared to attaching equivalent 
effects to foreign convictions to the extent that a double criminality problem 
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occurs in relation to a listed offence, and again provided that the execution of the 
mutual recognition request will not result in an unequal treatment of the 
candidate involved when compared to the other competitors in the procurement 
procedure. Equal treatment will prevent execution of the foreign conviction in 
the event the underlying behaviour is not equally criminalized in the (relevant) 
jurisdictions of the competitors.  
Secondly, for the offences not included in the 32 offence list, it is left to the 
member states to decide whether or not it is deemed appropriate to limit 
execution of foreign convictions to situations where double criminality is met. In 
the event member states have limit execution to situations where double 
criminality is met, mutual recognition will not have any value when compared 
to the technique of attaching equivalent effects to foreign decisions. In the event 
member states have agreed to execute foreign decisions, even beyond the double 
criminality requirement, the added value of mutual recognition will be limited 
to those situations in which execution will not jeopardize equal treatment 
between candidates. Here too, the added value of mutual recognition is limited 
to a very specific situation. 
Second, the situation in which the exclusion is not foreseen in the national 
law of the executing member state can also be caused by the simple fact that 
exclusion from participation in a public procurement procedure is not foreseen 
as a sanction for the specific offence involved. Similar to what was argued above, 
this situation requires that the national adaptation provisions are looked into. 
Art. 9 FD Alternatives allows member states to adapt the foreign sanction if 
either the nature or duration of the sanction is incompatible with their national 
law. Though no common understanding (yet) exists on the interpretation of the 
incompatibility concern462 it can be argued that the imposed exclusion from 
participation in a public procurement procedure is incompatible with the law of 
the executing member state, for such sanction is not foreseen in relation to the 
offence involved. If member states have legislated that the sanction will be 
adapted and the exclusion disregarded, the introduction of mutual recognition 
will have no added value when compared to the technique of attaching 
equivalent effect to foreign convictions. Only where member states accept to 
execute a sanction in spite of it not being foreseen for the offence involved in the 
national legislation and under the condition that execution thereof would not 
give rise to an unequal treatment of the person involved when compared to the 
other competitors, mutual recognition can have an added value. 
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Considering the limited added value of mutual recognition when compared 
to attaching equivalent effect to foreign convictions as complemented by the 
introduction of approximated disqualifications for approximated offences, the 
priorities in terms of future policy making should be focussed on those two 
latter techniques. 
 
5 Summary of recommendations in the area of 
public procurement 
This case study looked into the functioning of disqualifications in a public 
procurement context and more specifically into the scope ratione materiae of the 
exclusion from participation in a procurement procedure, against the 
background of the disqualification triad. 
First, approximated disqualifications for approximated offences can already 
be found in the context of public procurement. Art. 45 Procurement Directive 
elaborates on the mandatory conviction-related exclusion grounds. Three main 
recommendations are made. Firstly, considering the rapidly developing 
approximation acquis, it is advised to look for an approach that delineates the 
scope of the mandatory exclusion grounds in a way that is transparent and can 
stand the test of time. The current approach cannot suffice. It is suggested to use 
the EU level offence classification system as a basis to identify the (categories of) 
offences for which conviction should result in a mandatory exclusion. Secondly, 
to increase cross-instrument consistency, it is advised to include the existence of 
mandatory exclusion grounds in instruments that approximate the constituent 
elements of offences and their sanctions. Thirdly, the current level of detail in the 
criminal records information cannot support a distinction between a conviction 
that relates to identified approximated behaviour that should lead to exclusion 
and a conviction that relates to other behaviour. An increase in the level of detail 
in the available criminal records information is necessary to ensure the proper 
functioning of the mandatory exclusion grounds. 
Second, attaching to foreign convictions effects that are equivalent to the 
effects national convictions would have, should be further developed. The scope 
for taking account of foreign convictions can either or not be modelled on the 
national criminal code, but foremost it is important that due account is taken of 
the implications of the need to ensure equal treatment between all competing 
candidates. To that end, convictions can only be taken into account to the extent 
they relate to the largest common denominator identified, either EU-wide or ad 
hoc based on the specific profiles of the competing candidates. The only 
exception thereto consists of the public order exception, which can be motivated 





with respect to a conviction for which the underlying behaviour is criminalised 
in the national criminal law of the contracting authority. The indirect 
discrimination complexity makes motivation far more difficult in relation to a 
conviction for which the underlying behaviour is not criminalised under the 
national criminal law of the contracting authority. Here too, sufficiently detailed 
criminal records information is crucial to adhere to the equal treatment principle 
and remains the main concern for the practical implementation thereof. 
Third, though mutual recognition is an important element in the 
disqualification triad that seeks to extend the effect of disqualifications as 
sanction measures in the EU, the added value thereof specifically in a public 
procurement context when compared to the effect of attaching equivalent effects 
to foreign convictions is fairly limited. This can be explained referring to the 
limited number of member states that actually impose exclusion from 
participation in a public procurement procedure as a sanction and can have an 
interest in seeking cross-border execution thereof. More importantly, the 
cooperation principles governing the current set of mutual recognition 
instruments have an important limiting impact. Mutual recognition can only 
have an added value in two very specific situations.  
Firstly, mutual recognition can have an excluding effect beyond the 
technique of attaching equivalent effect in the situation:  
- where the duration of the exclusion imposed in the sentencing state exceeds 
the maximum duration foreseen in the executing member state; ánd  
- the executing member state has not introduced a mandatory adaptation of 
the duration in case of inconsistency with the national law; ánd  
- execution will not jeopardise the equal treatment of the person involved with 
the competing candidates for the duration still falls within the largest 
common denominator identified amongst the relevant EU jurisdictions, 
provided that no public order exception can be motivated. 
Secondly, mutual recognition can have an excluding effect beyond the 
technique of attaching equivalent effect in the situation: 
- where the underlying behaviour is not criminalised in the executing member 
state; ánd  
- execution is not (made) dependent on a double criminality requirement; ánd  
- execution will not jeopardise the equal treatment of the person involved with 
the competing candidates for the criminalisation still falls within the largest 
common denominator identified amongst the relevant EU jurisdictions, 







Considering the limited added value of mutual recognition when compared 
to attaching equivalent effect to foreign convictions as complemented by the 
introduction of approximated disqualifications for approximated offences, the 
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Net zoals het eigenlijke doctoraat start deze samenvatting met een 
probleemstelling, de bijhorende onderzoeksvragen en de aanpak om die te 
beantwoorden gevolgd een korte toelichting bij de vorm van het doctoraat en de 
hoofdlijnen van de argumentatie over de nood en haalbaarheid van een EU 
misdrijfbeleid. 
 
Probleemstelling, onderzoeksvragen en aanpak 
Vertrekkend vanuit de vaststelling dat elke EU lidstaat een eigen strafrecht 
heeft als gevolg waarvan (1) het gedrag dat als misdrijf gekwalificeerd wordt in 
de ene lidstaat, niet noodzakelijk strafbaar gesteld is in een andere lidstaat, (2) 
zelfs wanneer de strafbaarstellingen overeenkomen er nog verschillen kunnen 
bestaan met betrekking tot de toepasselijke straf(maat) en (3) er ook meer 
algemeen grote verschillen zijn in de positie die misdrijven in het totale 
rechtssysteem innemen, rijzen de volgende onderzoeksvragen: “In welke mate 
ondervindt het EU beleid moeilijkheden door die misdrijfgerelateerde 
verschillen?” en “In welke mate het haalbaar is om die moeilijkheden het hoofd 
te bieden om een allesomvattende, consistente en gebalanceerde manier?”. 
Om op die vragen te antwoorden is het in de eerste plaats belangrijk om na te 
gaan in welke beleidsdomeinen misdrijven een rol spelen en dus welke 
beleidsdomeinen mogelijk hinder ondervinden van de misdrijfgerelateerde 
verschillen. Analyse heeft uitgewezen dat een brede waaier aan 
beleidsdomeinen in meer of mindere mate misdrijfafhankelijk is. 
In eerste instantie kan daarbij gedacht worden aan de criminaliteitsstatistiek 
die erg belangrijk geacht wordt ter ondersteuning, verantwoording en evaluatie 
van strafrechtelijk beleid. Lidstaten kijken daarbij niet langer enkel naar hun 
eigen criminaliteitsstatistieken, maar zijn steeds meer geïnteresseerd om aan 
grensoverschrijdende vergelijking te doen. Bovendien heeft ook de EU in haar 
hoedanigheid van beleidsmaker een zekere interesse in criminaliteitsstatistieken 
ter ondersteuning, verantwoording en evaluatie van haar eigen strafrechtelijke 
beleid. De haalbaarheid van grensoverschrijdende vergelijking en samenvoeging 
van data wordt echter gehypothekeerd door de verschillen in de 
strafbaarstelling van het gedrag dat eraan ten grondslag ligt. In deze context 
werden de onderzoeksvragen geherformuleerd als: “In welke mate is er nood 
aan EU criminaliteitsstatistieken voor de ontwikkeling van EU beleid?” en “In 
welke mate zijn vergelijkbare criminaliteitsstatistieken haalbaar?” Om die 
vragen te beantwoorden werd allereerst de kennis over gelijklopende 
strafbaarstellingen in kaart gebracht; zulks geeft immers aan waar de grens van 





vergelijkbare criminaliteitsstatistiek zich bevindt. Nadien werd in de context van 
een EU onderzoek naar criminaliteitsstatistieken nagegaan in welke mate de 
lidstaten in staat zijn om data aan te leveren enkel met betrekking tot de 
gelijklopende delen van de strafbaarstellingen. Ter afronding van dit deel werd 
op basis van een discours analyse bepaald welke de EU prioritaire misdrijven 
zijn en voor welke misdrijven criminaliteitsstatistiek onontbeerlijk is om een 
goed beleid te kunnen garanderen. De haalbaarheid van vergelijkbare 
criminaliteitsstatistieken werd geanalyseerd door de resultaten van de discours 
analyse in verband te brengen met de resultaten van de bevraging in de 
lidstaten.  
In tweede instantie kan daarbij gedacht worden aan de dubbele 
strafbaarheidsvoorwaarde die te vinden is in heel wat internationale 
samenwerkingsinstrumenten. Lidstaten hebben bepaalde vormen van 
samenwerking afhankelijk gesteld van de voorwaarde dat het gedrag dat aan 
een dossier ten grondslag ligt ook strafbaar is in de aangezochte of uitvoerende 
lidstaat. In deze context werden de onderzoeksvragen geherformuleerd als: “In 
welke mate is internationale samenwerking afhankelijk van de dubbele 
strafbaarheidsvoorwaarde?” en “In welke mate is het haalbaar om 
onaanvaardbare en onnuttige dubbele strafbaarheidsverificaties uit te sluiten?”. 
Deze vraag kwam aan bod in verschillende onderzoeken. Als eerste werd tijdens 
een EU onderzoek naar bewijsgaring en bewijstoelaatbaarheid nagegaan welke 
positie dubbele strafbaarheid daarin heeft. Bovendien werd ook de haalbaarheid 
getest om in het verlengde van het huidige acquis, de dubbele 
strafbaarheidsverificatie niet langer toe te laten wanneer een EU instrument een 
overeenkomstige criminaliseringsverplichting inhoudt. Nadien kwam de positie 
van dubbele strafbaarheid meer in algemene zin aan bod in het EU onderzoek 
naar de toekomst van internationale samenwerking in strafzaken. Ook daarin 
werd de positie van dubbele strafbaarheid nagegaan alsook de haalbaarheid van 
toekomstige mogelijke beleidslijnen getoetst.  
In derde instantie kan daarbij gedacht worden aan de grensoverschrijdende 
verzameling en toelaatbaarheid van bewijsmateriaal. Samenwerking kan ook 
hinder ondervinden zelfs wanneer het gedrag dat aan een dossier ten grondslag 
ligt strafbaar gesteld is in beide lidstaten. Zo kunnen bijvoorbeeld de verschillen 
in de beperking van de inzetbaarheid van sommige onderzoeksmaatregelen op 
basis van het betrokken misdrijf, vlotte samenwerking in de weg staan. In deze 
context werden de onderzoeksvragen geherformuleerd als: “In welke mate 
bemoeilijken de misdrijfgerelateerde verschillen grensoverschrijdende 
verzameling en toelaatbaarheid van bewijsmateriaal?” en “In welke mate is het 
haalbaar om de moeilijkheden op een allesomvattende, consistente en 
gebalanceerde manier het hoofd bieden?”. Om die vragen te beantwoorden 






bewijstoelaatbaarheid ook de aandacht gevestigd op de misdrijfgerelateerde 
beperkingen op het gebruik van onderzoeksmaatregelen alsook de 
beleidsbeslissing om de eraan gelinkte weigeringsgronden niet langer toe te 
staan voor die misdrijven opgenomen in de 32 lijst wanneer een huiszoeking of 
inbeslagname gevraagd wordt. In het verlengde daarvan werd de haalbaarheid 
getoetst om die inperking van de weigeringsgronden door te trekken naar 
andere onderzoeksmaatregelen. 
In vierde instantie kan daarbij gedacht worden aan de mandaten van EU 
actoren als Eurojust en Europol. Het vage en ongedefinieerde karakter van de 
misdrijflabels die gebruikt worden ter afbakening van hun mandaat is al vaak 
het voorwerp van discussie geweest. Niet alleen wordt aangegeven dat het de 
uitoefening van het bestaande takenpakket bemoeilijkt, het bemoeilijkt ook het 
bereiken van een politiek akkoord met betrekking tot de uitbreiding van het 
takenpakket. In deze context werden de onderzoeksvragen geherformuleerd als: 
“In welke mate bemoeilijken misdrijfgerelateerde verschillen de afbakening van 
de mandaten en het daaraan gekoppelde takenpakket?” en “In welke mate is het 
haalbaar om de mandaten af te bakenen op een allesomvattende, consistente en 
gebalanceerde manier?”. Om op die vraag te beantwoorden werd in het kader 
van het bovenvermelde EU onderzoek naar de toekomst van internationale 
samenwerking in strafzaken nagegaan in welke mate er een echte nood aan 
afbakening van de mandaten bestaat en in welke mate de kennis over 
gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen een rol kan spelen om moeilijkheden het hoofd 
te bieden.  
In vijfde instantie kan daarbij gedacht worden aan de grensoverschrijdende 
uitvoering van straffen. Alvorens de uitvoering van een in een andere lidstaat 
opgelegde straf aan te vatten, is het lidstaten toegelaten om de equivalentie 
tussen de opgelegde straf en de voorziene nationale straf na te gaan. Desgewenst 
kan de uitvoerende lidstaat de duur en/of de aard van de straf aanpassen. Voor 
de correcte toepassing van deze aanpassingsmogelijkheid zoals voorzien in het 
EU instrumentarium is het belangrijk voldoende informatie te hebben over het 
gedrag dat aan de veroordeling ten grondslag ligt. In deze context werden de 
onderzoeksvragen geherformuleerd als: “In welke mate bemoeilijken de 
misdrijfgerelateerde verschillen het identificeren van de equivalente nationale 
straf?” en “In welke mate is het haalbaar om de identificatie van de equivalente 
straf te ondersteunen?”. Om die vraag te beantwoorden werd er in het kader van 
het EU onderzoek over detentie gewezen op de moeilijkheden en op de 
haalbaarheid om die moeilijkheden het hoofd te bieden door gebruik te maken 
van de kennis over gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen. De redenering werd ook 
hernomen in het bovengenoemde EU onderzoek over de toekomst van de 
internationale samenwerking in strafzaken.  





In zesde instantie ten slotte kan daarbij ook gedacht worden aan de regels die 
het effect van een eerdere veroordeling bepalen. Het hebben van een eerdere 
veroordeling is niet alleen relevant tijdens een strafprocedure, maar kan ook 
relevant zijn voor de toepassing van de bepalingen uit andere takken van het 
recht. De vereiste een uittreksel uit het strafregister voor te leggen zoals voorzien 
in het arbeidsrecht of het openbare aanbestedingsrecht kunnen daarbij als 
voorbeeld dienen. In die context werden de onderzoeksvragen geherformuleerd 
als: “In welke mate wordt het in acht nemen van eerdere veroordelingen 
bemoeilijkt door de misdrijfgerelateerde verschillen?” en “In welke mate is het 
haalbaar om het afbakenen van het in acht nemen van eerdere veroordelingen te 
ondersteunen?”. Om op die vragen te antwoorden werden twee casestudies 
uitgewerkt. Als eerste werden de nationale bepalingen inzake de staat van 
herhaling in de strafprocedure van de 27 lidstaten geanalyseerd om uit te maken 
in welke mate de toepassing ervan beperkt is tot veroordelingen waarvan het 
gedrag dat eraan ten grondslag ligt eveneens strafbaar gesteld is in de 
vervolgende lidstaat. Vervolgens werd de haalbaarheid van een verfijning van 
het systeem dat de uitwisseling van strafregisterinformatie ondersteunt, 
geanalyseerd. Als tweede werden de nationale bepalingen inzake 
overheidsaanbestedingen van de 27 lidstaten geanalyseerd om ook daar uit te 
maken in welke mate de toepassing ervan beperkt is (zou moeten zijn) tot 
veroordelingen waarvan het gedrag dat eraan ten grondslag ligt eveneens 
strafbaar is in de aanbestedende lidstaat. Specifiek aan deze casus werd ook het 
gevolg van het principe van de gelijke behandeling van naderbij bekeken om uit 
te maken in welke mate dat de in achtneming van eerdere veroordelingen 
bemoeilijkt. In het kader van een openbare aanbestedingsprocedure is de nood 
om de moeilijkheden gekoppeld aan de misdrijfgerelateerde verschillen het 
hoofd te bieden daarom mogelijk veel groter dan in de andere casestudie. Ook 
hier werd de haalbaarheid van een verfijning van het systeem dat de 
uitwisseling van strafregisterinformatie ondersteunt, geanalyseerd in het kader 
van een recent EU onderzoek naar misdrijfgerelateerde disqualificaties.  
 
Doctoraat op basis van publicaties 
Deze onderzoeksvragen werden beantwoord in een zogeheten “doctoraat op 
basis van publicaties”. Dit doctoraat omvat twee tijdschrift artikels en drie 
hoofdstukken in boeken: 
− De Bondt, W. (onder review). Evidence based EU criminal policy making: in 
search of valid data. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. 
− De Bondt, W. (2012). Double criminality in international cooperation in 






Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters. Moving beyond 
actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality (pp. 86-159). Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
− De Bondt, W., & Vermeulen, G. (2012). EULOCS in support of international 
cooperation in criminal matters. In G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, & C. 
Ryckman (Eds.), Rethinking international cooperation in criminal matters. 
Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality. Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland: Maklu. 
− De Bondt, W. (onder review). Cross-border recidivism in the EU: Fact or 
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Nood aan en haalbaarheid van een EU misdrijfbeleid 
Het doctoraatsonderzoek bracht aan het licht (1) dat misdrijfgerelateerde 
verschillen de toepassing van sommige principes en bepalingen bemoeilijkt, 
daar waar het geen beletsel vormt voor de toepassing van andere principes en 
bepalingen, (2) dat de huidige aanpak allerminst allesomvattend, consistent en 
gebalanceerd is en (3) dat het mogelijk is om de moeilijkheden het hoofd te 
bieden op voorwaarde dat de kennis over de gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen 
gebruikt wordt als basis voor de ontwikkeling van een EU misdrijfbeleid. Het 
heeft aangetoond dat een dergelijk EU misdrijfbeleid nodig en bovendien 
haalbaar is en toelaat om op een allesomvattende, consistente en gebalanceerde 
manier het hoofd te bieden aan de moeilijkheden die geïdentificeerd werden.  
Op hoofdlijnen kan de argumentatie als volgt worden weergegeven: 
− Gestructureerd weergeven van het gehele acquis van gelijklopende 
strafbaarstellingen in een EU misdrijfclassificatiesysteem (EULOCS). Het 
feit dat strafrecht in essentie nationaal is en er grote verschillen zijn, betekent 
niet dat er geen gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen geïdentificeerd kunnen 
worden. Het doctoraatsonderzoek heeft in dat verband benadrukt dat er 
meer is aan gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen dat datgene wat we kennen 
door de klassieke harmonisatie-instrumenten. Ook naast de kaderbesluiten 
en de nieuwe richtlijnen, zijn er nog tal van andere instrumenten die in het 
verleden gebruikt zijn om gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen te bekomen. 
Daarbij moet niet alleen naar de EU gekeken worden, maar zijn ook 
instrumenten van de Raad van Europe en de Verenigde





Omdat het acquis van gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen een cruciale rol heeft 
in de uitwerking van een EU misdrijfbeleid is het aangewezen dat acquis 
weer te geven in een toegankelijk EU misdrijfclassificatiesysteem (EULOCS). 
Tot slot mag niet uit het oog verloren worden dat deze harmonisatie-
instrumenten tot doel hebben om waar nodig te vermijden dat bepaalde 
fenomenen door de mazen van het net glippen, wat betekent dat ze zich 
geenszins inlaten met de strafbaarstellingen waarvoor het gelijklopende 
karakter reeds gegarandeerd is door de historische ontwikkeling ervan. Het 
kan overwogen worden om in EULOCS ook aan te geven voor welke niet-
geharmoniseerde misdrijven de gelijklopende strafbaarstelling toch een feit 
is. 
− Verzekeren van vergelijkbare criminaliteitsstatistieken. Het doctoraats-
onderzoek heeft gewezen op de moeilijkheden die misdrijfgerelateerde 
verschillen met zich brengen wanneer gepoogd wordt om 
criminaliteitsstatistieken van verschillende lidstaten met elkaar te 
vergelijken. Daarnaast heeft het doctoraatsonderzoek ook gewezen op de 
nood om de beschikbaarheid van EU brede vergelijkbare criminaliteits-
statistieken te verzekeren voor een aantal prioritaire criminaliteitsfenomenen. 
Het is de verantwoordelijkheid van de EU om de uitwerking van een 
strafrechtelijke beleid voor die prioritaire criminaliteitsfenomenen aan te 
vullen met een beleid dat de beschikbaarheid van de nodige vergelijkbare 
criminaliteitsstatistieken garandeert. Interventie op korte termijn is 
aangewezen. Daarbij kan het acquis aan gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen 
zoals weergegeven in EULOCS een leidraad vormen.  
− Vermijden van onaanvaardbare of onnuttige dubbele strafbaarheids-
toetsen. Het doctoraatsonderzoek heeft gewezen op de vrijheid van de 
lidstaten om bepaalde vormen van samenwerking afhankelijk te maken van 
de voorwaarde dat het gedrag dat aan een dossier ten grondslag ligt ook 
strafbaar gesteld is in de aangezochte of uitvoerende lidstaat. Om de 
consistentie in het EU beleid te garanderen, is het evenwel vereist dat die 
vrijheid de engagementen in het kader van het harmonisatiebeleid niet 
ondermijnen. Het is onaanvaardbaar om een dubbele strafbaarheids-
probleem op te werpen in relatie tot een misdrijf waarvan de strafbaarheid 
het voorwerp uitmaakt van een harmonisatieverplichting. Een 
herformulering van de dubbele strafbaarheidsbepalingen dringt zich op. 
Bovendien is het onnuttig om een dubbele strafbaarheidstoets uit te voeren 
met betrekking tot misdrijven waarvan de dubbele strafbaarheid gekend is. 
Vandaar dat gewezen werd op de meerwaarde die het acquis aan 
gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen zoals weergegeven in EULOCS kan hebben 






waarvan de dubbele strafbaarheid van het gedrag dat eraan ten grondslag 
ligt, niet gekend is. 
− Ondersteunen van grensoverschrijdende bewijsgaring en bewijstoelaat-
baarheid. Het doctoraat heeft gewezen op de moeilijkheden die het gevolg 
zijn van de misdrijfgerelateerde verschillen in de strafwetboeken van de 
verschillende lidstaten en op de beleidskeuze die gemaakt werd in het kader 
van het Europees bewijsverkrijgingsbevel om die verschillen niet langer het 
voorwerp te laten uitmaken van mogelijke weigeringsgronden. In het licht 
daarvan werd geargumenteerd dat een allesomvattend, consistent en 
gebalanceerd beleid dat de nood aangeeft om bepaalde misdrijven op een 
gemeenschappelijke manier aan te pakken, zich niet beperkt tot het 
harmoniseren van het betrokken misdrijf maar er ook naar streeft om de 
gerelateerde bewijsproblematiek op een manier te reguleren die 
grensoverschrijdende bewijsgaring en bewijstoelaatbaarheid garandeert. In 
het licht van de beleidskeuzes gemaakt in het kader van het Europees 
bewijsverkrijgingsbevel werd gewezen op de meerwaarde die het acquis aan 
gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen zoals weergegeven in EULOCS kan hebben. 
− Verduidelijking van de mandaatsgebieden van de EU actoren. Het 
doctoraat heeft erop gewezen dat er geen algehele nood is om de 
mandaatsgebieden van de EU actoren strikt af te bakenen op basis van het 
acquis aan gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen. Het verdient de voorkeur om 
voor een aantal van de taken het ruime karakter te bewaren om lidstaten de 
mogelijkheid te laten een beroep te doen op de EU actoren voor bepaalde 
misdrijfcategorieën, ongeacht de EU brede strafbaarstelling van het 
specifieke onderliggende gedrag. Daarnaast is het voor andere bestaande 
taken en mogelijke toekomstige taken wel belangrijk om een duidelijke 
afbakening te voorzien. De problematische informatie-uitwisseling zoals die 
vandaag bestaat werd daarbij als voorbeeld uitgewerkt, evenals de 
moeilijkheden in het debat om de actoren nieuwe verderstrekkende 
zogenoemde sterke bevoegdheden toe te kennen.  Ook hier werd gewezen op 
de logica om het acquis aan gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen zoals 
weergegeven in EULOCS te gebruiken als basis voor de verduidelijking van 
de mandaatsgebieden. 
− Ondersteunen van equivalentietoetsen van buitenlandse straffen. Het 
doctoraatsonderzoek heeft gewezen op de moeilijkheden die misdrijf-
gerelateerde verschillen meebrengen alvorens de uitvoering van een in het 
buitenland opgelegde straf aangevat kan worden. Aangezien lidstaten de 
mogelijkheid hebben om de equivalentie tussen de in het buitenland 
opgelegde straf en de hypothetisch in het eigen land opgelegde straf te 
vergelijken, is het belangrijk om voldoende informatie mee te geven over het 
gedrag dat aan de veroordelingen ten grondslag ligt. Net daar schiet het EU 





beleid te kort. Het detail dat nu over het gedrag meegegeven wordt is 
onvoldoende gedetailleerd om een dergelijke equivalentietest uit te voeren. 
Ook hier werd gewezen op de logica om het acquis aan gelijklopende 
strafbaarstellingen zoals weergegeven in EULOCS te gebruiken als basis voor 
het opnemen van meer detail om zo de nodige equivalentietoetsen te 
ondersteunen. 
− Afbakenen van het effect van eerdere veroordelingen. Het doctoraats-
onderzoek heeft gewezen op de grote diversiteit aan bepalingen waarvan de 
toepassing afhankelijk is van het bestaan van en het type eerdere 
veroordeling, zowel binnen het strafrecht als binnen andere takken van het 
recht. Ook hier is voldoende informatie over het gedrag dat aan de 
veroordeling ten grondslag ligt, cruciaal voor de correcte toepassing ervan. 
Op basis van twee casestudies werd aangetoond dat de moeilijkheden en de 
oplossingen sectorspecifiek zijn en kunnen verschillen voor elk van de 
bepalingen die gebruik maken van het bestaan van en het type eerdere 
veroordeling. Ook hier werd gewezen op de logica en nood om het acquis 
aan gelijklopende strafbaarstellingen zoals weergegeven in EULOCS te 
gebruiken als basis voor het opnemen van meer detail om zo de correcte 
afbakening van het effect van eerdere veroordelingen mogelijk te maken.  
 
